JUDGMENT Ravi S. Dhavan 1. THIS revision is directed against the order and decree dated 8 August, 1983 passed by the Special Judge (E. C. Act), Etawah dismissing the S.C.C. Suit No. 2 of 1982 ; Seth Vishun Das v. The State of U.P. and another. 2. THE Court has heard the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner and has perused the record of the revision. No one has appeared on behalf of the State of U.P. and the commandant, 28th Battalion, Provincial Armed Constabulary, Etawah. The facts are brief. The building in construction was completed in 1977. The commandant, 28th Battalion, Provincial Armed Constabulary, Etawah took it on lease and was put into possession of the building by the landlord Seth Vishun Das. At some stage there was default in the payment of rent with the result that the landlord served notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice was not responded to and the arrears in default were not tendered. Thus, the landlord filed the, aforesaid, suit. On the exchange of pleadings, the following issues were framed :- 1. Whether the building in dispute is governed by U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 ? 2.Whether there was valid agreement of lease ? 3.Whether there was an agreement that the defendant would continue to be tenants as long as they needed the accommodation ? 4.Whether the defendant no. 2 a juristic person ? 5.Whether the defendants' tenancy has been duly terminated ? 6.Whether the defendants committed any default in payment of rent ? 3. THE trial Court answered all the issues in favour of the landlord plaintiff except issue no. 4 and 5. 4. INSOFAR as issue no. 1 is concerned, the trial court was of the opinion that there being no controversy about the fact that the building had been constructed in 1977, clearly, the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction Act). 1972, (hereinafter referred to as 'the U. P. Act 13 of 1972) did not apply and, thus, both the notice under section 106 and the suit, as had been brought, were correct. On issue no. 1972, (hereinafter referred to as 'the U. P. Act 13 of 1972) did not apply and, thus, both the notice under section 106 and the suit, as had been brought, were correct. On issue no. 2, the trial court gave a finding, that regard being had to the fact, that the defendants did not deny that the premises had not been taken on lease and further admitted that they paid rent an agreement of tenancy was spelled out and a lease in writing was not necessary. In effect, a relationship of landlord and tenant existed. 5. ON issue no. 3, the trial court did not agree with the defendants that at any stage the landlord had agreed that the defendants could continue as tenants as long as they needed the accommodation. 6. ISSUE No. 5 was, in effect, connected with issue no. 4. The court will revert to this aspect later. On issue no. 6, the trial court was of the opinion that it was not the obligation of the plaintiff to submit a bill of rent, in effect, holding that the defendants were liable for the payment of rent month to month, as part of the obligation under the law to tender rent to a landlord and not the other way around that it should be demanded for payment. 7. HAVING decided the case in favour of the landlord, nevertheless, the trial court unsuited the landlord on the ground that the commandant, 28th Battalion, Provincial Armed Constabulary was not a juristic person and consequently the trial court also held that the tenancy had not been terminated. This Court is afraid that the decision of the trial court on this aspect cannot be upheld, as it is legally unsound. 8. THE trial court decided the case correctly on facts but denied justice to the landlord on a misconception of law, as if it was afraid to pass a decree against a police or a para-military organisation whose officer was a commandant. No Juristic logic permits this Court to uphold the decision of the trial court. What is not important is whether the Commandant, 28th Battalion Provincial Armed Constabulary, Etawah was juristic person or not except that was there a tenant in him who actually and physically occupied the accommodation. 9. No Juristic logic permits this Court to uphold the decision of the trial court. What is not important is whether the Commandant, 28th Battalion Provincial Armed Constabulary, Etawah was juristic person or not except that was there a tenant in him who actually and physically occupied the accommodation. 9. THE only aspect which is relevant is (hat there is a tenant who is obliged to tender rent, which, if tendered, would be accepted by the landlord. Whoever be the tenant, he would be subject to his obligation under the law eviction not excluded, if he makes a default in the payment of rent. 10. THE suit for ejectment was dismissed by the Small Cause Court on the ground that the eviction of the Commandant, 28th Battalion, Provincial Armed Constabulary, Etawah could not be decreed as such an officer was neither a corporation nor a juristic person. On this, the issue as framed reads: Whether the defendant no. 2 is a juristic person ? THE issue was answered in the negative. In these circumstances, the default in not paying rent was certified by the Small Cause Court, but the relief for eviction was denied. While answering the aforesaid issue, it would be relevant to notice what the trial court has recorded. THE relevant extract is : "Defendant