Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. In this petition, the petitioner challenges the validity of the detention order passed in Criminal MP No. 8 of 1994 by the second respondent under Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. The petitioner was involved in four adverse cases, three of them under Section 4(1)(i) and one under section 4(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act. He was convicted in all the four cases. On 10-1-1994, on the instructions of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Prohibition Enforcement Wing, Karur along with his police party conducted a prohibition raid near the funeral shed at Brahmatheertham Road, old Bus Stand in Karur Town, when he found the petitioner sitting at the said place, which is a public place, having a black plastic can, pouring something in a glass tumbler and receiving money from an unknown buyer. On seeing the police party, the unknown buyer dropped the glass tumbler and, fled away and efforts were taken to secure him, but they proved futile. The petitioner was arrested. On examination of the black plastic can with a capacity of about 35 litres, which was in his possession, it was found to contain about 33 litres of illicitly distilled arrack with halitosis. He was enquired about the same. He confessed about the sale of illicitly distilled arrack. A sum of Rs. 25/- being the sale proceeds and a glass tumbler were seized from the petitioner. On his left hand, he was having an old white polythene bag. It was examined and found that it contained about 300 grams of ganja. On enquiry, he admitted that he is selling ganja also to those who want to purchase the same. Sample of about 500 ml. arrack each was taken in two bottles and sealed at the spot under a cover of mahazar. The remaining arrack was destroyed at the spot and a certificate to that effect was also prepared. Sample of 60 grams of ganja was taken in a packet and sealed at the spot. The remaining ganja was also packed and sealed at the spot under cover of mahazar. He was brought to the police station and a case in Karur Prohibition Enforcement Wing in Crime No. 91/94 under sections 4(1)(i) read with 4(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 and under section 20(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 was registered. He was brought to the police station and a case in Karur Prohibition Enforcement Wing in Crime No. 91/94 under sections 4(1)(i) read with 4(1)(a) of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 and under section 20(b) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 was registered. He was searched and handed over to the para police constable. He was produced before the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Karur on 10-1-1994 and remanded to custody on the same day. 2. One bottle containing the sample of arrack as sent to Chemical Analyst through Court on 10-1-1994. The Chemical Examiner examined the samples and reported in his C. Pro. No. 39/94 dated 12-1-1994 that the sample contained ethyl alcohol, acids, esters, higher alcohols and aldehydes and also atropine of 1.5 mg % w/v, which is a poisonous substance. The sealed packet containing the seized ganja was sent to the Special Court under the Essential Commodities Act, Pudukkottai with a requisition to send about 60 grams of ganja for analysis. In the course of the investigation, the Inspector of Police gave a requisition and examined Dr. K. Ramalingam, M.B.B.S. DMRD, Civil Surgeon Government Head Quarters Hospital, Tiruchirapalli on 13-1-1994. The Medical Officer has given a certificate to the effect that if any person consumes illicitly distilled arrack mixed with atropine of 0.64 mg % w/v and above, he will develop giddiness, vomitting, congestion of eye lids and respiratory failure, which if not treated vigorously would result in death due to atropine poisoning. The case is under investigation. 3. On the above materials, the Detaining Authority was satisfied that the petitioner is a bootlegger and he is selling illicitly distilled arrack mixed with poisonous substance in contravention of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937 and the rules made thereunder. On arriving at such a finding, the detaining authority took into account the fact that the petitioner will try to come out on bail by filing bail application and on coming out, he will indulge in such prejudicial activities in future. He was satisfied that the activities of the petitioner are affecting public order and public health, warranting his detention under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. Consequently, he passed the order of detention. 4. Government Advocate has taken notice. 5. Three grounds are urged by learned counsel for the petitioner before us. He was satisfied that the activities of the petitioner are affecting public order and public health, warranting his detention under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. Consequently, he passed the order of detention. 4. Government Advocate has taken notice. 5. Three grounds are urged by learned counsel for the petitioner before us. In the first instance it is stated that a copy of the confession statement referred to in the detention order is not furnished to the petitioner along with the other papers. We do not find any reference to a statement having been recorded containing the confession made by the petitioner herein. What all is referred to in the F.I.R. as well as the detention order is that the petitioner confessed about the sale of illicitly distilled arrack. The confession is obviously oral. On enquiry by the police authorities, the petitioner admitted that he was selling illicitly distilled arrack. No statement of the petitioner is stated to have been recorded. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that a copy of the confession statement referred to in the detention order is not furnished is not sustainable as there is no basis therefor, as there is no such statement of confession and there is no reference of any such confession statement either in the FIR or in the detention order. Hence, this contention fails. 6. The second contention is that in the grounds of detention, in the Tamil version, the detenu is said to be at large at the time when the detention order is passed. Here again, the contention is based on a mistaken reading of the detention order. In paragraph 5 of the detention order, it is expressly stated by the detaining authority that the petitioner is now in remand and will try to come out on bail by filing bail application. In paragraph 6, following that he has stated that he is satisfied on the materials mentioned above that if the petitioner is let to remain at large, he will indulge in further activities prejudicial to the maintenance of Public Order. In the Tamil Translation, the word used is (vernacular matter is omitted.) The words do not mean that at the time when the detention order is passed, the petitioner was outside the prison. Hence, this contention also fails. 