ORDER V.D. Gyani, J. -- 1. The petitioner is a company duly incorporated and registered as such under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. It is averred that it was specifically constituted and incorporated for the sole purpose of setting up an amusement park, at Indore in pursuance to the declared policy and resolution of the Indore Development Authority, the respondent No.2 (for short 'the I.D.A.') a statutory body established under sec. 38 of the M.P. Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (for short the Adhiniyam). 2. By this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the petitioner prays for a direction against the respondent No.2 to accept the petitioner's tender as being the only successful tenderer, admittedly fulfilling all conditions from amongst others, who had submitted their tenders for development of a children's amusement Centre in a sprawling area of about seven acres, in 'Meghdoot-Upvan' Indore, in response to a notice (Ann. 2) dated 23.12.91 published in local press on 26.12.91 This notice with other terms and conditions is filed as Ann. 3. 3. In view of the admitted position by the I.D.A. that the petitioner was the only tenderer who fully satisfied all the conditions mentioned in the advertisement, it is no longer necessary to state facts in detail, but in view of the relief sought, and the allegations of mala fide it would not be out of place to narrate facts in their chronological order. 4. It was in way back in 1987 that the respondent I.D.A. had envisaged a scheme for development of a children's amusement centre and a notice Ann. 2 admittedly was published on 6.10.87 in the local press. The respondent also admit" that eight bidders had applied in response to the said notice, but considering the specialised nature of work only three out of eight were invited by the respondent vide its resolution No. 19 (Ann. R. 2A) for further discussion for setting up an amusement park for children before finally inviting tenders. 5. As per resolution (Ann. R. 2B and C) dated 25.3.88 the respondent decided that the proposed amusement centre shall not be allotted to anyone, and shall be gradually developed by the authority itself. The bidders were accordingly informed. R. 2A) for further discussion for setting up an amusement park for children before finally inviting tenders. 5. As per resolution (Ann. R. 2B and C) dated 25.3.88 the respondent decided that the proposed amusement centre shall not be allotted to anyone, and shall be gradually developed by the authority itself. The bidders were accordingly informed. It may be noted here at this stage itself that the petitioner has contended that it was not open to the authority to set up an amusement park and indulge in commercial activity contrary to the provisions of the Adhiniyam. 6. Subsequently the respondent-authority was approached by M/s National Amusement, Delhi with a proposal for development of children's amusement park. This proposal was considered by the Authority at its meeting dated 4th April, 1990 when it was decided to take some concrete steps in the matter vide resolution dated 4.4.90 Ann. R.2D. Accordingly a notice No. 108/91 inviting fresh tenders was published in the various news papers, on 23rd December, 1991. Five tenders were received by the Authority. The respondent while admitting that on scrutiny of all the tenders submitted it was found that the petitioner alone fulfilled and satisfied all the conditions as laid down in the advertisement has further added that since the licence fee offered by the petitioner was the lowest, the matter was placed before the authority in its meeting dated 31.1.92 when no decision was taken and it was deferred to 28.2.92, when the Authority decided not to accept any of the tenders as per Ann. R. 2-K and R. 2-L. 7. It is this postponement of acceptance actuated by malice of petitioner's tender though fulfilling all conditions which forms the bone of contention between the parties. The petitioner has contended that this postponement of decision was most arbitrary and unfair and illegal. It was but legitimate to expectation that being the only tenderer, fulfilling all requirements and conditions the petitioner's tender would be accepted without demur forthwith on the spot. The petitioner has contended that this postponement of decision was most arbitrary and unfair and illegal. It was but legitimate to expectation that being the only tenderer, fulfilling all requirements and conditions the petitioner's tender would be accepted without demur forthwith on the spot. It is alleged that some of the members of the respondent-Authority were interested in awarding the tender to a particular person in total disregard of conditions of eligibility and postponement of taking a decision was yet another device employed by the respondent-Authority to allow the tender to die its own death by sheer delay in taking decision and ultimately leaving It to be decided by a 'sub-committee' a novel method not known to law or permissible under the Adhiniyam. 8. Shri Chafekar learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised the following points: (1) that the petitoner being the only highest qualifying tenderer, it was not open to the respondent-Authority to reject his tender. (2) rejection without assigning any reason is bad in law; (3) postponement of taking a decision in the matter was actuated by malice to accommodate some other tenderer and was intended to defeat the petitioner's rights. 