Judgment S.B. Sinha & S.K. Singh, JJ. All these writ applications involving common questions of law and fact were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. Some of these cases were directed to be listed after disposal of C.W.J.C. No. 6904 of 1993 and other analogous cases which were heard by a Division Bench. It was stated at the Bar that the Judgment in the aforementioned cases was reserved in July, 1993, but the said judgment has not beep delivered, as one of the Hon'ble Judges, who had heard the matters, has since been transferred. Perhaps in this situation, the office has listed these cases for ad mission. On 3.5.1994, all the cases in case of which judgment had been reserved were also listed. 3. Facts leading to these cases are short and simple. One Dr. A.A. Mullick, Deputy Director, Tuberculosis allegedly made appointments of the petitioners purported to be on the basis of the directive issued by the State of Bihar to regularise their services who were allegedly appointed on daily wages. The said appointments had been made:- (i) by way of adjustment of daily waged workers, (ii) by way of transfer to the office of Civil Surgeons-cum-Chief Medical Officers, who were to appoint them upon verifying their credentials and qualifications; (iii) appointments made after publication of advertisement and (iv) appointments on compassionate grounds. 4. According to the petitioners by reason of various letters issued by the State of Bihar from time to time, and purported to be in terms of 20 point programme as also the directive issued by the State of Bihar 125 posts per year of Tuberculosis Assistants and 125 posts per year of Tuberculosis Attendants were created for a period of five years, i.e., 625 for Tuberculosis Assistants and 625 for Tuberculosis Attendants. The said letters are said to be of dates 24.7.1984 and 17.10.1984 whereby regularisation of services were directed. It is stated that 125 posts were also allegedly created for primary health centres in terms of letter dated 12.2.1987. 5. In almost all these cases the offer of appointment was issued on ad hoc basis and till further orders. The appointments were purely temporary in nature and were liable to be terminated without any previous notice. It is stated that 125 posts were also allegedly created for primary health centres in terms of letter dated 12.2.1987. 5. In almost all these cases the offer of appointment was issued on ad hoc basis and till further orders. The appointments were purely temporary in nature and were liable to be terminated without any previous notice. The concerned employees were directed to join their posts in the office of the Civil Surgeons-cum-Chief Medical Officers in different Districts and pursuant to the said orders the respective Civil Surgeons-cum-Chief Medical Officers had allegedly adjusted them against some posts. However, salary was not paid to the writ petitioners and various writ applications were filed in this Court and by different orders either by concession or otherwise salary was directed to be paid in some of the cases. However, in none of the said matters, the legality or validity of such appointments was considered. However, in C.W.J.C. No. 857/92 and various other writ applications as also C.W.J.C. No. 565/90, 1277/92 and various other analogous cases which are contained in Annexures B, C and D to the counter affidavit and in C.W.J.C. No. 532/93 a different Division Bench of this Court directed that a thorough enquiry be made in relation to such appointments as it was contended that the said appointments were illegal. 6. Learned counsel for the State stated that a comprehensive counter affidavit was filed in C.W.J.C. No. 532/93 (Sarbjit Mishra and others) which case was also heard by the other Bench and he has supplied to us two plain copies of the said counter affidavit which have been kept on the records and with the consent of the parties is being treated to be the counter affidavit filed in these cases also. It is also stated that copies of the said counter affidavits• have also been served on the learned counsel of the petitioners. 7. In C.W.J.C. No. 857 of 1992 and other analogous cases (Annexure B) this Court upon noticing the statements of the learned counsel for the State that contrivances had been adopted by Dr. It is also stated that copies of the said counter affidavits• have also been served on the learned counsel of the petitioners. 7. In C.W.J.C. No. 857 of 1992 and other analogous cases (Annexure B) this Court upon noticing the statements of the learned counsel for the State that contrivances had been adopted by Dr. Mullick in making appointments by showing that some persons had worked for some period although no appointment was made and the same was made much in excess of the sanctioned strength, observed as follows:- "We do not see any reason as to why State should not proceed against such officers or such persons who have benefited themselves illegally. In this situation, we are disposing of all .the applications at this stage with a direction that the respondent no. 2 shall make an enquiry into the matter upon consideration of the individual cases of the concerned employees and shall pass an order for payment of salary for the period each employee has actually worked, subject to the condition that it is found that they fulfil the criteria for obtaining salary." 8. In C.W.J.C. No. 5658/90, Brij Narayan Singh Yadav and others vs. State of Bihar and others a Division Bench of this Court by an order dated 7.10.1991 refused to direct regularisation of services of the petitioners before it. Admittedly, pursuant to the observations made by this Court in various writ applications, a Committee was constituted. A general notice was issued to all such employees to file their show causes, if any and they were further directed to appear before the said Committee for personal hearing between 17.8.1992 and 29.9.1992. 9. Another advertisement was issued whereby and whereunder further opportunity of personal hearing was granted to the persons interested from 13.10.1992 to 22.10.1992. In terms of the recommendations of the Committee the impugned order dated 30.4.1993 was issued in terms whereof all appointments made by Dr. Mullick after 1.1.1980 having been found to be invalid and illegal were directed to be terminated. The legality and validity of aforementioned order dated 30.4.1993 has been questioned in these writ applications. 10. In support of the writ applications M/s Adhimanyu Sharma, Banwari Sharma, Binay Singh, Dinu Kumar, Rajiv Kumar Verma, Parimal Chandra Das, Mr. S.P. Mukherjee and others have made submissions whereas the State was represented by Mr. J.P. Karn. 11. The legality and validity of aforementioned order dated 30.4.1993 has been questioned in these writ applications. 10. In support of the writ applications M/s Adhimanyu Sharma, Banwari Sharma, Binay Singh, Dinu Kumar, Rajiv Kumar Verma, Parimal Chandra Das, Mr. S.P. Mukherjee and others have made submissions whereas the State was represented by Mr. J.P. Karn. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners raised the following contentions : (i) Prior to the issuance of the impugned order dated 30.4.1993, neither any notice nor any charge-sheet having been served upon the petitioners the same is illegal. (ii) The show cause notice issued to the petitioners does not contain the proposed punishment and thus the same is invalid. Reliance in this connection was placed upon Chintapalli Agency Taluk Arrack Sales Co-operative Society Ltd. and others vs. Secretary (Food and Agriculture) reported in (1977) 4 SCC 377 ; S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan and others reported in (1980) 4 SCC 379 ; Rama Shankar Srivastava vs. Divisional Supdt. Northern Railway, Allahabad, reported in A.I.R. 1956 Allahabad, 393. (iii) No reasonable opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners and thus the impugned order is vitiated by reason of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. In this connection reliance has been placed upon the decision reported in Indru Ramchand Bharvani and others vs. Union of India and others (1988) 4 SCC 1 , Chandradeo Mahto vs. The State of Bihar & ors. reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 111; 1979 SC 1803; 1991 (2) PLJR 511 ; 1992 BBCJ 578 ; 1986 SC 180; 1991 (2) PLJR 338 . (iv) Adjustments having been made by the appointing authority upon verifying the qualifications of the persons, the same cannot be said to be illegal and thus the impugned order is wholly unjustified. (v) The State has from time to time issued various letters and in fact in answer to the question raised on the floor of the Assembly clearly stated that the appointments made by Dr. Mullick are valid in law and thus the impugned order is hit by the Rule of Estoppel. (vi) The impugned order has been passed in terms of the report of the Vigilance Department which could not have been done and in any event the same could not have been passed without furnishing a copy thereof and without issuing of second show cause notice. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon Dr. (vi) The impugned order has been passed in terms of the report of the Vigilance Department which could not have been done and in any event the same could not have been passed without furnishing a copy thereof and without issuing of second show cause notice. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon Dr. Rabindra Nath Singh vs. The State of Bihar & ors. reported in 1983 PLJR 92 ; Union of India and others vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in AIR 1991 SC, 471 and Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderbad and others vs. B. Karunakar and others reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . (vii) Such appointments which have been made upon publication of notice on the Notice Board are also valid inasmuch as the same could only be questioned within a reasonable time only by the aggrieved persons who have not been appointed. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon Sardara Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and others reported in (1991) 4 SCC, 555. (viii) A single order could not have been passed terminating the services of all persons appointed after 1.1.1980 and such an order must be held to be vitiated on the ground of total non-application of mind on the part of the respondents. Reliance in this regard has been placed upon Excise Commissioner and another Vs. Chander Shekhar and others reported in (1983) SCC 224. (ix) There was no reasonable nexus nor rationale for directing termination of services of those employees who had been appointed after 1.1.1980. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon a decision reported in A.I.R. 1983 S.C., 130. (x) The impugned orders being not in conformity with Rule 55 of the Civil Service (Classification of Recruitment, Control and Appeal) Rules are vitiated in law inasmuch as the notices issued to the petitioners are absolutely vague inasmuch as, thereby only bio-data had been called for and no order of termination could be issued on the basis of such notice. Reliance has been placed in this regard upon Board of Technical Education, U.P. and others Vs. Dhanwantri Kumar and others reported in AIR 1991 SC, 271. (xi) The petitioners in terms of the policy decision of the State were entitled to be regularised in services and termination of services after such a long time is hit by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Dhanwantri Kumar and others reported in AIR 1991 SC, 271. (xi) The petitioners in terms of the policy decision of the State were entitled to be regularised in services and termination of services after such a long time is hit by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon State of Haryana and others etc. Vs. Piara Singh and others reported in AIR 1992 SC, 2130, D.K. Yadav vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. reported in (1993) 3 SCC, 259, Pramod Kumar and others vs. The State of Bihar & ors. reported in 1992 (1) PLJR, 438. 12. Mr. J.P Karn, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however, submitted that Dr. Mullick had made appointments in complete violation of Recruitment Rules applicable to Class III and Class IV employees as contained in the Circular letters issued by the State of Bihar bearing Nos. 16440 and 16441 dated 3.12.1980. It was submitted that keeping in view the nature of enquiry, it was not practicable to call for individual show cause from all the concerned persons. 13. The learned counsel submitted that from a perusal of the impugned order it would appear that out of five thousand persons appointed by Dr. Mullick, 1199 filed their show causes and 987 persons appeared for personal hearing. Learned counsel has pointed out that the Screening Committee found the following irregularities :- "(a) No employment notice was published in Newspaper. Notice if at all was published on Notice Board only. (b) Invariably whosoever approached was appointed, on daily wages. It is not known whether they were paid full wages. Some of them claimed to have received only part payment. None could produce appointment letter on daily wages. (c) It is not known from record of Dy. Director's office how much fund was made available to drawing and disbursing officer for payment of daily wage earners. (d) The appointment letter of all is alike. While showing them to be engaged on daily wage they were regularised/absorbed. (e) Such persons were appointed to the post of B.C.G. Technician who were not trained. At the time of appointment they were not eligible. (f) Reservation Rules were not followed. (g) Appointment on Class-IV posts were not made from district panel. (h) There was no Selection committee for selection of candidates. (e) Such persons were appointed to the post of B.C.G. Technician who were not trained. At the time of appointment they were not eligible. (f) Reservation Rules were not followed. (g) Appointment on Class-IV posts were not made from district panel. (h) There was no Selection committee for selection of candidates. (i) When appointment of five or more persons was done on any single day instead of combined list, separate list was prepared. (j) There was nothing to show that roster was cleared. (k) There was no proof of any recommendation of Selection Committee." It was also submitted that a novel method of appointment 'in relation to the employees was innovated by Dr. Mullick as the persons so appointed were directed to be absorbed or regularised against the regular posts without making any effort to find out as to whether the sanctioned posts are available or not. It was further found in the enquiry that against one post several persons had been working and several orders of transfer had been passed from one district to another with a view to avoid enquiry in the matter. It was also stated that no records are available to show how such recruitments were made and even the dispatch register is not available. The aforementioned facts were found out by the Screening Committee which submitted its report dated 24.12.1992 in terms' whereof the impugned order dated 30.4.1993 was passed. According to learned counsel, therefore, the principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with at all as the appointments were made in complete violation of Recruitment Rules as also the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It was further submitted that in any event, if only one conclusion on fact can be arrived at, the Court cannot issue any writ. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon Suresh Narayan Sharma & others vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1993 (1) PLJR, 16, S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan and ors. reported in AIR 1981 SC, 136 at page 145. 15. Learned counsel submitted that any appointment made without issuing any advertisement would be contrary to the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and thus such appointments must be held to be invalid. reported in AIR 1981 SC, 136 at page 145. 15. Learned counsel submitted that any appointment made without issuing any advertisement would be contrary to the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution of India and thus such appointments must be held to be invalid. Reference in this connection may be made upon Satish Kumar and others v. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1990 (1) PLJR, 219. Learned counsel submitted that such back-door appointment should not be encouraged nor the State is bound to recognise any person who has been appointed in violation of the Recruitment Rules. Reference in this connection may be made to Delhi Development Horticulture Employees Union vs. Delhi Administration and others reported in (1992) 4 SCC, 99 and Vijay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & ors. reported in 1993 (1) PLJR, 99. It was further submitted that appointment by way of regularisation is also not permissible in law when the appointments are nullities. Reference in this connection has been made to Sitaram Thakur vs. The State of Bihar & ors. reported in 1994 (1) PLJR, 68, Smt. Madhuri Kumari vs. The State of Bihar & ors. reported in 1993 (2) PLJR, 330, Jai Naresh Singh and others Vs. The State of Bihar & ors. reported in 1993 (2) PLJR, 713. 16. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, all citizens of India are entitled to be considered for appointment. The State and its officials are bound by the Equality Clause enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. It may or may not be true, as has been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that different orders had been issued from time to time authorising Dr. Mullik to regularise the services of some employees but he could have done so only in relation to his own department. It may be noted that Mr. Karn appearing on behalf of the State submitted that such orders in fact were issued by the State of Bihar prior to 1980 and some officers had only referred to the said Circulars and other letters issued from time to time subsequently although no orders in terms of Article 162 of the Constitution of India or otherwise has ever been issued by the State of Bihar directing regularisation of daily-rated worker. 17. 17. From a perusal of the impugned order dated 30.4.1993 it is evident that an Enquiry Committee was constituted in terms of the observation of this Court passed in several writ applications. The Committee was primarily concerned with the question as to whether the appointments had been made illegally or not. It was not concerned with nor was it possible for it to make an enquiry into the misconduct of any employee. The contentions of learned counsel for the petitioners therefore, that while issuing the said notice, no show cause notice containing the charges levelled against them had been issued and in any event, the procedures laid down under the provisions of Rule 55A of the Bihar Civil Services (Classification of Recruitment, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1935, were not followed, cannot be accepted. The said submission, in our opinion is misplaced. The provisions of the aforementioned Rules are required to be followed and regular departmental proceedings are required to be initiated only when the State and/or disciplinary authority is required to make an enquiry in relation to any misconduct committed by concerned employee and not otherwise: In that view of the matter, it was also not necessary to furnish a copy of the enquiry report or to issue a second show cause notice to the petitioners before issuing the impugned orders. For the reasons aforesaid it is not necessary, in our considered view, to consider the decisions cited at the Bar on those points. 18. It is now well known that the principles of natural justice cannot be put in a strait jacket formula. The applicability of the principles of natural justice may vary from case to case depending upon the facts and circumstances thereof as also the exigency of situations. 19. The findings arrived at by the Committee as contained in the impugned order dated 30.4.1993, leave no manner of doubt whatsoever that the appointments of the petitioners have been made in complete violation of the mandatory provisions of the Recruitment Rules as also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 20. 19. The findings arrived at by the Committee as contained in the impugned order dated 30.4.1993, leave no manner of doubt whatsoever that the appointments of the petitioners have been made in complete violation of the mandatory provisions of the Recruitment Rules as also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 20. In Sitaram Thakur vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1994 (1) PLJR, page 68, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows :- "in M.L. Gupta vs. Instrumentation Ltd. and ors., reported in 1992 (1) PLJR, 137 upon taking into consideration various decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court it has been held :- "Article 16 of the Constitution of India provides that all citizens of India are entitled to get equal opportunity for the purpose of obtaining employment in State Service. In order to fulfil such a condition, it is necessary to consider the case of all citizens who are eligible to be appointed. For that purpose, it is not only necessary to call for the names from the Employment Exchange, but the same in some cases also requires due advertisement of posts in newspapers by notifying the vacancies and the requisite qualifications therefore so that all eligible candidates may apply for their appointment in the said posts. It was further observed : "From the decisions of the Supreme Court as also of this Court, as referred to hereinbefore, it will thus be evident that any appointment which was made by a person having no authority to do so or the appointments which have been made without following the mandatory provisions of the Recruitment Rules, and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, such appointment should be held to be a nullity. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot direct regularisation of the services of the employees when the same would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution." The principle of natural justice as is well known is based upon two basic principles viz. Audi Alterum Partem and Nemo Debito Esses Judev in Propriea Causa. The principles of natural justice have been developed by the Apex Court from time to time adding new concepts therein. Audi Alterum Partem and Nemo Debito Esses Judev in Propriea Causa. The principles of natural justice have been developed by the Apex Court from time to time adding new concepts therein. In some decisions the Apex court has gone to the extent of holding that the principles of natural justice are embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In Union of India vs. Tulsi Ram Patel, reported in AIR 1985 S.C. 1416 , the Supreme Court of India held: "Principles of natural justice are not creation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India but merely they are constitutional guardian. The principles of natural justice can be traced their ancestry to ancient civilizations and long past history." "The Supreme Court in that case traced the history of the principles of natural justice in paragraphs 72 to 80 of the judgment and thereafter, discussed various principles involved therein in paragraphs 81 to 83 thereof. The Supreme Court held : "The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognised as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this court to the concept of equality which is the subject matter of that Article." Shortly put, the syallogism runs thus: Violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14. Article 14 however is not the sole repository of the principle of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body or man, not coming within the definition of "State" in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principle of natural justice requires that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially." In Tulsiram Patel's case (supra) the Supreme Court thereafter held that a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication may exclude application of the principle of natural justice. The Supreme Court therefore, concluded that the principle of natural justice riot only can be modified but also it can be excluded. The Supreme Court therefore, concluded that the principle of natural justice riot only can be modified but also it can be excluded. In Union of India vs. J.N. Sinha reported in AIR 1971 S.C. 40 it has been held:- "But if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principle of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred, and the effect of exercise of that power." Reference in this connection may also be made to R.S. Das versus Union of India reported in AIR 1987 S.C. 593 . Further, it is well known that there are certain exceptions to the principle of natural justice. In case of Maharastra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education vs. K.S. Gandhi and others reported in 1991 (2) SCC 716 it has been held : "From this perspective, the question is whether omission to record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The omnipresence and omniscience (sic) of the principles of natural justice acts as deterrence to arrive at arbitrary decision in flagrant infraction of fair play. But the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a strait-jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order-decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances." In National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences vs. K.K. Raman reported in 1992 S.C. 1806 it has been held that for selection or non-selection of a person in absence of a statutory requirement, the authority is under no legal obligation to record reason in support of its decision and even the principles of natural justice have no application in such a case. The Supreme Court in the case Dr. The Supreme Court in the case Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma and others versus the Chancellor, Nagpur University and others reported in 1990 (4) SCC 55 , held as follows:- "When, therefore, the services of the appellants are to be terminated in view of the change in the position of law and not on account of the demerits of misdemeanour of individual candidates, it is not necessary to hear the individuals before their services are terminated. The rule of audi alteram partem does not apply in such cases and, therefore, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. In the result, we are of the view that there is no merit in this case. The appeal therefore, stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case however, there will be no order as to costs." It is, therefore clear that in a case where the services of the employee is terminated owing to any misdemeanour on his part or his demerits, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. Recently, the Supreme Court in Baikuntha Nath Das and another vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Bariapada and another reported in 1992 (2) SCC 299 has held that before passing the order of compulsory retirement principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with nor even adverse remarks against the concerned employee are required to be communicated. The Supreme Court held :- "Before parting with the case, we must refer to an argument urged by Sri R.A. Garg. He stressed what is called, the new concept of Article 14 as adumbrated in Maneka Gandhi and submitted on that any and every arbitrary action is open to judicial scrutiny. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice audi alteram partem is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice audi alteram partem is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quasi-judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the Government, there is no room for importing the said facts of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement, is not punishment nor does it involve any stigma." In Bijay Bharti vs. State of Bihar reported in 1983 PLJR 530 a Full Bench of this Court held :- "Before considering the argument that the right of some of the petitioners to future appointment has been affected, it would be proper to consider as to what is the effect of saying that the appointment is irregular. Reference in this connection may be made to two cases decided by Mathew, J. as a Judge of the Kerala High Court, the first case is that of P. Unnikrishna v. State of Kerala (15). There on facts it was found that the petitioner was ineligible for being appointed to the service. The impugned order was, therefore, held to mean that it was a termination of an appointment which was itself void. In O.P No. 973 of 1968 the same learned Judge pointed out the order in question only declared that the petitioner was not validly appointed to the post and that he should be reverted. The learned Judge observed : "It was not an order cancelling a valid or even a voidable order; it was merely a declaration that there has been no appointment of the petitioner to the post. In the circumstance I do not think that natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the 1st to the 2nd respondent. I also do not think that in the circumstances there was any manifest injustice so that interference under Article 226 required." In U.P Junior Doctors Action Committee vs. Dr. In the circumstance I do not think that natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the 1st to the 2nd respondent. I also do not think that in the circumstances there was any manifest injustice so that interference under Article 226 required." In U.P Junior Doctors Action Committee vs. Dr. B. Sheetal Nandwani and others reported in 1991 S.C. 909 : 1992 (2) PLJR 16 (SC), it has been held that principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with in a case where a candidate had secured admission on the basis of forged certificate. It has further been held by the Supreme Court that natural justice should be viewed in circumstantial flexibility ( 1991 (4) SCC 584 ). It is also well known that the principle of natural justice need not be complied with when it would result in futility. It is also a settled law that an appointment made in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India or made by a person having no jurisdiction would be a nullity. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Ex. Capt. K. Balasubraminiam & others versus State of Tamil Nadu and another reported in 1991 (2) SCC 708 has held. “..... This, High Court has, in our opinion, rightly held that the direction contained in orders dated 16th June, 1976 and June, 15, 1977 were invalid being contrary to the provisions contained in rule 35 of the General Rules. Since the said orders were invalid the petitioner would not claim any right on the basis of said orders and therefore, no question of affording them an opportunity of hearing before passing the order dated 3rd March, 1980." In Ram Krishna Verma vs. State of U.P. reported in 1992 (2) SCC 620 , it has been held that a party would not be entitled to his right of natural justice if undue advantage is obtained by protracting a proceeding somehow and nullifying the objective. In S.L. Kapoor versus Jagmohan and others (AIR 1981 S.C., 136) it has been held that although non-observance of the principles of natural justice is itself prejudical but in that case also it has been observed : "Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approved the non-observance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs." 21. Keeping in view the nature of enquiry and the magnitude thereof as also the fact that the petitioners at best could have produced only documents which had been issued in their favour, there has been a substantial compliance of the principles of natural justice. However, in such a case where the appointment is a nullity, the principles of natural justice are also not required to be complied with. Further, the State has stated that even there is no record to show that many petitioners at any point of time had worked even on daily wages and thus the question of regularisation of their services by way of permanent absorption in the State service or by way of adjustment or otherwise did not arise. From a perusal of the advertisement as contained in Annexure 7/1 to the writ application it would appear that subject matter of enquiry was the violation of recruitment rules in a large scale. In the said advertisement it was clearly stated that almost all the records which were kept in the Secretariat were gutted in a fire which took place on 9.4.1992 as a result whereof the orders of this Court in C.W.J.C. 857/92 and other analogous cases were not possible to be complied with. It is in that situation, the advertisement had been issued directing the concerned employees to furnish all the details as notified therein which were absolutely relevant. Most of the petitioners failed/neglected to file their show cause. Their plea that they were not aware of the said advertisement cannot be accepted. 