Judgment : ARUNACHALAM, J, J. ( 1 ) PETITIONER Lakshmi is the mother of Velu, who is A-1 in C. c. 3 of 1993, pending on the file of First Additional Designated Court, Madras. On 14/9/1993, Designated Court framed 11 charges against Velu and A-2 Sisubalan, which include commission of offence punishable under TADA (P) Act, 1987 S. 3 S. 3 S. 4 S. 5 S. 6 of. Other offences alleged are punishable under the provisions ofrailway Act and Explosive Substances Act. ( 2 ) THIS is not the first time, that the petitioner has chosen to approach this Court, on behalf of her son Velu, for at least from the records placed before us, she had invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court, on four earlier occasions. ( 3 ) WE deem, it necessary to state the details-of those writ petitions and the orders passed thereon, for we are unable to exclude an impression, that every time, same grounds are sought to be put forth for a decision before this Court, whether taken in the memorandum or not, and the ultimate purpose appears to be intended, to delay the progress, in trial. Even in the instant Habeas Corpus Petition, though grounds taken in the memorandum are very limited, Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in the instant petition as well as in the earlier petitions, has placed a huge variety of, submissions, most of them decided in the earlier petitions and a few of them fresh for our consideration. Even at the outset, we must state, that it will not be fair either for the petitioner or her counsel to put forth the same contentions which have been the subject-matter of vindicating by this Court, for we do not sit in appeal over those decisions rendered by other Division Benches of this Court. If the petitioner or her counsel stood aggrieved by those orders, the remedy for them would certainly be elsewhere and not in this Court over again by mere repetition of the gamut of submissions made and considered earlier, by this Court. ( 4 ) THE earliest of the Habeas Corpus Petitions, preferred by the petitioner, was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 13/11/1992. That concerned petition is H. C. P. No. 494 of 1992. ( 4 ) THE earliest of the Habeas Corpus Petitions, preferred by the petitioner, was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court on 13/11/1992. That concerned petition is H. C. P. No. 494 of 1992. In that petition, Lakhsmi, mother of detenu Velu, had pleaded for production of her son before this Court, to be set free, alleging that he was illegally arrested by the TQT Branch Police, Dharmapuri on the evening of 8/11/1992 and not produced before any Court till 10/11/1992. There was a further allegation that Velu was being systematically tortured. On notice, it was represented by the State, that Velu was arrested on 9/11/1992 in respect of Crime No. 80 of 1992 on the file of Dharmapuri Railway Protection Force, registered for offences punishable under the layaway Act and Explosive Substances Act. It was also then submitted by the State, that the detenu was remanded by Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Dharmapuri on 10/11/1992. This Court, on being satisfied, that there was no ground to hold that there was illegal custody, dismissed the Habeas Corpus Petition. All that we have to note at this stage, is that the arrest of the detenu and his non-production stood questioned at the earliest point of time on which a decision was rendered by this Court. ( 5 ) H. C. P. No. 841 of 1993 is the second in the series of Habeas Corpus Petitions preferred by Lakshmi petitioner herein, on behalf of her son Velu. Another Division Bench of this Court disposed of this Habeas Corpus Petition, by its order dated 22/6/1993. In the affidavit sworn to in H. C. P. No. 841 of 1993, petitioner Lakshmi had stated, that from 8/11/1992, her son stood detained under Sections 3,4,5 and 6 of TADA Act and was facing prosecution in C. C. No. 3 of 1993 on the file of Designated Court No. II, Madras. According to her, detention of her son was illegal, for the material placed before the Designated Court was devoid of substance, to comment him with any of the provisions under TADA Act. According to her, detention of her son was illegal, for the material placed before the Designated Court was devoid of substance, to comment him with any of the provisions under TADA Act. It was also her case, that statement of witness Chinnasami and confession of a co-accused without an identification parade, could not be held to be sufficient material and further even if explosives had been seized from Velu, if he cannot be connected with any terrorist act, he could not have been taken before a Designated Court. The prayer was that if the offences punishable under TADA Act were excluded, Velu should have been re- leased on the expiry of 90 days, since by then final report had not been laid Mr. R. Sankarasubbu and Mr. I. Subramanian, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, were heard in extent so and ultimately this Court held, that the Designated Court which has power to Scrutinized, if prima facie offences punishable under TADA Act were discernible, had found that commission of such offences did loom large on the material placed before it and therefore the question of ordinary law becoming operative, did not arise. Soon after this Court dismissed the said Habeas Corpus Petition, Mr. R. Sankarasubbu made an oral application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. That Division Bench negated the oral prayer, since the Division Bench was satisfied that its decision was based on the law laid down by the Supreme Court, which was applied to the facts placed before them. Mr. R. Sankarasubbu stated today before us, that the petitioner did not choose to challenge the order in H. C. P. No. 841 of 1993, before the Supreme Court. ( 6 ) H. C. P. No. 538 of 1993 is the third Habeas Corpus Petition preferred by Lakshmi, pleading for production of her son Velu, to be set at liberty. That Habeas Corpus Petition was dismissed for non- prosecution on 6/9/1993. Even then, it will be our duty to state the facts, which led to the preferring of the said Habeas Corpus Petition. In her affidavit therein, Lakshmi has stated, that her son Velu was arrested on 8/11/1992 and was not produced before any Magistrate immediately that led to her-preferring H. CY. Even then, it will be our duty to state the facts, which led to the preferring of the said Habeas Corpus Petition. In her affidavit therein, Lakshmi has stated, that her son Velu was arrested on 8/11/1992 and was not