JUDGMENT- Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J.:---The petitioner challenges by this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution the judgment and order of the Administrative Tribunal, dated 28-12-1989, made in Eviction Appeal No. 49/86 which has unsettled the order of the Rent Controller dated 23-7-1986, in Case No. Rent/15/78. 2. By the aforesaid Order the Rent Controller had dismissed four applications of the respondent dated 18-4-1985, 11-9-1985, 6-12-1985 and 10-1-1994 seeking to obtain the stopping of the eviction proceedings instituted by him against the petitioner for non-payment of rents with a prayer that the respondent should be put in possession of the premises. 3. The petitioner is a statutory tenant of the respondent in respect of the part of the first floor of the house bearing No. E-162 behind Post Office Panaji on a monthly rent of Rs. 203 inclusive of electricity and water charges. The petitioner was earlier paying a monthly rent of Rs. 200/- and Rs. 15/- per month towards the water and electricity charges. Subsequently respondent No. 1 filed an application for fair rent in which the rent was fixed at Rs. 188/- per month inclusive of water and electricity charges. The respondent No. 1 who is the landlord within the meaning of the Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 (hereinafter called the Act) filed eviction proceedings in the year 1978 against the petitioner, being Rent Case No. 15/78, on the ground of non-payment of rents. The case is still pending and has not yet been decided on merits. In the meantime during the pendency of the proceedings the respondent No. 1 filed the aforesaid four applications invoking jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under section 32 by stating that the tenant had failed to deposit the rents during the eviction proceedings. A notice was issued to the petitioner in respect of all these four applications and upon hearing the parties the same were dismissed by the Rent Controller by Order dated 23-7-1986. However, the appeal filed by the respondent No. 1 to the Administrative Tribunal against this Order (Eviction Appeal No. 49/86) was allowed by the Administrative Tribunal by its Order dated 28-12-1989 which is under challenge. 4. However, the appeal filed by the respondent No. 1 to the Administrative Tribunal against this Order (Eviction Appeal No. 49/86) was allowed by the Administrative Tribunal by its Order dated 28-12-1989 which is under challenge. 4. The first grievance of Shri S.G. Dessai, learned counsel of behalf of the petitioner, is that the Order of the Rent Controller refusing to stop proceedings during the pendency of the eviction proceedings instituted by the respondent No. 1 against the petitioner is not a final Order being thus only an interlocutory one. Such Order is not appealable under section 45 of the Act and at the most is only revisable if permissible under section 46. Hence the impugned Order is without jurisdiction because obviously the respondent No. 2 has wrongly exercised its jurisdiction by entertaining respondent No. 1s appeal. 5. There seems to be a lot of substance in the submissions of the learned counsel in this regard. Indeed section 45 of the Act provides for an appeal from every order, other than an interim order, passed by the Rent Tribunal to the appellate Court. Admittedly the appeal filed by the respondent No. 1 to the administrative Tribunal is against the order of the Rent Controller passed by him under section 32(4) of the Act. Section 32 which refers to the payment or deposit of rents during the pendency of proceedings for eviction reads as under: "32. Payment or deposit of rent during pendency of proceedings for eviction.---(1) No tenant against whom a proceeding for eviction has been instituted by a landlord under this Act shall be entitled to contest the proceeding before the Controller or any appellate or revisional authority or to prefer any appeal or revision under this Act, unless he has paid to the landlord or deposits with the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, all arrears of rent due in respect of the building up to the date of payment or deposit and continues to pay or deposit any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the building, until the termination of the proceedings before the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority. (2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. (2) The deposit of rent under sub-section (1) shall be made within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed. (3) Where there is any dispute as to the amount of rent to be paid or deposited under sub-section (1), the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, shall, on application made either by the tenant or by the landlord, and after making such inquiry as he deems necessary, determine summarily the rent to be so paid or deposited. (4) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the Controller or the appellate or revisional authority, as the case may be, shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. (5) ....." It thus follows that sub-section (4) of section 32 enables the Rent Controller to stop all further proceedings and put the landlord in possession of the building in case he is not satisfied with the cause shown by the tenant not to pay or deposit the rents due. Therefore the consequence of the granting of the application is that the landlord is restored to the possession of the premises. In the instant case what was challenged is not the restoration of possession of the premises by the Rent Controller but instead the Rent