M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner was a conductor in Gujarat State Road transport Corporation. He was dismissed from the service of the Corporation on 6th November 1968. Against this order of dismissal, the petitioner filed a Regular civil Suit No. 163 of 1971. The trial Court decreed the suit in his favour on 18th august, 1972. Against this judgment and decree, the Gujarat State Road Transport corporation preferred a Regular Appeal being Appeal No. 48 of 1972 which was allowed on 25-6-1976 and decree passed by the trial Court was set aside. Against the order dated 25-6-1976 passed by the appellate Court, the present petitioner preferred Second Appeal before this Court being Appeal No. 414 of 1976 and this appeal was allowed in favour of the petitioner on 24th April, 1980 and the trial courts judgment and decree dated 18th August, 1972 was restored. However, neither the petitioner reported for duty before the Corporation nor the Corporation passed any order in compliance of the decree which was held by the petitioner against the Corporation. The petitioner has raised a grievance that the lawyer who conducted his case in Second Appeal went on informing him that the Second appeal was still pending and he would be informed as and when the same comes on board or is decided. But later on it was revealed that the appeal had already been decided in the year 1980 and thereupon in August, 1993, the petitioner preferred a petition for execution of the decree. In this Execution Application, two buses of the Corporation were attached under the orders of the Court so as to satisfy the decree, but Civil Revision Application No. 481 of 1994 was preferred by the Corporation against order of attachment passed by the trial Court and this revision Application No. 481 of 1994 was allowed and the proceedings of the trial court were quashed. This Revision Application was decided on 1st April, 1994. ( 2 ) IN the meanwhile, it appears that apprehending of the fate of execution case filed by him, the petitioner preferred this Special Civil Application before this Court seeking certain reliefs on the basis of the trial Courts judgment and decree held by him since 1972. This Revision Application was decided on 1st April, 1994. ( 2 ) IN the meanwhile, it appears that apprehending of the fate of execution case filed by him, the petitioner preferred this Special Civil Application before this Court seeking certain reliefs on the basis of the trial Courts judgment and decree held by him since 1972. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioner has stated before this Court that he does not ask for any wages or benefits for the period beyond 24th April, 1980 till 8th october, 1993 when he approached this Court by way of filing the Special Civil application and so far as the period from 6-11-1968 till 31-5-1971 is concerned, it is to be governed in terms contained in decree with a sum of Rs. 5376. 00 as damages as granted by the Civil Court. Thus, the petitioner claims reinstatement, a sum of Rs. 5,376. 00 for the period from 6-11-1968 to 31-5-1971 as granted by the Civil Court and the salary for the period of 1-6-1971 to 24-4-1980, while the matter was sub-judice before the Courts at different stages. ( 4 ) NO return has been filed on behalf of the respondents to this Special Civil application. However, Mr. Munshaw, appearing for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner did not bother after the decision given by this Court in Second appeal way back on 24th April, 1980. He has also invited attention to the Annexure "i" dated 30-6-1993 which is a reply to the notice by the Corporation to the petitioners Advocate in which it has been stated that - "subsequent to the honourable High Courts order in Second Appeal No. 414 of 1976 dated 24th April, 1980, your client has never bothered to approach the Corporation for reinstatement in service. Hence, your client alone is responsible or negligent and lethargic attitude and for that my client cannot be blamed and held responsible in view of the fact that your client has never bothered for reinstatement in the service for long years and hence nothing can be done at this stage by my client. In these circumstances, your client is not entitled for reinstatement as well as back wages as claimed by your client. " Mr. In these circumstances, your client is not entitled for reinstatement as well as back wages as claimed by your client. " Mr. Munshaw submitted that the petitioner did not approach the Court for execution of the decree within time and now, he has failed in Revision before the High Court against the order of attachment which had been passed by the executing Court in the execution proceedings. Having failed before this Court in the Revision to get the decree executed, may be on the ground of limitation, the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to avail the benefits of the decree which has become inexecutable by lapse of the period of limitation. He also invited my attention to the order passed in Revision Application No. 481 of 1994 by the High Court on 1st july, 1994. The contents of paras 3 and 4 of the order which has been passed in civil Revision Application No. 481 of 1994 on 1-7-1994 are quoted as under:"3. On behalf of the petitioner, it is argued that the opponent has also preferred Special civil Application No. 19631 of 1993 wherein he has taken all these contentions. Since the matter is pending before the Court, this Court would not like to address on the merits of the petition. Shri Shaikh, learned Advocate states that it is the case of poor workman once serving as a Conductor, now without means of subsistence. Without entering into the question whether application filed before the trial Court is barred by limitation or not, considering the circumstances, he would like to make a representation to the State Road Transport Corporation, so that a lenient view is taken in the matter and that his future will have some light of the day. Shri Shaikh also states that if the said representation is considered by the