A. N. DIVECHA, SUSANTA CHATTERJI, J. ( 1 ) ). The order of detention passed by respondent No. 1 on 30th July 1993 under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-social Activities Act 1985 (the Act for brief) is under challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the instance of the detenus sister. ( 2 ) ). The facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. It appears that the detention of the detenu was sponsored by one Police Inspector Shri H. P. Sharma of the Athwa Lines Police Station at Surat. On perusal of the materials placed before him respondent No. 1 ordered detention of the detenu under the Act branding him as a dangerous person. A copy of the detention order is at Annexure-A to this petition. It appears that this detention order came to be approved by respondent No. 2 in due course. It however appears that the order of detention at Annexure-A to U this petition could not be served to the detenu for quite some time and it came to be served to him as late as on 7th September 1993. Along with the service of the order of detention the grounds of detention were also served to him. A copy of the grounds of detention is at Annexure-B to this petition. Thereafter the detenus sister has moved this Court by means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for questioning the validity of the detention order at Annexure-A to this petition and also the validity of her brothers continued detention. ( 3 ) ). Several grounds have been urged before us in support of this petition. Both the sides have rendered their valuable assistance to this Court on each point of argument. We also had an opportunity to receive assistance from another learned Additional Public Prosecutor Shri M. R. Rawal who appears for the respondents against this very petitioner in two other detention matters. We have therefore thought it fit to avail of his assistance as well in this case. It appears that both the learned Advocates for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutors for the respondents have prepared well on the scope of all these petitions though we are at present focusing on the point involved in this petition alone. It appears that both the learned Advocates for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutors for the respondents have prepared well on the scope of all these petitions though we are at present focusing on the point involved in this petition alone. We have however thought it fit to dispose of this petition only on two grounds which have appealed to us most. The first ground is non-consideration by respondent No. 1 of the affidavits of the some 11 persons accompanying the bail application moved by the present petitioner with respect to the criminal case arising from Crime Register No. 371 of 1992. The second ground is mechanical claim of privilege under Section 9 of the Act. ( 4 ) ). It is not in dispute that the detenu in the instant case was arrested in connection with the offences mentioned in Crime Register No. 371 of 1992 It is not in dispute that his earlier bail application came to be rejected. It is again not in dispute that he made another bail application and along with that bail application affidavits of 11 persons were also filed in support of the said bail application. It is not in dispute that the deponents of those 11 affidavits were named as witnesses in the First Information Report arising from Crime Register No. 371 of 1992. It is again not in dispute that the Court granted bail on the present detenu after considering the materials accompanying the bail application. It is also not in dispute that the aforesaid bail application and the bail order passed thereon were considered by the detaining authority for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction for detention of the detenu in this case. It is however an admitted position on record that the affidavits of 11 witnesses accompanying the said bail application were not placed before the detaining authority and were therefore not considered by him for the purpose of reaching the required subjective satisfaction. That becomes clear from the second part of paragraph 14 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the successor-in-office of the then detaining authority. Relying on this admitted fact-situation on record Shri Kapadia for the petitioner has urged that non-consideration of circumstances operating in favour of the detenu would vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and would consequently render the detention order illegal and invalid. Relying on this admitted fact-situation on record Shri Kapadia for the petitioner has urged that non-consideration of circumstances operating in favour of the detenu would vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and would consequently render the detention order illegal and invalid. As against this the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has urged that the affidavits of the said 11 witnesses accompanying the bail application would be in the nature of evidence only and it was not necessary for the detaining authority to consider them separately as the reference thereto was made in the order granting bail on the bail application to which those affidavits were accompanying. ( 5 ) ). It cannot be gainsaid that an order of detention under any law of preventive detention encroaches upon the liberty of the detenu. That order has therefore to be passed after taking into consideration all relevant factors and circumstances requiring the detaining authority to be fully satisfied that it would be necessary to detain the detenu for the purposes of the Act authorising him to pass such order of detention. Such subjective satisfaction has not to be capricious or whimsical. Such subjective satisfaction has to be arrived at on the basis of certain objective factors. The detaining authority would not be justified in detaining a person simply on the ground that the former would not like to see the face of the latter. Such an order would have to be branded only as capricious and whimsical. On the other hand if the subjective satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority is based on objective factors arising from consideration of the materials on record it would not be open to this Court to sit in appeal over such subjective satisfaction. In order to see that such