JUDGMENT - SARAF B.P. (Dr.), J.:—Petitioner No. 1 (hereinafter 'the petitioner Company') is a limited Company and Petitioner No. 2 is a Director thereof. The petitioner Company owns a plot of land situate at 124/126 Wodehouse Road, Colaba, Bombay. On the said plot of land there were two houses which were occupied by tenants. On 28th May 1974, the petitioners submitted plans before the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay for construction of a thirty storeyed building consuming Floor Space Index (hereinafter 'F.S.I.') of 2.45 of the said plot. The Development Control Rules existent at the relevant time permitted the construction of building on the F.S.I. of 2.45 under R-8 F.S.I. Zone in which the above property is situated. The plans were approved by the Corporation and on 13th September 1974. Intimation of Disapproval (I.O.D.) was granted to the petitioner under section 346 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act. It was stipulated in the I.O.D. that no work should be started unless the existing structures proposed to be removed are in fact removed. It was also stated in the I.O.D. that it was given exclusively for the purposes of enabling the party to proceed further with arrangements on obtaining 'No Objection' Certificate from the Housing Commissioner under section 13(bb) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act. In pursuance of the I.O.D. granted by the Corporation, the petitioner company initiated proceedings for eviction of the tenants from the existing structures on the property in question, but could not succeed in that effort till August 1979, when the tenants were evicted and old structures were demolished. In the meantime, in 1975, the State Legislature of Maharashtra enacted the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Act, 1974 (Maharashtra Act No. IV of 1975) for forming Greater Bombay and certain areas round about into a Bombay Metropolitan Region, to provide for the establishment of an authority for the purpose of planning, co-ordinating and supervising the proper, orderly and rapid development of the areas in the region. The said Act come into force with effect form 26th January, 1975. The Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (“Authority”) was constituted under section 3 of the Act. The said Act come into force with effect form 26th January, 1975. The Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (“Authority”) was constituted under section 3 of the Act. Section 13 of the Act provides that except with the permission of the Authority, no authority or person shall undertake any development within the metropolitan region of the type as the Metropolitan Authority may from time to time specify, by notification published in the Official Gazette. The Metropolitan Authority, in exercise of powers under sub-section (1) of section 13 of the said Act, published in the Official Gazette a notification dated 10th June, 1977 providing, inter alia, that no construction or reconstruction of any building including addition to any existing building shall be carried out so as to have a floor space index exceeding 1.33. A person desiring to undertake development in contravention of the Notification may apply in writing to the Authority for permission to undertake such development. The authority, after making such enquiry as may be deemed necessary, may grant permission without any condition or with such conditions as it may deem fit or refuse to grant permission. This has to be done within 60 days from the receipt of the application under sub-section (2) of section 13. Appeal lies to the State Government against the order of the authority. 2. In view of the above developments, on 14th July 1977, the petitioner applied to the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (hereinafter 'B.M.R.D.A.') under section 13(2) of the Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority Act, 1974 (hereinafter 'the Act') for permission to undertake the above development with the F.S.I. of 2.45. The said application was received by the B.M.R.D.A. on 15-7-1977. The permission was refused by the Metropolitan Authority under section 13(3) of the Act on 8th September 1977. The petitioners preferred appeal to the State was allowed by the State Government on 23rd February 1978. Accordingly the petitioners were issued commencement certificate under sections 344 and 345 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act on 31st March 1980. 3. Soon thereafter a writ petition was filed in this Court by the residents of Colaba challenging the above order of the State Government under section 13(3) of the Act allowing the appeal of the petitioner against the order of the Metropolitan Authority. 3. Soon thereafter a writ petition was filed in this Court by the residents of Colaba challenging the above order of the State Government under section 13(3) of the Act allowing the appeal of the petitioner against the order of the Metropolitan Authority. The said writ petition was numbered as Writ Petition No. 989 of 1980 and was allowed by the judgment and order of this Court dated 5th April 1984. By the above judgment, the order of the State Government as well as the order passed by the Metropolitan Authority under section 13(3) of the Act rejecting the application of the petitioner were set aside with a direction to respondent No. 3 to consider the application afresh and pass appropriate orders. The material portion of the direction given by this Court in this regard is contained in para 17 of the said judgment which reads as under :- “Accordingly, the petition succeeds and the impugned order dated February 23, 1978 passed by Minister for Housing and B.M.R.D.A. is set aside and so also the order passed by respondent No. 3 rejecting the application and which was communicated to respondent No. 4 on September 8, 1977. Respondent No. 3 is directed to reconsider the application dated July 14, 1977, filed by respondent No. 4 under sub-section (2) of section 13 of the Act, in accordance with the observation made in this judgment and pass appropriate orders. Respondent No. 3 shall pass the orders as expeditiously as possible.” 