Corporation sympathetically, the respondents problem will be solved. Shri Shaikh undertakes that the respondent shall make such a representation to the Managing Director of the State Road Transport corporation within a period of one week from today, the learned Advocate appearing for the Corporation in the matter who agrees to forward the same. ( 5 ) IN view of this, the Revision Application required to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed. Proceedings pending in the trial Court are quashed. Rule is made absolute. ( 5 ) IN view of this, the Revision Application required to be allowed. It is accordingly allowed. Proceedings pending in the trial Court are quashed. Rule is made absolute. " it has been submitted by the learned Advocate Mr. Munshaw that the learned counsel for the petitioner had thus, stated that without entering into the question whether the application for execution was barred by limitation, he would like to make a representation to the Corporation, so that a lenient view is taken in the matter and his future may have some light of the day and he (Mr. Munshaw) appearing as Counsel for the Corporation had agreed to forward the petitioners representation and in this view of the matter, the Corporations revision petition was allowed and the proceedings pending before the trial Court were quashed. Mr. Munshaw has stated that the petitioner did make a representation thereafter and the same has been forwarded to the Corporation about two weeks back, but so far the corporation has not passed any order on that representation. In any case, the submission of the learned Counsel for the Corporation is that in view of the fact that the proceedings pending in the trial Court have been quashed, may be on the ground of limitation, the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) MR. Shaikh appearing for the petitioner has not disputed that he did not approach the Corporation after 24th April, 1980, the date of the decision by the High Court in his favour in the Second Appeal restoring the decree passed by the trial Court, but he has submitted that he did not come to know about the decision of the Second Appeal and as and when he approached his Advocate, whom he had engaged, for the purpose of Second Appeal, he was told that as and when the matter would be listed for hearing or as and when result would come, he would be informed, but his Advocate did not inform him at any stage and every time, when he approached, he was told that the matter had not come up on Board. It is the case of the petitioner that ultimately he sent a letter dated 20-4-1991 by registered post, but that too had not been replied. It is the case of the petitioner that ultimately he sent a letter dated 20-4-1991 by registered post, but that too had not been replied. Xerox copy of this letter dated 20-4-1991 has been placed on record as Annexure e by the petition along with Xerox copy of the A. D. The contents of this letter are reproduced as under: It has been further stated in Para-5 of this Special Civil Application that it made the petitioner restless and he indirectly inquired as to what had happened to his Second Appeal No. 414 of 1976 and he came to know that his Second Appeal had already been decided in 1980 and neither the respondents nor the learned Advocate for the petitioner informed him about the result. According to the petitioner, he came to know of this fact for the first time on 11-11-1992 (i. e. date on which the period of 12 years was already over even from the date of the decision of the Second Appeal, i. e. , 24-4-1980) and thereafter, he immediately applied for the certified copy of the judgment which was ready on 12-11-1992 and was delivered to the petitioner on that very day. It is the further case of the petitioner that he then contacted an Advocate at Rajkot, requested him to get the order implemented. His Advocate Shri Vora from Rajkot served a registered notice upon the respondents, but the notice dated 23-11-1992 was not replied. It has been stated that the petitioner is an illiterate person and he has acted blindly as per the advice given to him to file a Miscellaneous Civil Application to vindicate his grievance and accordingly, Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 409 of 1993 was filed on 15th february, 1993 in the nature of the Contempt Petition before this Court. This contempt Application No. 409 of 1993 came up before the Division Bench of this court and the Division Bench, after narrating the history of the case has recorded in the order dated 6th April, 1993 as under :"it may be stated that about 12 years have passed and still the petitioner has not got the fruits of the decree passed by the trial Court. In that view of the matter, it is expected that the respondents would do the needful in the matter. In view of the above observations, Mr. In that view of the matter, it is expected that the respondents would do the needful in the matter. In view of the above observations, Mr. S. M. Shah, learned Advocate for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw this petition. Permission is granted. The petition stands disposed of as withdrawn. Writ of this order be sent to the respondents immediately. "mr. Shaikh has submitted that despite this, the Corporation did not do the needful in the matter. Despite the fact that after this order of the Division Bench passed on 6th April, 1993, the petitioner again served a notice on 8th May, 1993 upon the respondents to reinstate him in service and to pay the amount awarded as wages by the trial Court. However, this time, the reply dated 30-6-1993 was sent informing him that the petitioner should thank himself. Thereafter, the petitioner had filed the application for execution of the decree on 30-8-1993 and later on, the present special Civil Application on 8th October, 1993. Mr. Shaikh has submitted that if at all he could not approach the Corporation after 24-4-1980, he could not do so because he was not informed by his Counsel and as soon as he came to know of the judgment in the Second Appeal on 