JUDGMENT : Sudhir Narain, J. This writ petition is directed against the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 30-12-1993 whereby he recalled the order dated 28-11-1991 and restore the revision for deciding it on merits. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that consolidation proceedings started in vitiate Pagapar, Pargana Haveli, district Gorakhpur (now Maharajganj). In the basic year Khataunl, Khata Nos. 8 and 822 situate in that village were recorded in the names of Smt. Aharkali, Shyam Narain and Aditya. The relevant pedigree is given below : “XXX” 3. Aditya, father of Petitioners 2 and 3, and Shyam Narain filed objections u/s 52 of Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act before the Assistant Consolidation Officer with the allegations that Awadhesh died Issueless and on his death his share devolved on Aditya alone. Smt Anarkali was not daughter of Awadesh and her name was wrongly recorded over the land in dispute. Anarkali denied the allegations. She asserted that she is daughter of Awadhesh. She relied upon a will dated 2-7-1967, whereby the property in dispute was bequeathed in her favour by Awadhesh. 4. The Consolidation Officer, after considering the evidence on record; came to the conclusion that Anarkali was daughter of Awadhesh and a will was executed in her favour on 2-7-1967 which was valid with regard to bhumidhari Khata. Khata No. 8 was bhumidhari Khata and Khata No. 822 was a sirdari Khata. Anarkali had, therefore, one-third share in the plots mentioned in Khata No. 8. He thus passed the order dated 9-2-1984 and partly allowed the objection of Anarkali in respect of Khita No. 8. Against the order of Consolidation Officer, two appeals were filed--one by Ghanshyam and other sons of Smt. Anarkali and the order by Aditya. The Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dismissed both the appeals on 26-9-1984. Two revisions were filed against the aforesaid order of the Asstt. Settlement Officer (Consolidation) dated 26-9-1984--one by Aditya and Shyam Narain and the other by Ghanshyam and his brothers. 5. During consolidation proceedings, after ascertaining valuation of the plots of Khata Nos. 8 and 822, new plot Nos. 1879 and 2653 were given, on which the names of Ghanshyam and other were recorded. On 22-1-1990, Ghanshyam, Radhey Shyam and Vinod Kumar sons of recorded tenure-holder Anarkali sold plot No. 1879 by a registered sale-deed in favour of Ram Kishore. 5. During consolidation proceedings, after ascertaining valuation of the plots of Khata Nos. 8 and 822, new plot Nos. 1879 and 2653 were given, on which the names of Ghanshyam and other were recorded. On 22-1-1990, Ghanshyam, Radhey Shyam and Vinod Kumar sons of recorded tenure-holder Anarkali sold plot No. 1879 by a registered sale-deed in favour of Ram Kishore. After purchasing the property, he moved an application for mutation of his name which was numbered as 739/1085. His name was directed to be mutated by the authorities concerned on 19-9-1990 and thereafter his name was recorded in the revenue records. Baijnath and Vishwanath, sons of Aditya, Petitioners 2 and 3 in this writ petition, filed an application for restoration of the mutation case and they also filed an appeal before the sub-Divisional Officer on 25-2-1991 u/s 52 to of the Land Revenue Act. 6. On 15-10-1991, a compromise application was filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation in both the revisions by Ghanshyam, Radhey Shyam and Vinod Kumar sons of Anarkali on the one hand and Shyam Narain, son of Uroa, Baijnath and Vishwanath sons of Aditya on the other, and under the said compromise, it was agreed by Ghanshyam, Radhey Shyam and Vinod that (he names of Ghanshyam, Radhey Shyam and Vinod sons of Anarkali be deleted from the revenue records. This compromise application was allowed on 28-11-1991 and both the revision were disposed on in accordance with the terms of compromise. The effect was that the original objections, which had been filed by Anarkali. were practically withdrawn and without any decision on merits, the orders of Consolidation Officer and the Assistant Settlement Officer (Consolidation), which had been passed in favour of the sons of Anarkali, stood set aside. 7. On 26-12-1991, Ram Kishore filed an application to set aside the order dated 28-11-1991, whereby the revisions were disposed of in terms of the compromise. He came with the allegation that the compromise was collusive and fraudulent to defeat his rights by the vendors. The Petitioners filed objections to the said application. The Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the application by his order dated 30-12-1993 holding that the order dated 28-11-1991 was obtained collusively and fraudulently with the sole purpose to defeat the rights of the transferee. The Petitioners have challenged this order |n this writ petition. 