P. K. Bahri ( 1 ) DERA Ghazi Khan District Refugees Cooperative House Building Society has filed this writ petition seeking appropriate writs and directions for quashing the order dated March 6, 1990, passed by respondent No. 2 by which he had REFERRED TO the dispute raised in application moved by Smt. Ram Piari against the Society on the question of inheritance to the membership of deceased Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia to an Arbitrator under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972 ( for short the Act ) and also quashment of subsequent award dated June 6, 1990 made by respondent No. 3-Arbitrator holding that Smt. Ram Piari was entitled to be substituted as member of the Society in place of her deceased husband and the present applicant, namely, respondent No. 7 has stepped into the shoes of Smt. Ram Piari inasmuch as she had bequeathed her rights in favour of respondent No. 7 by a Will. The petitioner-Society has also sought quashment of the subse- quent orders dated February 28, 1991 and April 22, 1991, made by respondents 4 and 5 respectively for implementing the award given by the Arbitrator. ( 2 ) FACTS leading to the filing of the present writ petition, in brief, are that initially the present petitioner was enrolled and got registered as a cooperative society in Faridabad (Haryana) and later on with effect from May 1, 1972, the petitioner-Society got itself enrolled under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act at Delhi vide notification published on December 3, 1971. One of the bye-laws of the Society at that time provided that no person shall be eligible to be member of the Society if he has some land allotted to him in Faridabad or in the neighbourhood. Initially respondent No. 6 became member of the Society On October 15, 1960 but later on after he had acquired some property in Model Town, Delhi, he stated to have got transferred his membership in the name of his father Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia in the year 1971. Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia was accepted as member by the Society and Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia had nominated daughter of respondent No. 6-Smt. Sangeeta 239 as his Successor. In March 1981 Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia expired. ( 3 ) IN May 1981 Smt. Sangeeta applied that the membership be transferred in her name. Jagan Nath Bangia in the year 1971. Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia was accepted as member by the Society and Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia had nominated daughter of respondent No. 6-Smt. Sangeeta 239 as his Successor. In March 1981 Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia expired. ( 3 ) IN May 1981 Smt. Sangeeta applied that the membership be transferred in her name. The Society having learnt about respondent No. 6 having acquired property No. R-74/1, Model Town, Delhi, even before he got his membership transferred in his father s name, did not agree to transfer the membership in favour of Smt. Sangeeta. ( 4 ) ON April 23, 1982, Smt. Sangeeta-respondent No. 8 filed a civil suit against the Society asserting that she had become member of the Society on the death of her father as she was a nominee of her grandfather but the said suit was dismissed as notmaintainableincivilcourtvide orderdated Augustl8,1982. Incontesting that suit the Society had highlighted the fact that respondent No. 6 who had acquired the disqualification to remain member of the Society had got the membership transferred in the name of his father concealing the fact that he had himself become ineligible to continue to be member of the Society. Respondent No. 8 then applied to the Society for withdrawing the share money lying with the Society. On July 17, 1983, she received back the share money lying with the Society in the name of her grandfather. ( 5 ) ON April 28, 1988, i. e. after the expiry of about five years, Smt. Ram Piari widow of late Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia asserted by way of a legal notice that she being the legal heir of Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia was entitled to be substituted as member of the Society in place of her deceased husband. On the petitioner-Society not agreeing with her request to substitute her as member in place of Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia, she invoked the provisions of Section 60 of the Act for reference of the dispute regarding her inheritance for arbitration. This application was moved in October 1988. ( 6 ) DURING the pendency of the said proceedings Smt. Ram Piari died on February 23, 1989. Jagan Nath Bangia, she invoked the provisions of Section 60 of the Act for reference of the dispute regarding her inheritance for arbitration. This application was moved in October 1988. ( 6 ) DURING the pendency of the said proceedings Smt. Ram Piari died on February 23, 1989. On April 7,1989, respondent No. 7 (grandson of Smt. Ram Piari being son of respondent No. 6) filed an application under Order XXII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure for being substituted as applicant in place of deceased Smt. Ram Piari. Although in that application he did not disclose how he had become legal heir of Smt. Ram Piari but in the rejoinder he had mentioned about his having become the sole legal heir of Smt. Ram Piari on the basis of a Will. ( 7 ) AFTER hearing the parties the respondent made a reference for arbitration under Section 60 of the Act and thereafter the impugned award was given in favour of respondent No. 7. ( 8 ) IT is averred by the petitioner that the claim set up by Smt. Ram Piari belatedly in 1988 was hopelessly barred by limitation and thus, the order of reference as well as the award given on the basis of the dispute raised by Smt. Ram Piari are nullity inasmuch as the claim of Smt. Ram Piari was barred by limitation. It is also urged by the petitioner that no formal order having been made by respondent No. 2 in substituting respondent No. 7 as the applicant in place of deceased Smt. Ram Piari, the reference made by respondent No. 2 without deciding the said question is nullity and beyond jurisdiction. It is also pleaded by the petitioner that the nominee having withdrawn the share money in 1983, there was no question of Smt. Ram Piari s claim being entertained in 1988 for being substi 240 tuted as member of the Society in place of deceased Sh. Jagan Nath Bangia. ( 9 ) THE petition is mainly contested by respondent No. 7. Respondent No. 7 has pleaded that the petitioner is not enti tied toinvoke the writ jurisdiction inasmuch as the alternate remedy of filing a revision petition under the Act was available which has not been availed. Jagan Nath Bangia. ( 9 ) THE petition is mainly contested by respondent No. 7. Respondent No. 7 has pleaded that the petitioner is not enti tied toinvoke the writ jurisdiction inasmuch as the alternate remedy of filing a revision petition under the Act was available which has not been availed. The petitioner is also guilty of laches inasmuch as the writ jurisdiction has been invoked after 11 months of passing of the impugned orders . ( 10 ) ON merits it is pleaded that the claim of Smt. Ram Piari was not barred by limitation and that respondent No. 6 had not played any fraud and at the time the membership was got transferred by respondent No. 6 in favour of his father there was no bye-law of the Society which made respondent No. 6 ineligible to remain member of the Society. It is also assered by respondent No. 7 that his application for being substituted in place of deceased Smt. Ram Piari virtually stood allowed as the only dispute raised before respondent No. 2 was that the Will left by Smt. Ram Piari was not probated and so the same could not be acted upon when in law no such probate of a Will was required to be taken. So, it is pleaded that impugned orders are not vitiated with any illegalities so as to be quashed by (his Court in writ jurisdiction. In rejoinder the peritioner-Society controverted the pleas raised by respondent No. 7 and reiterated its pleas. ( 11 ) FROM the facts it is quite evident that Smt. Ram Piari s application moved under Section 60 of the Act on September 14, 1988, was hopelessly barred by time inasmuch as her right, if any, to be substituted as member of the Society in place of her husband arose on death of her husband on March 19, 1981. At least the cause of action for asserting such a claim definitely arose to Smt. Ram Piari when on July 17,1983, respondent No. 8 Smt. Sangeeta had withdrawn the share money from the Society. At least the cause of action for asserting such a claim definitely arose to Smt. Ram Piari when on July 17,1983, respondent No. 8 Smt. Sangeeta had withdrawn the share money from the Society. By virtue of residuary Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in case any suit was to be brought by Smt. Ram Piari for claiming any relief on the basis of her being the legal heir of her deceased husband for getting the membership of the Society such a suit ought to have been brought within three years from the date the right to sue accrued. It is quite clear that in case the suit, if could be brought of a particular claim, becomes time-barred, there could arise no occasion for such a time-barred claim to be entertained for reference to an Arbitrator. The learned Counsel for the respondent No. 7 has argued that the question whether the claim of Smt. Ram Piari was barred by limitation could have been decided by respondent No. 2 and such plea being not raised before respondent No. 2 the petitioner-Society is not entitled to raise such a question in writ proceedings. ( 12 ) WE do not agree with this contention. After all the question of limitation on the admitted facts is a question of pure law. Such a question of law can, in our view, be raised by the petitioner-Society at any stage. Any admission made on point of law is not binding. In case the impugned orders stand vitiated by an error of law, the High Court has the power to quash such illegal orders by taking resort to the writ jurisdiction. ( 13 ) ,lndr. CHETKARJHA v. Dr. Viswanath Prasad Verma and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1832 , it was held by the Supreme Court that it is true that in a writ petition for certiorari a superior Court would not interfere on the mere ground of an error of fact or even of law but if the error of law is apparent on the record or consists of a 241 misconstruction of a law on which assumption of jurisdiction is made which otherwise does not exist, a certiorari can issue. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent, on the ther and, has argued that as award has been given by the Arbitrator under the provisions of the Act and the same having been not challenged in accordance with the provisions of the said statute, same having become final, is not open to be challenged by filing a writ petition and he has REFERRED TO to Satish Kumar and Others v. Surinderkuntar and Others, AIR 1970 SC 833 , in which it was laid down that the award is, in fact, a final adjudication of a Court of the parties owen choice, and until impeached upon sufficient grounds in an appropriate proceeding, an award, which is on the face of it regular, is conclusive upon the merits of the controversy submitted. There is no dispute about this proposition of law but the same is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is clear that this law would apply if the award on the face of it is regular and is not vitiated by law. In the present case, the reference as well as the award are against law and the error of law is apparent from the facts appearing on the record. In Cpt. Dushyant Somal v. Smt. ushma Somal and Others, AIR 1981 SC 1026 , the Supreme Court has laid down in para 7 of the judgment that it is true that an alternate remedy ordinarily inhibits a prerogative writ but it is not an impassable hurdle. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the impugned orders being vitiated by illegality apparent on the face of the record are liable to be quashed. We allow the writ petition, make the rule absolute and quash the impugned orders. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed. 54 (1994) DELHI LAW TIMES 241 DELHI HIGH COURT Present: Mr. P. N. Nag,j. POORAN CHAND -Petitioner versus D. D. A. and ANR.-Respondents C. W. No. 1183 of 1992-Decided on 12. 4. 1994 Licence Fee - Allotted Piao site on compassionale ground - On licence basis @ Rs. 324. 00 p. m.- Demand raising the licence fee - Exorbitant and arbitrary - Whether correct? - (Yes ). Held: In our opinion, ends of justice would be met if the petitioner is asked to pay the licence fee from 16. 2. 1990 to 15. 324. 00 p. m.- Demand raising the licence fee - Exorbitant and arbitrary - Whether correct? - (Yes ). Held: In our opinion, ends of justice would be met if the petitioner is asked to pay the licence fee from 16. 2. 1990 to 15. 2. 1991 at the rate of. R^. 1190. 00. per month (i. e. , double the licence fee fixed earlier by the respondent plus ^ increase thereon as per the policy of the respondent ). From 16. 2. 1991. to 15. 1. 1992 and onwards upto 15. 1. 1994 the petitioner should be asked to pay^^he licence fee per month by enhancing the licence fee at the rate of 5% per annum as per the policy adopted by the respondent. A copy of the new policy dated 10. 11. 1993 has been filed in Court by the petitioner, which is taken on record. According to this policy where the