Controllers refusal to stop the proceedings and to put the landlord in possession of the said premises. Obviously this type of order cannot be deemed as a final order because it is neither an eviction order nor any order which adjudicates on its merits the substantive right of the landlord. No doubt that this order is only an interlocutory order against which no appeal would lie. 6. Shri Dessai has rightly submitted that even otherwise in case the Rent Controller had allowed the respondent No. 1s application and directed the stopping of the proceedings putting him in possession of the premises that order also could not be as a final order in view of the provision of sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Act. 6. Shri Dessai has rightly submitted that even otherwise in case the Rent Controller had allowed the respondent No. 1s application and directed the stopping of the proceedings putting him in possession of the premises that order also could not be as a final order in view of the provision of sub-section (4) of section 22 of the Act. The said sub-section (4) of section 22 provides that in any proceeding falling under Clause (a) of sub-section (2) if the controller on an application made to it is satisfied that the tenants fault to pay, tender or deposit rent was not without reasonable cause, he may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) or in section 32, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, give the tenant a reasonable time, to pay or tender the rent due by him to the landlord upto the date of such payment or tender and on such payment or tender the application shall be rejected. Obviously this sub-section (4) of section 22 operates only in case of a ground of eviction prescribed in Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 22 while section 32(4) applies to all cases during the pendency of eviction proceedings on grounds other than the ground of non-payment of rents. It is not disputed that in our case the eviction was sought for by respondent No. 1 against the petitioner on the ground of non-payment of rents and being so section 22(4) necessarily operates and is attracted despite any order which might have been passed by the Rent Controller while exercising jurisdiction under section 32(4) of the Act. This is the reason why such order does not become final even if that order would amount to stopping the proceedings and to put the landlord in possession of the premises. However, the instant situation is otherwise because there is no such order stopping the proceedings and hence the question of the said order dismissing the application of the landlord to stop the proceedings being a final order does not seem to arise at all. Therefore no appeal would lie against this order. However, the instant situation is otherwise because there is no such order stopping the proceedings and hence the question of the said order dismissing the application of the landlord to stop the proceedings being a final order does not seem to arise at all. Therefore no appeal would lie against this order. However, even conceding that the learned Administrative Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the respondent No. 1s appeal we have to bear in mind that the order impugned before it was an order of the Rent Controller refusing to exercise his discretion to grant the respondent No. 1s prayer before him to stop the proceedings and put him in possession of the premises. Being so the Administrative Tribunal while exercising appellate jurisdiction was supposed to discuss and adjudicate these findings of the Rent Controller without going into the merits of the sufficient cause shown by the petitioner to the Rent Controller and accepted by him in exercise of its discretion. Admittedly the appellate Court could not in appeal substitute the discretion of the Rent Controller by its own discretion. 7. It is a fact that the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal includes besides appellate jurisdiction also revisional jurisdiction. Thus it seems that both appeals and revisions against the orders of the Rent Controller lie to the same Tribunal. Being so the Tribunal could have very well converted the respondents appeal into a revision if there was legal scope for that. But it appears that this was not done by the Tribunal either suo motu or at the request of the respondent No. 1. The learned Tribunal has therefore wrongly exercised its appellate powers in respect of an order which could not be the subject-matter of an appeal in terms of section 45 of the Act for the reasons of the order not being a final order but instead merely an interlocutory one with all the trappings of an interim order within the meaning of section 45 of the Act. 8. 8. It was next submitted by Shri Dessai that even assuming that the Administrative Tribunal had exercised its revisional jurisdiction in that case also the learned Tribunal had no power to assess evidence and upset the findings of fact arrived at by the Rent Controller on the issues raised by the respondent No. 1 in his four applications seeking for the stopping of the eviction proceedings and restoration of possession of the suit premises. 