9. According to learned counsel admittedly the successful tenderer fulfilling all the conditions and the requisite test of eligibility laid down in the tender could not be denied his rightful claim and entitlement being the highest tenderer having invested a huge amount incurring contractual obligations by entering into associateship with M/s International Amusement Ltd., New Delhi. The respondent-Authority was stopped from making any departure from its own norms and was legally bound by the doctrine of promisory estoppel to accept the petitioner's tender. 10. Shri Bagadiya, learned counsel for the respondent-Authority on the other hand contended that the respondent-Authority was competent to take its own decision in the matter, which in the circumstances of the case, was wholly justified and in public interest. Denying the attractibility of the doctrine of promisory estoppel, he argued that the petitioner had no legal right to press and persist in acceptance of his tender. Referring to note No.3 in the tender, Ann 3, he contended that the Authority had full power to accept or reject all or any of the tender applications. 11. Denying the attractibility of the doctrine of promisory estoppel, he argued that the petitioner had no legal right to press and persist in acceptance of his tender. Referring to note No.3 in the tender, Ann 3, he contended that the Authority had full power to accept or reject all or any of the tender applications. 11. Before proceeding to deal with the rival contentions as advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be worth while to note that the exercise of getting up of an amusement park for children at Meghdoot Upavan, Indore, had been doing on as undertaken by the respondent-Authority ever since 1988 and repeated efforts were made in this direction as is evident from the record. The last one being the present notice No. 108/91 dated 23.12.91 inviting tenders was published. It is in this background of events and the position as admitted by the respondent-authority in para 5 of its return "after a security of the various tenders it was reported to the Authority that only one tender viz., the petitioner was fully satisfying all the conditions mentioned in the advertisement." Further on in the same para "At the cost of repetition it may be pointed out that the tender of the petitioner though it complies with the terms and conditions of the advertisement was the only tender so eligible and it offered the lowest licence fees as compared to the other tenderers. " In para 10 of the return it is admitted: "In reply to para 10 it is submitted that as stated above only the tender of the petitioner satisfied all the requirements of the advertisement." 12. A bare reading of the above noted admissions established that the petitioner was the only qualified tenderer for setting up for an amusement park. 13. The real controversy which requires to be settled in the case lies within a short compass in face of the admitted position as noted above. Let us now turn to the reason of postponement of acceptance of petitioner's tender, and ultimate rejection vide resolution Ann. R. 2-L dated 28.2.1992. 14. There is unaminity of judicial opinion on the point that an authority or body inviting tenders has the power to reject any or all the tenders, but this power is neither absolute nor arbitrary, recording of reasons while rejecting the highest bid is a must. R. 2-L dated 28.2.1992. 14. There is unaminity of judicial opinion on the point that an authority or body inviting tenders has the power to reject any or all the tenders, but this power is neither absolute nor arbitrary, recording of reasons while rejecting the highest bid is a must. The reasons must be found in the decision taken by the authority. It is not how best the act of rejecting tenders when challenge is defended by assigning reasons in the return. Let us have a look at Ann. R 2L a one line resolution rejecting all tenders without recording any reason. 15. There is an apparent contradiction in the affidavit dt. 25.7.92 sworn by the respondent-Authority's C.E.O. and the reply filed. Para 5 of the said affidavit reads. "There is no question of any favour being invoked in the matter. The tender was rejected on merits and due to reasons which have already been explained in the reply to the show cause notice." As noted above, the reply to show cause notice does not contain any reason whatsoever for rejection of tenders, while affidavit sworn by the Chief Executive Officer states that the tenders were rejected on merits due to reasons already explained in the reply to the show cause notice, and the reply is totally silent on the point. So also the resolution dt. 28.2.92 (Ann. R. 2.L) as if this silence itself is the merit. 