Judgment : The petitioner stands charged for the offences under Secs. 467, 468, 420 and 201, I.P.C. in C.C.No. 8327 of 1988 in the Court of VII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras, on the allegation that he had cheated the Mint Street Branch of Indian Bank to the tune of Rs.20,000 by, issuing a duplicate pass book to the customer and withdrawing the money from the Savings Bank Account of one Vedavalli Ammal while he was the clerk-in-charge of the S.B. Account of that Branch of the Bank. Proceedings were initiated against him on 5. 1988 on which date he was arrested. The charge-sheet was filed on 8. 1988 and the trial commenced on 112. 1988. On the hearing dated P.W.1 T.V.R. Palaninathan was examined. The next witness P.W.2 was examined on 1. 1989. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application under Sec. 91, Crl.P.C. to summon certain document. The petition was dismissed and he moved this Court in Crl.M.P.Nos. 3920 and 4264 of 1989 to set aside the said order. On 4. 1989 those petitions were allowed. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in spite of the directions of this Court to cause production of certain documents required by him, the prosecution has not evinced any interest in complying with the same. So far no reason has been given before the trial court for the non-production of the documents. P.W.1 was also not produced for cross-examination inspite of repeated directions by learned VII Metropolitan Magistrate. In the meanwhile, P.W.1 himself was found guilty of misappropriating the funds, of the same branch of Indian Bank to the extent of Rs.1.92 crores. The said T.V.R. Palaninathan is avoiding the court ever since he was suspended. Even though the petitioner and his counsel were regularly appearing in court and praying that the case may be taken up and proceeded with expeditiously, no progress has so far been made after 11. 1989. The petitioner has so far attended 28 hearings. Though learned Magistrate had given a direction by way of a search warrant authorising the police to search the Mint Street Branch of the Indian Bank and produce the documents, the police has not moved in this direction. The petitioner is under suspension from June, 1988 and his marriage has been stopped on account of this case. Though learned Magistrate had given a direction by way of a search warrant authorising the police to search the Mint Street Branch of the Indian Bank and produce the documents, the police has not moved in this direction. The petitioner is under suspension from June, 1988 and his marriage has been stopped on account of this case. He is the sole bread-winner of his family and he is undergoing untold mental agony and suffering on account of the pendency of this case. Hence, he seeks in this application to call for the records in C.C.No. 8329 of 1988 pending on the file of VII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras and quash the proceedings therein. .2. Whereas learned Public Prosecutor contends that the prosecution is not responsible for the delay in the conduct of the case. Instead, it is the petitioner who is adopting delaying tactics. Even, if there is delay, it cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings. Secs. 420, 467, 468 and 201, I.P.C. under which the petitioner is charged are offences punishable with imprisonment for 7 years, 10 years and 7 years respectively. And there is no period of limitation for the conclusion of the trial. 3. Art. 21 of the Constitution declares that not person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the law. The right to a speedy trial is not expressly guaranteed constitutional right in India, but fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Art. 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. 4. A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and another, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1701, cited by both sides lays down that an accused has a right to be tried speedily. Correspondingly, it is the obligation of the State to respect and ensure this right. Where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial often accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. The Supreme Court has also pointed out in this case that one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. Where the court comes to the conclusion that right to speedy trial often accused has been infringed the charges or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. The Supreme Court has also pointed out in this case that one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. As is often pointed out, “delay is a known defence tactic”. Since the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Nonavailability of witnesses and disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the interest of prosecution. Therefore, in every case, where the Right to speedy trial is alleged to have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is-who is responsible for the delay? While determining whether undue delay has occurred, one must have regard to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the work load of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions and so on-what is called, the systemic delays. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the accused. Some delays may be indeed work to his advantage. Whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, against depends upon the facts of the case. Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several relevant factors and determine in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a case. 5. The question whether a conviction should be quashed on the ground of delayed trial depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If the accused is found to have been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence and it would be said that the accused had thus been denied an adequate opportunity to defend himself, the conviction would certainly have to go. But if nothing is shown and there are no circumstances entitling the court to raise a presumption that the accused had been prejudiced there will be no justification to quash the conviction on the ground of delayed trial only. But if nothing is shown and there are no circumstances entitling the court to raise a presumption that the accused had been prejudiced there will be no justification to quash the conviction on the ground of delayed trial only. In deciding the question whether there has been a denial of right to a speedy trial in the present case, we have to take into consideration whether the defendant himself was responsible for a part of the delay and whether he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the delay. Speedy trial or other expressions conveying the said concept are necessarily relative in nature. It is not possible to lay down any time schedule for conclusion of criminal proceedings. The nature of offence, the number of accused, the number of witnesses, the work load in the particular court, means of communication and several other circumstances have to be kept in mind. We must also bear in mind that in Antulay’s case, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1701, the Supreme Court has refused to fix any time-limit for trial of offences stating that it is neither advisable nor practicable. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. In every case of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is the duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon the complaint. .6. Learned counsel for the petitioner took me through the docket entries of the case. We find from the records that as early as on 11. 1988 the petitioner has filed an application before the trial court to issue process to cause production of the report sent by P.W.1. Palaninathan to Head Office and Zonal Office and the Vigilance Office report to the Zonal Office. He has also prayed for summoning the Token Register copy for the relevant period. However P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined in chief on 112. 1988 and 1. 1989 respectively and their cross-examination was deferred as per the request of the petitioner subsequently his request to produce the documents was rejected. Thereafter he took up the matter in revision before this Court. In its order dated 4. However P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined in chief on 112. 1988 and 1. 1989 respectively and their cross-examination was deferred as per the request of the petitioner subsequently his request to produce the documents was rejected. Thereafter he took up the matter in revision before this Court. In its order dated 4. 1989 this Court has found that the petitioner was justified in asking for the production of Bank records of T.V.R. Palaninathan examined as P.W.1. to impeach his credibility in cross-examination. But in spite of the direction of this Court, the prosecution has not evinced any interest in producing the documents. And no reason whatsoever has been given before the trial court for the non-production of these documents. The petitioner produced the copy of the said order before the trial court on 16. 1989, On the subsequent hearing dates 7. 1989 and 8. 1989 the witness and documents were not produced even though the petitioner was present in court. On the next three hearing dates also the same was the position. The case was transferred from the file of III Metropolitan Magistrate to that of VII Metropolitan Magistrate on 211. 1989. On 30.11.1989 the court suo motu adjourned the case to 12. 1989. On that day the petitioner was present and summons were ordered to be issued to the witnesses. On 212. 1989 three witnesses were available in court, while P.W.1 was not present. The documents directed to be produced by the High Court were also not produced. Thereafter the case underwent 28 adjournments till this Court granted stay on 20.8.1991 in Crl.M.P.No. 3689 of 1991. On none of these hearing dates the documents were made available as per the directions of the court. Except on 110. 1990, P.W.1 was not present on any of the hearing dates. 7. It is the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner that there is an inordinate delay in causing the production of witnesses by the prosecution before the trial court as a result of which the case had been adjourned innumerable times causing agony and anguish to the accused/petitioner. Even the direction of the Magistrate to search the premises of the Mint Street Branch of the Indian Bank and produce the documents remains unexecuted. The petitioner is under suspension from June, 1988 and his marriage has been stopped on account of this case. 8. Even the direction of the Magistrate to search the premises of the Mint Street Branch of the Indian Bank and produce the documents remains unexecuted. The petitioner is under suspension from June, 1988 and his marriage has been stopped on account of this case. 8. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor contended that the petitioner was responsible for the delay as he or the other accused remained absent for most of the hearing dates and so it cannot be said that there was any lethargy on the part of the prosecution. However, a scrutiny of the docket entries referred to above does not support his claim. The prosecution has not shown any reason for not producing the documents as directed by this Court in its order dated 4. 1989 even though the case underwent several hearings thereafter. The docket further discloses thai the petitioner was present throughout except on one hearing while the witnesses were not. Till the stay was obtained on 20.8.1991, it does not appear that the prosecution has cared to produce the documents so as to enable the petitioner to get along with the case by cross-examining P.W.1. No doubt delay by itself will not entitle the petitioner to have the proceedings quashed. However, in this case the lethargy on the part of the prosecution is apparent and what the petitioner was made to undergo was only harassment. Even in this Court the Additional Public Prosecutor was unable to say what exactly prevented the prosecution from producing the documents required by the petitioner and directed to be made available by this Court long back. We also find from the records that the petitioner made an endeavour to have an early hearing date fixed for the hearing of this O.P. which also indicates his anxiety to see the end of his agony. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is under suspension from 1988 onwards. It is not disputed that P.W.1 himself has now been involved for misappropriation of bank’s funds to the tune of Rs.1.92 crores. So, it is not known how far his version could carry conviction with the trial court. This may be one of the reasons for the prosecution losing interest in the case. 9. In S.G. Nain v. Union of India, 1992 Crl.L.J. 560, cited by the petitioner the prosecution against the appellant was pending for almost 14 years. So, it is not known how far his version could carry conviction with the trial court. This may be one of the reasons for the prosecution losing interest in the case. 9. In S.G. Nain v. Union of India, 1992 Crl.L.J. 560, cited by the petitioner the prosecution against the appellant was pending for almost 14 years. On going through the complaint the court was not sure whether an offence under Sec. 409, I.P.C. was even prima facie made out. Held: "Apart from mental agony it must have adversely affected him in his service career. In the facts of this case it is difficult rather impossible to a fair trial the appellant after such a long time lapse. It would be sneer waste of public time and money apart from causing harassment to the appellant. It is no doubt correct that this appeal has been pending in this Court for almost eleven years but that is no ground to permit this stale-prosecution to go on. It is not the state action but its effect on the citizen which is relevant. And it would not be in the interest of justice to permit the prosecution against the appellant to continue. 