JUDGMENT Sudhir Narain 1. THIS writ petition has been filed against the order dated 22-2-1991 passed by VIII Additional District Judge, Meerut, respondent no. 1, allowing the appeal of respondent No. 3 and releasing the shop in question in favour of respondent No. 3 under section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Runt and Eviction Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. BRIEFLY, the facts are that respondent No. 3 filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act on 22-1.2-1983 on the allegations that he is landlord of shop No. 2/577, Kotama Road, Patti Baru, Kasba Baraut, Meerut, and the petitioner is its tenant at the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per year The shop was let out in the year 1965 when his sons were small. He has three sons, namely, Rajesh, Jinesh and Suresh aged about 25, 22 and 20 years respectively (at the time of filing the application). His eldest son Rajesh and the youngest son Suresh left their studies after getting education upto High School and Intermediate respectively and they were without any job or vocation. The landlord needs the disputed shop to engage his sons Rajesh and Suresh in the work of General Merchant in the disputed shop. The tenant, his mother and two brothers are members of joint family and they purchased a shop for Rs. 80,000/- on 14-12-1983 which is situated in front of the disputed shop. The petitioner has started his business in the aforesaid shop and the disputed shop is: lying vacant. The petitioner purchased a plot on 21-11-1983 for Rs. 16,000/- where he can construct a shop for carrying on business and would not suffer any hardship. The petitioner contested the release application and filed written statement. He denied that the shop in question was bona fide required by the landlord. The landlord was milk vendor and his eldest son Rajesh was assisting in his milk business and his second son was in a firm carrying on wholesale business of Red and White Cigarette. He never purchased any shop on 14-12-1983, but it was purchased by his brother who was separate from him. The landlord has in his possession a shop which was in the tenancy of Sukhmal Chand and a Dukariya which is on the back portion of the disputed shop. He never purchased any shop on 14-12-1983, but it was purchased by his brother who was separate from him. The landlord has in his possession a shop which was in the tenancy of Sukhmal Chand and a Dukariya which is on the back portion of the disputed shop. The landlord had filed an application in the year 1978 under section 21 of the Act almost on similar allegations which was rejected by the Prescribed Authority and finally affirmed in appeal on 15-5-1982. The parties led evidence before the Prescribed Authority. The Preseribed Authority rejected the application on the finding that the tenant shall suffer greater hardship in case the shop is released in favour of the landlord. The landlord filed an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority before the learned District Judge, Meerut. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties filed additional evidence. The petitioner wanted to establish that during the pendency of the appeal Sukhmal Chand Jain vacated a shop and that was available to the landlord. 3. RESPONDENT No. I found that the sons of landlord were unemployed and they have no suitable alternative accommodation to carry on business and his need to establish his sons in She business in the disputed shop was bona fide and genuine and he would suffer greater hardship in case his release application is rejected. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition. 4. I have heard Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Sri Vivek Chaudhary, learned counsel for respondent No. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that respondent No. 3 had filed an application under section 21 (1) (a) of the Act against the petitioner to establish his sons in business in the disputed shop in the year i9/8 which was registered as P.A. Case No, 30 of 1978. The Prescribed Authority rejected the said application in the year 1980 and the said order was affirmed on 15 -5-1982 in appeal preferred by respondent No. 3 against the said order. In the earlier proceedings, a finding was recorded that the need of respondent No. 3 was not bonafide and genuine and such finding operates as resjudicata and the second application on the same facts and ground was not maintainable. 5. In the earlier proceedings, a finding was recorded that the need of respondent No. 3 was not bonafide and genuine and such finding operates as resjudicata and the second application on the same facts and ground was not maintainable. 5. BEFORE dealing with the legal question raised on behalf of the petitioner, it is necessary to consider the grounds for filing the application under section 21 of the Act in the year 1978 by the landlord. He filed application in the year 1978 for release of the disputed shop on the ground that he required it for running a Halwai shop along with his son. He had not stated about the need of his son Suresh, At that time, Suresh was 15 years of age. The application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority taking the view that respondent No. 3 can establish his business of Halwai in Dukariya. The petitioner has not annexed copy of the judgment of the Prescribed Authority in P.A. Case No. 30 of 1978 and the order of the appellate authority arising out of the said proceedings. The present application has been filed on 22nd December, 1983, on the ground that his sons Rajesh Kumar and Suresh Kumar are unemployed and they want the disputed shop to run General Merchant shop. The grounds mentioned in both the applications were totally different. 