JUDGMENT S.K. Dubey, J. -- 1. The State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred this appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for short, the' Act', against the judgment and decree dated 21.4.1993, passed in Case No. 1/92-Reference by the Second Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Gwalior, whereby the Reference under section 18 of the Act at the instance of the Department of the State Government for payment of the interest amounting to Rs. 5,67,804/- to the land-owners, the claimants, on the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, Gwalior, for short, the LAO, has been dismissed as not maintainable. 2. The brief resume of facts is necessary. On issue of notification dated 31.3.1989 under section 4 (1) of the Act, the land admeasuring 11.317 Hec., situated in village Bajhere, Tahsil Bhitarwar, District Gwalior, was acquired for the State Department, Water Resources Division, Gwalior. The LAO has, in Case No. 64-N32-87-88, passed an award on 15.10.1991, for payment of compensation of Rs. 3,48,560/- and interest thereon at the rate of 12% under section 23-A (I), amounting to Rs. 1,08,062/- and solatium under section 23 (II) at the rate of 30%, making up the total of Rs. 5,61,190/-. The State deposited Rs. 6,17,310/- which included the accrued interest till date. The claimants, by a writ petition filed in this Court namely, Misc. Petition No. 679 of 1992, claimed the interest from the date of taking over the possession, i.e. 3.2.1985. This Court directed the claimants to approach the LAO. Ultimately, the LAO issued the notice to the Department which objected for the payment of interest on the ground that while awarding the compensation, the value of the land was determined as' prevalent in the year 1988 while at the time of taking possession, i.e. on 3.2.1985, the market-value of the land was only Rs. 3,673/- per Bigha. Therefore, in the circumstances, the claimants have received much more amount than the market value and besides, 12% interest and 30% solatium. 3. After hearing objections, the LAO, by supplementary award under section 34 of the Act, awarded the interest of Rs. 5,67,804/-. As the State Department was aggrieved of the award of interest, it applied under section 18 of the Act as "person interested" for making a Reference. The Collector referred the matter under section 18 of the Act to the Reference Court. 5,67,804/-. As the State Department was aggrieved of the award of interest, it applied under section 18 of the Act as "person interested" for making a Reference. The Collector referred the matter under section 18 of the Act to the Reference Court. The land-owners raised a preliminary objection that the Reference is incompetent. The Reference Court, in view of the provisions of section 50 (2) of the Act and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Kumar v. Central Warehousing Corporation ( AIR 1986 SC 1164 ), held the Reference to be not maintainable and dismissed the same. Aggrieved of this order, the State has preferred this appeal. 4. Shri K.N. Gupta, learned Government Advocate and Shri V.K. Bharadwaj, learned counsel for the claimants heard. 5. In the facts alluded above, the question for determination before us relates to the competence of the Reference made by the Collector under section 18 of the Act at the instance of the State Government on the ground that the interest, as awarded by the LAO, was not awardable. 6. Learned Government Advocate took us through the provisions of Sections 18 and 50 (2) of the Act and placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Abdul Karim Allarakha v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1982 SC 61 ), contended that a Reference is barred under the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 50 at the instance of the local authority or company at whose instance, the acquisition of land is made. But, as the State has not accepted the award, for the purposes of section 18, the State is "person interested". Therefore, the Reference was competent. 7. It is trite law that when an award is made by the Collector or the LAO, he acts as an agent of the Government and that the legal character of the award made by the Collector is the tender or offer by him on behalf of the Government (See, Mohammed Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 404 ; Food Corporation of India V. Makhan Singh, 1992 AIR SCW 1466) and Santosh Kumar's case (supra). But, when once the offer is made, can a reduction in the amount of award be prayed by seeking a Reference under section 18 of the Act is the question. 8. But, when once the offer is made, can a reduction in the amount of award be prayed by seeking a Reference under section 18 of the Act is the question. 8. It is no matter of doubt that under section 18, the claimants and/or the owners of lands who have objected as to measurement of the land acquired, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation will fall within the expression "person interested" and may apply for a Reference. It has also now been well-settled that under section 18, a party for whose benefit the land is acquired under the Act and the Company or the local authority is entitled to a notice under section 20 of the Act in Reference made at the instance of the "persons interested" under section 18 (1) of the Act, so that such local authority or Company, as the case may be, could satisfy the Reference Court that the offer made by the LAO is proper and increase in the amount claimed of which the burden will1ay upon them will be prejudicial. If inspite of the objection and hearing, any judgment or decree is passed by the Reference Court against such bodies, such bodies are also entitled to file an appeal under section 54 of the Act as the definition of a "person interested", given in section 18 is an inclusive definition and must be liberally construed so as to embrace all persons who may be directly or indirectly interested in the title of the land or in the quantum of compensation. See, decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Sher Singh and others ( AIR 1993 SCW 701 = JT 1993 (3) 693; Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Ashok Singhal and others (AIR 1993 SCW 1083 = JT 1993 (3) 692; Food Corporation of India v. Makhan Singh (supra); Neelagangabai v. State of Karnataka (1990) 3 SCC 617 ; Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. F.V. Coutinho ( AIR 1980 SC 1118 ) and a few decisions of this Court, namely, in the cases of Central Railway v. Ramaiya ( 1993 JLJ 757 = 1994 MPLJ 154 ), M.P. Electricity Board v. Rukmini Bai ( 1992 MPLJ 434 ) and M.P. Grih Nirman Mandal and another v. Umashankar Kunjilai and another ( 1990 JLJ 240 = 1990 MPLJ 780 ). 