22. It is in that situation, the advertisement had been issued directing the concerned employees to furnish all the details as notified therein which were absolutely relevant. Most of the petitioners failed/neglected to file their show cause. Their plea that they were not aware of the said advertisement cannot be accepted. 22. But even assuming for the sake of argument that the petitioners were appointed by way of transfer/adjustment as they had worked on daily wages for some time, the offers of appointment issued to the petitioners themselves clearly show that such appointments were ad hoc in nature and could have been terminated without issuance of any notice. It is not the case of the petitioners that prior to their appointments any advertisement had been issued or the Employment Exchanges had been notified of the vacancies or any Selection Committee was constituted in accordance with the Recruitment Rules and/or any panel was prepared. Even assuming, although there is no material on record in this regard, that in some cases notices have been issued on the notice board, keeping in view the fact that according to the petitioners themselves a large number' of persons namely, 250 per year i.e. in total 1350 posts had been created, in our opinion, it was absolutely mandatory to issue an advertisement in the Newspapers. In case where one or two appointments are to be made on insignificant posts, it is possible to issue notice in the Notice Board. In Sardara Singh & ors. vs. State of Punjab and ors., reported in (1991) 4 SCC, 555, upon which strong reliance has been placed by the petitioners, the fact of the matter was completely different. In that case, the writ petitioners themselves applied in response to the notice and they were unsuccessful. In such a situation the Supreme Court held that the petitioners were estopped from questioning the method of publication of notice even if not succeeded in obtaining appointment. The Supreme Court observed : "Though we find that the procedure adopted by the Collector, inviting applications is not commendable, but the grievance would be voiced only by the persons who did not have the opportunity to make applications within the prescribed period." In this case nothing has been found on records that any such advertisement was made in the newspapers. Further issuance of advertisement is mandatorily required under the recruitment rules and thus Dr. Further issuance of advertisement is mandatorily required under the recruitment rules and thus Dr. Mullik, therefore, could not have ignored the same. 23. Further, the petitioners, in our considered opinion, did not derive any legal right to continue in service inasmuch as their appointments were absolutely ad hoc in nature. We are also amazed that a novel method was adopted in appointing the petitioners. In terms of the Bihar Service Code, the Civil Surgeon is the appointing authority with regard to the vacancies arising within the district wherein he is posted. All such appointments, therefore, are to be made in the cadre mentioned at the district level. No appointee could have therefore, been sent to another district immediately after appointment for the purpose of adjustment/by way of transfer. Such initial appointment by way of transfer is unknown in law. An appointment by way of transfer is permissible when the same is made on an equivalent post. An appointment by way of adjustment in our opinion is also unknown in law. The purported adjustments appear to have been made without ascertaining as to whether there existed any vacancy in the concerned district or not. The petitioners surprisingly were appointed to the post of clerks, orderlies, drivers, technician, statistics assistants, statistics clerks, family welfare worker etc. in the different districts in different schemes and no posts were sanctioned therefore. In some of the writ applications, it has categorically been admitted that appointments were purported to have been made by Dr. Mullik in anticipation of sanction. It is stated at the Bar that the purported order of sanction was issued in the year 1987 for a period of next five years. Such sanctions, as indicated hereinbefore, were for the post of T.B. Attendants and T.B. Assistants. We may also take note of the fact that the T.B. eradication programme was a temporary programme and thus the question of appointment of the employees who had been appointed as daily rated worker in some other department or in some other scheme did not arise. It is, therefore, surprising as to how appointments were made from the year•1980 onwards by Dr. Mullik. It may also be noted that the petitioners even in these writ applications have not annexed any document to show as to when and by whom they were appointed on daily wages. The finding of the Respondent no. It is, therefore, surprising as to how appointments were made from the year•1980 onwards by Dr. Mullik. It may also be noted that the petitioners even in these writ applications have not annexed any document to show as to when and by whom they were appointed on daily wages. The finding of the Respondent no. 2 to the effect that none of the appointees could produce any such document must be held to be correct. In this situation, the finding to the effect that appointments have been made in the name of regularization or adjustment although the petitioners were not working on daily wages cannot be said to be perverse. 24. It is not disputed that eradication of tuberculosis is a national programme having a separate and distinct infrastructure therefor. It is also not disputed that 2250 posts are sanctioned for the said establishment. Recurring cost of medicine is shared by the Government of India and the State of Bihar in equal proportion. It is also not in dispute that Dr. Mullik was posted in T.B.D.C. Institution at Patna and in August, 1979, he was posted as Dy. Director (lB.) Bihar. 25. In paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of the counter affidavit, it has been stated :- "That immediately after his posting as Dy. Director (T.B.) he indulged in indiscriminate appointments to Class III and IV posts. While making such appointments he had scant regard for Rules and Regulations. There was absolutely no adherence to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Without there being any advertisement for appointment or without calling for names from the employment exchange and without having regard to reservation policy of the State, appointments were made by him. No committee was ever constituted for selection of candidates as if it was his pocket organisation. On the top of everything, while making appointment there is hardly anything to show that he ever cared for the sanctioned posts and thus far exceeded the sanctioned posts while making such appointments. No committee was ever constituted for selection of candidates as if it was his pocket organisation. On the top of everything, while making appointment there is hardly anything to show that he ever cared for the sanctioned posts and thus far exceeded the sanctioned posts while making such appointments. That not only that there were irregularities in making appointments but there are hundred and thousand of such cases, where documents have been created, forgery has been committed, appointments have been made without any appointment letter and all other sorts of nefarious acts of commission and omission have been committed with the sole motive of causing pecuniary gain to him and his other associates in the misdeeds. That he had ingenuity of devicing novel method which is described as "transfer appointment". While there was no appointment at all he issued orders of transfer as if the transferee was already appointed and by issuing such transfer order made appointments, indeed with the aid of some Civil Surgeons. Precise number of appointees of Dr. Mullik is not known till today despite vigorous enquiries. It is also not possible to know the exact number particularly in view of the fact that there are large number of instances where such appointees are still moving on road with appointment letters allegedly issued by Dr. Mullik. Forged letters are being issued even till date by antedating. At this stage it is also difficult to ascertain whether such letters have been signed by Dr. Mullik himself or are signed by somebody else. In any event, it is anybody's case that such appointments will be around five to six thousand all over the State of Bihar." It was further stated :- "That the situation becomes so alarming that it was a matter of grave concern for the Government as the budgetary provision for the programme was far exceeding the limit and this situation was almost beyond control and the programme had almost collapsed. In the meantime, complaints, regarding illegal appointments kept pouring. In this background it was thought imperative to hold a thorough probe into the affairs and as such the task was entrusted to the Cabinet Secretariat (Vigilance) Department of the Government. In the meantime, complaints, regarding illegal appointments kept pouring. In this background it was thought imperative to hold a thorough probe into the affairs and as such the task was entrusted to the Cabinet Secretariat (Vigilance) Department of the Government. That the Vigilance Department picked up few districts and conducted thorough enquiry and during the course of enquiry it revealed that in the districts alone where such enquiry was held 1665 such appointments were made by Mr. Mullik. The Director General of Vigilance through his letter No. 768 dated 7.5.1991 submitted a report to the Government in the department, wherein he enclosed a list of 1665 persons and pointed out that all such appointments were not only illegal and irregular but were result of dubious machinations at the behest of Dr. Mullik and were no appointments in the eyes of law. Accordingly, he requested that in other districts where enquiry was not conducted the respective District Magistrates may be directed to conduct thorough enquiry and submit a report to find out all such appointments made by Dr. Mullik." 26. In this case as to how such appointments have been made may be noticed. In C.W.J.C. No. 5414 of 1992, the petitioner is said to have been appointed on daily wages basis on 4.9.1971 in the office of the Sub-divisional Magistrate for some time and thereafter retrenched. In 1976 he is said to have been appointed by the Superintendent of Patna City Hospital on daily wages basis. He filed a representation for his absorption in the T.B. department and on the basis thereof, he was appointed on 4.1.1984. 27. From the aforementioned fact it is thus evident that even on the petitioner's own showing that some persons have been appointed by Dr. Mullik although they had not been working in the T.B. department as daily rated worker. 