4. The Metropolitan Authority took up the application of the petitioner under section 13(3) of the Act for reconsideration in pursuance of the above order of this Court and by the order dated 19th September, 1984 rejected the application under section 13(3). Against that petitioners failed appeal on merits before the State Government on 16th October, 1984 which is still pending disposal. Against that petitioners failed appeal on merits before the State Government on 16th October, 1984 which is still pending disposal. On the very next day, the present writ petition was Authority also filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the Metropolitan Authority passed under section 13(3) rejecting the application of the petitioner under section 13(2) of the Act on the ground that in the facts and under the circumstances of the case and in view of the lapse of sixty days stipulated in section 13(3) of the Act, permission is deemed to have been granted to the petitioner by the Metropolitan Authority and in that view of the matter, the order of rejection passed under section 13(3) is illegal and without jurisdiction. 5. We have heard the learned Counsel for the petitioners Shri Nariman. The following facts are relevant for determining the legal issue arising for determination in this writ petition. The judgment of this Court in the earlier writ petition was delivered on 5th April, 1984 by which the order of the Metropolitan Authority under section 13(3) was set aside with a direction to reconsider the application and to pass fresh orders on the application of the petitioner filed under section 13(2) of the Act. The B.M.R.D.A. applied for a certified copy of the judgment on 18th April, 1984. The petitioner, by letter High Court to the B.M.R.D.A. The Executive Committee of the B.M.R.D.A. met on 21st June 1984, 18th July 1984 and on 24th August, 1984 and it finally decided to reject the application of the petitioner under section 13(2) of the Act, on the 17th September 1984. 6. The submission of Shri Nariman, learned Counsel of the petitioners, is that the order passed by the B.M.R.D.A. under section 13(3) of the Act on 17th September, 1984 is illegal and without jurisdiction, the same having been passed after the expiry of the period of sixty days provided by section 13(3) of the Act. Before we deal with this submission, it may be expedient to set out section 13 of the Act as it stood at the material time. It reads : “13. No. other authority or person to undertake certain development without permission of the Authority. Before we deal with this submission, it may be expedient to set out section 13 of the Act as it stood at the material time. It reads : “13. No. other authority or person to undertake certain development without permission of the Authority. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, except with the previous permission of the Authority, no authority or person shall undertake any development within the Metropolitan Region of the type as the Metropolitan Authority may form time to time specify, by notification published in the Official Gazette, and which is likely to adversely affect the overall development of the metropolitan Region. (2) Any authority or person desiring to undertake development referred to in sub-section (1) shall apply in writing to the Metropolitan Authority for permission to undertake such development. (3) The Metropolitan Authority shall, after making such inquiry as it deems necessary and within 60 days from the receipt of an application under sub-section (2), grant such permission without any conditions with such condition as it may deem fit to impose or refuse to grant such permission. If such permission is not refused within 60 days as aforesaid, it shall be deemed to have been granted by the Authority. (4) Any authority or person aggrieved by the decision of the Metropolitan Authority under sub-section (3), may, within 30 days, appeal against such decision to the State Government, whose decision shall be final: Provided that where the aggrieved authority submitting such appeal is under the Administrative control of the Central Government, the appeal shall be decided by the State Government, after consultation with the Central Government.” A bare reading of the above section clearly goes to show that a person desiring to undertake development referred to in sub-section (2) of the said section is required to apply in writing to the Metropolitan Authority for permission to undertake such development. The Metropolitan Authority has been empowered to make such enquiry as it deems necessary and to grant such permission without any condition or with such condition as it may deem fit to impose or to refuse to grant such permission. This, however, has to be done within 60 days form the date of the receipt of the application under sub-section (2). This, however, has to be done within 60 days form the date of the receipt of the application under sub-section (2). The later part of sub-section (3) sets out the consequences of the failure of the authority to refuse permission within 60 days and provides that in such an event the permission shall be deemed to have been granted by the authority. 