JUDGMENT V. S. KOKJE, J. - This order shall govern disposal of Cr. R. Nos. 236 of 1989, 237 of 1989 and 238 of 1989 as the point involved being same and the cases having been heard simultaneously. The short question in this case is as to whether an offence under section 46(1)(d) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958 (for short "the Act"), is a continuing offence for the purpose of section 472. Cr. P.C. and therefore, the bar of section 468, Cr. P.C would not apply to the prosecutions launched against the non-applicant. 2. On September 3, 1986, complaints were filed by a Sales Tax Officer against the non-applicant complaining of an offence under section 46(1)(d) of the Act alleging that the non-applicant commenced the business of manufacturing and selling oil and oil cake on May 16, 1975, under the registration obtained from the Sales Tax Department. The non-applicant is said to have carried on this business between May 16, 1975 to November 3, 1975. On February 6, 1982, an order reassessing the sales tax was passed and a demand of Rs. 10,800 was raised. The assessment order and demand notice was served on the non-applicant on February 23, 1984 and he was expected to deposit the amount of Rs. 10,800 within 30 days. The offence is said to have been committed because the amount so assessed was not deposited by the non-applicant. These are the facts involved in Cr. R. No. 235 of 1989. In Cr. R. No. 236 of 1989, the tax due is for the period November 4, 1975 to October 23, 1976 and the tax assessed and demanded is Rs. 91,901 by order dated December 26, 1980, out of which only Rs. 1,000 was deposited. In Cr. R. No. 237 of 1989 the amount of Rs. 4,016 is due towards sales tax and the assessment order is dated December 26, 1980. The demand notice was served on the non-applicant on February 19, 1981. In Cr. R. No. 238 of 1989 the amount of tax due is Rs. 17,155 due for the period between October 24, 1976 to December 11, 1977. The demand notice was served on November 20, 1981. All these complaints were filed in the court of C.J.M., Ratlam, on September 3, 1986. In Cr. R. No. 238 of 1989 the amount of tax due is Rs. 17,155 due for the period between October 24, 1976 to December 11, 1977. The demand notice was served on November 20, 1981. All these complaints were filed in the court of C.J.M., Ratlam, on September 3, 1986. An objection as to limitation was raised on the ground that for an offence under section 46(1)(d) of the Act maximum sentence of six months only can be imposed with Rs. 1,000 as fine. Therefore, complaints had to be filed within one year of the commission of the offence. The C.J.M. upheld the objection and dismissed the complaint as it was beyond limitation. The State has now come up in these revision applications contending that an offence under section 46(1)(d) of the Act was a continuing offence and, therefore, the complaint could not have been held to be barred by limitation. 3. In State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi AIR 1973 SC 908 the question before the Supreme Court was whether failure to furnish the annual return either in the prescribed forms or within the time prescribed for it would be a continuing offence or not ? In para 5 of this judgment, the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "5. Continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuance and is distinguishable from the one which is committed once and for all. It is one of those offences which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or its requirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and recurs, there is the offence committed. The distinction between the two kinds of offences is between an act or omission which constitutes an offence once and for all and an act or omission which continues and therefore, constitutes a fresh offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all." Ultimately in para 9 the Supreme Court held as under : "9. In the case of a continuing offence, there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of an offence which takes place when an act or omission is committed once and for all." Ultimately in para 9 the Supreme Court held as under : "9. Regulation 3 read with section 66 of the Mines Act makes failure to furnish annual returns for the preceding year by the 21st of January of the succeeding year an offence. The language of regulation 3 clearly indicates that an owner, manager, etc., of a mine would be liable to the penalty if he were to commit an infringement of the regulation and that infringement consists in the failure to furnish returns on or before January 21 of the succeeding year. The infringement, therefore, occurs on January 21 of the relevant year and is complete on the owner failing to furnish the annual returns by that day. The regulation does not lay down that the owner, manager, etc., of the mine concerned would be guilty of an offence if he continues to carry on the mine without furnishing the returns or that the offence continues until the requirement of regulation 3 is complied with. In other words regulation 3 does not render a continued disobedience or non-compliance of it an offence. As in the case of a construction of a wall in violation of a rule or a bye-law of a local body, the offence would be complete once and for all as soon as such construction is made a default occurs in furnishing the returns by the prescribed date. There is nothing in regulation 3 or in any other provision in the Act or the Regulations which renders the continued non-compliance an offence until its requirement is carried out." 4. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Wire Machinery Manufacturing Corporation v. State [1979] 54 FJR 244 (Cal); 1978 Cr LJ 839 was faced with the question as to whether offence under section 14(1A), (2), 14(A)(1) and section 14-AA of the Employees Provident Fund Scheme read with para 76(b) of the Scheme framed under that Act were continuing offences. Relying on State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi case AIR 1973 SC 908 the court held the offence not to be a continuing offence and held the complaints to be time-barred. 5. Relying on State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi case AIR 1973 SC 908 the court held the offence not to be a continuing offence and held the complaints to be time-barred. 5. The learned counsel for the State has cited the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria v. State of M.P. AIR 1984 SC 1688 where it was held that offence of non-payment of contribution by employer to provident fund is a continuing offence and limitation under section 468 does not apply. The other case cited was the decision of the Supreme Court in Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Balu Jeevappa Upparatti (1991) 2 SCC 141 wherein it was held that a trespass punishable under sections 441 and 448, IPC was a continuing offence. 6. It is, therefore, clear that applying the test set down by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi AIR 1973 SC 908 it is to be decided in each case as to whether offence charged was a continuing one or not. It would be necessary to reproduce section 46(1)(d) of the Act, which reads as under : 46. Offences and penalties. - (1) Whoever - (a) to (c) ................. (d) without reasonable cause fails to pay the tax due within the time allowed; or (e) to (q) ................ shall without prejudice to the recovery of any tax or penalty that may be due from him be punishable with - (i) imprisonment which may extend to three years and a fine not exceeding two thousand rupees in respect of offences under clauses (b), (c), (f), (h), (i), (j) and (n); and (ii) imprisonment which may extend to six months or a fine not exceeding one thousand rupees or both in respect of offences not covered by clause (i) above; and when the offence is a continuing offence, a further fine not exceeding - (a) rupees one hundred in respect of offences covered by clause (i); and (b) rupees fifty in respect of offences covered by clause (ii); for every day the offence continues : The plain meaning of the words "fails to pay the tax due within the time allowed" can only be that such failure constitutes a one-time offence and is not a continuing offence. Duty to pay the tax within the time is not performed as soon as the time allowed is over. Duty to pay the tax within the time is not performed as soon as the time allowed is over. Such a defaulter has failed to pay the tax due within the time allowed and whether the tax is paid one day after the time is over or one year after the time is over, would make no difference. He would be guilty all the same of the breach of the aforesaid provision. A person who fails to pay tax within the time continues to be a defaulter till he pays the amount but he does not commit the offence everyday as continuing to be a defaulter has not been made the offence under the Act. The provisions which were being considered by the Supreme Court in Bhagirath Kanoria's case AIR 1984 SC 1688 were under a social welfare legislation, namely, Employees Provident Fund and Family Pension Fund Act. In that case non-payment of contribution by the employer was held a continuing offence mainly on the grounds expressed by the court in para 19 of its judgment in the following words : "The question whether a particular offence is a continuing offence must necessarily depend upon the language of the statute which creates that offence, the nature of the offence and, above all, the purpose which is intended to be achieved by constituting the particular act as an offence. Turning to the matters before us, the offence of which the appellants are charged is the failure to pay the employer's contribution before the due date. Considering the object and purpose of this provision, which is to ensure the welfare of workers, we find it impossible to hold that the offence is not of a continuing nature." 7. In the case before us, the question is of recovery of sales tax. It is as much the duty of the officers of the State charged with the duty to enforce the Act to prosecute defaulters within a time-frame as it is the duty of the tax-payers to pay the tax within the time allowed by the statute. The normal process of recovery of tax is available to the officers of the State and prosecution is not the only recourse for effecting recovery. The normal process of recovery of tax is available to the officers of the State and prosecution is not the only recourse for effecting recovery. In the facts and circumstances of the case and looking to the language of the provision it cannot be said that the offence can be taken to be a continuing one not attracting the bar under section 468, Cr.P.C. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, I confirm the view taken by the learned Magistrate and dismiss these revision applications. Petitions dismissed.