9. Section 46 of the Act which confers powers of revision against orders of the Administrative Tribunal provides that the Administrative Tribunal may, in exceptional circumstances, on the application of any party, call for and examine the records relating to an order passed under this Act by ......., the Rent Tribunal for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of such order and may pass such order thereon as it deems fit. It therefore follows that the field of jurisdiction of the tribunal in the exercise of its revisional powers is restricted to a situation wherein exceptional circumstances occur and for the limited purpose of assessing the correctness, legality or propriety of an order of the Rent Controller. Thus the powers of the revisional Tribunal cannot be equated with the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts under section 115 of the C.P.C. which is an ample general power not restricted to exceptional circumstances only as it happens in case of section 46 of the Act. This means that the Administrative Tribunal can exercise its powers of revision only in very few cases, i.e. in exceptional cases and not liberally or in accordance with section 115 of C.P.C. in order to avoid injustice. 10. This being the position it cannot be said that the Rent Controller while declining in the instant case to exercise jurisdiction to stop the proceedings in favour of respondent No. 1 has caused gross miscarriage of justice or any substantial injustice to him. Such order has not finally adjudicated the landlords right to evict the tenant on the grounds sought for by him in the main eviction proceedings. 11. Such order has not finally adjudicated the landlords right to evict the tenant on the grounds sought for by him in the main eviction proceedings. 11. On the other hand being the power of the Rent Controller to stop the proceedings merely a discretionary power which he was supposed to use it judiciously the fact of his having opted not to use this power for reasons elaborately recorded by him in the order dated 23-7-86 cannot be held also as a perverse exercise of his jurisdiction in order to justify interference of the Tribunal even on revision. The Tribunal is required to interfere only in case of a patent perversity of the order for the purpose of assessing its correctness, legality or propriety and this also in exceptional circumstances which in all fairness the respondent does not seem to have been able to establish in the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. Shri Dessai has cited two authorities, namely, in the case of (Smt. Parmeshwari Devi v. The State and another)1, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 403 as well as in the case of (Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra)2, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 47 on the matter of definition of an interlocutory order. Similarly he has cited some rulings in the cases of (Rogue Antonio Judas Tadeu Caetano Ribeiro v. Angelo Cassiano Nevese Souza 4 others)3, 1989(2) Goa Law Times 313, (Satyavijay Anna Tandel v. Administrative Tribunal of Goa, Daman Diu)4, 1990 (Vol. 92) The Bombay L.R. 580 and (Shri Joao Xavier Pinto v. Shri Oswald J.C. Velho and 2 others)5, 1990 (1) G.L.T. 116, which are dealing with section 32(4) in order to buttress the point that the discretionary power confered on the Rent Controller in the aforesaid provision is only a discretionary one and to be sparingly exercised only in a case of a contumacious defaulter. I do not think that it is necessary for me to elaborate any further on these points in view of the observations made by me above, bearing in mind the special facts and circumstances of this case and the legal niceties of the challenges thrown out by the petitioner against the impugned order of the Administrative Tribunal. 13. I do not think that it is necessary for me to elaborate any further on these points in view of the observations made by me above, bearing in mind the special facts and circumstances of this case and the legal niceties of the challenges thrown out by the petitioner against the impugned order of the Administrative Tribunal. 13. However, reliance placed by the learned Counsel on the case of (Wander Ltd. and another v. Antox India P. Ltd.)6, 1990 (Supp.) S.C.C. 727 on the question of the manner of exercising of the right by the Appellate Court while interfering with the exercise of the discretionary powers of the subordinate Court appears to be very much to the point. The Supreme Court while elaborating on this point has held that in such appeals the Appellate Court need not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court of the first instance and substitute its discretion except when the discretion is shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or perversely or where the Court has ignored the settled principles of law relating to grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. It was observed further that an Appellate Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction is said to be an Appellate Court on principles. The Appellate Court will not re-assess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Court below if the one reached by that Court was reasonably possible on the material. The Appellate Court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of jurisdiction under appeal solely on the ground that even considering the matter at the trial stage it would have come to the contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial Court reasonably and in a judicious manner, the fact that the Appellate Court would have taken a different view would not justify interference with the discretion by the trial Court. 14. In the result I find merit in this petition which is therefore bound to be allowed. Rule accordingly made absolute and the judgment and order dated 28-12-1989 of the Administrative Tribunal are hereby quashed and set aside and the order of the Rent Controller dated 23rd July, 1986 is restored. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Petition allowed. *****