11-11-1992 he has taken steps in quick succession as per the legal advice which was given to him by his respective counsel by way of giving notices to the Corporation, by way of filing a contempt application and by way of filing execution application and ultimately, the present special Civil Application and looking to the totality of the circumstances, he deserves an order, so that he may avail the benefits of the decree which was passed in his favour. It is the argument of Mr. Shaikh that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been negligent and whatever steps were possible, were taken with atmost expedition. ( 7 ) IT has been submitted by Mr. Shaikh for the petitioner that the allegation against him was that he had received the amount of fare of 50 Ps. Shaikh that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the petitioner has been negligent and whatever steps were possible, were taken with atmost expedition. ( 7 ) IT has been submitted by Mr. Shaikh for the petitioner that the allegation against him was that he had received the amount of fare of 50 Ps. each from three passengers, who got into the bus from village Muli and who had to go to dhrangadhra, but did not give tickets to them upto the checking point and, therefore, on 27-11-1968, while he was discharging duties as a conductor (posted at Morbi depot), the checking party while checking the bus at the Dhrangadhra bus station, seized three unpunched tickets from the tray of the petitioner and on checking the cash, found that an amount of Rs. 1. 50 Ps. was short. It was for this charge that the petitioner was subjected to inquiry by the Corporation under Rules 7 and 12a of the Scheduled A of Discipline and Appeal Procedure for Gujarat State Road Transport corporation Employees Rules and the petitioner was dismissed vide order dated 6- 11-1968. It is this dismissal order 6-11-1968 which was held to be illegal, void and ineffective by the trial Court and the petitioners claim of salary for the period on and from 6-11-1968 to 31-5-1971 was granted by the trial Court and in consequence of this order and decree dated 18th August 1972, which was restored by the High court, the petitioner was entitled to the reliefs accordingly. He was entitled to reinstatement and other reliefs prayed by him as a natural consequence of the Civil courts order in his favour. It has also been pointed out by Mr. Shaikh that in the execution proceedings, the order was passed for attachment of the buses of the corporation and Revision Application which was filed by the Corporation before the High Court was against the order of attachment, while according to him, the execution proceedings were pending. It has also been pointed out by Mr. Shaikh that in the execution proceedings, the order was passed for attachment of the buses of the corporation and Revision Application which was filed by the Corporation before the High Court was against the order of attachment, while according to him, the execution proceedings were pending. He has submitted that in the order dated 1-7- 1994 passed in Revision Application No. 481 of 1994 also, it has been mentioned at the very outset in para 2 that the Corporation had preferred this Revision application being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Civil Judge (S. D.), rajkot in Execution Application No. 228 of 1993 on 6th April, 1994 attaching the properties, namely, two buses of the Corporation. He has submitted that his claim may be considered in the backdrop of facts and circumstances as aforesaid and the mere fact that in the Revision Application filed by the Corporation, against the order of attachment, the proceedings pending in the Execution Case have been quashed, should not come in his way for getting appropriate reliefs, more particularly when the Court, while deciding the Revision Application has observed that :"the opponent has preferred Special Civil Application No. 10631 of 1993 wherein he has taken all these contentions. Since the matter is pending before the Court, this Court would not like to address on the merits of the petition. ( 8 ) I have considered the submissions made on behalf of both the sides. The main question which is to be decided in this case is as to whether in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, is it open for the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for the purpose of the fruits of the decree in his favour, when he has already failed before this Court in the execution proceedings on the ground of limitation ? It appears from the facts of this case that the petitioner has been a victim of circumstances inasmuch as he did not come to known the decision of the High Court in the Second Appeal which was in his favour so as to restore the decree. It appears from the facts of this case that the petitioner has been a victim of circumstances inasmuch as he did not come to known the decision of the High Court in the Second Appeal which was in his favour so as to restore the decree. It is unbelievable that if a person comes to know of a decision in his favour, he would not take immediate steps to avail the fruits of that decision and, therefore, I am inclined to accept the submissions of Mr. Shaikh that he came to know about the decision of the High Court in Second appeal in April, 1992 and there is ample material on record to show that once the matter came to his knowledge, he made all possible efforts by way of giving notice to the Corporation, by way of filing contempt application before the Division Bench, by filing Execution Application and by filing the present Special Civil Application, but the question still remains that should the petitioner be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India ? In this context, i was reminded of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 , in the case of Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat. It was a case in which a decree had been passed for possession of two out four rooms and proportionate reduction of the rent was directed. Both the parties filed appeals in the Court