6. SECTION 37 (I) of the Act atradhes finality of an order passed by an authority under the Act, This, however, does not put a bar that a second application under section 21 of the Act will not be maintainable. SECTION 34 of the Act enumerates the power of various authorities and procedure to be followed by (hem. It has made applicable the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only to the extent whicls is presented under the said section when trying a suit or holding an enquiry or hearing under the Act. SECTION 34 of the Act enumerates the power of various authorities and procedure to be followed by (hem. It has made applicable the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure only to the extent whicls is presented under the said section when trying a suit or holding an enquiry or hearing under the Act. The powers of the Civil Court which are prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure have been conferred for summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him one oath, receiving evidence on affidavits, inspecting a building or its locality, or issuing commission for the examination of witnesses or requiring the discovery of production of documents, or local investigation awarding costs regarding a lawful agreement and such other matter which may be prescribed SECTION 11 of the-Code of Civil Procedure has not been made applicable. SECTION 38 of the Act provides that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act or in the Code of Civil Procedure. SECTION 34 (8) of the Act provides that for the purpose of any proceeding under the Act the authority shall have such other power and shall follow such procedure, principle of proof, rules of limitation and guiding principle as may be prescribed. SECTION 41 of the Act confers rule making power on the State Government. Rule 18 (2) of the Rules drained under the Act lays down the condition when a finding recorded in earlier proceedings shall be binding on the authorities in the subsequent proceedings. Rule 18 (2) reads as under :- "Where an application of a landlord against a tenant under section 21 for the release of any building or any specified part thereof or any surplus land appurtenant to such building is rejected on merits and a fresh application on the same ground is made within a period of one year from that decision, the prescribed authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive." 7. FROM the reading of the said Rule, it is clear that an application for release of any building under section 21 of the Act if filed within one year from the date of decision the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive. It is on the principle of res judicata. FROM the reading of the said Rule, it is clear that an application for release of any building under section 21 of the Act if filed within one year from the date of decision the Prescribed Authority shall accept the findings in those proceedings as conclusive. It is on the principle of res judicata. The finding is recorded by the Prescribed Authority and it is not necessary to again consider the same facts and grounds which had been considered earlier by the Prescribed authority, but in case an application is filed within a period of one year on different grounds the application is maintainable even within one year from the date of that decision and the finding recorded earlier will not be binding and conclusive. In Babu Lal Gupta v. Second Additional District Judge, Banda, 1979 ARC 219, it was held that if the first application was filed by the landlord for his own need and the second application was filed within six months for need of his sons, the provisions of Rule 18 (2) of the Rules was not applicable as it was filed on different grounds though within ones year. The question arises whether the findings recorded in the earlier proceedings will be binding and conclusive on the Prescribed Authority when an application under section 21 of the Act was filed after the expiry of one year on the same facts and grounds. Admittedly, section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to such proceedings. Rule 18 (2) of the Rules also does not provide that the findings recorded in earlier proceedings will be conclusive and binding if the second application is filed after expiry of one year. The Rule specifically refers to conclusiveness of the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority in an application under section 21 of the Act if it is filed within one year and by implication, it leaves open that such findings may not be conclusive in subsequent proceedings if second application is filed by the landlord after the expiry of one year. 8. 