Mandoobhai Dadoobhai v. STATE — 1994 DIGILAW 238 (GUJ)

A. P. RAVANI J. ( 1 ) HAVING regard to the fact that common questions of law and facts arise in these questions, at the request and with the consent of the learned Advocates appearing for the parties, all these petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) IN this group of petitions, the petitioners original owners of different survey numbers and different pieces of land have challenged the legality and validity of the acquisition proceedings initiated pursuant to the notification dated april 22, 1987 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the Act for short ). As per the notification, the land is sought to be acquired for the public purpose of North Gujarat university Campus. As notified the government declared its intention to acquire land of 50 (fifty) different survey numbers, of village Samalpati and 28 (twenty-eight) survey numbers of village matarwadi, admeasuring about 250 acres, of Taluka Patan, District Mehsana. After issuance of the notification different land owners submitted their objections to the acquisition in question. Hearing of objections took place some time in october 1987. After the hearing was over the Collector submitted report to the government under Section 5-A of the Act on December 31, 1987. Petitions were filed being Special Civil Applications No. 101/88 and 442/88 in this High Court challenging the legality and validity of section 4 notification and also inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. However, those petitions were disposed of by order dated February 8, 1988. Division Bench of this Court (Coram : P. R. Gokulakrishnan, CJ and R. J. Shah, J.) followed earlier decision of this Court in the case of Patel Gandalal Somnath v. The State of Gujarat, empowers (sic. reported) in 4 GLR 326 ( AIR 1963 Guj. 50 ). In that case the petition was filed only after the notification under Section 4 was issued. Following the observations made in the aforesaid judgment the Court held that the notification under Section 6 of the Act was not published and, therefore, the petitions were premature and the same were required to be dismissed on that short ground alone. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER the Government issued declaration under Section 6 on May 12, 1988. The Government has also invoked urgency clause as per provisions of section 17 of the Act. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER the Government issued declaration under Section 6 on May 12, 1988. The Government has also invoked urgency clause as per provisions of section 17 of the Act. On May 25, 1988 notice under Section 7 was issued. Thereafter on June 3, 1988 Special Civil application No. 2744/88 was filed. It was a composite petition filed on behalf of several land owners. Another Special civil Application No. 2745/88 was filed on the same date by another group of land owners. Both these petitions came up for hearing before the Court on september 9, 1992 and they were rejected on the ground that composite petitions were not maintainable. However, liberty was reserved to the petitioners to file separate petitions making same prayers. Thereafter these separate petitions have been filed in november 1993. One petition, i. e. special civil Application No. 4342/88 was filed by individual land-owner and right from the beginning that petition has been pending as it was filed initially. ( 4 ) IN the year 1988 this Court had granted ad interim relief as regards possession on the land. That ad interim relief has continued till today. After the petitions were filed afresh, several adjournments were sought and they were granted. As it was submitted before the court, the petitioners were trying to persuade the Government to drop acquisition proceedings and select some other land. Despite sufficient time having been granted, no fruitful result has been achieved. In view of this position we have heard the learned Advocates appearing for the parties at length. Even after conclusion of the hearing, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners requested not to pronounce the decision of the Court immediately so as to enable them to make efforts and to persuade the appropriate executive authorities to withdraw the acquisition and/or to find out amicable solution. We acceded to this request and, mainly for this reason, reserved the judgment. Now it is disclosed that no solution has been found. Hence we deliver this judgment. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioners it is contended that inquiry under Section 5-A has not been conduced in just and proper manner. It is submitted that principles of natural justice have not been complied with. The petitioners submit that inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is required to be held in quasi judicial manner. ( 5 ) ON behalf of the petitioners it is contended that inquiry under Section 5-A has not been conduced in just and proper manner. It is submitted that principles of natural justice have not been complied with. The petitioners submit that inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act is required to be held in quasi judicial manner. While conducting the inquiry the principles of natural justice should be observed. Inquiry should be fair inasmuch as hearing should be given to persons who are present. It is also contended that the persons who requested for recording their evidence and for being examined should be examined. It is further contended that copies of documents referred to and relied upon in preparing the report have not been furnished to the petitioners; that the petitioners submitted application for recovery and production of documents under Order 11 Rule 1 of the C. P. Code. That application has not been granted and therefore the inquiry has been conducted in unjust