16. What prompted the authority to postpone taking decision is averred as follows: "However the licence fee offered by it was the lowest. The matter was placed before the authority in its meeting dt. 31.1.92 when a decision was deferred. " 17. Shri Chafekar has denounced this so called reason as not only concocted but ill-conceived as well. Referring to the documents submitted by the petitioner alongwith tender filed as Ann. 4 Q', Ann. 12 and comparative chart Ann. 13 explained how wrong it was on the part of the respondent-authority to say that licence fee offered by the petitioner was the lowest. If it had only bothered to read its own, a mere glance at the Secretary's report Ann. 2. E as filed by it would have been clear that the petitioner's offer as worked out by the Authority itself was Rs. 6.41 lacs per annum which is undoubtedly the highest, the next second highest being only Rs. If it had only bothered to read its own, a mere glance at the Secretary's report Ann. 2. E as filed by it would have been clear that the petitioner's offer as worked out by the Authority itself was Rs. 6.41 lacs per annum which is undoubtedly the highest, the next second highest being only Rs. 5 lacs per annum. 18. As per tender conditions all the tenderers were liable to pay 25% of gate money to the respondent-Authority while no other tenderer had specified the entry fee per ticket. The petitioner had clearly stated that entrance fee chargeable would be Rs. 2/- per head per ticket and accordingly 0.50 p. per ticket payable to the respondent-Authority. No other tenderer had specified the entry fee per ticket which could be kept the minimum for entry and could be raised for other purposes such as rides inside the centre. Thus, causing loss to the respondent. 19. Shri Chafekar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while denouncing the so called 'reason as concocted', referring to the documents submitted by the petitioner alongwith tender, filed as Ann. 4. Q, Ann. 12 and comparative chart Ann. 13, explained how wrong it was on the part of the respondent -authority to say that licence fee offered by the petitioner was the lowest. If it had only bothered to read its own glance at the secretary's report Anx. R. 2E as filed by it, it would have been clear that the petitioner's offer as worked out by the authority itself was Rs. 6.41 lacs per annu, which is undoubtedly the highest. 20. The 'reason' as assigned by the respondent for postponing acceptance of petitioner's tender merely reminds one of the popular saying that prejudice govern the world only under the name of 'reason'. 21. The question is not whether the respondent had any justificable excuse or 'reason' for postponing acceptance of tender. Was it not expected of the respondent- authority a Statutory body, to take a decision in accordance with its own established norms in the matter. Does condition No.3 of the 'Note' included in the Tender form, which reads as follows: "Authority has full power to accept or reject any or all the tender applications. confer any aboslute right on the respondent to reject any or all tenders according to its sweet will? Does condition No.3 of the 'Note' included in the Tender form, which reads as follows: "Authority has full power to accept or reject any or all the tender applications. confer any aboslute right on the respondent to reject any or all tenders according to its sweet will? Rules have been framed in this behalf known as MP Nagar Tatha Anya Sanrachanao Ka Vyayan Niyam, 1975. Rule 18 thereof provides as under: "Where it is proposed to dispose of any land by inviting tenders full publicity shall be given to the notice inviting tenders in at least two newspapers one of which shall be a local Hindi paper and by getting notices affixed in offices of the Town and Country Development Authority, Municipal Corporation Municipal Council, Collector, Commissioner and Tahsildar concerned. The authority shall accept any tender out of the tenders so received but where it DOES NOTE ACCEPT HIGHEST TENDER IT SHALL RECORD REASONS FOR DOING THE SAME." 22. Even in absence of such a Rule, the respondent was under a legal obligation to record reason for rejecting petitioner's tender for it cannot act in an arbitrary manner. The Supreme Court has by now in several cases (to name only one Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India & ors. - AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) held that it is not open to public bodies/statutory bodies to reject a qualified tender in an arbitrary manner. 23. While agreeing with the views expressed by Mathew. J. (as he then was) V. Punnan Thomas v. State of Kerala (AIR 1969 Kerala 81) the Supreme Court in Ramana Shetty's case held as follows: "It must, therefore, be taken to be the law that where the Government is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or issuing quotas or licences or granting other forms of largess, the Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will and, like a private individual, deal with any person it pleases, but its action must be in conformity with standard or norm which is not arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or discretion of the Government in the matter of grant of largess including award of jobs, contracts quotas, licences etc., must be confined and structured by rational, relevant and non-discriminatory standard or norm and if the government departs from such standard or norm in any particular case or cases, the action of the Government would be liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some valid principle which in itself was irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory." 24. One of its very recent judgment the Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries (1993) 1 SCC 71 , has held "From the above, it is clear that even though the highest tenderer can claim no right to have his tender accepted, there being a power while inviting tenders to reject all the tenders, yet the power to reject all the tenders cannot be exercised arbitrarily and must depend for its validity on the existence of cogent reasons for such action." 