8. THE gap of one year presupposes change of the circumstances, hardship which might have been felt by the landlord and the pressing need which may not have been earlier but sprung up after gap of time e,g. if a man is living in discomfort and suffering a hardship or he requires an accommodation for business purpose and with passage of time he has still not been able to establish his business or requires accommodation for members of his family, his need may be severe after gap of time and in that situation the second application has to be considered again on merits and the Prescribed Authority has to apply the mind independently and cannot reject the application simply on the ground that the first application filed by him was rejected. This question came up for consideration in various cases decided by this Court. In Shakur v. Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Meerut 1984 (1) ARC 180, the appellate authority in an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority had set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority taking the view that two previous applications for release filed by the landlord bad been rejected on the ground that the accommodation with him was sufficient for his residential purposes. The third application for need of accommodation was barred on the principle of resjudicata This Court held that the view taken by the appellate court was not sustainable as under Rule 18 (2) of the Rules framed under the Act, his second application was maintainable after the expiry of one year. The application filed after the expiry of one year by the landlord was not barred on principles of resjudicata and the Court directed the appellate authority to decide the appeal on merits for recording his own independent finding 9. IN Ram Lila Society, Kanpur v. Second Additional District Judge, Kanpur, 1986 (2) ARC 49, the appellate authority in an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority in the proceedings under section 21 of the Act took the view that the second application filed by the landlord was barred on principle of resjudicata, Honourable R. M, Sahai, J. held that Rule 18 contains Rule of conclusiveness of the findings recorded in earlier proceedings only if another application is filed within a period of one year from that decision. If the application is filled after the expiry of one year, the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority or the appellate authority in earlier proceedings cannot, therefore, be relied upon in subsequent proceedings nor they could be treated as conclusive. As regards the applicability of principles of resjudicata, the Court observed as follows ;- "It is difficult to accept this argument. Either the Prescribed Authority had jurisdiction to proceed with the matter or not, if the earlier decision in the earlier application did not preclude him from entertaining or deciding the application, then the finding recorded, in earlier application cannot be held to be binding nor is there any merit in the submission that the additional reason disclosed by the petitioner was trivial and insignificant. As observed in Dr. Gandhi's case, it cannot be disputed that in respect of applications filed for release, time has an important bearing. An application on the ground of bona fide need may not be maintainable today but it may become maintainable tomorrow. The mere fact that an application filed 5 years earlier was dismissed could not result in rejecting the application filed in 1982 and that probably is the intention of sub-rule (2) of Rule 18. IN Prem Chand Jain v. District Judge, I981 ALJ 312, it was very appropriately observed that in the matters relating to proceedings for getting the property vacated on the ground of bona fide need, time is an important factor. By the passage of time the ages increase, the needs change and therefore, the circumstances also change. To apply the rule of resjudicata in such circumstances would be doing injustice and unfairness which is the very basis and foundation of the principle of conclusiveness." 10. IN Jagdish Prasad v. Fourth Additional -District Judge, Meerut, 1986 (1) ARC 377, it was held that if an application is filed after the expiry of one year from the date of decision of an application under section 21 of the Act. the decision given in the earlier application moved under section 21 of the Act will not operate as res judicata in view , of the provisions of Rule 18 (2) of the Rules framed under the Act. However, the averments made in the earlier application under section 21 of the Act and the fact that they were dismissed would be relevant: consideration for the purposes of deciding the application. However, the averments made in the earlier application under section 21 of the Act and the fact that they were dismissed would be relevant: consideration for the purposes of deciding the application. IN Badri Nath v. IX Additional District Judge, Varanasi, 1992 (2) ARC 580, the District Judge set aside the order of the Prescribed Authority, allowing the applicatiou of the landlord under section 21 of the Act on one of the main grounds was that the landlord had filed second release application without indicating the change in circumstances and, therefore, his need did not appear to be bonafide, This Court took the view that in view of the provisions of Rule 18 (2) of the Rules, the second application was maintainable if it is filed after one year from the date of the decision of the earlier application and that had to be judged on merits, The time gap itself indicates the changing circumstances when earlier release application was filed. The ages of the sons of the landlord were much less and if it is filed after expiry of ten years from the date of filing the earlier application, the ages of the sons of the landlord were different. IN Ram Swaroop v. XI Additional District Judge, Meerut, 1992 (2) ARC 519, it was held that the principle of resjudicata its not applicable when a second application is filed under section 21 of the Act after expiry of one year from the date of decision of the first application. It was held that Rule 18 is an exception to the principle of resjudicata as well as to the bar created by that principle. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the decision Hamldan v. District Judge, Muzaffarnagar, 1985 (1) ARC 455, wherein it was held that if a finding has already been confirmed by the High Court in earlier writ petition between the same parties, the same cannot be challenged again in subsequent writ petition. In Smt. Raj Kumari Kapoor v. Civil Judge, Kanpur, 1986 (2) ARC 469, the tenant had relied upon a compromise alleged to have been entered into in the proceedings under section 21 of the Act. The said compromise was not accepted in that proceedings. This Court held that the findings recorded in the said proceedings operated as resjudicata. In Smt. Raj Kumari Kapoor v. Civil Judge, Kanpur, 1986 (2) ARC 469, the tenant had relied upon a compromise alleged to have been entered into in the proceedings under section 21 of the Act. The said compromise was not accepted in that proceedings. This Court held that the findings recorded in the said proceedings operated as resjudicata. In Bengali v. District Judge, Allahabad, 1985 (2) ARC 455, the facts were that there was a dispute as to whether Babu Singh or Bengali were tenants of the disputed accommodation. The Additional District Judge in the proceedings under section 33 of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 held that Bengali was tenant. Babu Singh filed suit in the Court of Munsif for declaration of his rights. It was held that the findings recorded the proceedings under the said Act will be binding on the principle of resjudicata in a subsequent suit even though section 11, CPC was not applicable in terms, 11. LEARNED counsel further placed reliance upon various decisions of the Supreme Court which have laid down that where section 11, CPC is not applicable in terms the principles of resjudicata should be applied to any proceeding and under any provision of the Act on the gronnd of public policy. If a party has raised certain dispute and the Court has applied its mind and came to a conclusion and the same matter is reagitated, the Court should accept the findings recorded in earlier proceedings between the same parties. He placed reliance upon Burn and Company v Their Employees, 1957 SC 38, Satvadhyan v. Smt. Deorajin Debi, AIR I960 SC 941, Darvao v. State of U. P., AIR 1961 SC 1457 and O. K. Dudani v. S. D. Sharma, AIR 1986 SC 1455 . 12. THESE decisions lay down that the principles of resjudicata should be applied even though section 11, CPC is not applicable in terms but on the ground of public policy as expressed in the maxim "interest rei publicaeut sit finis litiuen". A person should not be permitted to raise the same dispute on the same cause of action which has attained finality between the parties. A person should not be permitted to raise the same dispute on the same cause of action which has attained finality between the parties. Rule 18 (2) of the Rules is in no way a departure from that principle but it has taken into account that in proceedings under section 21 of the Act, with passage of time, the period which passes between one decision and filing of application at some different time, the circumstances do change and the necessity for accommodation may not be so pressing at earlier stage may be pressing after some time, the hardship which the tenant was suffering might have been mitigated by the lapse of time and, therefore, Rule 18 (2) lays down a principle when a decision given by an authority under section 21 of the Act will be taken as conclusive if a subsequent application is filed within a period of one year from the date of that decision. This incorporates the principle of resjudicata. On the other hand, if an application is filed after the expiry of one year, the Judgment shall not be conclusive in the sense that the authority shall not reject the application on the ground that earlier application had been rejecited. The Prescribed Authority has to apply the mind afresh to the facts of the case considering the bona fide and genuine need of the landlord and also the hardship and also as to who shall suffer greater hardship in the evens the application is either allowed or rejected. The finding which might have been recorded earlier itself may not be conclusive The need of a person changes from time to time. His hardship may increase or mitigate with the passage of time So far as other proceedings under the Act are concerned, there is no similar provision and the principle of resjudicata may be applicable but as regards an application under section 21 of the Act the authority has to look into the circumstances and facts as existing on the date of the filing of the application by the landlord under section 21 of the Act. It may be that the Court may consider the facts that earlier application was filed and was rejected but that will not be itself a ground for rejecting the application without applying its mind on the facts of the case. It may be that the Court may consider the facts that earlier application was filed and was rejected but that will not be itself a ground for rejecting the application without applying its mind on the facts of the case. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon an unreported decision given in Civil Misc. Writ No. 75 of 1985, S. N. Barthwal v. Han Sahai and others where this Count while remanding the case directed the Prescribed Authority to consider the application afresh. An observation was made that the findings recorded in the earlier proceedings could not be completely ignored and some weight had to be given to them. Those observations were made on the facts of that case. It was not held that the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority in the earlier proceedings operated as a bar in filing a second application. 13. IN the present case, respondent No. 3 had filed application in the year 1978 for release of the disputed shop on the allegation that he required It for carrying on Halwai business by the landlord himself with his eldest son Rajesh Kumar. The application was rejected. The present application has been filed on the allegations that bis sons Rajesh Kumar and Suresh Kumar are unemployed and he will engage them in the work of general merchant in the disputed shop. The need which was shown in the earlier application was totally different from the need which was stated in the application filed in the year 1933. It was further stated that in the year 1978 his son Suresh Kumar was minor and he had become major when he filed the application in the year 1983,. The Prescribed Authority had to apply his mind regarding the need of his son for whom the need was stated in the application filed by the landlord under section 21 of the Act. The finding which might have been recorded in the earlier proceedings under section 21 of the Act could only establish that the need of respondent No. 3 to open a Halwai shop in the disputed shop was not established but there Is no finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority in the earlier proceedings regarding need of establishing the two sons of respondent No. 3 for opening a general merchant shop in it. 14. 14. THE principle of res judicata is otherwise not applicable on the facts of the present case. THE appellate authority has recorded a finding that the need of the landlord for establishing his two sons, namely, Rajesh Kumar and Suresh Kumar in the business of general merchant is bona fide. THE petitioner had contested the claim of the landlord on the allegation that Rajesh Kumar was assisting his father respondent No. 3 in his milk business. Admittedly, respondent No, 3 is a milk vendor and he has no shop. Rajesh Kumar has filed an affidavit stating that he has no other occupation or business. His father is a milk vendor and has no shop As regards Suresh Kumar, the petitioner had stated that he was employed in M/s Mittal Agency In sale of "Red and White Cigarette". Suresh Kumar filed affidavit denying the allegations of the petitioner. Sri Srawan Kumar Jain, proprietor of M/s. Mittal Agency filed affidavit and denied (that Suresh Kumar was employed in a firm M/s. Mittal Agency of "Red and White Cigarette". THE appellate authority found that both the sons' are unemployed and they have to be established in some business. Both the sons of the landlord had filed affidavits stating that they want to open a shop of general merchant in the disputed shop. the appellate authority has believed their version and has recorded a finding that the landlord requires the disputed accommodation to establish his sons Rajesh Kumar and Suresh Kumar in the business of general merchant in the disputed shop. There is no preversity in the finding recorded by the appellate authority. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that one Sukhmal Chand Jain was tenant of a shop adjacent to the disputed shop of which respondent No. 3 was owner and landlord. He vacated the shop in January, 1990 during the pendency of the appeal and if he required any shop to establish his sons he could establish them In the said shop. Respondent No. 3 denied that he was owner and landlord of the said shop. He stated., that there was an oral partition amongst the brothers and one of his brothers filed Suit No. 1847 of 1990 Raghubir Singh v. Ratan Lal in the Court of Civil Judge, Meerut, for declaration of ownership regarding the shop which was under the tenancy of Sukhmal Chand Jain and he was declared owner. He stated., that there was an oral partition amongst the brothers and one of his brothers filed Suit No. 1847 of 1990 Raghubir Singh v. Ratan Lal in the Court of Civil Judge, Meerut, for declaration of ownership regarding the shop which was under the tenancy of Sukhmal Chand Jain and he was declared owner. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the decree passed in the suit filed by Raghubir Singh was a collusive and it was obtained during the pendency of appeal. Respondent No. 1 has considered various circumstances indicating that the decree was not a collusive. I have examined the submission mads by learned counsel for the petitioner to find out as to whether the decree was a collusive only to exclude the shop vacated by Sukhmal Chand Jain from being considered by the court while considering the need of landlord-respondent. The shop, which was occupied by Sukhmal Chand Jain, was the property which was purchased by respondent No. 3 and his two brothers Raghubir Singh and Ratan Lal by a registered sale-deed dated 22nd September, 1955. Raghubir Singh, brother of respondent No. 3, alone filed an application on 8th March, 1987 to the local authorities for grant of permission to construct the shop in that property. The copy of the said application has been filed as Paper No. 16-0. It is clear that the property was a joint property and none of the brothers could claim exclusive right in the said property. Raghubir Singh filed Suit No. 1847 of 1990 for. declaration of ownership regarding various properties on the allegations that there was oral family settlement which had taken place on 9th November, 1976 and the said partition regarding various properties were divided amongst the brothers In the plaint, he had indicated the properties which came Co the share of the brothers given as Schedule 'A', *B' aud 'C' in the plaint; map. The copy of the plaint has been annexed in the couater-affidavit. It is clear from the plaint that the declaration was not only regarding the shop which was in the tenancy of Sukhmal Chand Jain. It related to various properties and his other brothers were also parties to the said suit. The suit was decreed by the Civil Judge. The copy of the plaint has been annexed in the couater-affidavit. It is clear from the plaint that the declaration was not only regarding the shop which was in the tenancy of Sukhmal Chand Jain. It related to various properties and his other brothers were also parties to the said suit. The suit was decreed by the Civil Judge. In view of the fact that the property was purchased jointly by registered sale deed on 22nd September, 1955, it could not be held that the other brothers had no share in the property. 15. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that respondent No. 3 had filed Suit No. 21 of 1976 against Sukhmal Chand Jain for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages. Respondent No. 3 alone had filed the suit. In paragraph 1 of the plaint, he had stated himself as owner and landlord. The suit was decreed as against Sukhmal Chand Jain. The revision filed by him was dismissed. This has been explained by respondent No. 3. The suit was filed before the family settlement had taken place. It was filed on 6th May, 1976, while oral family settlement is alleged to have taken place on 9th November, 1976. As the suit had been filed by Suraj Bhan, he had to continue the suit. He claimed himself as a landlord and the mere use of the word 'owner' itself was not conclusive as other brothers had also owned that property. Sukhmal Chand Jain has himself filed an application for amendment in his written statement stating that Suraj Bhan was not owner of the property. The Court, however, permitted to continue the suit. The filing of the suit prior to the family settlement will not indicate that decree passed in Suit No. 1847 of 1990 was collusive. There is another aspect that even assuming that the shop was a joint family property of respondent No. 3, still he will have only one-third share in it and he cannot claim exclusive right to occupy the same. The shop vacated by Sukhmal Chand Jain is thus not available to respondent No. 3 to occupy the same for establishing his sons in the business. 16. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner pointed out that one Dr. Suresh was a tenant of respondent No. 3 on the ground floor of his house situate in Mohalla Pachdara, Baraut. The shop vacated by Sukhmal Chand Jain is thus not available to respondent No. 3 to occupy the same for establishing his sons in the business. 16. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner pointed out that one Dr. Suresh was a tenant of respondent No. 3 on the ground floor of his house situate in Mohalla Pachdara, Baraut. He vacated the same in the year 1980 and took a shop on rent at Babli Road, Baraut and started his clinic there. Thin shop is available to respondent No. 3. In the counter-affidavit, respondent No 3 has stated that Dr. Suresh was occupying a portion of residential accommodation. The said house exists in a Mohalla deep inside an area where no shop can be run in the said accommodation. The appellate court has made an observation that the house of the landlord is in a residential place which is not suitable for running a general merchant shop. Learned counsel for the petitioner then urged that there is a 'Dukariya' which is on the back portion of the disputed shop in which the sons of respondent No. 3 can open general merchant shop and start their business. The Prescribed Authority in the earlier proceedings had recorded a finding that respondent No. 3 can use that 'Dukariya' for a Halwai shop. The alleged 'Dukariya' is on the back portion of the shop and it does not open to a main road. The is a Nala between the road and 'Dukariya' which at places is covered by a slab. Respondent