Judgment Nripendra Kumar Bhattacharyya, J. 1. By this revision the petitioner, who is one of the accused persons, namely, Suprabhat Mitra alias Rabin Mitra, has come up for quashing the proceeding being G.R. Case No. 3054 of 1980 arising out of Sankrail P.S. Case No. 10 dated 5.9.80 upon which the Howrah Special Court Case No. 3 of 1991 under Ss. 409/l20B IPC was started. The revision is buttressed on the fact that the Deputy Magistrate and the Deputy Collector as well as the District Planning Officer, Howrah, made a complaint to the Officer-in-Charge of Sankrail Police Station, Howrah, alleging, inter alia,. that one Ex-Block Development Officer, Panchla, withdrew government cash amounting to Rs. 80,000/- from the Ranihati Branch of the Union Bank of India and the• said amount was not entered into the cash book which amonted to misappropriation of the government money. The said amount was alleged to have been withdrawn on 16.8.80 against call deposit receipts. Initially the present revisional petitioner has not been named in the FIR. This complaint and/or information was treated as FIR and on the basis of this FIR the Sankrail Police Station Case No. 10 dated 5.9.80 under s. 409 of the Indian Penal Code was started and in course oj', investigation the police arrested the accused and produced him in the court of the learned Judge, Special Court at Howrah. No evidence was adduced. On the prayer of the Investigating Officer, Ss. 467 and 477 of the Indian Penal Code and s. 5(9)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act. II of 1947) were added in the FIR. On 28th December, 1989 the investigating Committee submitted a report stating that the case is only pending for sanction order from the court and prayed for another date to complete the investigation. Thereafter, from time to time adjournment was taken for such completion of the investigation. In the meantime, the present petitioner made an application for stopping investigation and discharging him under s. 167 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But that was refused on the ground that the offence was serious in nature. The learned Magistrate by his order dated 30.8.90 directed the Investigating Officer to submit the report in final form by 31 st December, 1990 after obtaining the necessary sanction. 2. It is submitted by Mrs.
But that was refused on the ground that the offence was serious in nature. The learned Magistrate by his order dated 30.8.90 directed the Investigating Officer to submit the report in final form by 31 st December, 1990 after obtaining the necessary sanction. 2. It is submitted by Mrs. Alokananda Bose, learned Advocate for the State, that the chargesheet was submitted on 10th December, 1990 and thereafter the Special Court Case No. 3 of 1991 was started under Ss. 409/120B of the Indian Penal Code, and the learned Special Judge, Howrah, took cognizance of the offence by his order dated 30.8.90. 3. Against the aforesaid order the present accused petitioner prayed for quashing of the proceeding of Sankrail P.S. Case No. 10 dated 5.9.80, being G.R. Case No. 3054 of 1980 and the Special Court Case No.3 of 1991 pending in the court of the learned Special Judge, Howrah. 4. Appearing for the accused petitioner, Mr. Amiya Kumar Chaudhuri, learned Advocate, submitted that though the accused petitioner was arrested on 3rd August, 1980, the matter was dragged on by the Investigating Officer till the 10th of December, 19'90, i.e. for a period of more than ten years and the delay has not been explained by the prosecution. The accused petitioner on the other hand had no hand in the matter of delay. Mr. Chaudhuri further contended that the right to speedy trial having been guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, after the lapse of more than ten years the impugned proceeding should not be prolonged and if the delay is not explained by the prosecution than the benefit goes to the accused petitioner. Mr. Chaudhuri in support of his contention relied on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satya Charan Das vs. The State, reported in 96 CWN 406, wherein it has been held, inter alia, that under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, right to personal liberty comprehends a right of the accused to have a speedy and expeditious trial. He also relied on another decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Amarendra Nath Dutta vs. State of West Bengal, reported in CLT 1992 (2) HC 295, wherein it has been held, inter alia, that the right to speedy trial has not been expressly conferred as a fundamental right in: our Constitution.
He also relied on another decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Amarendra Nath Dutta vs. State of West Bengal, reported in CLT 1992 (2) HC 295, wherein it has been held, inter alia, that the right to speedy trial has not been expressly conferred as a fundamental right in: our Constitution. But it has now been settled beyond doubt by a series of decisions of our Apex Court that the same right is fully covered by and comprised in Article 21 of the Constitution guaranting non-deprivation of life and liberty save according to procedure established by law. Mr. Chaudhuri also relied on a Supreme Court decision in the case of Santosh De vs. Archana Guha and others, reported in AIR 1994 SC, 1229 wherein it has been held, inter alia, that the inordinate delay in commencing trial and non-explanation of delay by the prosecution infringe the right of the accused to speedy trial and the order quashing proceedings is not liable to be interfered with. So, according to Mr. Chaudhuri, being fortified by the decisions, as referred to above, the proceeding which has been challenged in this revisional petition is liable to be quashed. 5. Appearing for the State, learned Advocate, Mrs. Alokananda Bose, could not produce any material to explain the delay. She also could not make out any case to show that the accused petitioner had anything to do in the matter of delay in filing the chargesheet resulting in delaying the completion of the investigation. 6. In appreciation of the above facts and in consideration of the principles of law as enunciated by the Apex Court and by the High Court I am of the opinion that the accused petitioner is entitled to quashing of proceeding since the accused petitioner have had no hand in the matter of delay in filing the chargesheet. The G.R. Case No. 3054 of 1980 arising out of Sankrail P.S. Case No. 10 dated 5.9.80 upon which the Howrab Special Court Case No.3 of 1991 under Ss. 409/120B of the Indian Penal Code was started are all hereby quashed, so far as the accused petitioner is concerned. 7. The revisional application is accordingly allowed. 8. Let xerox copies of this order be made available to the learned Advocates on record for both parties on their usual undertakings and upon compliance with necessary formalities.