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1994 DIGILAW 215 (SC)

Lakshmi Shanker Mehrotra v. S. M. Sengupta

1994-02-08

M.K.MUKHERJEE, S.MOHAN

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JUDGMENT M.K.MUKHERJEE, J. (1) IN this case, after hearing both the learned counsel, we are clearly of the view that the appellant is entitled to succeed for the following reasons : (2) THE appellant filed a suit for eviction of the respondent-tenant on the ground of sub-letting of the premises in question which came to be allotted to the tenant by the District Magistrate. The suit was under Section 3(e) of U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, III of 1947. The trial court decreed the suit. On appeal, it came to be reversed which is confirmed in the second appeal. The concurrent finding is that, no doubt, there is a sub-letting, however, the landlord-appellant had impliedly consented to such a sub-letting. (3) IN this appeal before us, Mr E.C. Agarwala, learned counsel for the appellants would urge that admittedly, in this case. Section 7(3 of the Act had not been complied with insofar as the permission of the District Magistrate had not been obtained for such a sub-letting. Therefore, it is prima facie proof of sub-letting. This can be pressed into service for eviction on the ground of sub- letting under Section 3(e). This aspect of the matter unfortunately was not a considered by the court of first appeal or by the High court. (4) IN meeting this submission, Mr Subodh Markandeya, learned counsel for the respondent-tenant would urge two grounds - (1 the point relating to Section 7(3 was not urged in the courts below; (2 even otherwise, in view of the ruling of the Allahabad High court in Hart Raj Swarup v. Daya Rame failure to obtain the permission of the District Magistrate under Section 7(3 would entail only the action contemplated under Section 8 of the Act, but cannot afford a ground for eviction on the ground of sub-letting. (5) IT is true that this point under Section 7(3 did not loom large before the courts below. Nevertheless, on the established facts before us, we are considering the scope of this section. Here, is a case where the appellant- landlord has chosen to evict the tenant under Section 3(c) of the Act. The said section reads as follows : "THAT the tenant has, on or after the 1st day of October, 1946, sub-let the whole or any portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord;". Here, is a case where the appellant- landlord has chosen to evict the tenant under Section 3(c) of the Act. The said section reads as follows : "THAT the tenant has, on or after the 1st day of October, 1946, sub-let the whole or any portion of the accommodation without the permission of the landlord;". No doubt, the factual finding of the courts below is that there is an implied consent by the landlord. That finding cannot be disturbed by us. Yet, to buttress the sub-letting, it is open to a landlord to urge that Section 7(3 had not been complied with insofar as the tenant had not obtained the permission of the District Magistrate. Be it noted, in this case, the premises came to be allotted by the District Magistrate. Therefore, Section 7(3 ought to be complied with in every respect. This does not mean that the landlord is seeking eviction on the ground of violation of Section 7(3, but only raising this ground as a second string to his bow. That we think cannot be shut out because it is purely a question of law. Admittedly, in this case, the tenant had not obtained the permission of the District Magistrate for sub-letting. (6) NO doubt, Hari Raj Swarup v. Daya Ram says violation of Section 7(3 would entail the consequences contemplated under Section 8. That is so, there cannot be any demur to the prosecution. Nevertheless, in the courts below, this ground is raised only as a fortification of the original ground of sub-letting. Accordingly, the Civil will stand allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. (7) AS regards time for vacating possession, the learned counsel have agreed as under (I) the landlord will not levy execution for recovery of possession for a period of 9 months from today;