This application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed to quash the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur dated 24.4.86 (Annexure A/2) imposing the penalty of dismissal from service. 2. The brief facts are as follows : The petitioner was initially appointed as Lower Division Clerk in the Revenue Department, Government of Manipur with effect from 9.2.67. He was later promoted as Upper Division Clerk which was regularised on 20.5.82. The petitioner was posted as the Head Clerk cum-Cashier in the office of the Sub Divisional Officer, Churachandpur and thereafter he was transferred to the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur in March, 1984 and posted as Upper Division Clerk (Revenue). The petitioner was placed under suspension on 19.4.84 and thereafter a departmental enquiry was initiated vide Annexure A/2. Along with the charges, documents and the list of witnesses were provided to the petitioner. The petitioner did not file any written statement against this charge sheet. The enquiry was fixed on 14J0.85 and on 14.10.85 the petitioner along with a medical certificate prayed for adjournment of the hearing. The medical certificate which is Annexure A/3 reads as follows : "Medical Certificate Certified that Mr. Tualzathang, aged.about 45 years has been suffering from chronic peptic ulcer and is under treatment. He is advised rest for 30 (thirty) days with effect from 14.10.86." The Enquiry Officer granted adjournment and next date was fixed for hearing on 21.10.85. On 21.10.85 also an application for adjournment was filed by the petitioner. The next date of the enquiry was fixed on 29.10.85 and on that date also the petitioner filed an application for adjournment. The next date was fixed on 4.11.85 and on that date also an application for adjournment was filed. The last date was fixed on 18.11.85 and on that date also an application for adjournment was filed. By Annexure A/5 on 28th October, 1985 the Sub-Divisional Officer, Churachandpur wrote to the District Medical Officer, Churachandpur as follows : "Sir, With reference to the subject indicated above I am to enclose herewith a true copy of Medical Certificate produced to this Office by Shri T. Tualzathang, UDC (now under suspension) for verification of its genuineness. The patient who has been advised bed rest has been seen in a healthy condition roaming in the town. The patient who has been advised bed rest has been seen in a healthy condition roaming in the town. The same may please be treated as most urgent." As the adjournment was not granted, the Enquiry Officer completed the enquiry in the absence of the petitioner. Thereafter on 2nd December, 1985 vide Annexure A/7/1 the petitioner applied that the witnesses who were examined behind his back may be recalled and he may be allowed a chance to cross-examine them for the ends of fairplay and justice. By Annexure A/7/2 on 9th December, 1985 the petitioner refused to file any statement of defence as his earlier application for re-calling the witnesses was not granted. On 9th January, 1986 the petitioner vide Annexure A/7/3 filed an application with the following prayers: (i) To inspect the papers, documents, (ii) To cross-examine the prosecution witnesses. (iii) To allow him to inspect the orders passed in day today hearing in the proceeding so as to enable him to prepare his defence statement. Earlier to it, on 3rd October, 1985 he filed an application to direct the Presenting Officer to produce certain records as mentioned in the application filed at the time of enquiry. All these prayers were rejected by the Enquiry Officer vide Annexure A/9 on 9th January, 1986. Thereafter the enquiry report was submitted vide Annexure A/11 on llth March, 1986 and the detailed report running into 15 pages the Enquiry Officer inter alia found as follows : "(a) Shri T. Tualzathang sold loan forms @ Rs. 1/- per form to the public without authority. (b) Shri T. Tualzathang earned a sum of Rs.415/- by using his station in the Government. (c) Shri T. Tualzanthang, while functioning as a Cashier in SDO, Churachandpur's office received a sum of Rs. 19,399.58 only as Govt. collection and did not deposit the said amount in the Govt. treasury thereby misappropriating the Government money." Thereafter the matter was sent to the Disciplinary Authority and the Disciplinary Authority vide Annexure A/12 considerced the whole matter afresh and in a detailed order running into 8 pages he found inter alia as follows : "As disciplinary authority under Rule 12 of CCS (CC & A) Rules, 1965,1 accept the Inquiry Report of SDO, Churachandpur. Since the charges are of extremely serious matter and have been proved beyond reasonable doubt; it is clear that the delinquent official has acted in a manner unbecoming of a Government servant in violation of the service conduct rules. By his unbecoming conduct he has not only misused his official position for illegal personal gain but has also caused a loss of Rs. 19,399.58 to the Government." Having arrived at this finding, the petitioner was dismissed from service. There was an appeal and that appeal was also rejected vide Annexure A/13 as it was time barred. Hence, this writ application. 3. I have heard Sri T. Gogonchandra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner J and Sri L. Shyamkishore Singh, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondents. 4. Sri Gogonchandra, learned counsel for the petitioner makes the following submissions: (i) The petitioner was not granted the proper opportunity to cross examine the witnesses. (ii) There was violation of the principle of natural justice, (iii) The procedural safeguards available to the petitioner was violated by the authority. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submissions places reliance on the following decisions : (i) AIR 1961 SC 1623 (State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayam). In that case the officer against whom the enquiry was proceeded was a Sub-Inspector of Police. The charge-sheet was framed against him on May 21,1951 and was delivered to him on 13th June, 1951. Before one Shamaldas, Sub-Divisional Officer (Police) the witnesses were examined. Thereafter the enquiry was taken up by the District Superintendent of Police. He framed fresh charges because he thought that the earlier charges were not clear. The witnesses were examined and cross examined by the respondents. The respondent-officer requested by .an application for certain documents may be supplied to him to make his defence. His request was granted in respect of some documents, but not with regard to all. After evidence was led against the officer, he was directed to produce his witnesses on November 13, 1951 and he was told if he did not produce the evidence on that date the enquiry would be closed. Two days earlier to this date, he repeatedly requested that the documents which he wanted to inspect before leading the evidence in defence and giving his own statement be produced. That application was rejected. Two days earlier to this date, he repeatedly requested that the documents which he wanted to inspect before leading the evidence in defence and giving his own statement be produced. That application was rejected. On November 28, 1951 the District Superintendent of Police gave his report and the officer was found guilty of all the three charges. Thereafter the petitioner was dismissed from service. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was filed and that was allowed by the High Court. In our case, the only point which is relevant is that on the argument which was made before the Court that the enquiry held by the authority was contrary to all principle of natural justice and at the enquiry the officer was not given reasonable opportunity to meet the charges framed against him. The Supreme Court relying on its earlier decision in AIR 1957 SC 882 (Union of India vs. TR Verma) pointed out as follows : "It is hardly necessary to emphasise that the right to cross-examine the witnesses who give evidence against him is a very valuable right, and if it appears that affective exercise of this right has been prevented by the Enquiry Officer by not giving to the officer relevant documents to which he is entitled, that inevitably would lead that the enquiry had not been held in accordance with rules of natural justice." Here is a case where the officer concerned was 'given the right to cross-examine the witnesses, but he failed to avail it by filing repeated applications for adjournment on the ground of his illness which was disbelieved by the authority. So, this case does not help the petitioner. (ii) AIR 1964 SC 708 (M/s Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Gangadhar & others). This was a case under the Industrial Disputes Act and the question in that case was the validity of the domestic enquiry. So, this case does not help the petitioner. (ii) AIR 1964 SC 708 (M/s Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Gangadhar & others). This was a case under the Industrial Disputes Act and the question in that case was the validity of the domestic enquiry. The Supreme Court in that case laid down the law as follows : "The minimum that the Court shall expect where witnesses are not examined from the very beginning at the inquiry in the presence of the person charged is that the person charge should be given a copy of the statements made by the witnesses which are to be used at the inquiry well in advance before the inquiry begins and it should be given at least two days before the inquiry is to begin. If this is not done and yet the witnesses are not examined in chief fully at the inquiry, it cannot be said that principles of natural justice which provide that the person charged should have an adequate opportunity of defending himself are complied with in the case of a domestic inquiry in an industrial matter." The facts of the instant case are absolutely different. So, this case also does not help the petitioner. (iii) (1975) 1SCC 155 (The State of Punjab vs. Bhagat Ram). That was a case where the Department did not supply the previous statement of the witnesses to the employee though they were utilised in the inquiry. Where the Supreme Court has laid down the law as follows : "The meaning of a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken is that the Government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself against charges on which inquiry is held. The Government servant should be given an opportunity to deny his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so by so when he is told what the charge against him are. He can do so by cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of supplying statements is that the Government servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the Government servant. Unless the statements are given to the Government servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. The object of supplying statements is that the Government servant will be able to refer to the previous statements of the witnesses proposed to be examined against the Government servant. Unless the statements are given to the Government servant he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. It is unjust and unfair to deny the Government servant copies of statements of witnesses examined during investigation and produced at the inquiry in support of the charges levelled against the Government servant. A synopsis does not satisfy the requirements of giving the Government servant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken." The facts of the present case are absolutely different from this, case and so this case also does not help the petitioner. (iv) (1982) 2 SCC 376 (State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Sharif). That was a case on different footings as will be evident from the portion quoted below : " After hearing counsel appearing for the State, we are satisfied that both the appeal Court and the High Court were right in holding that the plaintiff had no reasonable opportunity of defending himself against the charges.levelled against him and he was prejudiced in the matter of his defence. Only two aspects need be mentioned in this connection. Admittedly, in the charge-sheet that