subjective satisfaction suffers from no infirmity it would be incumbent upon the detaining authority to take into consideration all relevant materials for the purpose. Any and every material which is capable of influencing his decision with respect to exercise of his powers under the concerned law of preventive detention has to be taken into consideration by the detaining authority before reaching the subjective satisfaction regarding detention of a person thereunder. Any and every material which is capable of influencing his decision with respect to exercise of his powers under the concerned law of preventive detention has to be taken into consideration by the detaining authority before reaching the subjective satisfaction regarding detention of a person thereunder. It is a trite principle of law that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is a condition precedent for exercise of the power to detain a person under the concerned law of preventive detention. At this stage it would be quite proper to look at the relevant observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court at page 550. It has been held therein: the power of detention is not a quasi-judicial power. But the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is not wholly immune from judicial reviewability. The Courts have by judicial decisions carved out an area limited though it be within which the validity of the subjective satisfaction can yet be subjected to judicial scrutiny. The basic postulate on which the courts have proceeded is that the subjective satisfaction being a condition precedent for the exercise of the power conferred on the executive the court can always examine whether the requisite satisfaction is arrived at by the authority; if it is not the condition precedent to the exercise of the power would not be fulfilled and the exercise of the power would be bad. (Emphasis supplied.) we are bound by the aforesaid dictum of law pronounced by the Apex Court. We have to examine in this case whether or not the subjective satisfaction of respondent No. 1 stood vitiated on account of non-consideration by him of the affidavits of 11 witnesses accompanying the subsequent bail application made by the detenu. ( 6 ) ). In this connection a reference deserves to be made to the ruling of the Delhi High Court in the case of Lynn A. Curtis v. Union of India reported in 1990 Criminal Law Journal at page 74. In that case the pre-charge evidence of witnesses in a criminal case was not considered by the detaining authority. The challenge to the order of detention was made by pressing into service that fact-situation. In that case the pre-charge evidence of witnesses in a criminal case was not considered by the detaining authority. The challenge to the order of detention was made by pressing into service that fact-situation. In that context it has been held one of the pre-requisites for passing the detention order is that all relevant material and facts must be placed before the detaining authority which may sway the mind of the detaining authority in coming to the conclusion whether he should pass the detention order or not and if any relevant material particularly which is exculpatory in nature is not placed before the detaining authority the detention order becomes bad in law inasmuch as the detaining authority in that respect has failed to apply his mind to the relevant material. Therefore where the pre-charge evidence has not been placed before the detaining authority which was a relevant material document the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority in passing the detention order is vitiated. (Emphasis supplied.) The aforesaid ruling of the Delhi High Cout has been based on the earlier Division Bench ruling of that court in the case of Shri Ram Goyal v. Union of India reported in 1984 Criminal Law Journal at page 1048. In that case also the pre-charge evidence was not placed before the detaining authority for his consideration while passing the order of detention. It is needless to say that it has been held therein that such non-consideration of the relevant material would vitiate the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. ( 7 ) ). Practically to the same effect is the unreported ruling of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 549 of 1988 decided on 28 October 1988. In that case the detenus acquittal in certain criminal cases was not considered by the detaining authority. On that fact-situation the Division Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in that case stood vitiated. ( 8 ) ). Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has however urged that the evidence in support of a bail application need not be considered by the detaining authority when the bail order has been taken into consideration by him and the bail order would reflect consideration of the evidence if any in support of the bail application by the competent Court. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor has however urged that the evidence in support of a bail application need not be considered by the detaining authority when the bail order has been taken into consideration by him and the bail order would reflect consideration of the evidence if any in support of the bail application by the competent Court. It has been urged on behalf of the respondents that the grounds of detention at Annexure-B to this petition would clearly go to show that the detaining authority was alive to the grant of bail to the detenu in the instant case and the bail order (a copy of which was admittedly furnished to the detenu at the time of serving to him the grounds of detention) did reflect consideration by the competent Court of the accompanying affidavits of 11 witnesses. This submission urged before us by and on behalf of the respondents looks attractive at the first blush. However on closer scrutiny we find that it cannot be accepted. The reason therefore is quite simple. Any and every material which is capable of influencing the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for detention of a person under any law of preventive detention has to be taken into consideration by the detaining authority. Non-consideration thereof by him would vitiate his subjective satisfaction. ( 9 ) ). We are fortified in our view by the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Khudiram