Judgment Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. -the defendants are the appellants. They have lost in both the Courts below. 2. The plaintiff-respondent filed Title Suit No.62 of 1979 before the subordinate Judge, Depghar, for eviction of the defendant appellants from the suit premises detailed in the schedule to the plaint, as well as for recovery of arrears of rent. The suit was decreed. The defendants preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the 2nd Additional District Judge, Deoghar, and thereafter this appeal has been preferred. At the time of admission of this appeal, the following substantial question of law was framed : "as to whether mere pleading is sufficient for eviction on the ground of personal necessity and, secondly as to whether on the face of the evidence led by the parties, the court below has erred in law in arriving at a finding that the rent for the months of November and December, 1978 was not tendered ?" 3. According to the plaintiff, she was born and brought up at Madhupur and after her marriage, she was living at Calcutta, where her husband was a railway employee. On 30-6-1978. she purchased the suit house at Madhupur from one D. N. Kundu, who had inducted Rameshwar Prasad Burman, the original defendant No.1 as a tenant therein at the rental of Rs.21/-per month. The tenant-defendant attorned the plaintiff as his landlady and started paying rent from July, 1978 and paid upto October, 1978. Thereafter, the payment of rent was stopped. For sometime past, the climate of Calcutta did not suit her and as such she felt the requirement of the suit premises at Madhupur, which was famous as health report, for her personal use and occupation. The plainiff further alleged that the tenant-defendant No.1, namely Rameshwar Prasad burman has sub-let front veranda of the suit premises to his brother Lakshmi narain Burman, defendant No.2 without her consent. 4. As per the plaintiff, the tenant-defendant was liable to be evicted for being a defaulter for non-payment of rent for the months November and december 1978 and onward as also because the plaintiff required the premises for her personal use and occupation. 5. On 6-4-1979, the plaintiff claimed to have served a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the defendant No.1 determining the tenancy in respect of the suit premises. 5. On 6-4-1979, the plaintiff claimed to have served a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on the defendant No.1 determining the tenancy in respect of the suit premises. But even thereafter, the defendants neither vacated the suit premises, nor paid the arrears of rent and as such the plaintiff was compelled to file the suit for eviction against them. 6. Both the defendants No.1 and 2 appeared in the suit and filed separate written statements, but their pleadings are almost common. It has been averred in the written statement that both the defendants are living jointly in their own house situated at Panch Mandir Road within ward No.2 of Madhupur Municipality. Both of them have been jointly carrying on business in part of the suit premises and the remaining part has been in occupation of other family members. It has been falsely alleged in the plaint that part of the suit premises has been let out to defendant No.2 by the defendant No.1 on rental of Rs.2/- per day. 7. According to the defendants, the land over which the suit premises exist is a non-transferable raiyati land which originally belonged to Pathrol estate. D. N. Kundu had taken temporary settlement of the land from pathrol Estate which subsequently vested in the State of Bihar with effect from 1-1-1956 under the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. D. N, kundu filed writ application in this court Vide MJC No.674 of 1955 against the aforesaid vesting of land in the State of Bihar, which was dismissed by order dated 28-9-1956. However, Sri Kundu managed to continue in possession thereon in connivance with the local revenue authorities. 8. Initially, according to the defendants, rent for the suit premises was rs,.12/- per month, which was enhanced to Rs, 21/- and they were compelled to pay at the enhanced rate to the plaintiff, which is liable to be adjusted towards rent for the subsequent months 9. As regards allegation of default in payment of rent, the defendants alleged that as a matter of fact, the plaintiff had received rent upto the month of November, 1978. Sometime in the middle of January, 1979, the plaintiff called the defendants to see her at her fathers residence at Madhupur. As regards allegation of default in payment of rent, the defendants alleged that as a matter of fact, the plaintiff had received rent upto the month of November, 1978. Sometime in the middle of January, 1979, the plaintiff called the defendants to see her at her fathers residence at Madhupur. And when they went there, the plaintiff asked them to raise the monthly rent of the suit premises from Rs, 21/- to Rs.100/- which was not acceptable to them. On that occasion, the defendants claimed to have offered rent for the month of December, ,1978 to the plaintiff, but she refused to accept it. Accordingly, on 29-1-1979, the defendants remitted rent for December 1978 to the plaintiff by money order which she refused to accept. Thereafter, the defendants kept on remitting rent regularly for subsequent months by money orders and the plaintiff went on refusing the same, So it is not correct to say that there has been any default on the part of the defendants in payment of rent. 10. The defendants further stated that the plaintiff was still living in calcutta with one Vinod Singh, who is. a railway employee. But it is not known whether she is merried with him. The defendant has alleged that as a matter of fact, the plaintiff has" spent most part of her life in Bengal and as such her plea that the climate of Calcutta does not suit her is singly ridiculous. The plaintiff is living in a big , apartment in Calcutta and as such her plea of persona] necessity is false and fictitious. The defendants have been in occupation of the suit premises since the year 1945, Had the plaintiff got need of the suit premises, she would not have purchased the tenanted premises. In fact, the plaintiff has no cause of action for the suit which deserves to be dismissed with costs. 