7. The submission of Shri Nariman is that sub-section (3) of section 13 is in two parts. The first part provides the mandatory period of limitation of 60 days within which the Metropolitan Authority is bound to grant permission or to refuse to grant permission. The second part sets out the consequence of the failure of the authority to act within the period of 60 days form the date of the application and the consequence is that in that event, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted by the Authority. Shri Nariman submits that in the instant case the application under section 13(2) was received by the Authority on 14th July 1977. The order refusing to grant permission was passed on 8th September 1977. That order was set aside by the High Court and the Authority was directed to pass a fresh order. As a result of the above order, all the proceedings form the date of the application till the date of the High Court order stood nullified. A fresh period of limitation would be available to the authority concerned to pass an order under section 13(3) of the Act which would commence either form the date of the judgment of the High Court or, in any event, form the date of the knowledge of the judgment. In the instant case, according to the learned Counsel, the B.M.R.D.A. was a party to the writ petition though it did not appear before the High Court. The operative part of the judgment of the High Court was communicated to it by the petitioner on 24th May 1984. In the instant case, according to the learned Counsel, the B.M.R.D.A. was a party to the writ petition though it did not appear before the High Court. The operative part of the judgment of the High Court was communicated to it by the petitioner on 24th May 1984. The learned Counsel pointed out the relevant part of the affidavit of Shri Shraddhanand Vinayak Asgaonkar, Secretary to the Executive Committee of the B.M.R.D.A., wherein it is stated that the Executive Committee had met on 21st June 1984, 1st July 1984 and 24th August, 1984 when it finally decided, on consideration of the petitioner's original application together with further letters dated 24th May, 1984 and 26th July 1984, to reject the application of the petitioner. 8. As against the above submissions, the submission of Shri Singhavi, learned Counsel for the B.M.R.D.A. and Shri Seervai for the other respondents is that the limitation of 60 days specified in section 13(3) of the Act applies only to the first order passed by the authority and once order is passed within the stipulated time, the question of limitation gets exhausted. If such order is set aside by the higher authority or the High Court, the deeming provision contained in section 13(3) would not apply. The only requirement will be to pass an order under section 13(3) of the Act. It was also submitted that this Court, while setting aside the order and directing the B.M.R.D.A. to decide the application afresh, had only directed that it should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and said nothing about the 60 days time limit. So far as the question of deemed permission is concerned, the contention of the respondents is that the deeming provision contained in the later part of the sub-section would not apply to a case where the order has been set aside and the matter is remanded to the authority for reconsideration as in the present case. 9. We have considered the rival submissions. So far as the factual part is concerned, we find that the judgment of this Court was delivered on 5th April, 1984 and the impugned order under section 13(3) was passed on 17th September, 1984. From the date of the judgment apparently the order refusing the grant of permission had been made beyond the period of 60 days. So far as the factual part is concerned, we find that the judgment of this Court was delivered on 5th April, 1984 and the impugned order under section 13(3) was passed on 17th September, 1984. From the date of the judgment apparently the order refusing the grant of permission had been made beyond the period of 60 days. If we take the date of the application for certified copy filed by the B.M.R.D.A. before the High Court which is 18th April 1984, the order is still beyond 60 days. Even if the date of knowledge of the order of the High Court is taken to be the date when the operative part of the order was communicated by the petitioner to the B.M.R.D.A. on 14th May 1985, the order is beyond 60 days. In any event, even if it is calculated form the date of the first meeting of the Executive Committee of B.M.R.D.A. which took place on 21st June 1984, as stated in the affidavit of the Secretary of the Executive Committee, Shri Asgaonkar, to consider the application of the petitioners under section 13(2) of the Act in the light of the High Court's judgment and order for final decision, the order passed on 17th September, 1984 is beyond the period of 60 days from that date too which will expire on or about 20th August 1984. There is no scope to extend the date of knowledge of the respondents of the judgment of the High Court beyond 21st June 1984, because on this date admittedly the Executive Committee of the B.M.R.D.A. had knowledge of the High Court's judgment and order and it took up for consideration the application of the petitioner under section 13(2) of the Act in the light of the High Court's order. It is also