ORDER K.P. Balanarayana Marar, J. 1. Revision arises from an order in execution. Petitioner before the executing court is the revision petitioner. 2. Revision petitioner was a tenant in respect of a property which was recovered by the landlord in execution of a decree for arrears of rent. Properties were brought to sale in court auction and purchased by the landlord. Consequent to the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1967 the tenant moved an application for re-delivery on 1st January 1968. The petition was allowed and re-delivery was ordered on 23rd September 1974. When delivery of possession was attempted, 8th respondent who is one of the legal representatives of one of the decree holders resisted and claimed tenancy rights. After enquiry, the resistance was directed to be removed and re-delivery obtained on 12th February 1981. It was thereafter that petitioner filed the petition, E.P. 215 of 1983, claiming mesne profits to the extent of Rs. 20,000 being the profits for the period from the date of filing the petition till date of delivery of possession. The executing court dismissed the petition holding that it cannot go behind the decree and the remedy of the petitioner is to file an application before the court on the original side. Hence this revision. 3. A learned Single Judge of this Court before whom the matter came up for hearing felt that an important question of law is involved, the question for consideration being whether petitioner can be compensated for the illegal detention of the property by the legal representatives after delivery was ordered. This is not a case of restitution. but the question is whether the same principle can be applied. It was in these circumstances that the case was adjourned for being heard by a Division Bench. That is how the matter has come up before us. 4. Heard counsel. 5. The executing court dismissed the petition on the ground that relief can be claimed only in an application before the trial court on the original side and the petition for execution is not maintainable. The petition is presented under S.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is one for execution of a decree. But no form is seen prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure for this purpose. The application need not therefore conform to the requirements of R.11 of O.XXI. The petition is presented under S.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is one for execution of a decree. But no form is seen prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure for this purpose. The application need not therefore conform to the requirements of R.11 of O.XXI. It may be in any form which suits best in the circumstances. What is required is only the narration of the relevant facts and a request for recovery of the property lost to the applicant. The compliance of the provisions contained in R.11 of O.XXI arises only in regular execution proceedings. What is required under sub-S.(1) of S.144 of the Code is only an application by the party who is entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise to the court which passed the decree. Sub-S.(2) prohibits filing of a suit for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by an application under sub-S. (1). Since a proceeding under S.144 is in the nature of execution, relief can be claimed by moving the court on the execution side. That can be in the form of an execution petition since what is required is restitution and restoration of benefits to which the petitioner is entitled consequent to the variance, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree. A petition for restitution under S.144 has therefore to be filed on the execution side as an execution petition. In the present case also an execution petition has been filed for restoration of possession and delivery was obtained though several years after the filing of the execution petition. 6. The point that arises for consideration in this revision petition is whether the claim for mesne profits can be made in the execution petition or whether it should be made in an application filed on the original side. The court below is of the view that a petition on the execution, side is not maintainable and the remedy is only to file an application before the trial court on the original side. When the suit has ripened into a decree and has been put in execution, the question of the trial court being moved in the matter does not arise. More so, in a case where petitioner had obtained re-delivery in pursuance to the order passed on an application filed under S.144 of the Code. When the suit has ripened into a decree and has been put in execution, the question of the trial court being moved in the matter does not arise. More so, in a case where petitioner had obtained re-delivery in pursuance to the order passed on an application filed under S.144 of the Code. Petitioner only wanted determination of the mesne profits due to him from the date of filing the execution petition till the date of delivery. That was resisted on various grounds, one of them being that the petition on the execution side is not maintainable. Since the matter arises in execution, the claim for mesne profits can be sustained only on the execution side either as an execution petition or as an execution application in the execution petition filed earlier. In any case, an application on the original side for determination of mesne profits is not necessary in relation to a claim which arose subsequent to the execution petition. The court below was therefore wrong in holding that the petition is not maintainable on the execution side and the remedy of petitioner is only to move the trial court on the original side. That finding is set aside. 7. Even if the petition is not maintainable on the execution side, the court could have transferred it to the original side and treated it as an application for determination of mesne profits payable by the plaintiff to defendants. As observed by the Supreme Court in Ramankutty Guptan v. Avara 1994 (1) KLT 453, the Court does not cease to have any jurisdiction after passing the decree for realisation of arrears of rent. The court retains control over the decree even after the decree has been passed. The Supreme Court in that case was considering an application under S.28(1) of the specific Relief Act, 1963. It was held that it was open to the court to exercise the power under that sub-S. either for extension of time or for rescinding the contract as claimed for, It is further observed that since the execution application has been filed in the same court in which the original suit was filed, instead of treating the application on the execution side, it should have as well been numbered as an interlocutory application on the original side and disposed of according to law. The court below could have adopted that procedure instead of rejecting the claim of revision petitioner. Any way that question does not arise now in view of our finding that the petition is maintainable on the execution side. 8. On merits the court below has not expressed any opinion. The restitution is not one under S.144 of the Code of Civil Procedure but arose on account of a right given to the tenant under S.6 of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1967 which reads thus: "6. Restoration of possession. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law, or in any judgment, decree or order of any court, where any holding has been sold in execution of any decree for arrears of rent and the tenant dispossessed of the holding after the 1st day of April, 1964 and before the commencement of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Ordinance, 1967 (4 of 1967), such . tenant shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be entitled to restoration of possession of the holding." 9. Petition for restitution was filed on 1st January 1968 and delivery of possession was obtained only on 12th February 1981. After enquiry re-delivery was ordered on 23fd September 1974 but the 8th respondent who is one of the legal representatives of one of the decree holders resisted delivery by setting up tenancy. That matter was enquired into and finding that 8th respondent is not entitled to any such right, the resistance was directed to be removed. It was thereafter that revision petitioner obtained delivery on 12th February 1981. The claim for profits was therefore made in E. P. 215 of 1983 for the period from the date of filing the petition till date of delivery under S.47, 144 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This is not a case of reversal or modification of a decree entitling revision petitioner to get restitution under S.144 of the Code. Relief of restoration of possession was granted under an enactment. But it is settled law that S.144 is not exhaustive and that it only provides the procedure and the power of restitution is inherent in every court. A right is conferred under S.144 of the Code to get restitution to the position which, the petitioner would have occupied but for the decree of order which has since then been varied, modified or reversed. A right is conferred under S.144 of the Code to get restitution to the position which, the petitioner would have occupied but for the decree of order which has since then been varied, modified or reversed. The granting of relief under S.151 is discretionary but such discretion must be exercised fairly and reasonably and not arbitrarily. When S.144 of the Code does not apply to a particular case, it is open to the court to invoke the inherent jurisdiction under S.151 to order restitution. But such invocation can only be if the ends of justice require it or to prevent abuse of the process of court. The court has an inherent power to remedy any wrong committed by it. 10. Learned counsel for revision petitioner submitted that restoration of possession granted under S.6 of the Kerala Stay of Eviction Proceedings Act, 1967 was delayed by the legal representatives of the decree holders and 8th respondent. The contention is that revision petitioner was entitled to get possession on the date on which the petition was moved and the delay caused in the matter will not deprive him of the benefits to which he was entitled. Restoration of possession having been obtained, payment of mesne profits is only a consequence of that order, according to counsel. It is pointed out that the court is competent to make consequential orders for mesne profits. Attention is drawn to the Full Bench decision of the Travancore - Cochin High Court reported in Lakshmana Nadar v. Peruma Pillai AIR 1953 TC 612 . It was held that when the restitution is ordered, the court is competent to make consequential orders for mesne profits which the aggrieved party is entitled to get and therefore the direction of the court to file a separate suit for mesne profits is not proper. We are in respectful agreement with this view. Even in a case where restitution is ordered by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court, we see no. reason why the person entitled to restoration should be deprived of the consequential benefits like profits to which he would have been entitled had he been in a position to get restoration immediately after the filing of the petition. 11. Even in a case where restitution is ordered by invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the court, we see no. reason why the person entitled to restoration should be deprived of the consequential benefits like profits to which he would have been entitled had he been in a position to get restoration immediately after the filing of the petition. 11. In the present case the execution petition was protracted for several years either by the legal representatives of the decree holders or by one of the sons of one of the decree holders, setting up a plea of tenancy with the result that delivery was obtained more than 13 years after the filing of the petition. This is therefore a fit case where revision petitioner is entitled to get profits for the period for which he was prevented from getting restoration of possession. Since that aspect has not been considered by the executing court, the matter has to go back for consideration of the same. 12. In the result, the revision is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Revision petitioner is found entitled to get mesne profits which are to be ascertained in the petition filed by revision petitioner as an execution petition. The executing court shall restore the execution petition to file and determine the quantum of mesne profits payable by respondents. The Court may also determine the quantum of compensation payable by the 8th respondent and the extent to which other respondents will be liable, taking into account the contentions raised by the various respondents. The court shall afford reasonable opportunity to the parties to produce documents and adduce evidence in the matter. Since the execution petition is of the year 1983, the executing court shall expedite the enquiry and dispose of the petition as expeditiously as possible. Parties are directed to appear before the Munsiff's Court, Palghat on 11th July, 1994.