Judgement JUDGMENT :- Being felt aggrieved by the order D/- 7-8-1990 of the Railway Claims Tribunal, Bhubaneswar dismissing the suit as barred by limitation, the plaintiff has filed this appeal under S. 23(1) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). 2. The appellant filed Money Suit No. 407 of 1986 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Cuttack claiming compensation amounting to Rs. 47,052.00 with pendente lite and future interest against the respondent. The said suit came to be transferred under S. 24(1) of the Act to the Railway Claims Tribunal, Bhubaneswar which after hearing has dismissed the same as barred by limitation, as indicated above. 3. The case of the appellant is that it entrusted 240 bags (each bag weighing 100 kgs.) of gram dal to the respondent for transport from Bhiwani railway station to Cuttack which were booked under invoice No. 60 RR No. 186239 dated 7-7-1983 under the Railway risk. The consignment reached Cuttack on 25-7-1982. On that day, the respondent delivered only a part of the consignment, namely, 94 bags out of 240 bags. To be exact, there was short delivery of 146 bags (14600 kgs.) of gram dal, two bags were found in torn and slack condition with shortage of 27 kgs. of gram dal and 17 bags were delivered in damaged condition. According to the appellant, the shortage took place due to gross negligence and misconduct of the employees of the respondent. It called upon the respondent to make payment of the compensation for the loss and issued notice under S. 78-B of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 and S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure for settlement of the claim. As there was no response to the notices, the suit was filed. The appellant assessed the damage as follows : "3 bags @ 8% loss on account of damage 24 kgs. 7 bags @ 4% loss on account of damage 28 kgs. 7 bags @ 1% loss on account of damage 7 kgs. 2 bags torn and slack and shortage 27 kgs. short of 146 bags containing 14600 kgs. Total loss : 14686 kgs. Value of 14686 kgs. of gram dal @ Rs. 300/- per quintal. Rs. 44,058.00 Proportionate freight Rs. 2,994.00 Total : Rs. 47, 052.00" 4. 7 bags @ 1% loss on account of damage 7 kgs. 2 bags torn and slack and shortage 27 kgs. short of 146 bags containing 14600 kgs. Total loss : 14686 kgs. Value of 14686 kgs. of gram dal @ Rs. 300/- per quintal. Rs. 44,058.00 Proportionate freight Rs. 2,994.00 Total : Rs. 47, 052.00" 4. The respondent resisted the suit contending, inter alia, that there was no negligence on its part and the suit was barred by limitation. 5. On behalf of the appellant a lone witness was examined in support of its case. It also filed some documents. The Tribunal on assessment of evidence held that there was proper entrustment of 240 bags (240 quintals) of gram dal to the carrier, Railway, and the respondent s liability for the loss has been established. Having recorded such a finding in favour of the appellant, it declined to grant relief as the suit was barred by limitation. According to the Tribunal the date of delivery of the goods (with shortage and damages) was 26-7-1983 from which date limitation started and the suit having been filed on 1-10-1986, the same is barred by time under Art. 11 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, the appellant has stated that the cause of action for the suit arose on 8-8-1983 by which date the consignment ought to have been delivered to it but instead ";the department issued the shortage certificate at Cuttack railway station on 9-8-83";. No foundation was laid in the plaint to show as to how the cause of action for the suit did arise on 8-8-1983. P.W. 1 who was the Field Officer of the appellant stated in his evidence that the consignment of gram dal comprising 240 bags was booked from Bhiwani in Haryana to Cuttack. The consignment reached Cuttack on 25-7-1983. He approached the railway authorities at Cuttack on the same day for taking delivery of the consignment. He went to the wagon along with the railway unloading clerk. The clerk told him that the seal of the wagon had been tampered with. He saw the seal which was found to have been tampered with. P.W. 1 further stated that the lock of the wagon gave him the impression that there might be some shortage from the consignment. The bags were unloaded. The clerk told him that the seal of the wagon had been tampered with. He saw the seal which was found to have been tampered with. P.W. 1 further stated that the lock of the wagon gave him the impression that there might be some shortage from the consignment. The bags were unloaded. Out of the total consignment of 240 bags, only 94 bags were unloaded from the wagon and there was missing of 146 bags. Out of those 94 bags unloaded, 17 bags were damaged being in wet condition besides two bags (out of 17 bags) were tampered and contents were removed. On the next day, the Goods Supervisor gave delivery of 94 bags and a due slip for the remaining 146 bags. He signed the delivery book and took receipt of 94 bags. Thereafter he along with his staff had been going to the railway authorities to enquire about the remaining bags till 18-9-1983 on which date the shortage certificate for 146 bags was issued and the due slip was taken back by the railway authorities. It would be evident from the evidence of P. W. 1 that he has also not stated anything as to how did the cause of action arise on 8-8-1983, as stated in paragraph 12 of the plaint. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the time for limitation should be reckoned from 18-9-1983, the date on which the shortage certificate was issued. It is a new case not pleaded in the plaint. 