and unfair manner. ( 6 ) THE contention that the inquiry has not been conducted in just fair and reasonable manner has been contested by the respondents. It is pointed out that the petitioners had submitted objections on may 30, 1987. Objections were filed with vakalatnama of different advocates. The inquiry lasted for about five months. On different dates adjournments were sought. There were thirteen such adjournments. Advocates representing the objectors were heard on all points. ( 7 ) IN the report made under Section 5- a of the Act each and every objection raised has been dealt with. Application for discovery and production of documents was submitted after words, (sic.) i. e. on 1-10-1987. Decision thereon was taken on the same day. The report under Section 5-A of the Act is dated october 31, 1987. ( 8 ) IN support of the contention that the inquiry has not been conducted in just, fair and reasonable manner, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme court in the case of Shyam Nandan prasad v. State of Bihar, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 255 . In the para 10 of the reported decision it is inter alia observed as follows:"the person interested, or known to be interested in the land is to be served personally of the notification, giving him the opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and awakening him to such right. In the para 10 of the reported decision it is inter alia observed as follows:"the person interested, or known to be interested in the land is to be served personally of the notification, giving him the opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and awakening him to such right. That the objection is to be in writing, is indicative of the fact that the inquiry into the objection is to focus his individual cause as well as public cause. That at the time of the enquiry, for which prior notice shall be essential, the objector has the right to appear in person or through pleader and substantiate his objection by evidence and argument. And lastly, since the decision of the Collector may turn out to be final, unless interfered with by the Government, suo motu or on application, the Collectors decision is that of a quasi-judicial authority, arrived at by quasi-judicial methods. "the aforesaid observations have been made by the Honble Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of the Land acquisition Act as applicable to the State of Bihar. In paras 8 and 9 of the reported decision the contents of Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act as it is applicable to the State of Bihar is referred to. Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A as substituted in Bihar provides that every objection under sub-section (1) shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and making such further enquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, decide the objections. Thus, as provided in sub- section (2) of Section 5-A of the Act, as applicable to the State of Bihar, it is the collector who has to take decision after making enquiry. While in the case of land Acquisition Act as applicable to the state of Gujarat, the Collector has to make report to the appropriate government, containing his recommendations on the objections. Thereafter the appropriate Government is required to take decision and the decision of the appropriate Government on the objections would be final. This is the vital distinction between the two provisions. Thereafter the appropriate Government is required to take decision and the decision of the appropriate Government on the objections would be final. This is the vital distinction between the two provisions. ( 9 ) IT is in the context of the aforesaid provisions of the Act as applicable to bihar that the Honble Supreme Court has made observations, with regard to the right of objector to appear in person or through pleader and substantiate his objection by evidence and argument, and since the decision of the Collector is final, it is held that the inquiry is quasi- judicial in nature. However, een (sic.) on the basis of these observations which are in the context of the Land Acquisition Act as applicable in the State of Bihar it cannot be argued that the petitioners application for discovery of documents and examination of witnesses should have been granted by the Collector. Rejection of the application for discovery of documents and alleged denial to examine witnesses cannot be said to have been resulting into breach of principles of natural justice. ( 10 ) IT may be noted that the enquiry lasted for about five months. Application for discovery and production of documents was submitted on October 1, 1987 at the fag end of the enquiry. There is no such provision in the Act for praying for discovery of documents. In this connection reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners on the provisions of Section 14 of the Act. Section 14 empowers the Collector to summon and enforce attendance of witnesses and production of documents. It reads as follows:"for the purpose of enquires under this act the Collector shall have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses, including the parties interested or any of time, and to compel the production of documents by the same means, and (so far as may be) in the same manner as is provided in the case of a civil Court under the Code of Civil procedure, 1908. "the aforesaid provision of the Act cannot be read to mean that in the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act the objector or a person interested has a right to examine a witness or cross-examine any other witness who may be present. "the aforesaid provision of the Act cannot be read to mean that in the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act the objector or a person interested has a right to examine a