Judgment : In this application the petitioner has, inter alia, prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from acting pursuant to and in furtherance of the order dated June 14, 1994 issued by the Registrar, Jadavpur University as contained in Annexure 'S' to the writ application whereby and whereunder the petitioner's representation for stay of the departmental proceedings pending against him was rejected. 2. A First Information Report was lodged against the petitioner on 18th April, 1993, inter alia, alleging : "I. The Executive Council of the 1Jniversity vide Resolution No. 56, dated February 21, 1987 constituted a cell and handed over its charge to Sri Basudev Mitra, Junior Superintendent, Sri Prasanta Banerjee, Junior Superintendent and Sri Pabitra Bhattacharyya, Senior Assistant to work in House Building Loan/Advances Fund Cell of the University till May 31, 1989. II. During this period the housing building loan amounting to Rs. 65,000/- only was sanctioned in favour of Sri Basudev Mitra and another sum of Rs. 43,000/- only was sanctioned in favour of one Gopal Halder, Senior Durwan. III. The loan amount of Sri Basudev Mitra and Sri Gopal Halder have duly paid through Account payee cheques on United Bank of India, Jadavpur Branch. IV. During the same period, like other cheques, 2 cheques bearing No. 198059 dated April 19, 1989 amounting to Rs. 19,500/- in favour of Sri Basudev Mitra and another cheque bearing No. 198094 dated April 10, 1989 amounting to Rs. 5,500/- in favour of Sri Gopal Halder were issued on the Jadavpur University Branch, State Bank of India, J. K. Branch. V. After a lapse of 4 years it was found that the said two cheques were not recorded in the disbursement records of the cash book and in the ledger, folio maintained for Sri Mitra and Sri Halder respectively. VI. The Pass Book and cheque book issued by the S. B. I. were not traceable and thereafter missing. VII. The statement given by M/s. Prasanta Banerjee and Pabitra Bhattacharyya, it was revealed that Sri Basudev Mitra was in charge of the Cell relating to House Building Loan Fund for all practical purposes. VIII. The pass book and cheque book and other relevant documents were in custody of Sri Basudev Mitra, key, of the locker was also in the absolute possession of Sri Basudev Mitra till May 31, 1989. VIII. The pass book and cheque book and other relevant documents were in custody of Sri Basudev Mitra, key, of the locker was also in the absolute possession of Sri Basudev Mitra till May 31, 1989. IX. Thereafter when Sri Prasanta Banerjee took the charge of Cell he found that some documents including pass-book and cheque book were missing Sri Mitra did not report the matter to the appropriate authority and Sri Gopal Halder in this Statement stated that be was not aware of the cheque. X. The Registrar on behalf of the University arranged every thing that was warranted by and prescribed under the University statutes/rules and accordingly made an enquiry into the matter, all connected documents were lying at present in the Registrar's custody and all would be made available as and when asked for. XI. The proceedings against Basudev Mitra have already been initiated as per provisions laid down in the statutes of the University." 3. On or about 10th April, 1993 the petitioner was placed under suspension allegedly on similar set of facts for which the F.I.R. has been lodged. 4. It is admitted that the aforementioned criminal case is still pending investigation; whereas in the departmental proceedings witnesses are being examined. In the aforementioned departmental proceedings the petitioner had been served with the charge-sheet on June 10, 1993. 5. On June 10, 1993 the petitioner filed a reply to the said charges, a copy whereof is annexed to the writ application and marked as annexure 'K'. 6. The petitioner in his aforementioned reply although denied and disputed the charges by disclosing his defence purported to have stated that as the criminal proceedings against him is pending in a Court of Law, he would like to disclose his entire defence after obtaining the opinion of his lawyer. 7. The petitioner thereafter was directed to appear before the Enquiring Authority by a Memorandum dated 14.6.1993. It is admitted that the enquiry proceedings are being held and the petitioner had been attending the same. The petitioner has also sought for the permission of the enquiring authority to have the assistance of a lawyer which was rejected by an order dated May 21, 1990. 8. The petitioner allegedly asked the enquiring authority and also the disciplinary authority to stay their hands. The petitioner has also sought for the permission of the enquiring authority to have the assistance of a lawyer which was rejected by an order dated May 21, 1990. 8. The petitioner allegedly asked the enquiring authority and also the disciplinary authority to stay their hands. The petitioner only on 20th May, 1994 filed a representation in writing before the enquiring authority praying for stay of disciplinary proceedings pending the aforementioned criminal proceedings. The said representation was filed after the petitioner received a peremptory notice from the enquiring authority fixing May 21, 1994 for holding the departmental proceedings. 9. On 11th June, 1994 the enquiring authority rejected the said prayer. The petitioner thereafter filed an application for stay of the departmental proceedings before the disciplinary authority which was also rejected by reason of the impugned order dated 15th June, 1994. The petitioner has also received a notice from the enquiring authority whereby and whereunder the next date for further enquiry was fixed on 8th June, 1994. 10. Mr. Dutta, learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner submitted that keeping in view of the fact the disciplinary authority himself has lodged the First Information Report and further in view of the fact that the criminal charges as also the charges framed against the petitioner in the disciplinary proceedings are beged on same set of facts, the disciplinary proceedings should be stayed. 11. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (1) 1988 (2) LLJ page 47, Kusheswar Dubey v. M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., (2) 1993 (2) LLJ page 320, A. R. Kavi v. Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & Ors. and (3) 1993(1) LLJ page 168, P. J. Sunderrajjan and Another v. Unit Trust of India and Anr. as also a decision of this Court in (4) 1989(1) Calcutta Law Times page 80, Amarendra Nalh Pan v. Union of India & Ors. 12. Mr. Roy appearing on behalf of the respondents 2, 3 and 4, on the other hand, submitted that it is not a fit case in which the departmental proceedings should be directed to be stayed inasmuch as many witnesses have already been examined. It was further submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents that it is not known as to when the charge-sheet would be filed by the Police and criminal proceedings would start against the petitioner. It was further submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents that it is not known as to when the charge-sheet would be filed by the Police and criminal proceedings would start against the petitioner. It was also submitted that the police may not submit any charge-sheet at all and in this view of the matter it cann9t be said that the petitioner will be prejudiced if the departmental proceedings are allowed to be continue. 13. The learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner in reply submitted that the witnesses in the enquiry-proceedings' have been examined behind the back of the petitioner. In this writ application this Court is, not concerned with the legality and/or validity of the departmental proceedings. 14. The sale question which arises for consideration in this application is as to whether the departmental proceedings should be directed to be stayed pending the aforementioned criminal proceedings. 15. Kuseshwar Dubey's case (supra) arose out or a suit wherein an order of injunction was passed by the learned Trial Court. In that case, it was held as follows :- "According to Mr. Jain for the appellant, the legal position settled by this Court supported the stand that the disciplinary action had to be stayed till the criminal case was over. He relied upon the decision in The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, and Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen. He also referred in the course of his submission to the decisions of different High Courts in support of his propositions, two cases out of the several ones of the High Courts he relied upon are Kusi Ram v. Union of India and Project Manager, O. N. G. C. v. Lal Chand Wazir Chandna, Pathak, C.J., as he then was, in the Himachal case indicated that fair play required the postponing of the criminal trial and Thakkar, J. as our learned brother then was in the Gujarat case had also taken a similar view. We would like to point out that there are authorities in support of the position that there is nothing wrong in parallel proceedings being taken one by way of the disciplinary proceeding and the other in the Criminal Court. We would like to point out that there are authorities in support of the position that there is nothing wrong in parallel proceedings being taken one by way of the disciplinary proceeding and the other in the Criminal Court. Reference may be made to decision of this Court in fang Bahadur Singh v. Baji Niwari and some decisions of High Courts, such as, Rama P. C. v. Superintendent of Police, Kolar and Anr. All Mohd and Others v. Chairman, T. A. and C., Udham-Pur, Moulindra Singh v. The Deputy Commissioner and Others and Shaikh Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Office, Chinglepet. Mr. Jain contended that we should settle the law in a straight jacket formula as judicial opinion appeared to be conflicting. We do not propose to hazard such a step as that would create greater hardship and, individual situations may not be available to be met and thereby injustice is likely to ensue. (Underlining is mind for emphasis)". 16. In the Delhi Cloth and General Mills case (supra) it was pointed out by this Court:- 'It is true that very often employers stay enquiries pending the decision of the criminal trial Courts and that is fair; but we cannot say that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the Criminal Trial Court before taking action against an employee. In Sri Bimal Kanta Mukherjee v. M/s. Nesman Works (1)- this was the view taken by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. We may, however, add that if the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial Court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced'....... 17. In Tata Oil Mill's case (supra), Gajendragadkar, C.J., spoke for a three Judge Bench thus :- 'There is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal proceedings. In Tata Oil Mill's case (supra), Gajendragadkar, C.J., spoke for a three Judge Bench thus :- 'There is yet another point which remains to be considered. The Industrial Tribunal appears to have taken the view that since criminal proceedings had been started against Raghavan, the domestic enquiry should have been stayed pending the final disposal of the said criminal proceedings. As this Court has held in the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, it desirable that if the incident giving rise to a charge framed against a workman in a domestic enquiry is being tried in a criminal Court, the employer should stay the domestic enquiry pending the final disposal of the criminal case......' 18. In Jang Bahadur's c'ase (supra) this Court said :- 'The issue in the disciplinary proceedings is whether the employee is guilty of the charge on which it is proposed to take action against him. The same issue may arise for decision in a civil or criminal proceeding pending in a Court. But the pendency of the Court proceeding does not bar the taking of disciplinary action. The power of taking such actions vested in the disciplinary authority. The civil or criminal Court has no such power. The initiation and continuation of disciplinary proceedings in good faith is not calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice in the pending Court proceeding. The employee is free to move the Court for an order restraining the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings. If he obtains a stay order, a wilful violation of the order would of course amount to contempt of Court. In the absence of a stay order of the disciplinary authority is free to exercise its lawful powers. The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet, there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the Court. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the Court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should be or should not be such simultaneously of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline.' 19. It is, therefore, clear that in that case, no law as such has been laid down. However, in the Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan (supra), and Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Its Workmen (supra), the Supreme Court has clearly pointed out that it is a matter between the employer and the employee. It is, therefore, clear that the question as to whether the departmental proceedings should be stayed pending criminal trial or not depends upon facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor. 20. Further the delinquent must be involved in a case of grave nature which involves complicated question of fact and only in such case, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Tata Oil Mills and Delhi Cloth Mills Ltd. (supra) that it would be desirable that the employer himself should stay the departmental proceedings. Even in terms of the decision of the Supreme Court, the petitioners do not have any legal right which can be effected by issuance of a writ of Mandamus. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that some times criminal cases remain pending for years together. In such a situation, it may, not be prudent to stay the departmental proceedings for such a long time so as to enable the delinquent to continue to be in service and to receive salary and/or subsistence allowance if he is placed under suspension, as the case may be. 21. In such a situation, it may, not be prudent to stay the departmental proceedings for such a long time so as to enable the delinquent to continue to be in service and to receive salary and/or subsistence allowance if he is placed under suspension, as the case may be. 21. In P. J. Sunderrajan & Anr. v. Unit Trust of India, reported in 1993(1) LLJ P. 168, the Supreme Court directed stay of the departmental proceedings in the facts and circumstances of the said case. No ratio can be deciphered therefrom. 22. The aforementioned decision bf the Supreme Court was distinguished by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in (5) Shri Harbhajan Singh Dhillan v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., reported in 1994(1) B. L. J. R. P. 584 in the following terms :- "In P. J. Sunderrajan case (supra) the Supreme Court appears to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The said decision is not a binding precedent within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. Evidently the Supreme Court passed the said order in view of the fact that many witnesses had already been examined in the criminal case and the trial Court was expected to complete the trial within three months" 23. The decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of A.R. Kavi v. Karnataka Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & Ors., reported in 1993(2) LLJ P. 320 supports the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, but the said decision was rendered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. In that case, stay of departmental proceedings was sought for at an early stage. 24. In the case of Amarendra Nath Pan v. Union of India & Ors., reported in CLT 1989(1) P. 80, a learned Single Judge of this Court observed as follows :- "16. On being enquired into by the Court, Mr. In that case, stay of departmental proceedings was sought for at an early stage. 24. In the case of Amarendra Nath Pan v. Union of India & Ors., reported in CLT 1989(1) P. 80, a learned Single Judge of this Court observed as follows :- "16. On being enquired into by the Court, Mr. Mitra appearing for the bank authorities, of course, could .not satisfy the Court as to why the departmental proceedings should not wait till finalisation of the Criminal Trial, as in view of the accepted principles of law in the event the writ petitioner is convicted in the Special Court, in that event, the writ petitioner would be automatically dismissed and/or removed from service, without taking recourse to formalities in the departmental proceedings and, in the alternative, if the criminal case fails for want of evidence, by order of discharge and not acquittal, in that event also, the Departmental Authorities would be entitled to proceed with the departmental enquiry, even after passing of such order of discharge by the Criminal Court, as according to this Court none of the decisions of the Supreme Court cited from the Bar had the occasion to decide the matter from the said angle, but proceeded only with the view that it would be desirable to stay the departmental enquiry, as the defence of the delinquent might be exposed. 18. After having heard the parties at length and having considered the cases cited from the Bar, in my opinion, the respondents, bank, authorities will be getting opportunity to start the departmental proceedings in the event the criminal proceedings, ends with an order of discharge". 25. In that case, evidently the discretion of Court was exercised in view of the service regulations of the Respondent Bank. 26. In this case, as would be evident from the facts stated hereinbefore, the petitioner has already disclosed his defence. 27. The petitioner in paragraphs 4 to 14 of this writ application has also explained his position relating to the charges levelled against him in the criminal case as also in the departmental proceedings. As noticed hereinbefore the petitioner has also substantially disclosed the defence. It is, therefore, not a case where the petitioner would be prejudiced if the departmental proceedings is allowed to continue. 28. As noticed hereinbefore the petitioner has also substantially disclosed the defence. It is, therefore, not a case where the petitioner would be prejudiced if the departmental proceedings is allowed to continue. 28. Moreover admittedly no charge-sheet has also been submitted in the criminal case by the investigating officer and thus investigation in that case is still pending. 29. In this situation it cannot be said that any criminal case is pending as against the petitioner. A criminal proceedings starts- when a charge-sheet is-submitted by the police and cognizance of the offence is-taken by the Court pursuant thereto. 30. Moreover it is well known that whether the departmental proceedings should be stayed by the employer in a given case or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight jacket formula valid for all cases without regard to the particularities of the individual situation. 31. Similar view has been taken by two Division Bench judgment of Patna High Court reported in (6) 1993(2) B. L. J. R. p. 1293, Gaffar Khan v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., and in the case of (7) Bikram Purti v. Union of India reported in 1994(1) Bihar Law Judgment 457 as also by the Madras High Court in (8) 1990(1) Labour Law Notes, p. 121, S. John v. Indian Airlines Corporation. 32. For the foregoing reasons, it is not a fit case in which this Court should exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioner. This application is accordingly dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.