7. In course of hearing of this appeal, the bone of contention between the parties is as to which of the Articles, i.e., whether Article 10 or Article 11 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would govern the case. Articles 10 and 11 read as follows : follows : "Art. 10. Against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods. Three years. When the loss or injury occurs. Art. 11. Against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of, or delay in delivering goods. Three years. When the goods ought to be delivered." contemplates a suit for compensation for non-delivery or delay in delivering the goods and the time for filing the suit is three years from the date the goods ought to have been delivered. Art. 11. Against a carrier for compensation for non-delivery of, or delay in delivering goods. Three years. When the goods ought to be delivered." contemplates a suit for compensation for non-delivery or delay in delivering the goods and the time for filing the suit is three years from the date the goods ought to have been delivered. The allegation of the appellant with regard to the assessment of damages is of short delivery of 146 bags (146 quintals) of gram dal and loss/ shortage of 90 kgs. of gram dal from 17 bags delivered in damaged condition. From this it follows that it is the case of the appellant that there was short delivery of 146 bags together with of 17 bags of gram dal in damaged condition. 8. There was some divergence of opinion on the point whether short delivery of consignment is non-delivery of consignment as a whole. In Boota Mal v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1716 , the Supreme Court has clarified the position by stating the law that Art. 11 (corresponding to Art. 31 of the Old Limitation Act) applies to a case where the bulk of the goods had been delivered and only a part remained to be delivered. This being the position, the appellant s case has to be tested on the touch-stone of the provisions contained in Art. 11 of the Limitation Act as its case is one of short delivery. Now the important question that has to be decided is as to what is the starting point of limitation in the case of the appellant. Under Art. 11 the period of three years would begin to run when the goods ought to be delivered.There is no evidence showing any contract of carriage, whether express or implied, from which it could be held that the goods ought to have been delivered by a particular date. In absence of any such evidence, the expression ";when the goods ought to be delivered"; can only mean the reasonable time taken in the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. What is the reasonable time would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In absence of any such evidence, the expression ";when the goods ought to be delivered"; can only mean the reasonable time taken in the carriage of the goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination. What is the reasonable time would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In absence of any special circumstance, reasonable time would practically be the same between the two stations as would normally or usually be taken for the carriage of goods from one station to the other. In case where a part of the consignment has been delivered, it can be reasonable to hold that the date on which part consignment was delivered is the date when the goods ought to have been delivered as a whole. In the instant case, the goods were delivered on 26-7-1983. So, the clock started ticking from 26-7-1983 and the period of limitation commenced from that date. After allowing due time for the notice under S. 80, C.P.C., the last date for filing the suit expired on 26-9-1986. The suit, was filed on 1-10-1986 which is clearly out of time. 9. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the date on which the shortage certificate (18-9-1983) was issued should be taken to be the date for commencement of limitation. Learned counsel argued that the railway authorities gave impression to the appellant that they were in search of the balance goods and there was no from them only when they indicated their mind by issuing the shortage certificate. It has been held in Boota Mal ( AIR 1962 SC 1716 ) (supra) by the apex Court that if the correspondence discloses anything which may amount to an acknowledgment of the liability of the carrier that would give rise to a fresh starting point of limitation. But if the correspondence is only about the tracing of goods, that would not be material in considering the question as to when the goods ought to have been delivered. On the other hand, if the correspondence discloses materials which might throw light on the question of determining the reasonable time for the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination, then it would be open to the court to take into account such correspondence and the carrier would be estopped from denying that position. On the other hand, if the correspondence discloses materials which might throw light on the question of determining the reasonable time for the carriage of goods from the place of despatch to the place of destination, then it would be open to the court to take into account such correspondence and the carrier would be estopped from denying that position. There is no material to show that at any time the respondent had acknowledged the liability. The mere issue of the shortage certificate in the circumstances cannot be held to be the basis for starting of fresh period of limitation. 10. In view of what has been stated above, the Tribunal has rightly held that the suit is barred by limitation. I do not find any merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.