10. In State of U.P. v. Purushottam, 1991 Crl.L.J. 741, next decision cited by him the F.I.R. under Secs. 120-B and 420, I.P.C., was registered in 1958 and the charge sheet was submitted in 1959. However, the charges were framed in 1976. Held, considering the fact that the prosecution was pending for over three decades and even the trial had not yet commenced, it would be travesty of justice if they permit the prosecution to continue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the criminal prosecution. 11. In S. Guin and others v. Grindlays Bank Limited, (1986)1 Crimes 289 (S.C.), the appellants were prosecuted under Sec. 341 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 36AD of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 for having obstructed the officers of the Bank from lawfully entering the premises of a Branch of the Bank and also obstructed the transaction of normal banking business without reasonable cause. In that case the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner mainly weighed with the court in directing that the proceedings ought not to be continued any further. 12. In that case the nature of the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner mainly weighed with the court in directing that the proceedings ought not to be continued any further. 12. Whereas in Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan, (1990) 1 Crimes 377, the appellant was Manager of a Central Co-operative Bank. Prosecution was launched against him for embezzlement of money. The proceedings commenced in the year 1963 and eight cases were pending trial. The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court was sought to be invoked for quashing the proceedings on the ground that the inordinate delay and the consequential harassment to the appellant required exercise of such power to prevent the abuse of the process of court and to secure the ends of justice. The High Court, after detailed examination of the entire facts and history of the pending proceedings as well as the causes for the delay, concluded that it was not at all in the interest of justice to quash the proceedings. The prosecution should come to its legitimate end and accused should not be allowed to abuse the process of court by delaying himself the criminal proceedings which he was facing by his own conduct. It was submitted before the Supreme Court that the proceedings under Sec. 408 or 409 of the Indian Penal Code were pending for over 25 years and the prolongation of the trial on the part of the appellant amounted to persecution and the proceedings should have been quashed by the High Court. In spite of passage of several years, no evidence worth the name was recorded. Holding that though trial had been unduly protracted due to various causes, and it is no doubt regrettable feature, but having regard to the nature of the allegations made and availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, held it has not expedient to terminate the proceedings at that stage, on account of lapse of time alone, by invoking the inherent power of the court. The circumstances of the case warranted only issuance of an appropriate direction for the expeditious disposal of the pending proceedings and allow the law to take its own course to prevent miscarriage or justice. Ultimately the direction of the High Court to the trial court to proceed with the cases against the appellant day-to day and decide them expeditiously were upheld. 13. Ultimately the direction of the High Court to the trial court to proceed with the cases against the appellant day-to day and decide them expeditiously were upheld. 13. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Pavithran, 1990 Crl.L.J. 1306. The Supreme Court has laid down that no general and wide proposition of law can be formulated that whenever there is inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency in completing the investigation, such delay, ipso facto, would provide for quashing the First Information Report or the proceedings arising there from. Besides, it is not possible to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform application for speedy investigation or to stipulate any arbitrary period of limitation within which investigation in a criminal case should be completed. 14. The entire facts and the history of the proceedings as narrated above reveal that the prolongation of the trial was only due to the supine indifference exhibited on the part of the prosecution in securing either the presence of witnesses or causing production of documents as ordained by this Court. On a careful consideration of the materials in entirely, I am of the view that no useful purpose would be served by giving any direction to the trial court to dispose of the case within a time frame and the prosecution to render its assistance properly. Such an order to continue the proceedings would make the prosecution to become persecution. I am conscious of the fact that the complaint is of the year 1988 only and it cannot be said considering the present day standards there is an inordinate delay in the disposal of the case. However, it is important to bear in mind that P.W.1 the main witness for the prosecution himself has been charged for embezzlement of bank funds to the tune of Rs.1.92crores. It is difficult to get over the fact that in spite of specific directions from this Court, the prosecution is unable to produce the documents required by the petitioner for the cross-examination of P.Ws.1 and 2. So continuation of the trial would be sheer waste of public time and money apart from harrassment to the present petitioner. Certainly it cannot be stated that in this case the petitioner has been responsible for the delay in the progress of the trial. It is not an instance where, the accused is trying to take advantage of his own wrong. Certainly it cannot be stated that in this case the petitioner has been responsible for the delay in the progress of the trial. It is not an instance where, the accused is trying to take advantage of his own wrong. On the other hand, from the commencement the petitioner has been demanding speedy trial and yet he is not given one. The grievance of learned counsel for the petitioner that apart from mental agony the proceedings have adversely affected him in his getting marriage is a justifiable one. The very fact of being accused of a crime is cause for concern. It affects the reputation and the standing of the person among his colleagues and in the society. It is a cause for worry and expense. If it is serious offence, the man may stand to lose his life, liberty, career and all that the cherishes. The effect of the pendency of the proceedings on the citizen is also a relevant factor in an application of this nature. In spite of complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, the prosecution herein has failed to make an endeavour to justify and explain the delay. If we balance and weigh the several relevant factors, it is evident, that the proceedings herein deserve to be quashed. 15. In the result, the petition is allowed and the proceedings in C.C.No. 8327 of 1988 in the court of VII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras, are hereby quashed.