pertinent to mention that the Secretary of the Executive Committee of the B.M.R.D.A. himself has stated in his letter dated 1st October, 1984 addressed to the petitioner, in particular para 3 of the said letter, that the Executive Committee had acted on the uncertified copy of the judgment and order of the Court. Though the date of the receipt of the said copy is nowhere specified, the date of applying for certified copy has been stated to he 18th April 1984. Though the date of the receipt of the said copy is nowhere specified, the date of applying for certified copy has been stated to he 18th April 1984. The uncontroverted factual position therefore is that even calculated from the date of the first meeting of the B.M.R.D.A. to consider the application of the petitioner under section 13(2) of the Act which was held on 21st June 1984, the impugned order dated 17th September, 1984 is beyond the period of 60 days as stipulated in section 13(3) of the Act. 10. The question that arises for consideration is whether in such a situation sub-section (3) of section 13 is applicable and because of the failure of the B.M.R.D.A. to pass any order on the application of the petitioners under section 13(2) within the stipulated period of 60 days, permission would be deemed to have been granted by the Authority in favour of the petitioner in terms of the said sub-section. The submission of Shri Nariman is that sub-section (3) has to be read as a whole and interpreted accordingly. All the conditions set out therein will apply to an order passed under that sub-section either originally or on remand. Shri Nariman was, of course, fair enough to state that it will not be reasonable to contend that in all cases the period should be calculated form the date of the application itself, because in the event in a case like the present one, on the very date of the High Court's order the deemed permission will become operative which can neither be the object of sub-section (3) nor the purport of the order of the High Court. According to the learned Counsel, the period of 60 days applies from the date of the High Court's judgment or form the date of its knowledge, Reliance is placed in this connection on the decision of the Supreme Court in (C.B. Gautam v. Union of India)1, 1993(199) I.T.R. 530. The above decision of the Supreme Court was rendered in a case under Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 269-UD of the said Act empowers the appropriate authority to make an order for purchase by the Central Government of any immovable property agreed to be sold at an amount equivalent to the amount of apparent consideration. The above decision of the Supreme Court was rendered in a case under Chapter XX-C of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Section 269-UD of the said Act empowers the appropriate authority to make an order for purchase by the Central Government of any immovable property agreed to be sold at an amount equivalent to the amount of apparent consideration. The proviso to sub-section (1) of the said section provides that no such order shall be made in respect of any immovable property after the expiration of two months from the end of the month in which the statement referred to in section 269-UC in respect of such property is received by the appropriate authority. In a number of cases the orders passed by the appropriate authority under section 269-UD were challenged besides the validity of the provision itself. The Supreme Court while upholding the validity of the provision set aside the orders of the appropriate authority on the ground of failure of the authority to grant reasonable opportunity of hearing to the affected persons. The Supreme Court took note of the limitation on the power of the appropriate authority to pass an order under sub-section (1) of section 269-UD i.e. the period of 60 days from the end of the month within which the application under section 269-UC has been received and observed : “We find that, if the original time frame prescribed in Chapter XX-C is rigidly applied, it would not be possible for the appropriate authority concerned to pass an order under section 269-UD(1) at all in respect of the property in respect of the property in question.” In order to avoid that situation and yet to ensure that no injustice is caused to the petitioner, in the facts and circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court ordered that the statement in Form No. 37-1 submitted by the petitioner should be treated as if it were submitted on the date of the signing of the judgment. 11. 11. On an application filed by the Union of India the above order was clarified by the Supreme Court on November 27, 1992, 1993(199) I.T.R. 530, (562) and the following supplemental direction was given : “In respect of the cases other than that of the petitioner, C.B. Gautam, the period of two months referred to in section 269-UD(1) shall be reckoned with reference to the date of disposal of each of such pending matters either before this Court or before the High Courts, as the case may be. Where, however, the stay orders inhibiting the authorities from taking further proceedings are vacated, the period referred to in the said section 269-UD(1) shall be reckoned with reference to the date of such vacating of the stay orders.” It was said that the above clarification and further direction should be supplemental to and read as parts of the main judgment in C.B. Gautams's case. Clarification was also issued in respect of matters pending before the authorities and it was directed that Form No. 