11. The plaintiff filed the municipal tax receipts (Ext.2 series), carbon copy of the petition dated 10-10-1979 for mutation of her name in-the municipal records (Ext.3), rent receipt (Ext.4) and the sale deed dated 13-6-1978 (Ext.5) executed by D. N. Kundu in her favour. Besides that, the plaintiff examined six witnesses including herself and her husband. 12. The defendants filed land revenue receipt (Ext.4 ). and municipal receipt (Ext. Besides that, the plaintiff examined six witnesses including herself and her husband. 12. The defendants filed land revenue receipt (Ext.4 ). and municipal receipt (Ext. B series) relating to their house at Panch Mandir Road, madhupur standing in the name of their respective wives. They also filed rent receipt (Ext. C series) granted by the original landlord Sri D. N. Kundu, money order coupons (Ext D series), postal receipts (Ext. E series) and the refusal endorsement by the postal peon marked as (Ext: F series ). 13. Rent remitted through money order coupon (Ext. D/23) was accepted by the plaintiff. By the said money order, two months rent is said to have been remitted. According to the defendants, the rent remitted vide Ext. D/23 related to the months of October and November, 1978 whereas according to the plaintiff, the same related to "september and October 1978 and not for October and November.1978 as alleged by the defendants! the defendants have failed to produce any money order coupon or postai receipt in order to show that the rent for the months of September 1978 was already paid. In absence of any evidence regarding the remittance or payment of rent for September, 1978, the defendant claim regarding remittance and" acceptance of rent for the months of October and November 1978 vide ext. D/23 has rightly been not accepted bv the two Courts below. In case ext. D/23 is taken to be for the months of October and November 1978, then the rent for the month of September, 1978 must have been remitted separately, but no such evidence has been produced by the defendants Besides that, the postal money order coupon (Ext. D/23) was filed in the trial Court at a very late stage and, therefore, the trial Court doubted some manipulations therein and the lower appellate Court has also concurred thereto. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the rent for the month of November 1978 was ever remitted by the defendants and as such, they defaulted in payment of rent for the month of November, 1978. 14. Similarly, the defendants claim to have remitted rent for the month of December 1978 vide Ext. D, but no postal receipt relating to the said money order coupon (Ext. D) has been filed by the defendants. 14. Similarly, the defendants claim to have remitted rent for the month of December 1978 vide Ext. D, but no postal receipt relating to the said money order coupon (Ext. D) has been filed by the defendants. As already held by this Court in the decision reported in the (AIR 1986 Patna 162) in absence of the postal receipt a remittance cannot be said to be valid. In the circumstances, the defendants defaulted in payment of rent of the suit premises for the month of December, 1978 too. Both the Courts below have, therefore, rightly recorded concurrent findings to the effect that the defendants are defaulters within the meaning of Sec.11 (1) (d) of the Act for non-payment of rent for two consecutive months i. e. November and december 1978 and, therefore, the defendants are liable for eviction. 15. So far as the plaintiffs claim of personal necessity is concerned, the trial court believed the plaintiffs case that the Calcutta climate was not suitable to her and, therefore, she rightly felt necessity of her house at madhupur, which is famous for health resort. Besides the suit permises, the plaintiff has no other house to live at Madhupur. Admittedly, there are sixteen blocks in the holding in which the suit premises is situated and many people are living therein alongwith their family members comfortably and some of them have even constructed double or triple storeyed residential houses. 16. The lower appellate Court confirmed the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court and held that even if the suit premises was not presently comfortable for the plaintiff, she would make all necessary prosions of kitchen, both-room, latrine etc. therein after she gets vacant possession of the same. As regards partial eviction, since admittedly the suit premises consists of a single room with two varandas on both sides, it is not possible to further divide it into two parts to serve the purpose of either the plaintiff or the defendants. The plaintiffs demand for eviction of the defendants from the suit premises was based on genuine and reasonable personal requirement for her/own use and occupation. 17. In my opinion, the personal requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff is reasonable. It appears that the plaintiff purchased the suit premises at Madhupur for a valuable consideration, because she genuinely required the house for her own occupation. 17. In my opinion, the personal requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff is reasonable. It appears that the plaintiff purchased the suit premises at Madhupur for a valuable consideration, because she genuinely required the house for her own occupation. If climate of Calcutta is not suitable to her for sometime past and for change of climate she wishes to reside at Madhupur, such requirement of the plaintiff is quite bonafide. In the circumstances, I find that the plaintiffs requirement of the suit premises reasonable and is in good faith for her own occupation. Therefore, the defendants are liable for eviction on this ground too. 18. The trial Court in Paragraph 8 of its judgment and the lower appellate Court in Paragraph 19 of its judgment have discussed the point of partial eviction and have come to the concurrent finding that the partial eviction will not serve the purpose of the plaintiff. 19. In the circumstances stated above, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction of the defendants on both Courts i. e. on the ground of defaults in payment of rent as also on the ground of personal necessity of the plantiff land-lady. 20. The impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below require no interference by this Court under the provisions of Sec.100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as this appeal is concluded by findings of fact. 21. In the result, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.