28. As noticed hereinbefore, a Division Bench of this Court in Brijnandan Singh Yadav and others vs. The State of Bihar and others in C.W.J.C. No. 5658 of 1990 by an order dated 7.10.1991 observed as follows :- "There are the privileged section of Society and not the underdogs in respect of whom, the Supreme Court has made directions to bring them in the mainstream of the public life. We are constrained to say, as we have said in the other cases, that process of appointment (and its cancellation) has become a lucrative business, flourishing in the corridors of the State Secretariat and other offices of the Government which has also now spread to various Boards and Corporations in the State, in which the public functionaries are engaged. No statutory rule has been pointed out to us under which a person can claim regularisation of his appointment. True it is that the State Government at one stage had taken such decision, but in our opinion, that decision is opposed to public policy and in conflict with the constitutional mandates of Articles 14 and 16 and, therefore, they cannot be given effect particularly when no scheme has been framed under which cases of all other similarly situate persons who in fact may be possessing better merit than the privileged ones, are to be considered. The orders as contained in Annexures 3 and 4 make an interesting reading. The appointing authority in respect of Class III posts in the Health Department is Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, but these letters have been issued by the Deputy Director, Health Services (T.B.) Patna, saying that the persons mentioned in those communications should be adjusted "depending upon their qualification". While dictating the order, Mr. Navin Sinha, interjected to say• that the appointing authority is the Deputy Director himself. This makes the position still more funny. The Officer does not know the qualification of the persons in respect of whom he is issuing 'orders' of appointment. He has had no occasion to adjudge his merit either individually or inter-se with others. All that he said (to the Civil Surgeon) is to regularise the persons mentioned therein depending upon their qualification. We fail to appreciate as to what kind of appointment is this, where the appointing authority does not know the qualifications of the persons and has no idea as to on which post he is going to be appointed. These things, perhaps, happen only in the State of Bihar. We may state here that we have come across dozens of such orders/letters issued by the same officer Dr. These things, perhaps, happen only in the State of Bihar. We may state here that we have come across dozens of such orders/letters issued by the same officer Dr. A.A. Mullick, in respect of hundreds of such persons." This Court further observed :- "During the course of argument, learned counsel for the petitioners has brought to our notice that certain other persons in respect of whom also directions had been likewise issued by the Deputy Director (T.B.) have been appointed by the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Palamau and they are being allowed to continue. The names of such persons have been mentioned in Annexure 8 which is a letter written by Dr. A.A. Mullick forwarded to the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, Palamau bearing no. 457 dated 4.3.1989. It would be appropriate in order to maintain consistency that their cases should also be examined and if their cases appear to be similar to those of the petitioners, an appropriate order should be issued in respect of them in accordance with law." In All Manipur Regular Posts Vacancies Substitute Teachers' Association vs. State of Manipur, reported in 1992 (1) PLJR (S.C.) 23, the Supreme Court passed an order in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to avoid further litigation and also to avoid the High Court. In Dinanath Singh and other vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1991 (2) PLJR, 53 a Division Bench of this Court while holding that even in a case of illegal appointment the principle of natural justice has to be considered. It does not appear that except referring to the case of Shravan Kumar Jha (supra) as also its earlier decision, it took into consideration the other decisions of the Supreme Court as also the binding precedents of this Court in which Shravan Kumar Jha's case has also been taken into consideration. For the same reason Sumeshwar Prasad Verma and others vs. State of Bihar and others reported in 1991 (2) PLJR, 718 cannot be said to have laid down a good law. In Champaran Salt Agency vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1991 (2) PLJR, 338, a learned Single Judge of this Court merely held that the agreement entered into by and between the State and Coal Agents cannot be thrown out on imaginary grounds. In Champaran Salt Agency vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1991 (2) PLJR, 338, a learned Single Judge of this Court merely held that the agreement entered into by and between the State and Coal Agents cannot be thrown out on imaginary grounds. In that case, the impugned order suffered from vagueness and was cryptic. In Prithvi Nath Yadav vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1991 (2) PLJR, 511, this Court was concerned with a case where appointment was made pursuant to an advertisement and only some irregularities were alleged. In that situation it was held that principles of natural justice are required to be complied with. In Organo Chemical Industries and another vs. Union of India and others reported in A.I.R. 1979 SC, 1803, the Supreme Court was considering a case relating to damages under Section 14 (B) of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act. The said decision is, therefore, not applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. In Olga Tellis and others vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and others reported in AIR 1986 SC, 180, upon which strong reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners the Supreme Court observed :- "Having given our anxious and solicitious consideration to this question, we are of the opinion that the procedure prescribed by S. 314 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act for removal of encroachments on the footpaths or pavements over which the public has the right of passage or access, cannot be regarded as unreasonable, unfair or unjust. There is no static measure of reasonableness which can be applied to all situations alike. Indeed, the question "Is this procedure reasonable ?" implies and postulates the enquiry as to whether the procedure prescribed is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. In Francis Coralie Mullin 1981 (2) SCR 516 : AIR 1981 SC 476 , Bhagwati, J. said: " ... Indeed, the question "Is this procedure reasonable ?" implies and postulates the enquiry as to whether the procedure prescribed is reasonable in the circumstances of the case. In Francis Coralie Mullin 1981 (2) SCR 516 : AIR 1981 SC 476 , Bhagwati, J. said: " ... it is for the Court to decide in exercise of its constitutional power of judicial review whether the deprivation of life or personal liberty in a given case is by way of procedure, which is reasonable, fair and just or it is otherwise." The Supreme Court further observed :- "The hearing may be given individually or collectively, depending upon the facts of each situation." It further observed :- "Normally, we would have directed the Municipal Commissioner to afford an opportunity to the petitioners to show why the encroachments committed by them on pavements or footpaths should not be removed. But, the opportunity which was denied by the Commissioner was granted by us in an ample measure, both sides having made their contentions elaborately on facts as well as on law." In Raj Kishore Kumar Sinha and others vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1992 BBCJ. 578 the Full Bench did not decide any law. In fact S.N. Jha, who was a party in the Full Bench in Taja Prasad vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1992 (2) PLJR, 568 himself held that principle of natural justice are not required to be complied with where the appointments have been made in violation of the provisions of the Bihar and Orissa Cooperative Societies Act. 29. In Pramod Kumar and others Vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1992 (1) PLJR, 438, upon which reliance has been place by the petitioners, a learned Single Judge of this Court inter alia, held that as to whether initial appointment is regular or irregular becomes immaterial when the incumbent worked as such for long three years continuously and to the full satisfaction of employer. In our opinion the said decision does not lay down the law correctly inasmuch as therein the decision of the Division Bench of this Court as also the Supreme Court have not been considered. 30. In our opinion the said decision does not lay down the law correctly inasmuch as therein the decision of the Division Bench of this Court as also the Supreme Court have not been considered. 30. This aspect of the matter has again been considered in Miss Prasanna Kumari Amma M.P. and another vs. Bihar State Financial Corporation reported in 1994 (1) PLJR, 366, Nand Kumar Prasad and Others Vs. The State of Bihar & others and other analogous cases reported in 1994 (1) PLJR 386 and Arjun Pd. Sharma & ors. Vs. State of Bihar & ors., 1994 (1) PLJR 486 . In the aforementioned cases, Piara Singh's case (supra) has been distinguished. In Sukhsagar Prasad and others Vs. The State of Bihar and others 1994 (1) PLJR 811 it has been held by a Division Bench that appointment made by the University in violation of the provisions of Section 35 of the Bihar State Universities Act is illegal. In Sukhsagar Prasad's case, this Court considered the decision of the Supreme Court in Jammu and Kashmir Public Service Commission vs. Dr. Narinder Mohan reported in 1993 (4) SCALE, page 597. It was held:- "The rules or instructions should be in compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The procedure prescribed shall be just fair and reasonable. Opportunity shall be given to eligible persons by inviting application through public notification and recruitment should be according to the valid procedure and appointment should be of the qualified persons found fit for appointment to a post or an office under the State. Therefore, it must be held that power of relaxation exercised by the Government is right in holding that Government cannot relax the rules of recruitment to be made by the PSC. Government have no power to make regular appointment under the Rules without selection by the Public Service Commission under S. 133 (1) read with Rule 5 and Schedule III of the Rules." In Vijay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1993 (1) PLJR 99 , a Division Bench of this Court held as follows :- "It is therefore, a case where we should