371 shall be deemed to have been filed as on the date of the judgment in C.B. Gautam's case on 17th November, 1992 for the purposes of completion of proceedings in terms of section 269-UD (1). According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners Shri Nariman, the ratio of he above decision squarely applies in the present case to the interpretation of section 13(3) of the Act. 12. The learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the period of limitation specified in section 13(3) and the legal fiction set out therein got exhausted with the first order passed by the Authority under that section and they are no more applicable when the matter is sent on remand. The second submission of the respondents is that in the instant case the petitioners having never taken the plea of limitation and/or deemed permission before the authorities and having written letters from time to time, have waived the question of limitation and/or deemed permission. It is stated that the period of limitation specified in section 13(3) of the Act and the deeming provision contained therein can be waived by the petitioners, which, according to the respondents in the instant case they have done by their conduct. It is stated that the period of limitation specified in section 13(3) of the Act and the deeming provision contained therein can be waived by the petitioners, which, according to the respondents in the instant case they have done by their conduct. In support of his submission, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in (Director of Inspector of Income Tax v. Pooran Mall and Sons)2, 1974(96) I.T.R. 390. We have carefully perused the above decision. We find that the ratio of the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. In the above case before the Supreme Court a consent order had been obtained by the parties in the writ petition and the observations made therein are in that context. Secondly, the language of the two provisions, section 132(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and section 13(3) of the Act, is completely different. Moreover in the above decision of the Supreme Court the contention of the petitioner was that the order had become barred by limitation even before he consent order was passed by the High Court. Here, on the contrary, the contention of the petitioner itself is that the period from the date of the application till the date of the decision of the High Court or the knowledge of the decision has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation prescribed under section 13(3) of the Act to give it a reasonable meaning. In this view of the matter, the ratio of the above decision of the Supreme Court is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The more appropriate decision in our opinion is the decision in C.B. Gautam's case, where the language of the provisions f section 269-UD(1) is more akin to section 13(3). Besides, section 13(3) also provides the consequence of the failure of the authority to exercise the power within the stipulated period by specifically providing that in such an event the permission shall be deemed to have been granted. The language of section 13(3) clearly goes to show that the period of limitation is mandatory and the object of the period of limitation is to see that the authorities do not delay the decision beyond the specified time. The language of section 13(3) clearly goes to show that the period of limitation is mandatory and the object of the period of limitation is to see that the authorities do not delay the decision beyond the specified time. They must decide one way or the other within that period and in the event of failure to do so, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted. There is no exception to the above period of limitation. This is also clear from the amendment of section 13(3) of the Act made in the year 1989 by the Maharashtra Act XXXIX of 1989 by which the last sentence of section 13(3) commencing with the words 'if such permission' and ending with the words 'by the Authority' were substituted by the following :— “If the authority fails to communicate its decision to grant or refuse permission to the applicant within sixty days from the date of receipt of his application, or within sixty days from the date of receipt of compliance of requisition, if any made by the Secretary of the Executive Committee or any officer authorised by him, whichever is later, such permission shall be deemed to have been granted to the applicant on the date immediately following the date of expiry of such sixty days, but subject to the provisions of the Regional Plan or the Regulations or the Development Control Rules, if any, applicable for the time being to such development.” This amendment came into force with effect from November 1989 and, as such, it is not applicable to the present case. This, however, clearly goes to show that the position prior to the amendment was that in any event the period of 60 days was to be reckoned from the date of the receipt of the application. No extension of time was possible even in a case where there was non-compliance of requisition by the petitioner. It is only by the above amendment that it has been provided that the deeming permission provision will apply only if the authority fails to communicate its decision to grant or refuse permission within sixty days from the date of receipt of his application, or within sixty days from the date of receipt of compliance of requisition, if any, made by the Secretary of the Executive Committee whichever is later. 