produced before any Magistrate immediately that led to her-preferring H. CY. No. 614 of 1992, wherein the respondent, that he had been produced before the Magistrate on 10/11/1992, for, stated it alleged commission of offences punishable under the Explosive Substances Act and Railway Act. Petitioner was further aware, that police custody had been obtained on 16/11/1992 and thereafter Velu was remanded to judicial custody till 25/11/1992. On 25/11/1992, he was informed that he would be produced before Designated Court No. II, Madras, on 9/12/1992. But, on the date, he was not produced before the said Court at Madras, but the learned Designated Judge, went over to Jail premises at Salem and extended the remand without considering, whether the material placed before him would attract offences punishable under the provisions of TADA Act. Further on the same day; Designated Judge, entertained an application preferred by the Prosecution seeking police custody and without furnishing an opportunity to Velu, disposed of the said application. Non-furnishing of opportunity to Velu was vocative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Lakshmi had further stated in her affidavit, in that Habeas Corpus Petition, that an application under Sec. 28 of TADA (P) Act preferred on behalf of her son, was dismissed on untenable grounds. His counsel and relatives were waiting at Madras, but without any opportunity to them, to help the detenu, remand orders were passed at Central Prison, Salem, on 9/12/1992. The case of Lakshmi was, that extending of remand at jail premises would be unjust and illegal. Though the dismissal order in H. CY. No. 538 of 1993 was passed on 6/9/1993 on the ground of non-prosecution; neither the petitioner nor her counsel had chosen to plead for restoration of the said Habeas Corpus Petition for disposal on merits. This attitude only portrays, that no seriousness was sought to be attached to the prayer made in that Habeas Corpus Petition, and that preferring of a series of Habeas Corpus Petitions was only a planned course of conduct to have the trial delayed. At this stage, Mr. This attitude only portrays, that no seriousness was sought to be attached to the prayer made in that Habeas Corpus Petition, and that preferring of a series of Habeas Corpus Petitions was only a planned course of conduct to have the trial delayed. At this stage, Mr. R. Sankarasubbu submitted, that he had preferred an application for restoration of the Habeas Corpus Petition, but the said application was not numbered. If obtaining of a remedy was found imminent, counsel would have certainly processed that petition, and brought it for hearing, for it is not unusual for Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, to bring to our notice, any infirmities found in passing of papers in the concerned Section of this Court. We say this much and nothing more. ( 7 ) THEN came H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992 for decision by this Court. A third Division Bench disposed of this Habeas Corpus Petition by its order-dated 9/11/1993. The averments in the affidavit filed therein by Lakshmi was, that her son was taken into custody on 8/11/1992 at 1-00 p. m. by the Q Branch Police, Dharmapuri and he was not produced before any Magistrate even on 9/11/1992. She sent a telegram on 9/11/1992 and thereafter moved a Habeas Corpus Petition, before this Court, on 10/11/1992. While so, on 11/11/1992, her son was produced before Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Dharmapuri in Crime No. 80 of 1992. This affidavit contains, details of police custody ordered initially by the learned Magistrate, and later ordering of judicial remand, though it stood sated by the petitioner, that such remands or extensions were mechanically made and hence illegal. As has-been done previously, the case of the petitioner was countered by the State giving out various dates apart from facts, which were sufficient to indicate involvement of the petitioner in commission of offence punishable under TADA (P) Act. ( 8 ) PASSING here for a moment, we are bound to observe, that some of the allegations made therein, do certainly overlap on the averments made in the earlier Habeas Corpus Petitions and also to some extent on those made in the instant Habeas Corpus Petition. Srinivasan, J. , speaking on behalf of the Division Bench stated as follows: From the facts set out in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, it is clear that the detention of the accused is under judicial orders of remand. Srinivasan, J. , speaking on behalf of the Division Bench stated as follows: From the facts set out in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent, it is clear that the detention of the accused is under judicial orders of remand. If those orders are illegal, the proper remedy of the petitioner is to file appropriate proceedings, challenging the validity of the said orders. When the petitioner has come to this Court with a petition alleging that her son was not produced before any Magistrate and was being kept illegally, it is not open to her to collaterally attack the orders of remand made by the Judicial Magistrate under the statutes. It is not necessary for us to go into the question whether the provisions of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will permit remand for more than 60 days or the provisions of the said Code have been modified by the provisions of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, as a result of which there can be remand for more than 15 days at a time. Those questions are alien to the consideration by this Court of this petition. TI R. C. P. No. 614 of 1992 was accordingly dismissed. ( 9 ) THE state is now set to detail the averments made by the petitioner in the instant Habeas Corpus Petition. Petitioner has stated in her affidavit, that her son Velu was arrested on 8/11/1992 and charged for defenses punishable under Sections 3 (3), 4,5 and 6 of TADA (P) Act. Though he was an under trial prisoner, charge-sheet was not filed within-six months, and the detention beyond 8/5/1993 was illegal and therefore extension of remand mechanically, was vocative of Section 20 (4) of TADA (P) Act. She has further alleged, that the charge sheet and the documents appended to it were in English. The same was returned to the Designated Court by Velu on 30/8/1993, with a request to furnish Tamil translations of the documents found in English. However, the Court furnished 27 pages of Tamil translations alone, as against 98-page paper book supplied earlier. Though