9. But, still, section 50 does not give any right to the State or to the local authority or the company for whom the land is acquired and the compensation is offered or tendered by the Collector to pray for reduction of the amount making a grievance that the compensation is excessive. For that, the reasons are two. Because section 18 does not give right to seek a Reference for reduction of the compensation as awarded by the Collector, being an offer by the State through the Collector. Secondly, section 25 is a pointer to that effect that the amount of award by the Collector is kept sacrosanct and compensation can in no event be less than the one awarded by the Collector. 10. In the case of Santosh Kumar (supra), the Supreme Court, after examining the scheme of the Act and the provisions of sections 11, 18, 25, 50 and 54 or the Act, has observed in para 4 of the Report thus: "In our view there cannot be any possible doubt that the scheme of the Act is that, apart from fraud, corruption or collusion, the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector under S. 11 of the Act may not be questioned in any proceeding either by the Government or by the Company or Local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made. Section 50 (2) and S. 25 lead to that inevitable conclusion. Surely what may not be done under the provisions of the Act may not be permitted to the done by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226. Art. 236 is not meant to avoid or circumvent the processes of the law and the provisions of the statute. When S. 50 (2) expressly bars the compancy or local authority at whose instance the acquisition is made from demanding a reference under S. 18 of the Act, notwithstanding that such company or local authority may be allowed to adduce evidence before the Collector, and when S. 25 expressly prohibits the Court from reducing the amount of compensation while dealing with the reference under S. 18, it is, clearly not permissible for the company or local authority to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 to challenge the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector and to have it reduced." 11. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Municipal Council, Piparia v. State ( 1965 JLJ 1060 ), while examining the provisions of sections 11, 18,26 and 50 (2), observed that sub-section (2) of section 50 of the Act authorises a local authority or company to appear in the land acquisition proceedings before the Collector or a Court and adduce evidence. But the proviso to that sub-section says that such local authority or company shall not be entitled to demand a reference under section 18 of the Act against the award passed by the Collector under section 11, even if such body is aggrieved of the compensation so awarded as in view of section 25, the Reference Court can award compensation exceeding the amount awarded by the Collector, but cannot award more compensation than the amount claimed by the land-owner and also cannot reduce the amount awarded by the Collector which exceeds the amount claimed by the person concerned as section 25 injuncts the Court to reduce the amount. This Court observed that there is a defect in the Act, but that cannot be removed by the Court by a forced construction of the provision as it is the function of the Legislature and not of the Court. 12. It is submitted before us by learned Government Advocate that the LAO has no jurisdiction to award interest prior to the date of the Notification on the compensation so awarded under the Act, while, on the other hand, Shri V.K. Bharadwaj, learned counsel, placing reliance on a Full Bench decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Guntur v. Vasiraddy ( AIR 1970 AP 262 ), contended that expression "taking possession of the land" in section 28 of the Act means that possession even can be taken prior to acquisition proceedings and if such possession is taken, interest is payable from the date of taking possession, whether possession is taken under the Act or by private negotiations or otherwise, in anticipation of valid proceedings under the Act, on equitable principle, the land-owners would be entitled to interest from the date of taking over of the possession. Without expressing any opinion on this, we are of the view that a Reference under section 18 of the Act can be claimed only in certain circumstances, Le., when there is an objection to the amount of compensation, to the measurement of the land, to the persons to whom it is payable, or to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. Therefore, it is beyond the purview of section 18 as the compensation is determined under the Act on the market-value of the land at the time of the Notification and other relevant considerations. The interest is awarded to the land-owner on the compensation so determined from the date of taking over of the possession. The award of interest is statutory in nature because it is fixed under sections 32 and 34 of the Act and is payable at the rate of nine per cent. per annum from the date of taking over possession until it is paid or deposited within one year and if it is not so deposited, at the rate of fifteen per cent. per annum from the expiry of the period of the said one year. Therefore, on the award of statutory interest, no Reference can be made. For that, we take support of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Ram Mehar and others ( AIR 1973 SC 305 ) and a Single Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court in the case of the State of Rajasthan v. Maharaja Rao Bhim Singh and another (AIR 1980 Rajasthan 27). As a result of the above discussion, we are of the view that the Reference Court rightly dismissed the Reference as incompetent. 13. It takes us to the last and the alternative submission of the learned State counsel that this appeal be converted into a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. For that, we simply say that it would be appropriate for the State Government, if so advised, to file a fresh petition and if such petition is filed, certainly the decision of this appeal will not come in the way as the Reference was found to be incompetent. 14. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. We leave parties to bear their own costs.