No. 3 has offered the said 'Dukariya' to the petitioner. The petitioner has declined the offer on the ground that it is not suitable for his business purposes as it is on the back side of the disputed shop and opens on a Nala. In the written statement, the petitioner had stated that the landlord can use the 'Dukariya' for any purpose he likes hat when the offer has been made he stated that it is unsuitable to him. An accommodation which is not suitable to a tenant, he cannot say that it is suitable to the landlord. In paragraph 33 of the written statement, he had stated that initially the 'Dukariya' was under his tenancy, but later on it was got vacated. An accommodation which is not suitable to a tenant, he cannot say that it is suitable to the landlord. In paragraph 33 of the written statement, he had stated that initially the 'Dukariya' was under his tenancy, but later on it was got vacated. From the above discussion, it is clear that the landlord has no suitable accommodation to establish his sons Rajesh Kumar and Suresh Kumar in the business of general merchant and the finding recorded by respondent No. 1 is not vitiated under law. 17. LASTLY, it was urged that the petitioner would suffer greater hardship in case he is evicted as he has no other alternative accommodation to shift his business. He has been carrying on business since the year 1965 and has also earned a goodwill. The Court has to consider the hardship of the landlord and of the tenant and has further to consider who shall suffer a greater hardship in the event the application is allowed or refused 18. THE petitioner was lei out the; accommodation at the time when the sons of respondent No. 3 were minors. THE court has found that two major sons of the petitioner are unemployed. In case the application is rejected, they will not be able to carry on business in their own shop. On the other hand the tenant is a man of status. He has established his business. He has purchased a plot which indicates that he is a man of status. Considering the totality of the circumstances, in case the application is rejected, respondeat no. 3 shall suffer a greater hardship. THE petitioner has also not shown that he made any effort to find out any other suitable accommodation. THE accommodation, which has been offered to the petitioner, may not be of the same nature and suitable but it is for the tenant to accept the same or not to accept the same. THE law doss not contemplate that unless a suitable alternative accommodation is provided to the tenant no order for eviction against him can be passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon P. L Gupta v. Bankey Lal. 1978 ARC 17, Sim Shiv Babu v. Smt. Ram Janki, 1983 (2) ARC 494 and Kishan Lal Laxminarayan karva v. smt. Shalinibai, 1991 SC 335, in support of Ms contention that the tenant may be provided suitable accommodation. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon P. L Gupta v. Bankey Lal. 1978 ARC 17, Sim Shiv Babu v. Smt. Ram Janki, 1983 (2) ARC 494 and Kishan Lal Laxminarayan karva v. smt. Shalinibai, 1991 SC 335, in support of Ms contention that the tenant may be provided suitable accommodation. This depends upon the facts of each case where a landlord wants to get the accommodation vacated and offers a suitable alternative accommodation. THE tenant cannot resist the application of the landlord where the landlord has established his genuine and bona fide need to establish his sons in business and he am no alternative accommodation with him to offer to the tenant, and the application of the landlord cannot be rejected on the ground that no suitable alternative accommodation has been provided by the landlord to him. 1b Jagannath Prasad v. IV Additional District Judge, Mathura. 1986 (U.P.) RCC 130 it has been held that non availablity of suitable alternative accommodation to a tenant is no ground to reject the release application of a landlord. In Yathoda Nandan Pathak v. Vishnu Kumar Gupta, 1988 (2) ARC 244, it was held that it is not necessary for a landlord to provide an alternative accommodation to the tenant. In view of the discussions made above, there is no merit in the writ petition. Ik is accordingly dismissed. 19. IN the present case, however, an offer of certain accommodation hast already been made and on the facts of the present case the petitioner is granted to accept the offer as given below :- (i) IN case the petitioner files an affidavit within two weeks from to-day that he will file an affidavit before the Prescribed Authority respondent No 2, that he will accept the shop in 'Dukariya' situated on the back of the disputed shop to the extent of an area equal to the disputed shop, the landlord shall deliver the same. (ii) IN case the petitioner does not accept any of the offer and does not want the said accommodation, as indicated above, he shall vacate the disputed shop within six months from to-day provided be gives an undertaking before the Prescribed Authority, Meerut, within two weeks from today that he does not accept the offer and shall vacate the disputed shop within the time granted by this Court and hand over peaceful and vacant possession to respondent No. 3. 20. THE writ petition is dismissed subject to the above directions. THE parties shall bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.