the said irregularity was pointed out to the Designated Court. Without attaching any seriousness, the Court concerned, merely framed charges on 14/9/1993. Petitions preferred by Velu, under Section 207, Cr. However, the Court furnished 27 pages of Tamil translations alone, as against 98-page paper book supplied earlier. Though the said irregularity was pointed out to the Designated Court. Without attaching any seriousness, the Court concerned, merely framed charges on 14/9/1993. Petitions preferred by Velu, under Section 207, Cr. P. C. , for furnishing of the entire material sought to be relied upon by prosecution were dismissed, and without a proper and reasonable opportunity, charges stood framed on 14/9/1993. This procedure was vocative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Again, the usual prayer made by the petitioner, in all the Habeas Corpus petitions, that the remand was illegal, has been repeated here in, with an addition that remand beyond six months without reason, was illegal, and violative of Article 21 of the Constitution. Petitioner has further stated in her affidavit, that taking of cognizance of the case, without prior sanction from Inspector General of Police, was illegal. If the Designated Court had taken cognizance, it must be held to be non-east. ( 10 ) OF course, Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, as is usual of him, did 10 restrict his submissions to the grounds taken in the affidavit, but extended, it by advancing several submissions, which, again, as usual, we did permit him to urge, for, in our view, if any genuine grievance could be spelt out, it will have to be remedied by this Court, for furtherance of the cause of justice. Though the question of initial remand by Judicial Magistrate, Dharmapuri, inclusive of his directions to produce Velu before the Designated Court and the further order of the Designated Court, directing holding of sitting at Salem prison, to extent the remand, has been held to be legal, in the earlier Habeas Corpus Petitions, the same argument was repeated. However, Mr. Sankarasubbu contended, that in so far as the remand at Central Prison, Salem, on 9. 12. 1992 is concerned, Velu was not put on notice that he could have the assistance of his counsel at the time of remand. Therefore, the earlier remand process has to be struck down. He invited this Court to hold that subsequent remand orders cannot survive in view of illegal remands earlier. He submitted, that with effect from 22. 5. 12. 1992 is concerned, Velu was not put on notice that he could have the assistance of his counsel at the time of remand. Therefore, the earlier remand process has to be struck down. He invited this Court to hold that subsequent remand orders cannot survive in view of illegal remands earlier. He submitted, that with effect from 22. 5. 1993, Section 20-A, has been introduced in, TADA (P) Act which prohibits recording of information about the commission of offences under TADA Act by the police, without the prior approval of the District Superintendent of Police and further puts a bar, on a Court, from taking cognizance of any offence under that Act, without that previous sanction of the Inspector-General of Police or, as the case may be, the Commissioner of Police. His contention was, that cognizance taken by the Designated Court without previous sanction of the authorities referred to under Section 20-A (2) of the Amending Act, would suffice to hold in favor of accused Velu. He then referred to amend Section 20 (4) of the Act, which substituted in clause (b) of the old Section, the words one hundred and eighty days instead of the words one year at both the places, where they occur. He then referred to added proviso in subsection (2) after the existent proviso, which reads as hereunder: Provided further that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Designated Court shall extend the said period up to one year, on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days. This, Mr. Sankarasubbu submitted, was a serious legal flaw, which can be only remedied by directing release of Velu from judicial remand. ( 11 ) THE next ground urged by petitioners counsel was, that the language of Courts in Tamil Nadu under Section 272, Cr. P. C. was Tamil and if the final report and the documents accompanying the same, were not in Tamil, the Designated Court ought to have refused to take cognizance and returned the papers. ( 11 ) THE next ground urged by petitioners counsel was, that the language of Courts in Tamil Nadu under Section 272, Cr. P. C. was Tamil and if the final report and the documents accompanying the same, were not in Tamil, the Designated Court ought to have refused to take cognizance and returned the papers. As long as the final report, was not laid before the Designated Court, in the Language known to the detenu, or the Court language, it must be deemed, that investigation was still in progress and therefore unless the provisions of amended Section 20 (4) of the Act, stood complied with, the whole foundation for this prosecution must be struck down as illegal. ( 12 ) THEN, reference was made to Section 327 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to contend, that the place in which any Criminal Court is held, for the purpose of inquiring into or trying any offence, shall be deemed to be an open Court to which public generally may have access so far as the same can conveniently contain them. The submission was, that the Designated Judge, should not have held proceedings in camera in Central Prison, Salem, to extend the remand of Velu. Of course, we find a proviso to this Section, which reads that if the Court thought it fit, at any stage of any enquiry or trial of any particular case, can order that the public generally, or any particular person, shall not have access to or be, or remain in, the room or building, used by the Court. In extension of this argument, Mr. Sankarasubbu submitted that merely because Velu is being prosecuted under the provisions of TADA (P) Act, his rights under Article 21 of the Constitution do not get suspended or erased. He then referred to an order passed by the Designated Court in Criminal M. P. No. 218 of 1993 wherein the learned Judge has stated, that on 19/7/1993, 2/8/1993, 16/8/1993 and 31/8/1993 both sides were heard. According to learned counsel, this statement of the designated Judge in his order dated 12/10/1993 was contrary to his order made in his own handwriting on the docket-sheet of the petition filed by him before the said Court, which reads that both sides were absent. According to learned counsel, this statement of the designated Judge in his order dated 12/10/1993 was contrary to his order made in his own handwriting on the docket-sheet of the petition filed by him before the said Court, which reads that both sides were absent. The object of this contention was that, without hearing both parties learned Designated Judge had chosen to give a contrary picture in his order; as though both sides were heard. In other words, the contention was, that due process of law was not observed. ( 13 ) THE final ground was, that though records under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were supplied to Velu on 10. 