25. It may be noted here itself that the resolution Anx. R. 2L dtd. 28.2.92 rejecting all tenders, contains no reason whatsoever muchless a cogent reason. 26. The same principle has to be found in the Star Enterprises v. CID of Maharashtra Ltd. (1990) 3 SCC 280 . Agreeing with the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant the Apex Court explaining the correct legal position held: "It is the contention of Mr. Dwivedi appearing in support of these appeals that the respondent is 'State' under Article 12 of the Constitution and conferment of naked and unguided power as referred to above is arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and since there is no prescribed norm or guideline and the power is unregulated and unfettered and the highest offer after complying with the prescribed requirements is liable to be rejected without assigning any reasons, citizens are likely to be affected by exercise of such uncanalised power. Shortly put, Mr. Dwivedi submits that the procedure is contrary to the requirement of Rule of Law and, therefore, cannot be sustained. An affidavit in opposition has been filed on behalf of respondent 1 wherein the circumstances under which the highest offers have not been accepted has been indicated and the position has been explained. Shortly put, Mr. Dwivedi submits that the procedure is contrary to the requirement of Rule of Law and, therefore, cannot be sustained. An affidavit in opposition has been filed on behalf of respondent 1 wherein the circumstances under which the highest offers have not been accepted has been indicated and the position has been explained. We do not find it difficult to agree with Mr. Dwivedi's submissions that respondent 1 is 'State' within the meaning of Art. 12 and in its dealings with the citizens of India it would be required to act within the ambit of Rule of Law and would not be permitted to conduct its activities arbitrarily. It is too late in the day for an institution like respondent 1 to adopt the posture that the activity in question is commercial and as respondent 1 is engaged in trading activity it would be open to it to act as it considers appropriate for the purpose of protecting its business interest. An instrumentality of the State as has been laid down by this Court in a series of authoritative decisions beginning with R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India and in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sheravardi and a number of decisions thereafter has to act within the ambit of Rule of Law and would not be allowed to conduct itself arbitrarily and in its dealings with the public would be liable to judicial review." 27. Pausing here for a while what do we find is total lack of reasons in rejecting petitioner's tender. Shri Bagdia appearing for the respondent, however, argued, placing reliance on State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal and ors. ( AIR 1972 SC 1816 ) that once the tenders were rejected, a power which the respondent undoubtedly had under the terms of contract, the respondent could decline to accept the highest bid. 28. The case relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is distinguishable on facts. It was a case of sale of country liquor by shops by auction as provided u/s 29 of the Orissa Excise Act. This case is not an authority for the proposition that highest bid can be rejected without assigning reasons. In this connection para 15 of the said judgment is worth reading. 29. The other case relied upon by the respondents' counsel is State of U.P.v. Vijay Bahadur Singh AIR 1982 SC 1234 . This case is not an authority for the proposition that highest bid can be rejected without assigning reasons. In this connection para 15 of the said judgment is worth reading. 29. The other case relied upon by the respondents' counsel is State of U.P.v. Vijay Bahadur Singh AIR 1982 SC 1234 . It was a case of auction of forest lots. The Govt. had revised its policy, as is evident from the placitum itself. No such policy or change of policy is involved in the case at hand. 30. In State of M.P. & ors etc. etc. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & ors. 1987 JLJ 53 = AIR 1987 SC 251 , yet another case relating to manufacture and sale of liquor, relied upon by the respondent. The Supreme Court even while holding that Govt. can negotiate with persons, who come with offer, has held that State Govt. can not ignore requirement of Art. 14 of the Constitution in such matters. It was again a case of policy decision of the State Govt. which was found to be neither malafide nor guided by coleteral considerations. 31. There is a clear distinction. No such policy decision has been pleaded by the respondent justifying rejection of petitioner's tender. 32. In Malca Constructions (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The M.P. Housing Board, Bhopal & ors AIR 1990 MP 49 , relied upon and referred to us by Shri Bagdia is again a case where the lowest tender was rejected by the Housing Board for lack of required experience. This was a valid reason for rejection. In the instant case it is no body's case that petitioner's tender was rejected for want of requisite experience. This case, therefore, does not help the respondent. 