Das (supra ). It has been held therein it is therefore not only the right of the court but also its duty as well to examine what are the basic facts and materials which actually and in fact weighed with the detaining authority in reaching the requisite satisfaction. The judicial scrutiny cannot be foreclosed by a mere statement of the detaining authority that it has taken into account only certain basic facts and materials and though other basic facts and materials were before it it has not allowed them to influence its satisfaction. The judicial scrutiny cannot be foreclosed by a mere statement of the detaining authority that it has taken into account only certain basic facts and materials and though other basic facts and materials were before it it has not allowed them to influence its satisfaction. The Court is entitled to examine the correctness of this statement and determine for itself whether there were any other basic facts or materials apart from those admitted by it which could have reasonably influenced the decision of the detaining authority and for that purpose the Court can certainly require the detaining authority to produce and make available to the Court the entire record of the case which was before it. That is the least the Court can do to ensure observance of the requirements of law by the detaining authority. (Emphasis supplied.) ( 10 ) ). In this connection a reference also deserves to be made to the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kamal Kishore Saini reported in AIR 1988 Supreme Court at page 208. It has been held in paragraph 7 at page 211 of the reported ruling: similarly with regard to ground No. 3 the application of the co-accused as well as the statement made in the bail application filed on behalf of the detenus alleging that they had been falsely implicated in the same case and the police report thereon were not produced before the detaining authority before passing the detention order. The High Court therefore was justified in holding that the assertion made in the return that even if the material had been placed before the detaining authority he would not have changed the subjective satisfaction as this has never been accepted as a correct proposition of law. It is incumbent to place all the vital materials before the detaining authority to enable him to come to a subjective satisfaction as to the passing of the order of detention as mandatorily required under the Act. (Emphasis supplied.) the aforesaid binding dicta of law would be a clear pointer to the duty of the Court while considering the validity or otherwise of the detention order passed under the concerned law of preventive detention. ( 11 ) ). Copies of affidavits of 11 witnesses accompayning the concerned bail application are produced at Annexure-D to this petition. (Emphasis supplied.) the aforesaid binding dicta of law would be a clear pointer to the duty of the Court while considering the validity or otherwise of the detention order passed under the concerned law of preventive detention. ( 11 ) ). Copies of affidavits of 11 witnesses accompayning the concerned bail application are produced at Annexure-D to this petition. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has also supplied their English translation. All affidavits are not stereotype in nature. Their contents vary in certain material particulars. Each witness appears to have a different story to tell with respect to the criminal case arising from Crime Register No. 371 of 1992 wherein each was called as a witness. Those affidavits were certainly capable of influencing the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority while passing the impugned order of detention in this case. It would have been quite a different matter if the detaining authority had applied his mind to those affidavits and had readhed the same subjective satisfaction on consideration thereof. In that case this Court could not have sat in appeal over his such subjective satisfaction after taking into consideration all vital and material circumstances including those operating in favour of the detenu. It is one thing to apply mind to all relevant circumstances and materials on record and to reach the subjective satisfaction; it is quite the other not to consider certain relevant circumstances operating in favour of the detenu for reaching the subjective satisfaction against the detenu. If all relevant circumstances are not taken into consideration in reaching the subjective satisfaction the detention order will have to be found suffering from the vice of non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority ( 12 ) ). Even at the cost of repetition it has to be reiterated that the affidavits of 11 witnesses accompanying the subsequent bail application were relevant materials to be considered by the detaining authority It cannot be gainsaid that they were capable of influencing the subjective satisfaction to be arrived at by the detaining authority before passing the order of detention against the detenu in this case under the Act. The admitted fact is that those affidavits were not placed before the detaining authority and they were never taken into consideration while passing the impugned order of detention at Annexure-A to this petition Non-consideration of such relevant material by respondent No. 1 while passing the impugned order of detention at Annexure-A to this petition has vitiated his subjective satisfaction in that regard rendering it to be illegal and invalid. ( 13 ) ). Non-consideration of the evidence in support of a judgment or order may have to be considered in a given case. In order to brand a person as a dangerous person within the meaning of the Act his past criminal record may have to be taken into consideration. In certain criminal cases he might have come to be acquitted. His acquittal in such cases will have also to be considered. In a given case he might have earned acquittal on account of non-support of the prosecution case by witnesses. The acquittal judgment or order might have simply recorded the fact of non-support of the prosecution case by the prosecution witnesses. The detaining authority might come to the conclusion on the basis of the acquittal judgment or order that the prosecution failed because its witnesses did not support the prosecution case because they were apprehending some harm from the detenu as the accused. In the case resulting into such acquittal the prosecution witnesses might not have been declared hostile and might not have been cross-examined by the concerned Public Prosecutor. In such a situation the subjective satisfaction that the acquittal was earned by the proposed detenu by intimidating witnesses would be without any basis. At that stage in order to reach a proper subjective satisfaction the detaining authority might be required to look into the evidence supporting the judgment or order of acquittal. Non-consideration of such evidence by the detaining authority in such a case might vitiate his subjective satisfaction. ( 14 ) ). The unreported ruling of the Division Bench of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 97 of 1989 decided on 27th July 1989 lends support to our aforesaid view. Non-consideration of such evidence by the detaining authority in such a case might vitiate his subjective satisfaction. ( 14 ) ). The unreported ruling of the Division Bench of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 97 of 1989 decided on 27th July 1989 lends support to our aforesaid view. In that case the detaining authority took into consideration certain acquittals earned by the detenu in certain criminal cases and yet he reached the subjective satisfaction for passing the order of detention against the detenu by observing that the prosecution failed because the witnesses in that case resulting into acquittal of the detenu turned hostile. The order of detention in that case was challenged by pressing into service the contention that the material for coming to the conclusion that the witnesses turned hostile resulting into the acquittal of the detenu in certain criminal cases was not placed before the detaining authority and non-consideration thereof would vitiate his subjective satisfaction. That contention came to be upheld by the Division Bench of this Court in its aforesaid ruling. ( 15 ) ). The aforesaid ruling of the Division Bench of this Court will squarely apply in the instant case. As aforesaid affidavits of 11 witnesses accompanying the bail application were not placed before the detaining authority and the subjective satisfaction for detention of the detenu in the present case was reached without considering such material. As observed earlier such affidavits could have swayed the decision of the detaining authority one way or the other. Non-consideration thereof would therefore vitiate his subjective satisfaction. ( 16 ) ). So far as the claim of privilege is concerned it is an admitted position that copies of statements of witnesses supplied to the detenu left certain blanks. It has been urged that the blanks were deliberately kept as such in order to see that the identity of the witnesses was not disclosed or revealed in any manner. On perusal of the grounds of detention in this case in statements of the first two witnesses those blanks are supplemented. The relevant particulars with respect to which blanks were kept in copies of the statements given to the detenu were found mentioned in the grounds of detention. In that view of the matter blanks in that regard in copies of the statements of the concerned witnesses became meaningless. The relevant particulars with respect to which blanks were kept in copies of the statements given to the detenu were found mentioned in the grounds of detention. In that view of the matter blanks in that regard in copies of the statements of the concerned witnesses became meaningless. For example in the case of witness No. 1 blanks were kept in the copy of his statement with a view to concealing not only his name and address but also the nature and the address of his avocation. In the gist of his statement in the grounds of detention at Annexure-B to this petition it has clearly been mentioned that the detenu and his associates ordered for tea at his place of business. It would clearly go to show that he was having his tea-shop or tea-stall in that area. It could be a mobile or a stationary tea-shop or tea-stall. Nonetheless the nature of his avocation was clearly revealed. If that be so the blanks in that regard in the copy of his statement supplied to the detenu became meaningless and redundant. ( 17 ) ). In this connection a reference deserves to be made to two unreported Division Bench rulings of this Court in Special Criminal Application No. 1251 of 1992 decided on 17th September 1992 and Special Criminal Application No. 1545 of 1993 decided on 27th December 1993. Both the aforesaid rulings were rendered by two different Division Benches. In both the cases the privilege under Section 9 (2) of the Act was claimed with a view not to disclosing in any manner the identity of the witnesses. In both the cases it was found that certain particulars in copies of statements of the said witnesses in respect of which such privilege was claimed figured in the gist or the summary of such statements in the grounds of detention. In that context the Division Bench in Special Criminal Application No. 1251 of 1992 decided on 17 September 1992 came to the conclusion that it was the case of non-application of mind with respect to the claim of privilege under Section 9 of the Act resulting into denial to the detenu an opportunity of making an effective representation and that violated his fundamental right under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench in Special Criminal Application No. 1545 of 1993 decided on 27th December 1993 also came to the conclusion that by mechanically claiming the privilege under Section 9 of the Act the detenus right of making representation against his detention was seriously impaired and that violated Article 22 (5) of the Constitution of India. ( 18 ) ). The aforesaid two unreported Division Bench rulings of this Court are on all fours applicable in the present case. We are not inclined to take a view different from that taken by the aforesaid two different Division Benches of this Court in the aforesaid two different unreported rulings. The impugned order of detention at Annexure-A to the petition cannot be sustained in law on this ground as well. ( 19 ) ). In the result this petition succeeds. The order of detention at Annexure-A to this petition is declared illegal and invalid. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Rule is accordingly made absolute. .