5. 1993, they were turned to the Designated Court, since certain documents were in English, which language he could not understand. He pleaded for supply, of such of those documents and statements of witnesses, which were in English language, to be translated into Tamil and copies thereof furnished to him. Translated Tamil copies of those passages in English, were supplied to the detenu, on orders of the Designated Court, of 31/8/1993. According to Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, initially documents supplied to Velu stood returned to Designated Court and thereafter only a few pages of translated documents were furnished to him while the Court itself retained the main paper book. In spite of his pleading before the Designated Judge, that Velu had not been supplied with entire records, sought to be relied upon by the prosecution, without supplying such documents to him, Designated Judge chose to frame charges on 14. 9. 1993. Petitioners counsel further pointed out, an order passed by the Designated Court in Cr1. M. P. No. 193 of 1993 on 28. 9. 1993, which reads as hereunder: Copies of the documents have been agreeably furnished to the accused. As requested by the petitioner, Tamil terrorizations have been furnished. Copies. Returned by the petitioner, returned herewith. On the basis of this order, it was submitted, that the original paper book supplied to the detenu, which was returned to the Designated Court, was ordered to be handed over to the petitioner only on 28/9/1993, which would suffice to show, that on 14/9/1993 when the charges were framed, Velu did not have the benefit of those records. On the basis of this order, it was submitted, that the original paper book supplied to the detenu, which was returned to the Designated Court, was ordered to be handed over to the petitioner only on 28/9/1993, which would suffice to show, that on 14/9/1993 when the charges were framed, Velu did not have the benefit of those records. It was further submitted by petitioners counsel, that even though this order reads, that copies were returned to Velu, it was immediately put back into Court on the ground, that charges had been framed in the absence of full supply of records to him. A strenuous contention was put forth, that the right given to the accused, under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to plead for discharge, had not been reasonably afforded and therefore the charges framed must be quashed and an opportunity afforded to Velu, to put, forth his submission, at Section 227, Cr. P. C. stage. ( 14 ) ON these contentions, we have heard Mr. I. Subramaniam, earned Additional Public Prosecutor. Before referring to his submissions, it will be necessary to have a quick look at the counter-affidavit sworn to by Gopalakrishnan, concerned Deputy Superintendent of Police. He has questioned the maintainability of this Habeas Corpus Petition. A specific averment has been made, that Velu was arrested only on 9/11/1992 and not on 8/11/1992 as claimed by the petitioner. Charge sheet was laid before the Designated Court on 29/3/1993 and hence there was no violation of any procedure contemplated under TADA (P) Act. He has further stated, that initially documents relied upon by the prosecution were supplied to Velu on 10/5/1993. Subsequently, in view of the grievance expressed by value, that some of the documents were in English and that he could not understand the same, copies of such of those documents and statements of witnesses that were in English were translated in Tamil and copies of the same furnished to Velu on 31/8/1993. Those documents were only a few. According to the Respondent, Velu had sufficient Opportunity to go through the documents relied upon by the prosecution. Further, it was only after hearing counsel appearing for the accused, that charges were framed on 14/9/1993 by the Designated Court. There was no infringement, whatever, of the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution. Those documents were only a few. According to the Respondent, Velu had sufficient Opportunity to go through the documents relied upon by the prosecution. Further, it was only after hearing counsel appearing for the accused, that charges were framed on 14/9/1993 by the Designated Court. There was no infringement, whatever, of the mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution. The affidavit further reads, that the provision relating to obtaining of sanction from the Inspector-General of Police, before taking of cognizance, had come into effect only from 22/5/1993 and hence charge- sheet filed and cognizance taken long prior to that date were in order and the provision as amended later, was not applicable. The affidavit proceeds to add, that after framing of charges, P. W. 1 was partly examined on 12/10/1993, and that with the sole view of protracting the ongoing trial, this Habeas Corpus Petition had been preferred. ( 15 ) MR. I. Subramanian, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, while countering the submissions made by Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, submitted, that neither introduction of new Section 20-A in the TADA (P) Act nor amendment to Section 20 (4) of the Act, would make any impact on the instant facts, since the final report was laid even on 29/3/1993 long before introduction of these provisions with effect from 22/5/1993. He contended, that cognizance can be taken only once and that had been taken in accordance with law much earlier to 22/5/1993 when certain amendments were sought to be introduced in TADA (P) Act. He then contended, that on the filing of the final report, provisions under Section 167, Cr. P. C. become inoperative, for recourse to provisions under Section 309, Cr. P. C. step in automatically. He pointed out, that every time after 29/3/1993, when the final report was laid, accused was produced before the Designated Court and after hearing parties concerned, remand stood extended till the next adjourned date. He has given a list of dates, which are 12/4/1993, 26/4/1993, 10/5/1993, 24/5/1993, 7/6/1993, 21/6/1993, 5/7/1993, 19/7/1993, 2/8/1993, 16/8/1993 and 31/8/1993. He also placed for our scrutiny orders passed by the Designated Court, on each one of the those dates, stating the reasons for postponing hearing, while extending remand of the accused concerned, through those orders. He has given a list of dates, which are 12/4/1993, 26/4/1993, 10/5/1993, 24/5/1993, 7/6/1993, 21/6/1993, 5/7/1993, 19/7/1993, 2/8/1993, 16/8/1993 and 31/8/1993. He also placed for our scrutiny orders passed by the Designated Court, on each one of the those dates, stating the reasons for postponing hearing, while extending remand of the accused concerned, through those orders. He reiterated that all documents were supplied to the accused on 10/5/1993 and when certain translations were requested on the directions of the Designated Court, they stood furnished to the accused on 31/8/1993. He strenuously argued, that at the time when charges were framed, Velu had participated in the proceeding, through his counsel, and hence he cannot now take a ground, as though he had been impaired in placing his case before the Designated Court, at that stage. He submitted, that it appeared prima facie, from the ledger maintained by the Designated Court, that the original paper book containing the case record had been returned to the Court only on 28/9/1993, subsequently to the framing of the charge. If that were so, the grievance of Velu, cannot at all be real. He then pointed out to the limited prayer made by the petitioner in her affidavit, which does not indicate further return of papers on 28/9/1993, which, in turn would permit an inference being drawn, that the paper book was available with Velu, at the time of framing of charges on 14/9/1993. He has placed for our scrutiny G. O. Mrs. 10, Law Department, dated 21/1/1976 which states that with effect from 13th April 1976 Tamil shall be the language of all criminal Court subordinate to there High Court in the State of Tamil Nadu for the purpose of writing judgments and orders provided that the Presiding Officer whose mother tongue is other than Tamil, may, Continue to write judgments and other orders in English: Similarly, even if the mother tongue of the Presiding Officer is Tamil, but, in his opinion, he may not be able to write judgments and other orders in Tamil, he may continue to write judgments and other orders in English. This G. O. further provides that the Presiding Officer may employ English words and phrases in writing judgments and other orders wherever he feels necessary to bring out the exact purported meaning. Again, G. O. Ms. This G. O. further provides that the Presiding Officer may employ English words and phrases in writing judgments and other orders wherever he feels necessary to bring out the exact purported meaning. Again, G. O. Ms. No. 2807, Public (Tamil Development) Department, dated 13/11/1969 was placed before us, to show that Tamil shall be language of all criminal Courts in the State of Tamil Nadu for the purpose of recording evidence in all the proceedings. He contended that Section 272, Cr. P. C. relates to mode of taking and recording evidence in enquiries, for which the State Government may have to determine what shall be the language of each Court, within the State other than High Court. According to him, it will be erroneous to contend that Courts will not be entitled to take cognizance if a portion of the record was laid in English and the remaining in Tamil language, unless the Presiding Officer, did not know English language, in which contain documents were presented before him. So long as the Court concerned knew both the languages there could have been no impediment in applying its mind to the documents placed before it and thereafter choosing to take cognizance. He argued, that under Section 16 of TADA (P) Act notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, all proceedings before a Designated Court should have to be conducted in camera if the Designated Court so desired. Provisions under the TADA (P) Act were converse to the provisions found under Section 327, Cr. P. C. He then pointed out, that under Section 10 of the TADA Act, the Designated Court may on its own motion or on application made by the Public Prosecutor, decide to sit for any of its proceedings at any place other than its ordinary place of sitting, if it considered it expedient or desirable so to do. Even on 4. 12. 1992 while taking cognizance, Designated Court had ordered, that further remand of Velu, would be held at Central Prison, Salem and, therefore, contentions advanced as though proceedings were conducted in secret, can have no probative value. Even on 4. 12. 1992 while taking cognizance, Designated Court had ordered, that further remand of Velu, would be held at Central Prison, Salem and, therefore, contentions advanced as though proceedings were conducted in secret, can have no probative value. He further submitted, that every time remand ordered was in accordance with law, and that in any event if the detention of Velu can be held to be legal on the date of hearing of this Habeas Corpus Petition that would suffice and earlier illegality, assuming, if any, cannot alter the position. By pointing out certain portions of original record summoned from the Designated Court, Mr. I. Subramanian submitted that every time Velu was put on notice and was represented throughout by his counsel. It will be odd to contend, that the accused had no opportunity to effectively put forth his case through his counsel. ( 16 ) WE have assessed and evaluated the inherent merits of the divergent contentions placed for our decision. While there cannot be a second opinion, that if the rights of the accused stand affected, he would certainly have liberty to approach this Court to have injustice, if any, occasioned to him, remedied. At the same time, one cannot overlook, that the grievance or violation alleged, must be real and cannot be fanciful or imaginary. Further, it will be travesty of justice to indulge in preferring consecutive Habeas Corpus Petitions, alleging or pleading same factual details and claiming a relief, though different in label, amounting to one and the same, negative on merits earlier. As much as the libery of a citizen will have to be given top priority, counsel owe a duty, not to flood this Court with petitions by the same party, raising the same issues, considered and decided, for then the imagined libery of an individual, tends to affect the untested and live liberty of so many other litigants, wanting some portion of the time of this Court, to be spared for that process. It is-quite possible to use different terminology, in the petitions or affidavits, to effect an entry into the writ jurisdiction of this Court, but discretion must prevail on the counsel, more so, when the counsel happens to be the same person, to avoid entry into this Court, with prayers for same relief on the same facts, negative earlier by this Court. All these we are constrained to state, since in almost all Habeas Corpus Petitions, the factual details as well as the prayer, be it in any form, ultimately plead for setting Velu at libeny. The story starts from the date of arrest and every time the prior remand, though upheld by this Court, is sought to be challenged. In between these entries into this Court, we find that similar prayers have been made before the Designated Court, quite often and even after negation of the same, petitioner had preferred similar applications of the same nature before the Designated Court, though one can easily understand, that the ultimate result cannot be anything else other than the earlier verdict, on the same facts, more so, without any special or changed circumstances. ( 17 ) WE were further surprised to notice a petition preferred by petitioners counsel before the Designated Court as though some oral Observations were made by this Court in H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992 on 8/12/992 especially when this Court had passed a written order which reads as follows: P. P. takes notice. Post on 9/12/1992. On 2/12/1992, A division Bench constituted by Arunachalam, J. and Rengasamy, J. , directed issue of notice to learned Public Prosecutor returnable on 7/12/1992. There appears to have been no need to mention the name of any Judge of this Court in that petition. A Division Bench constituted by Srinivasan, J. and Abdul Hadi, J finally disposed of H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992 Though petitioners counsel who was afforded an opportunity to speak out, denied any attempt having been made, to state wrong facts, there appears to have been an attempt on the part of the petitioner or his counsel to put forth certain facts though vaguely with ambiguity which could not have been without any purpose. No Court makes any oral directions to be incorporated in any petitions before the subordinate Courts. Any order, if necessary, to be made, this Court always makes it in writing to be communicated to the Court concerned. No Court makes any oral directions to be incorporated in any petitions before the subordinate Courts. Any order, if necessary, to be made, this Court always makes it in writing to be communicated to the Court concerned. If petitions of this nature, alleging certain oral comments made by Judges form part of petitions preferred before subordinate Courts, there will be no opportunity for subordinate Courts themselves, to check up all that had happened, and at the same time they would be in an unenviable position, as not to attack importance to the contents of the petition, more so when some oral directions stated to have been made by this Court, stand placed before them in writing. It is possible to comprehend, that by making statements of this nature, subordinate Courts are placed in a critical and difficult position, to facilitate obtaining of orders, in a particular pattern, relying upon perused oral observations made by this Court. It so happened that while perusing the original records we were able to find this piece of paper referring to certain oral comments made by this Court, while pleading for release of Velu. Members of the Bar owe a duty to uphold purity in judicial administration. We do not know how much more misuse of this nature is prevalent, for only occasionally, we come across documents, which shock our conscience. It is hoped that responsible counsel will put an end to such practice, for they are equally officers of Court and have a duty to protect the majesty of justice delivery system. ( 18 ) AS we have already stated, in every one of the prior Habeas Corpus Petitions, earlier remands have been questioned as illegal. It would suffice for us to refer to the order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992 wherein the legality or otherwise of the remands of Velu up to 9/12/1992 have been considered. As a matter of fact, the said Division Bench had also taken note of the order of the Designated Court, directing production of the accused on 9/12/1992 at Salem, where he was expected to sit, the venue having been fixed under Section 10 of TADA (P) Act. We have to keep in mind, that the Division Bench of this Court disposed of H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992 on 9/11/1993. We have to keep in mind, that the Division Bench of this Court disposed of H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992 on 9/11/1993. If the petitioner was interested in challenging the further detentions after 9/12/1992 as illegal, nothing could have prevented the petitioner and her counsel from placing those facts as well before the said Division Bench, for its decision for, by then, almost a year had elapsed after December, 1992. It is not as though that arguments are restricted only to the grounds taken in the memorandum, for quite often not only arguments are advanced on points not taken, but several H. C. P. S. get allowed on those fresh points. Petitionerts counsel owed a duty, to have brought to the notice of that Division Bench, which had disposed of H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992, illegality, if any, in respect of further remands, for there cannot be a second opinion that even with effect from 22/5/1993, six months prior to the disposal of H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992, certain amendments had been made, to the main TADA (P) Act. It only reflects an impression, that with a view to present another Habeas Corpus Petition and delay further proceedings, arguments are advanced in installments, every time. We are quite pained as to the manner in which successive Habeas Corpus Petitions are filed, almost pleading for the same relief. We entirely agree, with the observations of the Division Bench in H. C. P. No. 614 of 1992, that once it appears clear that accused is in remand under judicial orders, there will be no scope, whatever, for seeking issue of a habeas. It will be relevant