not exercise our discretion in favour of the petitioner particularly in view of the fact that the petitioner's appointment was ad hoc in nature. We may further observe that by reason of the impugned order, neither any disqualification nor any misdemeanour on the part of the petitioner has been found. The impugned order has been passed only on the basis that recruitments policy has not been followed and there has been a violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The State in our opinion, in a given situation, can always hold an enquiry in such matters and pass appropriate orders, in view of the fact that such illegal appointments have become rampant in the State of Bihar. We may also deserve that the enquiry has been conducted on the basis of the official records, the veracity whereof has not been questioned before us by the petitioner. In this situation even if a writ is issued by this Court, the same would be futile as the facts have not been controverted. It is also well known that the rule of natural justice, must not be stretched too far. Only too often, the people who have done wrong seek to invoke the rules of natural justice so as to avoid the consequences (See 1976 (3) AER 796)". In Mritunjay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar & ors. reported in 1993 (1) PLJR, 757 a Division Bench of this Court held as follows :- "In the case of the petitioner, though the selection Committee comprises of the District Education Officer, District Inspectress of School and the Headmaster of School in question, but the petitioner has himself admitted that his appointment was pending regular appointment after due process of appointment in the paper etc. In view of the assertions made by the petitioner himself, there cannot be any doubt that the appointment of the petitioner was ad hoc in nature. The said appointment was for a particular purpose and thus the petitioner did not derive any legal right to continue in the said post. It is also admitted that in terms of the policy decision of the State, even no advertisement was issued in the newspaper and thus there has been a violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India." 31. The Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. U.P. Law Officers' Association reported in 1994 (2) SCC, 204 inter alia observed that those who come through backdoor must go through that door. The Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. U.P. Law Officers' Association reported in 1994 (2) SCC, 204 inter alia observed that those who come through backdoor must go through that door. The Supreme Court further observed that in cases of such appointments there is no public interest in saving such appointments (See paragraph 19). 32. In Sitaram Thakur vs. State of Bihar and others reported in 1993 (2) PLJR 140 a Division Bench of this Court held as follows :- "Yet recently in Delhi Development Hoticulture Employees Union vs. Delhi Administration, Delhi and others, ( 1992 (1) JT 394 ), it has been observed:- "We may take note of the pernicious consequences to which the direction of regularisation of workmen on the only ground that they have put in work for 240 or more days has been, leading. Although there is Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in employment exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the employment exchange and the persons registered in the employment exchanges, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered or any lower in the long waiting lis in the employment register. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that such appointment is sought and given directly for various illegal consideration including money. The employment is given for temporary period with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules, and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularisation knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularised. A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the employment exchange for years. Not all those who gain such back door entry in the employment are in need of particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere, they joined the job for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the courts are of employment in Government department, public undertakings or agencies. Ultimately, it is the people who bear heavy burden of the surplus level. Though already employed elsewhere, they joined the job for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the courts are of employment in Government department, public undertakings or agencies. Ultimately, it is the people who bear heavy burden of the surplus level. The other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the work .undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts." In Karnataka State Private Colleges Stop Gap Lecturers Association vs. State of Karnataka and others ( 1992 (2) S.C.C. 29 ) the Supreme Court again held :- "ad hoc appointments, a convenient way of entry usually from back door, at times even in disregard of rules and regulations are comparatively recent innovations to the service jurisprudence. They are individual problems to design with, become a family problem in court of law. It is unjust and unfair to those who are lesser fortunate in society with little or no approach even though better qualified, more meritorious and well deserving. The inception is widespread in Government or Semi-Government department or State financed institutions. It arises either because the appointing authority resorts to it deliberately as a favour or to accommodate someone or for any extraneous reason ignoring the regular procedure provided for recruitment as a pretext under emergency measure or to avoid loss of work etc. or the rules or circulars issued by the department itself empower• the authority to do so as stop gap arrangement. The former is an abuse of power. It is unpardonable. Even if it is found to have been resorted to as a genuine emergency measure the court should be reluctant to grant indulgence. Latter gives rise to equity which has bothered courts every now and then." In State of Punjab and others vs. Surindra Kumar and others reported in 1992 (1) SCC 489 it has been held :- "There is still another reason why the High Court cannot be equated with this Court. Latter gives rise to equity which has bothered courts every now and then." In State of Punjab and others vs. Surindra Kumar and others reported in 1992 (1) SCC 489 it has been held :- "There is still another reason why the High Court cannot be equated with this Court. The Constitution has, by Article 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court while dealing with a writ jurisdiction, is circumscribed by the limitation discussed and declared by the judicial decisions and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge." In Sandeep Kumar vs. State of U.P. reported in 1992 SC, 713 the Supreme Court held :- "From the facts placed before us, it appears that the scheme under which the petitioners are working is of a very specific nature. There is no permanent need for the work and since it is a project for a particular purpose, it will not be possible to direct that the petitioners may be regularised in service." The Supreme Court again reiterated the aforementioned view in Karnataka Estate Private College Stop Gap Lecturers reported in J.T. 1992 (1) S.C., 373." 33. In Bijay Kumar vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1993 (1) PLJR, 99 this Court has categorically held that the State is not bound at any point of time to appoint the person if the same has been made in complete violation of the mandatory provision of the Recruitment Rules as also Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The said decision has been followed by this court in the decision reported in 1993 (2) PLJR, 330 (supra). 34. Reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioners on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 1993 (3) SCC, 259 is misplaced. In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the provision of the Standing Order framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act whereby the employer was entitled to terminate the service of any person on giving• three months notice or wage in lieu thereof. The said position is not here. 35. In that case, the Supreme Court was considering the provision of the Standing Order framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act whereby the employer was entitled to terminate the service of any person on giving• three months notice or wage in lieu thereof. The said position is not here. 35. The submission of the learned counsel to the effect that only because on the tloor of the Assembly, the State has accepted that appointments made by Dr. Mullik is valid, the State is estopped from passing the impugned order cannot be accepted. It appears that in answer to a question, it has been sated that Dr. Mullik had made 616 appointments during the period 1980-87 which were valid. As has been admitted at the Bar, Dr. Mullik during that period had made more than five thousand appointments. Further, in our opinion, in the impugned order dated 30.4.1993 sufficient materials have been disclosed so as to enable the State to come to a conclusion that all informations were not gathered by the State Government at that point of time. In any event in our opinion the rule of estoppel cannot be applied in this case inasmuch as there cannot be any doubt that the appointments were made in contravention of the recruitment rules as also the constitutional provisions as enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Krishan vs. Kurukshetra University reported in AIR 1976 SC 376 is misplaced inasmuch as in that case the subject matter of the judgment was wholly different. 36. Learned counsel, however, submitted that the services of the petitioners should not have been terminated on equitable or humane consideration. It is true that they have worked for sufficiently a long period. The State, in certain situation, may not like to terminate the services of the employees. Learned counsel in support of their contention have relied upon H.C. Puttaswamy and others Vs. The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court, Bangalore and others reported in AIR 1991, SC 295. Such a direction in our opinion can be given by the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India but this Court cannot do so in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Roshan Lal and others Vs. Such a direction in our opinion can be given by the Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India but this Court cannot do so in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Roshan Lal and others Vs. International Airport Authority of India and others reported in AIR 1981 SC 579 the Supreme Court was considering the question of legality of the appointment of the respondents several years after their appointment although the prayer in the writ application was confined primarily to the inter se seniority of the parties and the consequences flowing from the seniority list. 37. In Jacob vs. Kerala State Authority (1992 SC, 2070) upon which strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Mukherjee, has been distinguished in the Director, Institute of Management Development vs. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava in the following terms :- "In the instant case, there is no such rules. The appointment was purely ad hoc and on a conditional basis for a limited period." Recently the Supreme Court of India commented upon the indiscriminate directions of the High Court relating to appointment on compassionate ground in Life Insurance Corporation of India vs. Mrs. Asha Ramchandra Ambekar and another reported in 1994 (68) FLR 791 and stated the law thus :- "Of late, this Court is coming across many cases in which appointment on compassionate ground is directed by judicial authority. Hence, we would like to lay down the law in this regard. The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration. No doubt, Shakespeare said in Merchant of Venice : "The quality of mercy is not strained; It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath it is twice blessed;" it blesseth him that gives, and him that takes." These words will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered "law is the embodiment of all wisdom". Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be. At this juncture we may usefully refer to Martin Burn Ltd. vs. The Corporation of Calcutta, at page 535 ( AIR 1966 SC 529 ) of the Report the following observations are found : "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be. At this juncture we may usefully refer to Martin Burn Ltd. vs. The Corporation of Calcutta, at page 535 ( AIR 1966 SC 529 ) of the Report the following observations are found : "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve that it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a Court likes the result or not." The Courts should endeavour to find out whether a particular case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law. Disregardful of law, however, hard the case may be, it should never be done. In the very case, itself, there are regulations and instructions which we have, extracted above. The Court below has not even examined whether a case falls within the scope of these statutory provisions. Clause 2 of sub-clause (iii) of Instructions makes it clear that relaxation could be given only when none of the members of the family is gainfully employed. Clause of the Circular dated 20.1.1987 interdicts such an appointment on compassionate grounds. The appellant Corporation being statutory corporation is bound by the Life Insurance Corporation Act as well as the statutory Regulations and Instructions. They cannot be put aside and compassionate appointment be ordered. Further it is well settled in law that no mandamus will be issued directing to do a thing forbidden by law. In Brij Mohan vs. M.P.S.R.T. Corp. ( AIR 1987 SC 29 ) it is stated as under :- "The provisions of Motor Vehicle Act and in particular Sections 42 and 59 clearly debar all holders of permits including the State Road Transport Corporation from indulging in unauthorised trafficking in permits. Therefore, the agreement entered into by the petitioner unemployed graduate with the State Road Transport Corporation to ply his bus as nominee of the Corporation on the route in respect of which the permit was issued in favour of the Corporation for a period of five years, was clearly contrary to the Act and cannot, therefore, be enforced. Therefore, the agreement entered into by the petitioner unemployed graduate with the State Road Transport Corporation to ply his bus as nominee of the Corporation on the route in respect of which the permit was issued in favour of the Corporation for a period of five years, was clearly contrary to the Act and cannot, therefore, be enforced. In these circumstances, the petitioner would not be entitled to the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Corporation to allow him to operate his Motor vehicle as a State carriage under the permit obtained by the Corporation as its nominee. It is true that there may be pitiable situations but on that score, the statutory provision cannot be put aside." The Supreme Court further observed :- "We are totally unable to support this line of reasoning. For ought one knows, there may be other cases waiting already for appointment on compassionate grounds, they may be even harder than that of the 2nd respondent. Thus, apart from the directions as to appointment on compassionate grounds being against statutory provisions, such decision does not take note of this fact. Whatever it may be, the Court should not have directed the appointment on compassionate grounds. The jurisdiction under mandamus cannot be exercised in that fashion. It should have merely directed consideration of the claim of the 2nd respondent. To straightway direct the appointment would only put the appellant Corporation in piquant situation. The disobedience of this direction will entail contempt notwithstanding the fact that the appointment may not be warranted. This is yet another ground which renders the impugned judgment dated 19.10.1993 unsupportable." In Latham vs. Richard Johnson & Nephews, Ltd. reported in 1991 to 1993 All England Law Reporters, page 177 at page 123 the Court of Appeal observed :- "We must be careful not to allow our sympathy with the infant plaintiff to affect our judgment. Sentiments is a dangerous will o' the wisp to take as a guide in the search for legal principles." 38. Yet recently the Supreme Court in State Bank of India and others vs. Samarendra Kishore Endow and Another reported in (1994) 2 SCC 537 observed that although equitable jurisdiction can be exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 36 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot exercise the same jurisdiction under Article 226 thereof. 39. Yet recently the Supreme Court in State Bank of India and others vs. Samarendra Kishore Endow and Another reported in (1994) 2 SCC 537 observed that although equitable jurisdiction can be exercised by the Supreme Court under Article 36 of the Constitution, the High Court cannot exercise the same jurisdiction under Article 226 thereof. 39. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is merely of a judicial review which can be exercised only in the event, this Court finds that illegality, irrationality or procedural irregularities have been committed by the administrative authorities. 40. It is true that the Committee had taken into consideration the report of the Vigilance Department. In Rabindra Nath Singh vs. The State of Bihar and others reported in 1983 PLJR, page 92, this Court was considering the case of punishment imposed upon the petitioner in terms of Rule 55 A of the Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1935. In that situation, it was held that if any prejudicial material is used by the disciplinary authority, against the delinquent employee, the latter must have the knowledge of the said matter in order to file an effective representation for the consideration of the disciplinary authority. In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the Committee was considering the question as to whether the mode of appointment adopted by Dr. Mullik was legal or not. The petitioners have produced all their documents in their favour. Most of them have also been heard in person. In any event, before us the petitioners have produced all the documents and we have considered the same. Further, even if, the report of the Vigilance Committee is excluded from consideration, in our opinion, the impugned order can be upheld on the basis of other materials brought before it. It is not the contention of the petitioners, as noticed hereinbefore, that in relation to the said appointment, the recruitment rules had been followed or the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India have been complied with. 41. It is not the contention of the petitioners, as noticed hereinbefore, that in relation to the said appointment, the recruitment rules had been followed or the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India have been complied with. 41. In Joyachan Antony vs. State of Kerala and others reported in 1994 (1) SCC, page 302 it was held :- "The question as to what material the Government could take into consideration while issuing the said notifications, according to us, is not of much significance so long as the State Government had taken into consideration all relevant material and had not omitted to consider any relevant material before it issued the impugned notifications." 42. Further in these cases there are materials on record to show that fraud of a great magnitude has been practised. The Supreme Court in Smt. Shrisht Dhawan vs. M/s Shaw Brothers, AIR, 1992 SC, 1555, held as follows :- "Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct." It is now well known that any advantage or benefit resulting from the fatal reduction of fraud can find no room in protective embrace of any legal doctrine or equitable principles, such as natural justice. Fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine (See 1993 BBCJ, page 612). Even a decree which has been obtained by fraud by suppression of some documents would be a nullity (See 1994 (1) BLJR 216 (SC)). 43. It is now well known that he who seeks equity must approach the court with clean hands. In this case, we have no doubt that the petitioners are beneficiaries of a large scale fraud practised by the officers of the State. 44. In Lucknow Development Authority vs. M.K. Gupta reported in 1994 (1) SCC, 243, the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "A public functionary if he acts maliciously or oppressively and the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then it is not an exercise of power but its abuse. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer." 45. It is now well known that issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus is a discretionary remedy. No law provides protection against it. He who is responsible for it must suffer." 