7. In the Tamil Translation, the word used is (vernacular matter is omitted.) The words do not mean that at the time when the detention order is passed, the petitioner was outside the prison. Hence, this contention also fails. 7. The next contention is that as per the chemical analysis, the sample contained only 1.5 mg % w/v atropine which is not dangerous to health. According to learned counsel, a Division Bench of this Court has held that unless 100 mg. w/v atropine is present in 100 litres of arrack, it will not be dangerous to public health or public order and, no order of detention can be passed, when the contents are only of 1.5 mg w/v of atropine. We have gone through the judgment of the Division Bench in H.C.P. 1590 of 1993 (Rasu Alias Ramasamy v. The State of Tamil Nadu, order dated 14-2-1994). The judgment refers in turn to three earlier judgments. It is better to refer to all the four judgments in the chronological order. The earliest one is rendered in Dharman v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P. No. 6737 of 1988 order dated 15-2-1989. In that case, the Chemical Analyst failed to indicate the percentage of the substance atropine. The opinion of the doctor was that 60 to 120 mg. of atropine consumed at a time would affect the health. He had not stated what would be quantity necessary to prove fatal or to impair the health of the concerned person in an irreversible manner. After referring to those circumstances, the Bench held that there was no material for the detaining authority to come to the subjective satisfaction that the liquid sold by the detenu would pose grave and widespread danger to public health. Thus, that judgment turned entirely on the facts of that case and the records available before the detaining authority. 8. The next judgment is in Perisu Alias Kanni v. State of Tamil Nadu, (W.P. No. 9179 of 1990) (Order dated 9-11-1990). Another Division Bench of this Court referred to the facts of the case. On the chemical examination of the samples, it was found that they contained atropine only 10.4% in 100 mt. g. The Doctor examined by the Sponsoring Authority had clearly stated that only if anyone takes atropine from 60 mg. to 120 mg. it would hurt him. Another Division Bench of this Court referred to the facts of the case. On the chemical examination of the samples, it was found that they contained atropine only 10.4% in 100 mt. g. The Doctor examined by the Sponsoring Authority had clearly stated that only if anyone takes atropine from 60 mg. to 120 mg. it would hurt him. It was also on record that a person could take only from 200 mg. to 300 mg. of arrack at a time and he could not consume 500 mg. of arrack. That averment found in the affidavit filed in support of the petition was not controverted factually by the State in the counter affidavit. Relying on that circumstances, the Bench held that there was no material before the Detaining Authority to prove that the contraband seized from the petitioner contained so much percentage of atropine, which could cause danger to human life. That judgment also depended only on the facts of that case. The Bench did not lay down any proposition of law as such. 9. The third judgment is found in Pambukaran @ Kamalesan v. State of Tamil Nadu, W.P. Nos. 11773 and 11774 of 1990, Order dated 10-12-1990. Another Division Bench after referring to the abovesaid earlier Bench decisions observed that in a proper case, this Court may be required to reconsider the correctness of the view expressed in the said two cases. But, having observed in that manner, the Bench, however, proceeded to follow the two earlier judgments implicitly without referring to the facts of the case before them or the facts of the cases considered by the two earlier Benches and said :- "We, however, follow the law stated in those two cases and accordingly we allow the writ petitions and order for the release of the petitioners forthwith ......." The facts of the case are not found in the judgment. Hence, we proceed on the footing that on the facts of the case, the Bench found that there was no material, to prove that the seized contraband contained atropine substance, which would cause grave danger to life or health. However, we must point out that the two earlier cases did not lay down any proposition of law as stated by the Bench in the third case. 10. However, we must point out that the two earlier cases did not lay down any proposition of law as stated by the Bench in the third case. 10. In the last of the cases, the Bench referred to the earlier three cases and said that the view taken in the first two cases has not so long been reconsidered and, therefore, it is advisable for the detaining authorities to follow the law laid down in those two cases. Again the Bench has not set out the facts of the case before it. We are unable to know the materials available in that particular case. Hence, we proceed on the footing that the decision turned on the facts of that case. 11. Thus, the four judgments referred to above do not lay down any proposition of law that whenever the atropine substance found in the illicitly distilled arrack is less than any particular quantity, an order of detention should not be made by the detaining authority. 12. We must point out that the Supreme Court has on more than one occasion laid down the law of preventive detention very clearly with reference to such Acts similar to Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. In State of Bombay v. Atma Ram, AIR 1951 SC 197 (1951 (52) Cri LJ 373), it was held that the Court cannot interfere with an order of detention except on grounds of mala-fides if it is found that the grounds set out in the order are connected with the object of detention. The test prescribed was that if the grounds on which it is said that the Government was satisfied are such as a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with the objects which were to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fide cannot be challenged in a Court. 13. In Shibban Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 179 : (1954 Cri LJ 456), the position was reiterated and it was held that the Court is not competent even to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu. 14. 13. In Shibban Lal v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 179 : (1954 Cri LJ 456), the position was reiterated and it was held that the Court is not competent even to enquire into the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as grounds of detention in the communication to the detenu. 14. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1984 SC 1344 : (1984 Cri LJ 909), it was held that it is not open to the Court to go into the adequacy or sufficiency of grounds of detention. 15. In Rajendra Kumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat, ( AIR 1988 SC 1255 ), on the facts, there was no sale of any liquor or arrack. It was only a case of import of Indian Made Foreign Liquour like scotch whisky, beer etc. from outside the State which was prohibited in that State. Dealing with the detention order passed in that case, the Court had occasion to consider the words "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order". After extracting the section in the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act and the explanation thereto, the language whereof is almost identical with that in the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982, the court upheld the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate. What is relevant to be noted here is that there was only import of whisky, beer etc. and there was no case of mixing of any poisonous substance therewith. Even in such a case, the court upheld the order of detention saying : "The District Magistrate in passing the impugned order has recorded his subjective satisfaction with respect to the appellant that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make an order that he be detained. In the accompanying grounds for detention this is the basis for the formation of his subjective satisfaction." 16. In State of Punjab v. Sukpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 231 : (1990 Cri LJ 584), the Supreme Court dealt at length with the difference between punitive law and detention law. In that connection, the Court said :- "The question is whether a particular person is disposed to commit the prejudicial acts. In State of Punjab v. Sukpal Singh, AIR 1990 SC 231 : (1990 Cri LJ 584), the Supreme Court dealt at length with the difference between punitive law and detention law. In that connection, the Court said :- "The question is whether a particular person is disposed to commit the prejudicial acts. The duty of deciding this question is suspicion or reasonable probability and not criminal charge which can only be warranted by legal evidence. ... ... ... What is to be seen is whether the detaining authority has applied its mind or not to the question whether it was necessary to make preventive detention. ... ... ... The High Court under Art. 226 and Supreme Court under Art. 32 or 136 do not sit in appeal from the order of preventive detention. But, the Court is only to see whether the formality as enjoined by Art. 22(5) had been complied with by the detaining authority, and if so done, the Court cannot examine the materials before it and find that the detaining authority, should not have been satisfied on the materials before it and detained the detenu. In other words, the Court cannot question the sufficiency of the grounds of detention for the subjective satisfaction of the authority as pointed out in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1982 SC 1143 : (1982 Cri LJ 1191) : (1982) 3 SCR 707 . Those who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order must be the judges of what the national security or public order requires. Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society." 17. Thus, in each case, the question is whether the materials before the detaining authority were relevant for his considering whether the detention of the person concerned is necessary. As regards atropine, it is stated in Livingstone's Pocket Medical Dictionary, 10th Edition, page 55 as follows : "It is a principal alkaloid of belladonna. Has spasmolytic, mydriatic and central nervous system depressant properties". In Concise Medical Dictionary published by Oxford University Press, 1980 Edition, at page 52, atropine is described as "a drug extracted from deadly neightshade that inhibits the action of certain nerves of the automatic nervous system". It is also pointed out in the text books that individual sensitivity to the toxic effects of atropine varies widely. In Concise Medical Dictionary published by Oxford University Press, 1980 Edition, at page 52, atropine is described as "a drug extracted from deadly neightshade that inhibits the action of certain nerves of the automatic nervous system". It is also pointed out in the text books that individual sensitivity to the toxic effects of atropine varies widely. In some cases, small dosages of atropine will even lead to fatalities. If a poisonous substance is mixed with arrack and sold, how can it be said that it is not likely to affect public health ? 18. The definition of the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" contained in Section 2(a) of T.N. Act 14 of 1982 and the Explanation thereto show that even if there is likelihood of danger to public order, the provisions of the Act are attracted. Thus, if the authority concerned is satisfied that there is a likelihood of grave or widespread danger to public life or health then he is entitled to make an order of detention, provided there are materials before him. It is now well settled that it is the subjective satisfaction of the authorities which counts. 19. On the facts of this case, there are enough materials to satisfy the authority concerned that atropine substance contained in illicitly distilled arrack will cause danger to those who consume the same. The opinion of the Medical Officer clearly shows that if any person consumed illicitly distilled arrack mixed with atropine of 0.64 mg. % w/v and above, he will develop giddiness, vomitting, congestion of eye lids and respiratory failure, which if not treated vigorously will result in death due to atropine poisoning. 20. In two of the four cases decided by this Court and referred to earlier, the judgments refer to certificates of the Medical Officers that the atropine was not dangerous to public health. In the other two cases, the facts are not disclosed in the judgments. Hence, those judgments cannot be taken as laying down any general proposition that in all cases, whenever atropine substance is found to be less than 100 mg. w/v in 100 litres of arrack, there is no danger to public health. In the other two cases, the facts are not disclosed in the judgments. Hence, those judgments cannot be taken as laying down any general proposition that in all cases, whenever atropine substance is found to be less than 100 mg. w/v in 100 litres of arrack, there is no danger to public health. If those decisions are to be understood as laying down the law, they will be running counter to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Rajendra Kumar's case, AIR 1988 SC 1255 and, therefore, not good law. 21. In the circumstances, all the three contentions urged by learned counsel against the order of detention fail and this petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.