to refer even at this stage to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in T. Mohan v. State by Inspector of Police, CBCID, Madras, wherein, after referring to certain judgments of the Supreme Court, it was observed as follows: On the facts of this case narrated above, we have seen that the prosecution has promptly produced the petitioner before the proper Court, but unfortunately in the absence of the proper Presiding Officer, Judicial Magistrate No. 1, Chengalpauu, who had no power to extend the remand, have granted extension of remand. Therefore, the mistake committed by the Court, should not cause injury to the prosecution. Therefore, the mistake committed by the Court, should not cause injury to the prosecution. Viewed from that angle, coupled with the fact that subsequently there is a valid remand order, the relief of habeas corpus cannot be granted. T There is abundant case law, that in a Habeas Corpus Petition, Court has also to consider, legality of detention on the date of hearing. We are unable to discern any illegality in remands ordered, at any point of time, before, on or after 9/12/1992. Accused Velu, who was represented by counsel, had been afforded sufficient opportunity every time. ( 19 ) WE have already furnished certain dates, placed before us, and by learned Additional Public Prosecutor. Every time, the endorsement shows, that Velu had been produced before the Designated Court and thereafter remand was extended. On the filing of a final report, power to postpone or adjourn proceedings, will fall within the purview of Section 309, Cr. P. C. Under Section 309, Clause (2) Cr. P. C. , if the Court, after taking cognizance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same, on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody. Of course, such remand to custody cannot exceed 15 days at a time. Needles to state, that when the provisions under Section 309, Cr. P. C. become operative, recourse to Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be had. At this stage, we are bound to consider the submission made by Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, that on the peculiar facts of this case; it must be deemed, that investigation was pending till 31/8/1993, when translated documents in Tamil were furnished to Velu and if that be so, provisions of Section 167, Cr. P. C. must be held to be operative, at least till 31/8/1993. A reference to Chapter XII of Code of Criminal Procedure appearress of investigation and specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond the said period of 180 days. Naturally, this provision cannot attract the instant facts, because not only the final report was laid, but cognizance was also taken long before the induction of these provisions. A reference to Chapter XII of Code of Criminal Procedure appearress of investigation and specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond the said period of 180 days. Naturally, this provision cannot attract the instant facts, because not only the final report was laid, but cognizance was also taken long before the induction of these provisions. It is also apparent, that within the period of 180 days, final report stood filed in this prosecution, for the arrest was on 9/11/1992, while the charge sheet was laid before the Designated Court on 29/3/1993. Even if it is assumed that Velu was arrested on 8/11/1992, it can make no difference as far as cognizance is concerned. We reject the submission that detention beyond 8/5/1993 was illegal. Mr. R. Sankarasubbu was desirous, of having an opportunity left open to him, to challenge before the Designated Court, the prospective or retrospective nature of these provisions, but we stated, that it would only give rise to another round of litigation and hence we would rather decide it ourselves, since arguments were advanced. These provisions, on the facts available before us, can only operate prospectively and cannot be held to be retrospective in their application. This question cannot arise any more for consideration by the Designated Court. ( 20 ) AS we have stated earlier, without, all this discussion, this Habeas Corpus Petition could have been easily disposed of by holding, that there is no custody illegal, whatever. However, when we were able to notice an infirmity that tended to affect the right of the accused to effectively defend him, we decided not to stand on technicalities of the cause before us, since justice alone can be our concern and nothing else. We are more worried about substance, for chasing shadows can lead nowhere. It is only in that view, to set right the injustice caused, and we have quashed the charges, while affording a fresh opportunity to Velu, the other accused and the prosecution to put forth their respective cases, before the Designated Court. ( 21 ) WE agree with learned Additional Public Prosecutor that under Section 16 of TADA (P) Act, it would be possible for the Designated Court to conduct proceedings in camera if it so decided. ( 21 ) WE agree with learned Additional Public Prosecutor that under Section 16 of TADA (P) Act, it would be possible for the Designated Court to conduct proceedings in camera if it so decided. Similarly, under Section 10 of the Act, a Designated Court may, on its own motion or on an application made by the Public Prosecutor, can sit for any of its proceedings at any place, other than its ordinary place of sitting, if it considered such a step expedient or desirable. Therefore, we are unable to find any violation, as alleged by Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, referable to Section 327 of Code of Criminal Procedure, which will have to give way to the provisions of special Act. ( 22 ) AS far as Section 272, Cr. P. C is concerned; we have referred to certain notifications placed for our scrutiny by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. As a matter of fact, Tamil Nadu Official Language Act, 1956, was ushered in almost on similar lines, as the earlier notifications, which, on the advent of the Act, have ceased to be operative. To reiterate, language of the subordinate Courts is Tamil for a limited extent and not that English had been barred entry from proceedings in subordinate Courts lock, stock and barrel. ( 23 ) SINCE certain decisions were referred to by counsel on either side, it has become necessary for us to refer to them to give a logical termination to this order In State of UP. Lakshmi Brahman, Supreme Court stated as hereunder:- From the time the accused appears or is produced before the Magistrate