45. It is now well known that issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus is a discretionary remedy. The Supreme Court in State of Maharastra and others vs. Prabhu reported in 1994 (2) SCC, 481 observed as follows :- "Such hasty actions by superior officers are destructive of discipline which is necessary to be maintained. In any case the Director might have acted under constraints for reasons more than one but the High Court was not bound by it. It was in a better position to appreciate the effect of such order. Therefore, even if the order of the Government was vitiated either because it omitted to issue a proper show cause notice or it could not have proceeded against the respondent for his past activities the High Court should have refused to interfere in exercise of its equity jurisdiction as the facts of the case did not warrant interference. What could be more harmful to society than appointing the respondent as members of the Board, a position of importance and responsibility, who was found responsible for mass copying at the examination centre of which he was a supervisor. It shakes the confidence and faith of the society in the system and is prone to encourage even the honest and sincere to deviate from their path. It is the responsibility of the High Court as custodian of the Constitution to maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for sake of justice and refusing to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good." In Vijay Kumar's case (supra) it was held :- "This Court in Pramod Kumar and ors. vs. The State of Bihar and ors. reported in 1988 PLJR, 931, upon consideration of various decisions held as follows :- "It is now well settled by the various decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court of India that issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. In this connection reference may be made to the case of Goode Venkateshwara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and others ( AIR 1966 S.C. 828 ); Abdul Majid and others vs. The State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar and other (AIR 1960 Patna 333); Devendra Prasad Gupta . In this connection reference may be made to the case of Goode Venkateshwara Rao v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh and others ( AIR 1966 S.C. 828 ); Abdul Majid and others vs. The State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar and other (AIR 1960 Patna 333); Devendra Prasad Gupta . vs. The State of Bihar and others ( 1977 BBCJ 543 : 1977 PLJR 576 ); Hari Prasad Mandal vs. Additional Collector ( 1978 BBCJ 575 : 1978 PLJR 636 ); Banwari Lal Newatia vs. Under Secretary to Government of India and others (1982 BLT 311) and 1988 (1) Supreme Court Cases page 40. The aforementioned decisions are authorities for the proposition that writ jurisdiction of a High Court only provides for discretionary remedy and it should not be exercised for quashing an order which might give rise to another illegal order as if substantial justice has been done to the parties. In this connection, reference may be made to recent decision of mine in the case of Jai Bharat Co. vs. Central Coalfields Ltd. reported in 1988 BLT (Rep) at page 192 wherein it was held that High Court would be justified in a given case to refuse to interfere with illegal order if it is inequitable so to do or if the same would be against public interest." The same view has been taken in Suku Mahto vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1992 (2) PLJR, 134." In a case of this nature, where fraud has been committed by the officers of the State in a well planned and systematic manner and the petitioners have derived benefit therefrom and thus in our opinion, these are not fit cases, where we should exercise our discretionary jurisdiction. Some of the learned counsels suggested that appointments in similar manner have been done in other departments but services of such persons have not been terminated. This, in our opinion, is a submission in desperation. It is well known that a court of law cannot issue any direction whereby illegalities will be perpetuated. Further, Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot have any application in the case where illegalities have been committed. This, in our opinion, is a submission in desperation. It is well known that a court of law cannot issue any direction whereby illegalities will be perpetuated. Further, Article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot have any application in the case where illegalities have been committed. The submissions of learned counsels to the effect that the services of the petitioners should also be protected in view of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as also in view of the fact that they had acquired status, cannot be accepted. It is now well known that Directive Principles of the State cannot be enforced. It is impossible for the State to solve the problem of unemployment. Further, in case of conflict between the provisions of Part IV of the Constitution of India and Part III thereof, the later shall prevail. Further, such a backdoor appointment must have been farthest from the mind of the founding fathers of the Constitution. By reason of such appointment all other persons who are more meritorious are left at lurch and they have to wait for years for obtaining their livelihood although their names are registered in the Employment Exchange for years together. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India clearly forbid such discrimination. For the self same reason, in our opinion, in a case of this nature, the provision of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is also not attracted. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that a discrimination has been meted out to Class III and Class IV employees in so far as the State of Bihar in relation to Gazetted Officers has enacted Bihar Gazetted Officers Ad hoc appointment Regulation Act, 1987 for the purpose of regularising the services of ad hoc appointment made on gazetted post by the State Government and also passed a resolution for regularisation of the services of teaching and non-teaching staff of the constituent colleges which were allegedly made prior to 10.5.1986. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be accepted. The Gazetted Officers are class by themselves. In any event, only because the Legislature of the State of Bihar had enacted an Act for regularisation of the services of Gazetted Officers, the same does not mean that the State of Bihar ipso facto is bound to regularise the services of Class III and IV employees. The Gazetted Officers are class by themselves. In any event, only because the Legislature of the State of Bihar had enacted an Act for regularisation of the services of Gazetted Officers, the same does not mean that the State of Bihar ipso facto is bound to regularise the services of Class III and IV employees. In fact, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners militates against their own contentions. The aforementioned Act is a pointer to the fact that regularisation can be directed to be done only by virtue of or under the provisions of a Legislative Act or a policy decision adopted by the State of Bihar in exercise of its executive power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. However, it may be noted that in Sukh Sagar Prasad and others vs. The State of Bihar & ors., C.W.J.C. No. 10378/93 disposed of on 23.3.1994 [ 1994 (1) PLJR 811 ] a Division Bench of this Court following the judgment of this Court in Pramod Kumar vs. Bihar University reported in 1993 (2) PLJR, 618 has held that the State has no jurisdiction to issue an order directing regularisation of the services of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the colleges of the Universities contrary to the mandatory provisions contained in Section 35 of the Bihar State Universities Act. 46. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in these applications, which are accordingly dismissed. 47. The case of petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 5394 of 1993 appears to be on a different footing. In that case, the advertisement was issued in 1986 calling for the applications for selection of the candidates for training. The petitioner is said to have been selected by a Selection Committee and was also imparted training and thereafter she had been appointed, in 1990. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the case of Shila Kumari requires reconsideration at the hands of the Commissioner of Health. If there exists any other case of similar nature the authorities may reconsider the matter strictly in accordance with law. The petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 5979 of 1993 are said to have been appointed to the post of Laboratory Technicians. Allegedly, the petitioners were trained in different Government institutions. If there exists any other case of similar nature the authorities may reconsider the matter strictly in accordance with law. The petitioners in C.W.J.C. No. 5979 of 1993 are said to have been appointed to the post of Laboratory Technicians. Allegedly, the petitioners were trained in different Government institutions. According to the petitioners they were selected for Medical Laboratory training after advertisement and in the training they came out successful whereupon they were appointed as laboratory technicians. Such advertisements are said to have been issued in the year 1981 as also in the year 1983. However, it is stated that 1981 advertisement at present is not available to the petitioners but advertisement dated 20.6.1983 has been annexed with the writ application and has been• marked as Annexure 4 thereto. It has further been alleged that an advertisement had been issued for appointment to 277 posts on 16.12.1989 but as the petitioners had already been working they did not apply pursuant thereof. It is stated that 144 eligible persons were only appointed by a common order dated 8.3.1991 and the rest posts are still lying vacant. In this case no counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State controverting the submission made by the said writ application. In this view of the matter, in our opinion, the case of the petitioners of the aforementioned writ application and similar other cases also deserves reconsideration. 48. We further may observe that if any appointment has been made on compassionate ground strictly in accordance with law, although learned counsel for the parties did not point out any such case before us, it would be open to the State of Bihar to consider their cases inasmuch as it is now well settled that any appointment on compassionate ground stands on a different footing. We may state that Mr. Abhimanyu Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 6446/93 (Kumari Kaiser) stated that the petitioner was appointed after her father died in harness. However, learned counsel admitted that the said fact has not been mentioned in her appointment letter. She is also said to have imparted training after advertisement. Her case may also be reconsidered. 49. For the reasons aforementioned, all the writ applications except C.W.J.C. Nos. 5394 of 1993, 6446 of 1993 and 5979 of 1993 are dismissed. C.W.J.C. Nos. However, learned counsel admitted that the said fact has not been mentioned in her appointment letter. She is also said to have imparted training after advertisement. Her case may also be reconsidered. 49. For the reasons aforementioned, all the writ applications except C.W.J.C. Nos. 5394 of 1993, 6446 of 1993 and 5979 of 1993 are dismissed. C.W.J.C. Nos. 5394, 6446 and 5979 of 1993 are allowed in part to the extent mentioned hereinbefore. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.