33. The last case relied upon by respondent is U.P. State Electricity Board v. Goel Electric Stores AIR 1977 All 494 . It was an appeal, arising out of a suit for injunction. Going through the facts as narrated in the said judgment para 2, the case it would be noticed turns on its own facts and secondly what is more insistent is that it does not deal with the question of rejecting the highest tender without recording reasons. 34. It was an appeal, arising out of a suit for injunction. Going through the facts as narrated in the said judgment para 2, the case it would be noticed turns on its own facts and secondly what is more insistent is that it does not deal with the question of rejecting the highest tender without recording reasons. 34. The Supreme Court in the case of Star Enterprises (supra) tracing the development of law on the point has observed as follows: "In recent times, judicial review of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day. The traditional limitations have been vanishing and the sphere of judicial scrutiny is being expanded. State activity too is becoming fast pervasive. As the State has descended into the commercial field and giant public sector undertakings have grown up, the stake of the public exchequer is also large justifying larger social audit, judicial control and review by opening of the public gaze; these necessitate recording of reasons for executive actions including cases of rejection of highest offers. That very often involves large stakes and availability of reasons for action on the record assures credibility to the action; disciplines, public conduct and improves the culture of accountability. Looking for reasons in support of such action provides an opportunity for an objective review in appropriate cases both by the administrative superior and by the judicial process. The submission of Mr. Dwivedi, therefore, commends itself to our acceptance, namely, that when highest offers of the type in question are rejected reasons sufficient to indicate the stand of the appropriate authority should be made available and ordinarily the same should be communicated to the concerned parties unless there be any specific justification not to do so.". 35. Shri Bagadiya learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Authority has argued that allegations of malafides having been denied on oath, and placing all the materials as per Ann. R. 2-E in a regularly called meeting of the Authority, the matter of consideration of tenders being on agenda, was postponed to 31.1. 92 for want of time as per Ann. R. 2K and finally on 28.2.92 all tenders rejected as per Ann. R. 2L. He boldly questioned whether in such circumstances, how can arbitrariness be imputed to the Authority and can this Court direct enforcement of a contractual obligation in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.? 36. 92 for want of time as per Ann. R. 2K and finally on 28.2.92 all tenders rejected as per Ann. R. 2L. He boldly questioned whether in such circumstances, how can arbitrariness be imputed to the Authority and can this Court direct enforcement of a contractual obligation in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.? 36. As already noted above, it is evident from Ann. R. 2. L that there is total lack of reasons in rejecting tenders which unfailingly point to 'arbitrariness" on the part of the respondent-Authority. 37. As has been pointed out by the Supreme Court in Airport Authority's case (supra) that arbitrariness in such matters would even attract Art. 14 of the Constitution (see paras 21 and 23). It is well settled that tenderer can approach this Court challenging the giving of contract to some other if the same be arbitrary or vitiated by legal infirmity. The Supreme Court has further held that even where a tender notice allows the authority to reject highest tender without assigning any reason the choice cannot be unreasoned or unprincipled. 38. A tenderer is legitimate in his explanation that the authority would act in a fair manner, and not arbitrarily. 39. Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corp. ( AIR 1990 SC 1031 ) is yet another land mark judgment. It was a case of stoppage of supply of lubricants, without any notice or intimation to a firm, who was not a dealer of Indian Oil Corporation but had been in business for about eighteen years and claimed to be treated as one. The action of stoppage even to such a firm (not duly appointed dealer) was held to be arbitrary impeachable on the ground as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. A direction was made to continue the supply of lubricants under the existing arrangement, until the corporation gave opportunity to the appellant as directed by the Supreme Court. 40. Look at the case at hand the petitioner on the basis of the tender notice enters into and seeks reliance with International Amusement, New Delhi incurring financial burden, association contractual obligations, admittedly fulfilling all requirements of the tender conditions. 