of the District Judge. The decree was affirmed as the order of the trial Court was an equitable one. The respondent preferred a petition for revision under Sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code before the High Court and the learned single Judge who heard the petition dismissed it as he was not satisfied that the appellate Court had acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The respondent, then moved a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the said order of the appellate Court and following a decision of a Full Bench in K. B. Sipahimarani v. Fidahussain Valibhai, reported in 1956 (58) BLR 344, the Division Bench which heard the writ petition held that inspite of the dismissal of the petition by the learned single Judge, there could be interference under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution on an appropriate case being made out. The Bombay High Court in K. B. Sipahimaranis case (supra) made a distinction between appellate jurisdiction and Revisional jurisdiction as the right of Appeal is a vested right and an Appeal is a continuation or re-hearing of the suit, while the Revision, however, is not continuation or re-hearing of the suit nor is it obligatory, upon the revisional Court to interfere with the order even though the order may be improper or illegal and that if the revisional Court interferes, the order of the lower Court does not merge in the order passed by the revisional Court, but it simply sets aside or modifies the order of the lower Court and the Supreme court itself has observed in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankars case (supra) that it was this argument which mainly weighed with the Bombay High Court. The supreme Court considered the question that if revisional jurisdiction is invoked, both the parties are re-heard and an order is made. The question is whether the order of the subordinate Court has become merged in the order of the High Court and if it has got merged in the order of the High Court, the order of the subordinate court cannot be challenged or attacked by any other suit or proceedings in the High court, namely, by means of a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution; it is only if by dismissal of the Revision petition the order of the subordinate Court has not become merged in that of the High Court, that it may be open to the party to invoke extraordinary writ jurisdiction of that Court and there again, a question will arise, whether it would be right and appropriate for the High Court to interfere with the order of the subordinate Court in the writ petition when a petition for revision under Sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code against the same order had been dismissed. The Supreme Court also considered the principle of merger, as was considered in the case of U. J. S. Chopra v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1955 SC 633 ) with reference to Sec. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code which confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. The Supreme Court also considered the principle of merger, as was considered in the case of U. J. S. Chopra v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1955 SC 633 ) with reference to Sec. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code which confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. It has been observed by the Supreme Court in para 7 in the case of Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar (supra) as under :"in U. J. S. Chopra v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 633 the principle of merger was considered with reference to Sec. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code which confers revisional jurisdiction on the High Court. In the majority judgment it was held, inter alia, that a judgment pronounced by the High Court in the exercise of its appellate or revisional jurisdiction after issue of a notice and a full hearing, in the presence of both the parties would replace the judgment of the lower Court thus constituting the judgment of the High Court the only final judgment to be executed in accordance with law by the Court below. In Chandi Prasad Chokhani v. State of bihar, 1962 (2) SCR 276 : ( AIR 1961 SC 1708 ) it was said that save in exceptional and special circumstances this Court would not exercise its power under Art. 136 in such a way as to by-pass the High Court and ignore the latters decision which had become final and binding by entertaining an appeal directly from orders of a tribunal. Such exercise of power would be particularly inadvisable in a case where the result might lead to a conflict of decisions of two Courts of competent jurisdiction. "it has been held in the case of Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar (supra) in paras 6 and 8 as under :"6. Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. We do not, therefore, consider that the principle of merger of orders of inferior Courts in those of superior Courts would be affected or would become inapplicable by making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal. ""8. Even on the assumption that the order of the appellate Court had not merged in the order of the single Judge who had disposed of the revision petition we are of the view that a writ petition ought not to have been entertained by the High Court when the respondent had already chosen the remedy under Sec. 115 of the Code of civil Procedure. If there are two modes of invoking the jurisdiction of the High court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate Court. The refusal to grant relief in such circumstances would be in consonance with the anxiety of the Court to prevent abuse of process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions. " ( 9 ) IT is, therefore, absolutely clear that in the case of Shankar Ramchandra abhyankar v. Krishanji (supra) before the Supreme Court, the order passed by the first appellate Court was challenged in Revision application and the Revision petition was dismissed