Judgment :- The above Writ Petition has been filed for a writ ofCertiorarito Call for and quash the records of the first respondent on his file C. No. V/38/15/9/23 CX. Adj. II, of the second respondent on his file order No. 103/81 and of the third respondent on his file order No. 136 of 1984 and quash the orders of the first respondent dated 10-10-1973 as confirmed by the second respondent by his order dated 11-6-1981 and as further confirmed by the third respondent by order dated 2-4-1984. 2. Having regard to the nature of the disposal the writ petition deserves, it is unnecessary for me to deal with the merits of the matter at length. The petitioner is a manufacturer of matches at Gudiyatham. Under the proceedings of the Collector of Central Excise, Madras, dated 10-10-1973, the petitioner was imposed a penalty of Rs. 5, 000/- for the alleged offence and violation of Rule 52A on the finding that the offence committed was pre-planned, deliberate and is of a very serious nature warranting a deterrent penalty. An appeal filed before the Central Board of Excise and Customs came to be rejected on the ground that it was belated and there was no powers to condone the delay in an appellate authority. The further revision filed also came to be rejected on the ground that no exception could be taken to the order of the Central Board that the appeal was belated and there was no scope for condoning the delay. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition challenging all the three orders of the authorities below. 3.Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. The learned counsel for the petitioner persuaded this Court to go into the merits of the claim and the legality and propriety of the order imposing the penalty in question. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition challenging all the three orders of the authorities below. 3.Heard the learned counsel appearing on either side. The learned counsel for the petitioner persuaded this Court to go into the merits of the claim and the legality and propriety of the order imposing the penalty in question. Apart from this, it was also contended that even assuming that the order of the appellate authority was justified on the ground that it was belated one, taking into account the date of the receipt of the appeal by the said authority as the date of filing, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the Government ought to have exercised itssuo motupower of revision under Section 36(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, to consider the claim of the petitioner on merits and ought to have passed an order on merits instead of summarily rejecting it on the ground that the appellate authority's order declining to interfere with the order of the 2nd respondent that the appeal was belated was in order. Sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Act reads as hereunder :-"Section 36(2). Sub-section (2) of Section 36 of the Act reads as hereunder :-"Section 36(2). - The Central Government may, of its own motion or otherwise call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which any decision or order has been passed under section 35 or section 35A of this Act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such a decision or order and may pass such order thereon as it thinks fit : Provided that no decision or order shall be varied so as to prejudicially affect any person unless such person is given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation and, if he so desires, of being heard in his defence : Provided further no proceedings shall be commenced under this sub-section in respect of any decision or order (whether such decision or order has been passed before or after the coming into force of this sub-section) after the expiration of a period of one year from the date of such decision or order.' It is by now well settled as a proposition of law thatsuo motupowers of revision conferred upon public authorities need not necessarily be exercised or invoked only when such authority desires to exercise it on its own to protect the interest of the revenue. It has been held in cases arising out of legislations with similar powers ofsuo moturevision that the power ofsuo moturevision is conferred upon the revisional authority coupled with a duty to exercise in any appropriate case even where an extraordinary situation has been brought to the notice of the revisional authority by the person aggrieved. In the case on hand it could be seen that the revision if was received in the office of the appellate authority on 2nd February, 1974, it would have been in time. There is no controversy over the fact that on 1st February, 1974 the revision has been despatched by post. Unfortunately, due to postal delay, the appeal appears to have reached the office of the appellate authority on 5-2-1974. There is no controversy over the fact that on 1st February, 1974 the revision has been despatched by post. Unfortunately, due to postal delay, the appeal appears to have reached the office of the appellate authority on 5-2-1974. Having regard to the position that the appeal was belated and if there was no power to the appellate authority to condone the same and entertain and adjudicate on the merits of the claim nothing precluded the revisional authority namely, the third respondent to exercise its powers under Section 36(2) to the case on hand to consider the revision on merits instead of mechanically rejecting the same on the correctness or otherwise of the order of the appellate authority alone which rejected the application summarily as time-barred. In my view, the third respondent which has been conferred with powers ofsuo moturevision, which as noticed earlier, may and ought to be exercised even at the instance of the aggrieved person in a deserving case, has committed an error in not doing so. In my view, it is a case of total non-application of mind to the obligation cast upon the third respondent to do real and substantial justice. For all the reasons stated above, the impugned order is hereby quashed. The third respondent is directed to dispose of the revision filed by the petitioner as one to be dealt with under Section 36(2) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and decide the issues raised on merits. Having regard to the long lapse of time, the third respondent is directed to dispose of the revision within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order of course after giving an opportunity to the petitioner. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.