witness or cross-examine any other witness who may be present. ( 11 ) IN this connection reference may be made to a decision of Division Bench of this Court (Coram : K. T. Desai, CJ and P. N. Bhagwati, J. as he then was) in the case of Gandalal v. State of Gujarat, reported in 4 GLR 326 wherein it is held that in enquiry under Section 5-A an objector is not entitled to cross-examine any officer or members of the acquiring body. The aforesaid decision has been approvingly quoted by the Supreme court in the case of P. J. Jani v. State of gujarat, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1188 . In the case of Gandalal (supra) the division Bench of this Court observed as regards the scope of the enquiry as follows :"very broadly expressed, the first principle is that the party to the controversy must know with reasonable certainty the nature of the case against him. Secondly, he should be given a fair and proper opportunity to meet the case against him and to state his own case. According to this principle he should have a fair and proper opportunity to make any relevant statement which he may desire to bring toward and to correct or controvert any relevant statement prejudicial to his view. Lastly the tribunal must conduct the inquiry and reach its conclusion in good faith. The procedure to be followed by the tribunal in the observance of these principles need not, as we have pointed out above, conform to any recognised methods of judicial procedure nor need the procedure of every such tribunal be the same. Whilst giving effect to these principles the procedure is bound to vary from tribunal to tribunal depending in each case upon the subject, the nature of the inquiry, the nature and constitution of the tribunal and the statutory rules of procedure laid down by the law under which the inquiry is held. Whilst giving effect to these principles the procedure is bound to vary from tribunal to tribunal depending in each case upon the subject, the nature of the inquiry, the nature and constitution of the tribunal and the statutory rules of procedure laid down by the law under which the inquiry is held. We must, therefore; examine the present question in the light of the statutory rules and provisions and see whether the procedure prescribed by the statutory provisions and rules entitles the petitioners to obtain the further information required by them from the third respondent-Society even though they have not given evidence in the inquiry. Now all that Section 5-A provides is that the objector shall be given an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader. It is not necessary for us to decide in the present case as to what is the content of the right to be heard in the context of the statutory provisions contained in Section 5-A but howsoever large the content, it is clear that it cannot include any right in the objector to call for any information from the Company for whose benefit land is proposed to be acquired or to cross- examine any members of such Company even though they have not given evidence in the inquiry. " ( 12 ) AFTER considering the aforesaid decision, in the case of P. J. Jani (supra) the Supreme Court referred to the rules framed under Section 55 of the Land acquisition Act with regard to inquiry under Section 5-A. After referring to the rules the Honble Supreme Court has observed as follows:"the appellant cannot under these rules claim to cross-examine officers of the Corporation, and in our opinion the prayer to cross-examine officers was rightly rejected. Indeed it was a strange request. The Officers had not given any evidence before the Collector and we are unable to see what principle entitles the appellant to claim this right. When rules have been framed regulating the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land acquisition Act, it is not necessary to consider whether the enquiry is administrative or quasi-judicial and whether rules of natural justice have been complied with, and accordingly we say nothing on this point. "in view of this settled legal petition the petitioners could not have insisted that they wanted to cross-examine certain persons as witness. "in view of this settled legal petition the petitioners could not have insisted that they wanted to cross-examine certain persons as witness. Similarly, the petitioners could not have asked for discovery and production of documents as provided under Order 11 Rule 1 of civil Procedure Code. It is immaterial whether the enquiry is considered quasi- judicial or not. In the instant case it cannot be said that there is breach of principles of natural justice while holding the inquiry. Hence the contention that the enquiry is not fair, just and reasonable cannot be accepted. ( 13 ) IT is submitted that even before issuance of Section 4 notification dated august 22, 1987 decision to acquire these lands was taken. Therefore the enquiry was pre-determined one and hence it cannot be said to be just and fair. This contention is raised on the basis of a letter dated 15th July 1986 written by the then minister for Education, Youth Services and Cultural Activities, Government of gujarat, to one Shri Viraji Navaji thakore, M. L. A. , and letter dated 7th september 1987, written by the additional Chief Secretary, Education department, Government of Gujarat, to one Shri Shankarji Kalaji Thakore, M. L. A. (produced at pages 118 and 119 of special Civil Application No. 12630/93 ). Letter dated 15th July 1986 written by the then Minister for Education, Youth services and Cultural Activities was in response to letter dated June 17, 1986. Therein it is stated that after full consideration the land for University at patan was selected near Patan College. In the letter dated September 7, 1987 written by the Additional Chief Secretary also it is indicated that the Government has, after