was framed and served upon the plaintiff no particulars with regard to the date and time of his alleged misconduct of having entered Government Forest situated in PC Thatia District, Farrukhabad and hunting a bull in that forest and thereby having injured the feeling of one community by taking advantage of his service and rank, were not mentioned. Not only, were these particulars with regard to date and time of the incident not given but even the location of the incident in the vast forest was not indicated with sufficient particularity. In the absence of these plaintiff was obviously prejudiced in the matter of his defence at the inquiry. Secondly, it was not disputed before us that a preliminary enquiry had preceded the disciplinary enquiry and during the preliminary enquiry statements of witnesses were recorded but copies of those statements were not furnished to him at the time of the disciplinary enquiry. Even the request of the plaintiff to inspect the file pertaining to preliminary enquiry was also rejected. In the . Even the request of the plaintiff to inspect the file pertaining to preliminary enquiry was also rejected. In the . face of these facts which are not disputed it seems to us very clear that both the first appeal Court and the High Court were right in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff was denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself at the disciplinary enquiry; it cannot be gainsaid that in the absence of necessary particulars and statements of witnesses he was prejudiced in the matter of his defence." So, this case also does not help the petitioner. (v) (1986) 3 SCC 229 (Kashinath Dikshita vs. Union of India & others). That was a case whe/e the Supreme Court laid down the law as follows: The Supreme Court relying on its earlier decision in Bhagat Ram (supra) came to the conclusion that the appellant has been denied the reasonable opportunity to defend himself and as such the impugned order was violative of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The facts of that case are different and do not help in the present case. (vi) 1989 Supp (1) SCC 389 (Ram Prakash vs. State of Punjab & others). That case was decided on the particular facts of that case. It does not lay down any law. 5. Here the case in hand, the petitioner was given all the opportunities to defend and cross-examine the witnesses. He deliberately did not avail the opportunity. A horse can be taken to the water, but it cannot be made to drink, that is the state of affairs in the present case. In that view of the matter, the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was violation of principle of natural justice and the procedural safeguards was given a go by cannot be accepted. 6. The only requirement in this case is that the authority is bound to act in a fair manner. The authority is to act in a good faith and without bias. The authority is to apply all relevant considerations and must not be swayed away by irrelevant things it must not act arbitraritly or capriciously and must not come to a conclusion which is perverse or such that no reasonable body or persons properly informed could arrive at it. The authority is to act in a good faith and without bias. The authority is to apply all relevant considerations and must not be swayed away by irrelevant things it must not act arbitraritly or capriciously and must not come to a conclusion which is perverse or such that no reasonable body or persons properly informed could arrive at it. In order to give power to the Court to touch a decision in an enquiry is that it must be a case based on no evidence. The Court is not concerned with the sufficiency of evidence. Jurisdiction of the Court being supervisory and not appellate, the Court cannot assess the evidence, afresh to see whether the finding of the domestic tribunal was correct. Its only function is to see whether there was/any legal evidence to support the finding or it was perverse. A disciplinary proceeding is not criminal trial. The standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. /Hence where there are some relevant materials on which conclusion of the disciplinary authority that the Govt. servant is guilty could be supported, the Court cannot under Article 226 of the Constitution enter into the question of adequacy or the reliability of the avidence. 7. In the instant case along with the charge sheet, the following documents were annexed : "For articles of charge I 1. Np.4 /DC (S)/81 (Pt) dated 16.4.84. 2. His explantion dated 17.4.84. 3. Application Forms. For articles of charge II 1, No. 1 (22)84/SDO/CH/296 dated 27.10.1984 of the SDO, Churachandpur with enclosures. 2. No. 85 (5) 84/SDO/CH/408 dated 20.1.1985 of the SCO, Churachandpur with enclosures. 3. Para I of Part II-A of the Audit Note on the Account of SDO, Churachandpur for the period from 1.4.82 to 31.12.88." So, the petitioner knew that these documents would be utilised against him and in that enquiry he was given the assistance of a defence assistant. He also produced certain documents in support of his case as will be evident from the enquiry report (page 50 to the writ application). It was also found by the Enquiry Officer that most of the documents like General Cash Book, Subsidiary Register and Collection Registers were burnt down in a fire that revaged the SDO, Churachandpur Office a couple of days after the FIR was lodged on 3.5.84 against the Govt. servant. It was also found by the Enquiry Officer that most of the documents like General Cash Book, Subsidiary Register and Collection Registers were burnt down in a fire that revaged the SDO, Churachandpur Office a couple of days after the FIR was lodged on 3.5.84 against the Govt. servant. So, the enquiry authority had to rely on the internal audit report prepared earlier and the report of the SDO and arrived at the findings quoted above. So, the question of violation of procedural fairness in the instant case does not arise. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no merit in this writ application and accordingly the same is dismissed. I leave the parties to bear their own costs.