40. Look at the case at hand the petitioner on the basis of the tender notice enters into and seeks reliance with International Amusement, New Delhi incurring financial burden, association contractual obligations, admittedly fulfilling all requirements of the tender conditions. And even the respondent-Authority spending a huge amount in publishing notices (tenders) deputing its Engineers for visiting in amusement parks in different cities of the country and coming out of with public advertisement announcing the setting up of the amusement park on the eve of Republic Day (Ann. 7R) announcing to the world at large that all the procedural requirements of establishing the amusement parks were towards completion; but abruptly taking a decision without assigning any reason, rejected all tenders. Here comes the legitimate expectation of a tenderer that the Authority inviting tenders would act fairly and free from arbitrariness. 41. A statutory body has not only acted in breach of its statutory duty but has also violated Art. 14 of the Constitution by acting in the most arbitrary manner in rejecting tenders without assigning any reason. 42. As for invoking the writ jurisdiction, there is ample authority as already noted above. In the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha and ors. (AIR 1980 SC 1897) it was contended that the High Court after setting aside the award made by arbitrator, upholding order of termination of services of workman, could not have ordered for reinstatement of workman instead of remanding the matter to the Arbitrator, the High Court had no power to order reinstatement in service, Krishna Aiyer J. repelling the contention, observed" -- Art. 226, however, restrictive in practice is a power wide enough in all conscience to be a friend in need when the summons comes in a crisis from a victim of injustice." 43. Having held the respondent-Authority's action of rejecting all tenders as arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, a direction to consider the petitioner's tender in accordance with law must follow and it is accordingly directed. 44. But Shri Bagadiya learned counsel for the respondent-Authority by posing the question would this Court direct acceptance of tender? has raised dilemma. Such an arguement is designed to push the adversary into a corner, and it is possibly for this reason that it is said to be perhaps the most powerful instrument of persuasion ever devised. 44. But Shri Bagadiya learned counsel for the respondent-Authority by posing the question would this Court direct acceptance of tender? has raised dilemma. Such an arguement is designed to push the adversary into a corner, and it is possibly for this reason that it is said to be perhaps the most powerful instrument of persuasion ever devised. But from strictly logical and legal point of view, this question is not of much importance. 45. The Supreme Court reading the requirement of fair play in action reasonableness and non-arbitrariness as forming part of Art. 14 of the Constitution has in Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. [ (1991) 1 SCC 212 ] has held as follows: ".... Unlike the private parties the State while exercising its powers and discharging its functions, acts indubitably, as is expected of it, for public good and in public interest. The impact of every State action is also on public interest. It is really the nature of its personality as State which is significant and must characterize all its actions, in whatever field, and not the nature of function, contractual or otherwise, which is decisive of the nature of scrutiny permitted for examining the validity of its act. The requirement of Art. 14 being the duty to act fairly justly and reasonably, there is nothing which militates against the concept of requiring the State always to so act, even in contractual matters. This factor alone is sufficient to import at least the minimal requirements of public law obligations and impress with this character the contracts made by the State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter that the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling with the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes. However, to the extent, challenge is made on the ground of violation of Art. 14 by alleging that the impugned act is arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that the dispute also falls within the domain of contractual obligations would not relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the basic requirement of Art. 14. To this extent, the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. To this extent, the obligation is of a public character invariably in every case irrrespective of there being any other right or obligation in addition thereto. An additional contractual obligation can not divest the claimant of the guarantee under Art. 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of the State in any of its actions." ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ). It follows, therefore, that not only a direction to the respondent-Authority to consider petitioner's tender but a direction to accept the same being the only qualified tenderer and the highest one should also be made. 46. In Harmindersingh v. Union of India ( AIR 1986 SC 1527 ) the Supreme Court not only quashed the acceptance of tender, accepted arbitrarily and capriciously, but also made a direction to the respondent-Authority to accept the tender of the appellant. 47. The respondent-Authority is, therefore, directed to accept the tender of the petitioner. Petition stands allowed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 2,500/-.