discussion, taken matured decision with regard to selection of the site for north Gujarat University. On the basis of these letters it is submitted that the inquiry under Section 5-A was merely formal. Even before the inquiry was held the Government had already made up its mind with regard to the site of the land. ( 14 ) THE contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that Section 4 of the act enjoins duty upon the appropriate government to issue notification declaring its intention to acquire the land in any locality for any public purpose or for a Company. ( 14 ) THE contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that Section 4 of the act enjoins duty upon the appropriate government to issue notification declaring its intention to acquire the land in any locality for any public purpose or for a Company. In the case of Narendrajit v. State of U. P. , reported in AIR 1971 SC 306, after referring to the provisions of section 4 of the Act, the Supreme Court has inter alia observed that the process of acquisition must start with a notification under Section 4. Even in extremely urgent cases like those mentioned in sub- section (2) of Section 17, the notification under Section 4 is a sine qua non. It is further observed that issuance of a notification under Section 4 is a condition precedent to the exercise of any further powers under the Act and a notification which does not comply with the essential requirement of that provision of law must be held to be bad. In para 9 of the reported decision it is observed as follows:"section 4 (1) does not require that the identity of the lands which may ultimately be acquired should be specified but it enjoins upon the government the duty to specify the locality in which the land is needed. "in view of this settled legal position if the Government formed its tentative intention before issuing notification under Section 4 of the Act to acquire land for purposes of North Gujarat University at Patan in a particular locality it cannot be said that the Government made up its mind even before the inquiry under section 5-A of the Act was completed. Unless this tentative decision is taken as regards the need of land in any locality for any public purpose, Section 4 notification cannot be issued at all. Therefore the allegation that the decision to acquire the land was pre-determined and therefore the enquiry is bad has no merits and the same is rejected. ( 15 ) IT is submitted that other alternative land is available. The petitioners have shown five different places of land which, as submitted by them, would be more suitable. It is also submitted that the extent of land sought to be acquired is in far excess of the need. ( 15 ) IT is submitted that other alternative land is available. The petitioners have shown five different places of land which, as submitted by them, would be more suitable. It is also submitted that the extent of land sought to be acquired is in far excess of the need. As regards the extent of land needed for the University campus it is stated in the affidavit-in- reply that the area of the land required is not at all excessive. It is a teaching university. The land sought to be acquired is most suitable inasmuch as it is nearby educational institutions such as polytechnic, Arts College, Commerce college, Science College and also hostel. Moreover it is stated that suitability of the land is not to be adjudged by the court. It is for the appropriate government to decide as to which particular land would be more suitable for the public purpose in question. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, reported in AIR 1980 SC 319 . In para 8 of the reported decision the Honble supreme Court has inter alia observed as follows:"this power to select is left to the responsible discretion of Government under the Act, subject to Articles 14, 19 and 31 (then ). The Court is handcuffed in this jurisdiction and cannot raise its hand against what it thinks is a foolish choice. Wisdom in administrative action is the property of the executive and judicial circumspection keeps the court lock- jawed save where power has been polluted by oblique ends or is otherwise void on well-established grounds. The constitutional balance cannot be upset. " ( 16 ) AGAIN in the case of Ramgir uttamgir Goswami v. State of Gujarat, reported in 29 (1) GLR 502, the Honble supreme Court has, in para 7 of the reported decision, observed that the assessment of suitability of the land proposed to be acquired for the concerned public purpose is primarily for the Land Acquisition Officer to consider. In the instant case, in para 12. 1 of the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the university (in Special C. A. 12629/93) the reasons indicating the suitability are mentioned. In the instant case, in para 12. 1 of the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the university (in Special C. A. 12629/93) the reasons indicating the suitability are mentioned. Similarly in the affidavit-in- reply filed on behalf of the Government, averments with regard to suitability of the land and the need of the University have been made. It cannot be said that the land has been selected in breach of any of the constitutional provisions. It is not even argued or urged that any of the constitutional provisions have been violated in selecting the land. Therefore no case for interference with the decision of the Government in selecting the land is made out by the petitioners. As indicated in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the Government it is evident that the government has considered all other alternatives and on consideration of the relevant aspects the land has been considered suitable for the purposes of university Campus. Therefore the contention that other alternative land was available and on that ground