no. 2 in this case is Commandant 28th Battallion P.A.C. A suit can be instituted against a person natural or juristic. THE Commandant of 28th Battallion is an officer held by a person. It is only when a law provide (hat the public officer shall be a corporation and can be sued is as corporation that a suit can be filed against him. In this I am supported by a case of P. B. Saha and Company v. Chief Executive Officer, AIR 1962 Cal 283 . THEre is no law making commandant a juristic person. THE suit against defendant no. 2 is therefore not maintainable." What the lower court did not notice was the fact that a Commandant of the Provincial Armed Constabulary owes his position to the legislation known as the Special Armed Constabulary Act, 1942, which was repealed and replaced by the Uttar Pradesh Pradeshik Armed Constabulary Act, 1948. The expression 'Commandant' finds mention in the definition clause particularly section 2 (1). The expression 'Commandant' finds mention in the definition clause particularly section 2 (1). Consequently, not only the department which occupied the premises of the landlord but also the officer, being the Commandant of a para police force, or a security force, was statutorily designated. Even the case which was relied upon was misread by the trial court. The plaint, in the case under reference P. B. Sah and Co. v. Chief Executive Officer, AIR 1962 Cal 283 , far from being rejected was restored with a direction to the trial court that the names of the persons designated as defendants be permitted to be impleaded. The Calcutta High Court observed : "If the plaintiff intends to sue the persons who for the time being occupy those offices he must implead those persons by their individual names." 11. BUT, in the case before this Court, the situation is entirely different. Closer to the issues being examined by this Court is a case decided and reported in B. S. Nigam v. Second Additional Civil Judge, Agra 1961 ALJ 109. In this case a similar plea was taken, as was the view of the court below out of which the present civil revision arises. The proposition before the Court in B. S. Nigam v. Second Additional Civil Judge, Agra (supra) was whether an allotment could be made in favour of a Sales Tax Officer as he may not be a juristic person. The High Court answered the issue by holding that a Sales Tax Officer is also represented by a living person and an allotment is really not to a dead or an inanimate person, but it is made to a living person by his official designation. The Court explained its reasoning, thus : "BUT all the same since the rent in this case of the part of the building will be paid by the Sales Tax Department and part by the Sales Tax Officer the allotment in favour of the Sales Tax Officer appears to be a valid allotment. An allotment of this kind can well also be supported on the basis of convenience of the Government Offices. It is usual that one Government officer is transferred from one place to another and the usual practice has been that whenever an officer is transferred his successor usually occupies the same building, which was occupied by his predecessor. An allotment of this kind can well also be supported on the basis of convenience of the Government Offices. It is usual that one Government officer is transferred from one place to another and the usual practice has been that whenever an officer is transferred his successor usually occupies the same building, which was occupied by his predecessor. The present allotment, therefore, would be for the convenience of the State offices. If the building which was occupied by an outgoing officer is not allotted to the incoming officer in his place there is liable to be great difficulty in the administration." 12. IN the matter of B. S. Nigam (supra), the allotment which was made in favour of the Sales Tax Officer, was held to be a valid allotment. Consequently, the same principles would apply in the case out of which this revision arises Whoever was the subject matter of an allotment order could also be the subject matter of an order of eviction. The Commandant, 28th Battalion, Provincial Armed Constabulary, Etawah, is so designated as his existence is in pursuance to the U. P. Pradeshik Armed Constabulary Act, 1948. In these circumstances, to frustrate a relief for eviction on the ground that the Commandant of the 28th Battalion, Provincial Armed Constabulary is not a juristic person is an unsound reasoning which is legally not tenable. Further, this Court is of the view that the framing of the issue itself was irrelevant as the only issue before the Small Cause Court was whether there was a default in the payment of rent and, consequently, should a decree of eviction follow ? The moment the Small Came Court came to the conclusion that indeed there was default in the payment of rent, eviction was only a consequential relief 13. IN these circumstances, the judgment and decree of the Small Cause Court needs to be corrected by inclusion of the decree for eviction for the reason that the Court, aforesaid, had decided the matter otherwise than in accordance with law. 14. THE matter is remanded to the Court below to forthwith correct the decree, in accordance with law, and grant the consequential relief of eviction and further modulate the money decree against arrears of rent to bring it upto date. The revision is allowed with costs. Revision allowed.