13. 13. Reliance was also placed by the learned Counsel for the respondents on the decision of the Supreme Court in Director of Inspector of Income Tax v. Pooran Mall and Sons, 1974(96) I.T.R. 390 and (Additional Assistant Commissioner of S.T. v. Firm Jagmohandas Vijay Kumar)3, 25 S.T.C. 74 S.C. These decisions also, in our opinion, have no application to the facts and circumstances of this case. Reference may also be made to the ratio of two decisions referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioners viz., (Badri Prasad v. Nagarmal)4, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 59, and (Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust)5, A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 2065. The decision of the Supreme Court in Superintendent of Taxes, Dhubri v. Onkarmal Nathmal Trust (supra), which was a decision of Bench of five Judges (by a majority of three Judges) was also followed by later decisions in (The Superintendent of Taxes, Tezpur v. M/s. Bornmahajan Tea Co. Ltd.)6, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 533 (at page 536) and (Salonah Tea Company Ltd. v. The Superintendent of Taxes, Nowgong)7, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 772 (at 780). We have considered the above decisions. We find that the question regarding the mandatory nature of limitation and the effect of failure of the authorities to act within the specified time and also the question of waiver has been discussed at length by the Supreme Court in the above decisions. Following the ratio of the above decisions, we re of the opinion that the period of sixty days is a fetter on the power of Authority and not just a bar of time. This position has been made further clear by providing that if permission is not refused within sixty days, it shall be deemed to have been granted by the authority. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, there cannot be any order of rejection of the permission by the authority after the expiry of sixty days and there would be no jurisdiction to pass such an order. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, there cannot be any order of rejection of the permission by the authority after the expiry of sixty days and there would be no jurisdiction to pass such an order. We are also of the clear opinion that there was no waiver of the provision of section 13(3) of the Act nor can there be any such waiver having the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the authority to pass order under section 13(3) of the Act refusing to grant permission after expiry of sixty days which is not there in view of the express provision to that effect contained in that sub-section. The fact that the bar of limitation was not pleaded by the petitioner before the authority in our opinion, is of no consequence. Because as observed by the Privy Council in (Surajmull Nagarmull v. Triton Insurance Co. Ltd.)8, A.I.R. 1925 P.C. 83, no Court can enforce as valid that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from which a Court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties, or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset. 14. Much emphasis was laid by the learned Counsel for the respondents on the expression “shall pass the orders as expeditiously as possible” in the order of the High Court while directing the Authority to pass necessary orders on the application of the petitioner under section 13(2) of the Act. We have given our careful consideration to the above submission. We, however, find it difficult to agree with the Counsel for the respondents that this expression has the effect of permitting the Authority to pass order under section 13(3) at any time it pleases without regard to the statutory period of sixty days specified for the purpose. In our opinion the expression “as expeditiously as possible” has been used only to emphasize the urgency of disposal of the application under section 13(2) which is pending for several years. The maximum period available for the purpose being set out in the section itself, it was not necessary to specify the same in the order of this Court. In our opinion the expression “as expeditiously as possible” has been used only to emphasize the urgency of disposal of the application under section 13(2) which is pending for several years. The maximum period available for the purpose being set out in the section itself, it was not necessary to specify the same in the order of this Court. The direction to pass orders under section 13(3) as expeditiously as possible can only be interpreted to mean as expeditiously as possible within the time-frame specified in section 13(3) of the Act. Any other interpretation will render the direction contrary to the statutory provision of section 13(3) of the Act. 15. In the above premises, we are of the clear opinion that the order dated 17th September, 1984 refusing to grant permission passed by the Authority, is illegal and void, the same having been passed after the expiry of the statutory period of sixty days and that begin so, permission shall be deemed to have been granted by the authority in terms of section 13(3) of the Act. In that view of the matter, the writ petition is allowed and the Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a). Under the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 16. After the delivery of the judgment, the learned Counsel for the respondents prayed for stay of the operation of this order. Accordingly, we stay the operation for 12 weeks from today. Petition allowed -----