acquisition proceedings should be quashed has no merits. ( 17 ) AS far as the land and the property sought to be acquired of the petitioner of special Civil Application No. 4342/88 is concerned it is submitted that the decision is actuated by legal malice. It was submitted that the public purpose stated was vague and illusory. By no stretch of reasoning it can be said that the public purpose stated in the notification is vague or illusory. The purpose stated is north gujarat University Campus. It is not shown as to how the purpose stated was vague or illusory. The University is a teaching University. It may be noted that by Ordinance No. 5/86 North Gujarat university Ordinance was promulgated. On May 31, 1986 the Ordinance took the shape of the Act as north Gujarat university Act, 1986. The Act came into force with effect from September 11, 1986. It is an Act to establish and incorporate a teaching and affiliating university in the State of Gujarat to be known as North Gujarat University. Section 48 of the Act inter alia provides that all Post Graduate institutions teaching and training within the university shall be conducted by the university at its Headquarters. It is an Act to establish and incorporate a teaching and affiliating university in the State of Gujarat to be known as North Gujarat University. Section 48 of the Act inter alia provides that all Post Graduate institutions teaching and training within the university shall be conducted by the university at its Headquarters. If the public purpose stated in the notification is considered in the light of the provisions of the North Gujarat University Act, it would become evident that by no stretch of reasoning the public purpose stated is vague or illusory. It also gives an idea as to the extent of the land which may be needed by the North Gujarat University for the purposes of establishing different teaching and training institutions. Therefore the allegation that there is legal malice in selecting the land has no merits. ( 18 ) IT is submitted that the petitioners were not supplied with copy of the report submitted to the Government and therefore the declaration made under section 6 of the Act and further acquisition proceedings are bad. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Hussain Tayabali v. The State of gujarat, reported in AIR 1968 SC 432 . In para 16 of the reported decision it is inter alia observed that the report has merely recommendatory value and is not binding on the Government. The Collector has to send the report together with the record and it is for the Government to arrive at its satisfaction independently. The report and the record are sent to the government to enable the Government to form its satisfaction that the acquisition is necessary for the public purpose. It is thereafter that Section 6 declaration as required under Section 6 is issued. The honble Supreme Court has further held that neither Section 5-A nor any other provision of the Act lays down that a second opportunity has to be given before the issuance of Section 6 notification. In view of this petition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, supply of copy of the report to the objector will be of no use whatsoever. In view of this petition of law laid down by the Supreme Court, supply of copy of the report to the objector will be of no use whatsoever. However, as observed by the honble Supreme Court in the case of kalumiya Karimmiya v. The State of gujarat, reported in AIR 1977 SC 497 it would be better if a copy of the report is given, but if a copy of the report is not given, it would not vitiate the acquisition proceedings. Thus the failure to give report under Section 5-A is innocuous. ( 19 ) IT is submitted that many persons would become landless if the land is acquired for the public purpose notified. As the owners of the land would become landless, their means of livelihood would be taken away. It is submitted that acquisition of land cannot be resorted to unless they are provided with alternative means of livelihood. On the basis of this contention it is further submitted that the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 and section 23 of the Act which provides for compulsory acquisition of land are constitutionally bad as they are violative of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In support of the contention that the means of livelihood cannot be taken away unless alternative land is provided, the following decisions have been relied upon: (1) State of Maharashtra v. Basantibai mohanlal Khetan, AIR 1986 SC 1466 (2) State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi, air 1986 SC 2025 (3) Central Inland Water Transport corporation Ltd. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly, air 1986 SC 1571 (4) Banwasi Seva Ashram v. State of u. P. , AIR 1992 SC 920 (5) Karjan Jalasay Yojana Assargrasth sahkar Ane Sangarsh Samiti v. State of gujarat, AIR 1987 SC 532 (6) Gadigeppa Mahadevappa Chikkubi v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1990 karnataka 2. Reference to the aforesaid decisions has been made in order to buttress the argument that the provisions of Sections 4, 6 and 23 of the Act are ultra vires article 21 of the Constitution. ( 20 ) IT may be noted that the constitutional validity of the provisions of sections 4 and 6 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Manubhai Jethalal Patel v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1984 SC 120 . ( 20 ) IT may be noted that the constitutional validity of the provisions of sections 4 and 6 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of Manubhai Jethalal Patel v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1984 SC 120 . After referring to its earlier decisions the supreme Court has held that the provisions of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the