with the police report under Section 170 and the Magistrate proceeds to enquire whether Section 207 has been complied with and then proceeds to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by Section 2 (g) of the Code. Obviously Section 309 would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till the inquiry to be made is complete. It further stated as follows:- The order of the High Court therefore granting bail to the accused on the short ground that they could not be remanded to the custody before the order committing them to the Court of Session is made, is erroneous. It further stated as follows:- The order of the High Court therefore granting bail to the accused on the short ground that they could not be remanded to the custody before the order committing them to the Court of Session is made, is erroneous. It is incorrect to say that after the accused is bought before the Court along with the police report, the Magistrate must forthwith commit the accused to the Court of Session because the Magistrate would have no jurisdiction in the absence of any provision to remand the accused to custody till the order committing the case to Court of Session is made. Our decision is based on the law laid down by the Supreme Court. ( 24 ) A single Judge of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Matchumari China Venkatareddy and others v. State of A. P. 3, observed that if the police report was not filed in complete form, that is, by complying with the provisions of Section 173 (2) and 173 (5), Cr. P. C. within the stipulated period contemplated by Section 167 (2), Cr. P. C. , accused concerned would have absolute right for being released on bail. Such a contingency does not arise in the instant case, for the final report was laid incomplete form. The only objection taken by Mr. R. Sankarasubbu is that certain documents, which formed part of the final report, were in English. That cannot make the final report incom plete. ( 25 ) IN Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra, Supreme Court was concerned with the manner in which bail granted under Section 167 (2), Cr. P. C. could be cancelled on production of charge-sheet. The majority opinion was that cancellation of bail, ordered on default by the prosecution, must be based on song grounds. It is not known how the said ruling can have any bearing to the issue involved in this Habeas Corpus Petition. ( 26 ) DECISION of the Supreme Court in Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, was referred to, to contend that new Section 20-A of TADA (P) Act and amended Section 20 (4) of the same Act, should be deemed to be retrospective. In that case decided by the Supreme Court, it was stated that procedural law or law of evidence may have retrospective operation in absence of any provision to the contrary. In that case decided by the Supreme Court, it was stated that procedural law or law of evidence may have retrospective operation in absence of any provision to the contrary. Supreme Court considered section 113-A of the Evidence Act with regard to presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. It was held that it operated retrospectively, being a procedural provision. Dictum laid down therein cannot be applied to the present facts, for, as we have already stated, long before induction of these two new provisions, not only a complaint was registered, but also a final report was laid in accordance with the law existing at the point of time and cognizance was also taken. That process had reached its irreversible end. ( 27 ) FOR the same proposition, petitioners counsel cited the decision in Herridge v. Herridge. There will be no need to refer to the said decision in detail, for the same had been taken note of by the Supreme Court in Gurbachan Singh v. Sat pal Singh (supra ). ( 28 ) AGAIN, the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Nataraja Pillai v. Rengasami Pillai and others, only reiterates the difference between the substantive right and affect of alteration in procedural law. ( 29 ) IN M. J. Delaflore v. Amir Mohammed, Ramakrishna, J. , stated as follows: The saving provision in Section 4 (2) (d) would mean that the pending legal proceeding cannot be put an end to by reason of anything enacted in the later law, if the party affected has a right to continue the legal proceeding under the repealed Act. What is saved by the saving provision, is only the right to continue the legal proceeding notwithstanding anything in the later enactment which may affect such continuance. What will be really relevant is to determine if there is anything in the old procedure in the nature of a vested right, a privilege, an obligation or a liability falling within the meaning of section 4 (2) (d) of the act, and to seek to preserve such right etc. , wherever they are likely to be jeopardized by the application of the new procedural law law laid down therein is quite clear, but it does not appear to have any bearing in the present context. , wherever they are likely to be jeopardized by the application of the new procedural law law laid down therein is quite clear, but it does not appear to have any bearing in the present context. ( 30 ) DECISION of the Supreme Court in Balumal J amnadas v. State of Maharashtra9, only reiterates that a procedural role could be applied when the case came before the trial Court in 1969, while certain goods were notified in the official gazette on 26/8/1967 and a complaint stood filed on 30/10/1968 in respect of accused having been found in possession of such goods on 21/4/1967. Law on this issue is settled and its application alone varies depending upon facts placed. ( 31 ) THOUGH we are unable to discern any ground to issue a habeas, as we have stated earlier, on noticing miscarriage of justice, not wanting to stand on technicalities, we have quashed the charges framed by the Designated Court on 14/9/1993, and are affording opportunity to as parties concerned to put forth their submissions at the pretrial stage contemplated under Section 227, Cr. P. C. Since we do not want the trial not be unnecessarily delayed, we direct the Designated Court to conclude enquiry under Section 227, Cr. P. C. , after affording sufficient opportunity to all parties concerned, within thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Except quashing of charges framed on. 14/9/1993, with a fresh opportunity afforded to the son of the petitioner, no other ground survives in this Habeas Corpus Petition. This Habeas Corpus Petition is ordered accordingly. Ordered accordingly.