8. The Petitioners filed objections to the said application. The Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the application by his order dated 30-12-1993 holding that the order dated 28-11-1991 was obtained collusively and fraudulently with the sole purpose to defeat the rights of the transferee. The Petitioners have challenged this order |n this writ petition. 8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted that Ram Kishore, Respondent No. 2 had purchased the disputed property during the pendency of the revision. He was bound by any order passed in the revision. The revision was continuation of the proceedings of the case and if the parties entered into a compromise and an order in passed in that proceeding, it is binding upon him in view of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. A compromise decree is as much binding an a decree passed in a contested suit as against a transferee. He placed reliance upon Dutt maharaj v. Sukur Mohommed, wherein it was held that the words "any decree or order which may be made therein" used u/s 52 of the Transfer of Property Act (1882) applies to a compromise decree as well and further observed "the broad purpose of Section 52 is to maintain the status quo unaffected by the act of any party to the litigation pending its determination. The Applicability of section cannot depend on matters of proof or strength or weakness of the case on the one side on the other in bona fide proceedings." The compromise thus should be in bona fide proceeding. This view was emphasised by the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Lal and Another Vs. Ganesh Ram and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1717 . 9. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates "any suit or proceeding which is not collusive". If any, proceeding is collusive and any order is passed by the Court, such order many not be binding upon a transferee. A person, who is a party in the suit and has alienated his rights and title in the property in dispute, cannot collusively defeat the rights of the person to whom he has transferred the property. If any, proceeding is collusive and any order is passed by the Court, such order many not be binding upon a transferee. A person, who is a party in the suit and has alienated his rights and title in the property in dispute, cannot collusively defeat the rights of the person to whom he has transferred the property. He has left no interest in the property after he had executed the sale-deed in favour of his transferee except to defend his rights in the suit and in doing so in some circumstance he may enter into a compromise but a person to whom he has sold the property is also entitled to be impleaded in the suit or proceedings which may be pending affecting his rights. The moment he is impleaded, he has a right to a fair trial. Seshagiri Aiyarr J. in Policherala Veerarghava Reddi v. Cherla Subba Reddi AIR 1920 Mad. 391 considered the origin of doctrine of lis pendens enunciated u/s 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. There are twin principles-one that the party should not suffer by any private action of a party to the suit affecting his rights but the other principle is that the right of a person to whom the property has been sold should not be affected by a collusive decree who is not before the Court, and his right should not be affected by any adjustment or compromise to which he is not a party. He can intervene in the proceedings and in his absence his rights should not be affected by any adjustment or agreement between the parties to the suit. 10. In Nanjammal v. Eswaramurthi AIR 1934 Mad. 592, the Court took the view that where an application for impleadment by a transferee was pending, the Court ought not to have recorded compromise as the transferee has a right to oppose the compromise as intended to defeat his rights. In case a purchaser is not before the court and a party to the suit or proceedings entered into a compromise collusively or fraudulently to defeat the rights of the transferee, such compromise will not be binding upon the transferee. It is open to him to show that it his a collusive or fraudulent. A decree may be passed on contest or on the basis of consent of the parties. It is open to him to show that it his a collusive or fraudulent. A decree may be passed on contest or on the basis of consent of the parties. In both the cases, it is a decree which is binding upon a transferee pendentelite. The only exception is that it is not the result of fraud or collusion between the parties see Bharat Ramanuj Das Mahanta v. Srinath Chandra Sahoo 1922 Cat 358, Hiranya Bhusao v. Gauri Dutt 1943 Cal. 227, Nathu Dhoju Gholap Vs. Ramchand Balchand, AIR 1946 Bom. 462 and Venkiteswara Pai v. Kunjuvavs AIR 1952 TC 309. 11. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners next contended that unless the transferee pendente lite makes clear allegation that his transferor, who was a party in toe proceedings, collusively and fraudulently entered into a compromise to defeat the sights of transferor, be is not entitled to avoid the compromise decree, He placed reliance upon the, decision to V.S. Visbwavidyalaya v. Rajkishore AIR 1977 SC 613 and Pt. Ram Avtar Sharma and Others Vs. Pt. Chakradhar Saran Sharma and Others, AIR 1971 All 157. 12. In the instant case, the facts as disclosed in the application fifed by Respondent No. 2 and the material on record clearly indicate that there was H fraud and collusion between the parties in revision. The meaning of the word "fraud" has been explained in Nagubai Ammal and Others Vs. B. Shama Rao and Others, AIR 1956 SC 593 in following words : Collusion in judicial proceedings is a secret arrangement between two-parsons that the one should institute a suit against the other in order to obtain the decision of a judicial tribunal for some sinister purpose. (Wharton's Law Lexican, 14th Edn., p. 212). In such a proceeding, the claim put forward is fictitious, the contest over it is unreal, and the decree passed therein is a mere mask having the similitude of a judicial determination and worn by the parties with the object of confounding third parties. 13. In the instant case, the names of transferors, namely, Ghanshyam, Redheyshyam and Vinod Kumar were recorded m the revenue record when they executed the sale-deed in favour of Respondent No. 2 on 22-1-1990. After purchasing the property, he filed an application for mutation of his name before the revenue authority and his name was directed to be mutated. 13. In the instant case, the names of transferors, namely, Ghanshyam, Redheyshyam and Vinod Kumar were recorded m the revenue record when they executed the sale-deed in favour of Respondent No. 2 on 22-1-1990. After purchasing the property, he filed an application for mutation of his name before the revenue authority and his name was directed to be mutated. The Petitioners filed an appeal against the said order before the sub-Divisional Officer concerned u/s 210 of the Land Revenue Act and also fifed an application for setting aside the order dated 19-9-1990. In these proceedings, they never alleged that any revision was pending before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. They fifed compromise application on 15-10-1991 before the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the revisions filed by them, in the said compromise, the transferors Ghanshyam, Radaey Shyam and Vinod abandoned their claim in the disputed property without assigning any reason particularly when the Consolidation Officer has partly allowed their objections and that order was affirmed in appeal. There were two separate revisions-one filed by Ghanshyam and others claiming the rights with regard to Khata No. 822 and the Petitioners claimed the rights regarding Khata No. 8 which was decided against them by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Offices (Consolidation). Ghanshyam and his other brothers (Respondents 3 to 5) had already alienated their, rights in the disputed property and they could nee have abandoned their claim The compromise on the face of it was a collusive to defeat the rights of the transferee. 14. In Annammal v. Chellakutti AIR 1963 Mad. 300 , it was held that unless the termination of the suit is honestly brought in one of usual modes, the doctrine of lis pendens will have no application. An abandonment of a suit cannot be said to be normal way of its, termination or one honesties brought about, even though it may not be the result of collusion. In the instant case, the rights, which were claimed by Anarkali have been abandoned, in, the, compromise application particularly when her claim was partly accepted be the. Consolidation Officer and the Asstt., Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 15. The revision was alleged to be pending since 1984 and in the mutation proceedings even the Petitioners did not inform Respondent No. 2 that revision was pending. He could have filed an application for his impleadment in the revision. Consolidation Officer and the Asstt., Settlement Officer (Consolidation). 15. The revision was alleged to be pending since 1984 and in the mutation proceedings even the Petitioners did not inform Respondent No. 2 that revision was pending. He could have filed an application for his impleadment in the revision. He is a bona fide purchaser and purchased the property when the names of his transferors were recorded hi the revenue records. The facts itself speak about the collusive character of the compromise. The finding, recorded by Respondent No. 1 does not suffer from any error of law. 16. The wilt petition is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed.