JUDGMENT Naresh Kumar Sinha, J. No controversies are raised in this application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and the only prayer is for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding respondent Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 to execute the order dated 29.4.88 passed by respondent No. 1. By the said order respondent nos. 3, 4 and 5 had been directed to vacate 10 feet of land both in the front and in the rear of the land in question and to dismantle the construction standing thereon meant for set back within 30 days and failing which the said construction would be dismantled by the respondent No. 1 and the cost thereof realised from them as arrears of land revenue. Both the petitioners were substituted in place of their mother who died on 21.4.1994. 2. The facts of the case are these. The petitioner's mother was the owner of holding No. 72/80, Circle No. 16, Sabzibagh, Patna, under the Patna Municipal Corporation. One, Anil Kumar of Sabzibagh Patna, addressed a complaint to the Vice-Chairman, Patna Regional Development Authority (in short P.R.D.A.) alleging that respondent nos. 3, 4 and 5 were constructing a commercial building over holding No. 74/63, Ward No, 15, Circle No. 16 without the sanction of any plan by the P.R.D.A. without leaving any set back causing untold difficulty to the people. On the orders of the Vice-Chairman, P.R.D.A., J.E. inspected the plot and submit1ed his report with sketch map. Meanwhile the petitioner's mother also filed a complaint alleging that respondent nos. 3, 4, and 5 had constructed a market complex without the sanction of the P.R.D.A. after encroaching upon the public land and the constructions made obstructed the passage of light and air to her house. Again under the orders of Vice-Chairman one A.E. inspected the spot and submitted a report against respondent nos. 3, 4 and 5 along with a sketch map. On the basis of the aforesaid two reports one by the J.E. and the other by the A.E., "proceeding was drawn and notices to show cause were issued. Respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 appeared and filed their show cause and documents. The Vice-Chairman, P.R.D.A., after considering their cause and documents was pleased to pass the order dated 29.4.88 (Annexure-1) directing respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 to vacate the land in terms already indicated above. Respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 appeared and filed their show cause and documents. The Vice-Chairman, P.R.D.A., after considering their cause and documents was pleased to pass the order dated 29.4.88 (Annexure-1) directing respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 to vacate the land in terms already indicated above. 3. According to the petitioners, respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 filed Appeal No, 18 of 1988 before the Appellate Tribunal, P.R.D.A. (Respondent No. 2) against the impugned order dated 29.4.88 (Annexure-1). Respondent no. 2 by its order 18.11.88 copy of which is Annexure-2 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order passed by the Vice-Chairman (Respondent No.1). It is alleged that even after the aforesaid judgment of the appellate authority, respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 took no steps to comply with the order of the Vice-Chairman. The P.R.D.A also did not take any steps to dismantle the construction standing on the land i.e. 10 feet both in front and the rear of the land in question meant for set back. The petitioner's mother made a number of unsuccessful attempts to get the order (Annexure-1) carried out by approaching the P.R.D.A. The petitioner's mother was ultimately obliged to file a petition dated 10.4.90 before the Vice-Chairman, P.R.D.A. a copy of which is Annexure-3 praying for taking immediate steps for removal of the structure as per order dated 29.4.88. The P.R.D.A failed to carry out its legal duty by not complying with the directions contained in the order of the Vice-Chairman vide Annexure-1 and affirmed by the Appellate Tribunal vide Annexure-2 and hence' a prayer is made for issue of writ of mandamus commanding the P.R.D.A. to carry out the said directions as contained in Annexure-1. The petitioner claims that if the order (Annexure-1) is not implemented she will suffer an irreparable loss and injury which will amount to a denial of life to her within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution and as such the encroachment as mentioned ill Annexure-1 should be removed or caused to be removed by an officer of the P.R.D.A. 4. No counter affidavit was filed either by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on whose behalf their counsel had received notice of the application as mentioned in the order sheet dated 5.7.91 or on behalf of respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 on whom notices were validly served. No counter affidavit was filed either by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on whose behalf their counsel had received notice of the application as mentioned in the order sheet dated 5.7.91 or on behalf of respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 on whom notices were validly served. No counsel appeared on behalf of the respondents at the time of hearing. 5. Sri Udyan Choudhary, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner stated that the averments made by the petitioner in the application supported by copies of the impugned order (Annexure-1) and the order of the appellate authority (Annexure-2) left no room for doubt that an order had been passed obliging respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 to dismantle the construction from the area of the land in question and that the legality of the said order had also been confirmed on appeal by the appellate authority. That order had been passed as far back as on 29.4.88 as contained in Annexure-1 and the appeal filed by respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 against the said order had been dismissed on 8.11.88 by the appellate authority which confirmed the impugned order vide Annexure-2. The impugned order was passed by respondent No. 1 under sub-section (1) of Section 54 of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981 (hereinafter "the Act") which reads as follows : "54. Order of demolition of building. The impugned order was passed by respondent No. 1 under sub-section (1) of Section 54 of the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981 (hereinafter "the Act") which reads as follows : "54. Order of demolition of building. - (1) Where any development or erection of building has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the Regional Plan, Master Plan or Zonal Development Plan or without the permission, approval or sanction referred to in Sections 35, 36, 37 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permission, approval or sanction has been granted, any officer of the Authority empowered by it in this behalf may, in addition to prosecution that may be instituted under this Act, make an order briefly stating the reasons therefor directing that such erection or development work shall be removed by demolition, filling or otherwise by the owner thereof or by the person at whose instance the erection or development work had been commenced or is being carried out or has been completed within a period of thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order of removal has been delivered to the owner or that person, as may be specified in the order, and on his failure to comply with the order, any officer of the Authority may remove or cause to be removed the erection or development work and the expenses of such removal shall be recovered from the owner or the person at whose instance the erection or development was commenced or was being carried out or was composed, as arrears of land revenue : Provided that no such order shall be made unless the owner or the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should not be made." The impugned order (Annexure-1) described respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 as the three owners of the holding over which illegal construction was being made and directed them to dismantle the construction on the 10 feet of land both in front and the rear of the building, within thirty days failing which the P.R.D.A. would demolish the construction and realise its cost from them. 3, 4 and 5 as the three owners of the holding over which illegal construction was being made and directed them to dismantle the construction on the 10 feet of land both in front and the rear of the building, within thirty days failing which the P.R.D.A. would demolish the construction and realise its cost from them. No such order under section 54 (1) of the Act could be passed unless the owner or the person concerned had been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order should not be made. 6. There is no dispute that the impugned order was passed after issuing of the show cause notices and after the respondents appeared. Under sub-section (2) of Section 54 of the Act any person aggrieved by an order under sub- section (1) may appeal to a Tribunal constituted under the Act against that order within thirty days from the date thereof and the Tribunal may after hearing the parties to the appeal either allow or dismiss the appeal or reverse or vary the order or any part thereof. The order under sub-section (1) shall be final and conclusive subject to the decision of the Tribunal on the appeal. As already noticed above the order passed under subsection (1) had been upheld on appeal by the appellate authority and the order has thus become final and conclusive. It may, however, be mentioned that no question of the legality of the impugned order is involved in the present proceeding. As already mentioned earlier the application had been filed only for directing the authorities to discharge their duties by carrying out the directions contained in the impugned order. 7. In terms of the impugned order respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were required to dismantle the construction within thirty days of receipt of the order dated 29.4.88. Since they had filed an appeal against the impugned order the question of their carrying out the direction contained in the impugned order did not arise during the pendency of the appeal. However, the appeal was dismissed by order dated 8.11.88 and respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 thereafter had hardly any excuse not to carry out the directions contained in the impugned order. However, the appeal was dismissed by order dated 8.11.88 and respondent Nos. 3, 4 and 5 thereafter had hardly any excuse not to carry out the directions contained in the impugned order. Learned counsel for the petitioner stated that if the respondent failed to carry out the directions contained in the impugned order, it was the duty of the authorities of the P.R.D.A. to comply with the impugned order by taking steps and demolishing the alleged construction on the plot in question and realise the cost of such demolition from the respondents concerned. The petitioner in support of her contention that she moved tile P.R.D.A. for carrying out the directions contained in the impugned order has filed a copy of her petition dated 10.4.90 addressed to the Vice-chairman, P.R.D.A. which is Annexure-3. After stating the facts of the case she has complained in her petition that in terms of the impugned order passed by him (Respondent No. 1) in case No. 47-B/87 immediate steps be taken for removal of the structure. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners states that in the facts and circumstances of the case the petitioner was entitled to the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding respondent Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 to implement and execute the impugned order as the failure of the authorities to carry out the orders is destructive of the basic principles of natural justice. In support of his contention learned counsel referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Bhopal (A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 182). In that case a five Judge Bench was dealing with a matter in which the Income Tax Officer had refused to carry out the directions given by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the High Court had refused to issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that no injustice had resulted from such refusal. Their Lordships while setting aside the order of the High Court had this to say : "(8). We think that the learned Judicial Commissioner was clearly in error in holding that no manifest injustice resulted from the order of the respondent conveyed in his letter dated March 24, 1955. Their Lordships while setting aside the order of the High Court had this to say : "(8). We think that the learned Judicial Commissioner was clearly in error in holding that no manifest injustice resulted from the order of the respondent conveyed in his letter dated March 24, 1955. By that order the respondent virtually refused to carry out the directions which a superior tribunal had given to him in exercise of its appellate powers in respect of an order of assessment made by him. Such refusal is in effect a denial of justice and is further more destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based as it is in this country on a hierarchy of courts. If a subordinate tribunal refuses to carry out directions given to it by a superior tribunal in the exercise of its appellate powers, the result will be chaos in the administration of justice and we have indeed found it very difficult to appreciate the process of reasoning by which the learned Judicial Commissioner while roundly condemning the respondent for refusing to carry out the directions of the superior tribunal, yet held that no manifest injustice resulted from such refusal. (9) It must be remembered that the order of the Tribunal dated April 22, 1954 was not under challenge before the Judicial Commissioner. That order had become final and binding on the parties, and the respondent could not question it in any way. As a matter of fact the Commissioner of Income tax had made an application for a reference, which application was subsequently withdrawn. The judicial Commissioner was not sitting in appeal over the Tribunal and we do not think that in the circumstances of this case it was open to him to say that the order of the Tribunal was wrong and, therefore, there was no injustice in disregarding that order. The judicial Commissioner was not sitting in appeal over the Tribunal and we do not think that in the circumstances of this case it was open to him to say that the order of the Tribunal was wrong and, therefore, there was no injustice in disregarding that order. As we have said earlier, such a view is destructive of one of the basic principles of the administration of justice." Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that in the instant case the impugned order had been confirmed by the Appellate Tribunal and respondent No. 1 by not carrying out the directions contained in his order (Annexure-1) which had been confirmed by the appellate authority was violating the directions of the Appellate Tribunal which was destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice as held by the Apex Court in the decision cited above. 9. Learned counsel in support of his other contention argued that if the impugned order is not implemented and encroachment on public land not removed it would amount to denial of life to the petitioner and others within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution and referred to the decision of the Apex Court in State of Himachal Pradesh & another v. Umed Ram Sharma & ors. (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 847). The aforesaid decision has been cited as an authority for the proposition that the right under Article 21 of the Constitution embraces not only the physical existence of life but the quality of life also. It was pointed out that if the alleged constructions are not removed the petitioner would be deprived of the passage of air and light and which adversely affected the quality of life. In course of the said decision the Apex Court held that it was permissible within the limits to take affirmative action in the form of some remedial measures in public interest and in the background of the constitutional aspirations as enshrined in Article 38 read with Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution in cases of executive inaction or slow action. However, it was emphasised by the Apex Court that if the High court activises or energises executive action, it should do so cautiously. However, it was emphasised by the Apex Court that if the High court activises or energises executive action, it should do so cautiously. In the instant case as argued by the learned counsel the petitioner was one of the two complainants on the basis of which the Vice-Chairman of the P.R.D.A. had started the proceeding and in course of which he had passed the impugned order alter hearing the respondents. By the failure of the authorities to carry out the direction contained in the impugned order which had resulted in the construction being not removed by the respondent concerned in terms of the order, her quality of life had been affected as the failure of the authority to carry out their duties hac1 deprived the petitioner of the passage of air and light. It was, therefore, argued by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that this Court should not hesitate to issue a writ of mandamus directing the P.R.D.A. (Respondent No. 1) to carry out its public duty by ensuring the demolition of the construction. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that if the P.R.D.A. found any difficulty in implementing the impugned order they could take the help of the police on the principles as laid down in a decision in A.I.R. 1993 Kerala 62. It is not the case of the petitioners that the P.R.D.A made any effort to carry out the direction contained in the impugned order requiring them to take steps for demolition of the construction at the cost of the respondents concerned. The P.R.D.A. is expected to know the law of the land and it is not necessary to consider in detail a hypothetical case whether in the facts and circumstances of the case P.R.D.A. could take police help in order to perform their duties. 10. The impugned order envisages a situation where on the failure of the respondents concerned to carry out the direction in the matter of removal of the construction within the stipulated period the P.R.D.A. could take necessary action to remove the construction at the cost of the respondents concerned. Since the impugned order containing the aforesaid direction had been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal, it would be failure of the principles of administration of justice if respondent No. 1 did not perform the duties by complying with the aforesaid direction contained in Annexure-1. Since the impugned order containing the aforesaid direction had been upheld by the Appellate Tribunal, it would be failure of the principles of administration of justice if respondent No. 1 did not perform the duties by complying with the aforesaid direction contained in Annexure-1. The petitioner is thus found entitled to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondent No. 1 to carry out the direction contained in the impugned order within a reasonable time preferably within three months from the date of receipt/production of a certified copy of this order and I hold accordingly. Let a writ of mandamus issue to respondent No. 1 in the terms indicated above. 11. This writ application is accordingly allowed but there shall be no order as to costs.