act are intra vires the Constitution. The same position of law is reiterated in the case of Ramgir Uttamgir Goswami v. State of Gujarat, 29 (1) GLR 502. As far as the constitutional validity of the provisions of Section 23 of the Act is concerned, the same is decided against the petitioners by the Supreme Court in the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of delhi, AIR 1974 SC 2077 . . ( 21 ) IT is true that the question with regard to the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions has not been argued nor has been considered by the Honble supreme Court from the standpoint of the provisions of Article 21 of the constitution of India. However, on this ground it would not be open to this Court to consider the constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions. It is to be presumed that all the aspects regarding the question raised before the Supreme court were present before the Honble supreme Court. It is not open to this court to consider the question of constitutional validity of the aforesaid provisions once the Honble Supreme court has held the same to be constitutionally valid. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. C. and G. Mills v. Shambhu Nath, AIR 1978 sc 8 . In that case the question was with regard to the constitutional validity of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The question was concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. , v. The 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal AIR 1957 SC 329 . The question was sought to be reagitated on other grounds. The question was concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. , v. The 2nd Punjab Industrial Tribunal AIR 1957 SC 329 . The question was sought to be reagitated on other grounds. In that connection the Honble Supreme Court has observed in para 14 of the reported decision as follows:"if this Court held S. 10 as intra vires and repelled the objection under Article 14 of the Constitution it would not be premissible to raise the question again by submitting that a new ground could be raised to sustain the objection. It is certainly easy to discover fresh grounds of attack to sustain the same objection, but that cannot be permitted once the law has been laid down by this Court holding that S. 10 of the Act does not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution. "in the case of Smt. Somavanti and others v. The State of Punjab and Others, air 1963 SC 151 , in para 22 of the reported decision it is inter alia, observed by the Supreme Court that the binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether the particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided. At any rate it is not open to the High Court to ignore the decision of the Supreme Court on the ground that relevant provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court (see balladas Mathurdas Lakhani and Others v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, SIT 1970 SC 1002 - para 4 of the reported decision ). In view of this settled legal position it would not be proper for us to go into the constitutional validity of the different provisions of the Act on the ground that the constitutional validity of the provisions of the Act has not been considered from the standpoint of the provisions of Article 21 of the constitution of India. ( 22 ) IT may be observed that the case of the land owners who may be rendered landless after the acquisition of the land requires sympathetic consideration. Learned Counsel appearing for the university submitted that efforts may be made to give them alternative employment provided they hand over possession of the land voluntarily. ( 22 ) IT may be observed that the case of the land owners who may be rendered landless after the acquisition of the land requires sympathetic consideration. Learned Counsel appearing for the university submitted that efforts may be made to give them alternative employment provided they hand over possession of the land voluntarily. We would like to observe that at the time of passing the award the authority concerned would take into consideration this aspect in cases of land-owners who would become totally landless on account of acquisition of their land. ( 23 ) NO other contention is raised. There is no substance in the petitions. ( 24 ) IN the result the petitions are rejected. Rule discharged in all the petitions. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated. ( 25 ) AT this stage the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners request that certificate under Article 133 of the constitution of India for filing appeal before the Supreme Court be granted. In our opinion the case does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance. All that we have done is to follow the Supreme Courts decisions as far as the question regarding challenge to the constitutional validity of the provisions of Sections 4, 5-A, 6 and 23 of the Act, is concerned. With regard to the other questions raised in the petition also we have followed the settled legal principles as pronounced by the Supreme court. In our opinion the questions raised in the petitions do not need to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence certificate refused. ( 26 ) AT this stage the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submit that the petitioners wish to challenge the legality and validity of the aforesaid judgment and order before the Honble supreme Court. Therefore they request that the order vacating the interim relief be kept in abeyance for some time so as to enable the petitioners to avail the remedy of the appeal before the Honble supreme Court. Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case the order vacating the interim relief is ordered to be kept in abeyance upto october 10, 1994. Petitions rejected. .