and, thereafter, against the very same order of the first appellate Court, the writ petition was filed under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution and the supreme Court considered the question of merger and held that if there are two modes of invoking jurisdiction of the High Court and one of those modes has been chosen and exhausted, it would not be a proper and sound exercise of discretion to grant relief in the other set of proceedings in respect of the same order of the subordinate Court and the refusal to grant relief in such circumstances, would be in consonance with the anxiety of the Court to prevent abuse of the process as also to respect and accord finality to its own decisions. In my considered opinion, in the case at hand, the position is entirely different. Here is a case in which the petitioner sought the execution of the decree and while the executing Court passed an order of attachment and the Corporation came in Revision against the order of attachment, the proceedings pending before Civil Court in execution have been quashed by the high Court in its revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, in the present petition under arts. 226 and 227, the petitioner has not challenged any order whatsoever. On the contrary, he has come with a prayer to get relief in accordance with Civil Courts decree in his favour which he has failed to get executed on account of lapse of time. Thus, there is no challenge to any order before me in this petition, unlike the case was before the Supreme Court in which the order of the first appellate Court was challenged in the revision before the High Court and having failed in that revision, the party challenged the same order of the first appellate Court by way of filing a writ petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter, there is no question of merger of the orders before me nor there is a case of conflict of decisions as it was in the case before the Supreme Court inasmuch as the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction did not interfere with the order of the first appellate Court, whereas the same order of the first appellate Court being under challenge in the petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, there could be a conflict of decisions. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, there could be a conflict of decisions. In the case at hand, the Bench which decided the Revision has itself mentioned in its order dated 1st July, 1994 that the Special Civil Application is pending and the Court, therefore, did not like to address on the merits of the petition and, therefore, it is obvious that there is no question of any conflict of decisions in this case. When there is no question of merger and there is no apprehension of any conflict of decisions and no order of any Court is under challenge before me, even if the petitioner has failed to get the decree executed on account of lapse of time, in the remedy which was available to him, under common law, in my considered opinion, it will be no abuse of process of the court if this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 is entertained, rather it would serve the ends of justice and would seek to fortify the faith reposed in the judiciary which the people of India cherish the most. The remedy under common law for execution of a decree is, in my opinion, an ordinary remedy available under common law. The remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is in its very nature an extraordinary remedy meant to reach the injustice wherever it is happening. In my opinion, no exception can be taken if petition under Arts. 226 and 227 is entertained at the instance of the petitioner who has been moving from pillar to post despite holding a valid decree of the Court in his favour, who himself has been a victim of circumstances at the hands of those who are part and parcel of the legal system and thus, in my opinion, it would be unjust to deny the right of audience to the holder of a decree and it would be a sound exercise of discretion under extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court to protect the rights of the petitioner, if he has not been able to get the relief, if the doors of ordinary remedy have been closed on him because of the lapse of time and the objection of limitation for reasons which were beyond his control and comprehension, for reasons which could not be attributed to him. Therefore, even if the petitioner has lost, the remedy of execution of decree, on account of lapse of time, this by itself does not extinguish the decree as such and, therefore, the petitioners legal right under the decree still survive and it does not extinct. If he has any legal right under a valid decree of the Court and having failed in the matter of execution of that decree, if he seeks the protection of that legal right, through extraordinary remedy under Arts. 226 and 227 of the constitution, no exception can be taken, rather, it would serve the ends of justice, if such a right of the petitioner is given a protection under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court itself while dealing with the scope Art. 226 in the case of Dwarka nath v. I. T. Officer, reported in AIR 1966 SC 81 has observed as under : "this Article is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found. The constitution designedly used a wider language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can be exercised. It can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in england; but the scope of those writs also is widened by the use of the expression "nature", for the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in india with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. That apart, high Courts can also issue directions, orders or writs other than the prerogative writs. It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution with that of the English courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the Article itself. " the facts of this case make it transparently clear that this Special Civil Application under Arts. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the Article itself. " the facts of this case make it transparently clear that this Special Civil Application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution has been filed in very unusual circumstances and it is to be agreed on all hands that the petitioner has already remained deprived of the fruits of the decree for a very little, rather negligible fault, which too cannot be directly attributed to him and even the Division Bench of this court, while deciding the contempt application filed by the petitioner has observed that, "about 12 years have passed and still the petitioner has not got the fruits of the decree passed by the trial Court and in that view of the matter, it was expected that the respondents would do the needful in the matter. " It is unfortunate that even such a pious expectation expressed by the Division Bench of this Court hopefully addressed to the respondent-Corporation did not give any result in favour of the petitioner. It was an expectation addressed not to any private individual but to Gujarat state Road Transport Corporation, which is an agency and instrumentality of the state and I am simply bemooned that the Corporation has only shown a scant respect to such an expectation expressed by the Division Bench of the Highest Court of the state. According to the concept of trinity, as has been given out by the Supreme court, the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary are the three wings of the State comparable with Gods, viz. , Brahma, Vishnu and Mahesh but there is a lack of co-ordination in the three wings of the State, which is not supposed to be there. If any decree is passed by the Civil Court against any agency or instrumentality of the State, such agency or instrumentality may seek its legal remedy to challenge the same; but once such challenge is thrown before the Highest Court and is not sustained and decree attains finality, such agencies and instrumentalities should readily come forward to honour and implement the decree or order passed by the Court. It is a dismal fact in this case that even after the expectation of the Division Bench of this Court hopefully addressed to the Corporation, the functionaries of the Corporation did not take care to see that whatever was due to the petitioner under the decree is available to him. In this context, I may straightway refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India, reported in 1974 (1) SLR 1, in which Krishna Iyer, J. as he then was, in his concurring judgment in para 24 has quoted a portion of Kerala High Courts decision as under :"the State, under our Constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook; for the States interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an opportunity. The state is a virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits the case is weak, Government shows a willingness to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations which move private parties to fight in Court. The lay-out on litigation costs and executive time by the state and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large amount of litigation in which it is involved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin method of not being tempted into forensic show-downs where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957. This second appeal strikes me as an instance of disregard of that policy. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957. This second appeal strikes me as an instance of disregard of that policy. " ( 10 ) THERE is no doubt that Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the State and a distinction has to be made in the manner in which private individual takes a decision of the Court and the manner in which any agency or instrumentality of the State is supposed to take it up. Thus, honest and just claims of the citizens are not to be discarded by the State or its agencies and instrumentalities on technical or hypertechnical ground so as to defeat the rights of its own employees. Notwithstanding the question of increasing litigation against the State and other like petitions, if at all we mean the rule of law and expect any sense of respect for the orders passed by the Court, the rights of the citizens should not be allowed to be rendered defeasible at the hands of the welfare state and its agencies and instrumentalities. It is certainly a case which has given rise to a new type of problem calling for a new solution so as to give protection to the petitioner against undue advantage taken by the Corporation against its own employee which has rendered the fruits of the decree to be futile on a jejune ground and, therefore, the whole matter has to be examined with a new orientation and neo-functional approach. In the case of A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1970 SC 1 50, the Supreme Court has observed as under : "to prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers. In matter like these public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. "in my considered opinion, it is a case in which it will be appropriate to entertain this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution in order to prevent miscarriage of justice. In matter like these public good is not advanced by a rigid adherence to precedents. New problems call for new solutions. "in my considered opinion, it is a case in which it will be appropriate to entertain this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution in order to prevent miscarriage of justice. ( 11 ) SO far as the merits of the case are concerned, it is the common case of the parties that the petitioner holds a decree in his favour against the respondent- corporation and the order of the petitioners dismissal has been held to be illegal and void and ineffective and an amount of Rs. 5,376. 00 has been awarded to the petitioner against his claim of salary for the period on and from 6th November, 1968 to 31st May, 1971 and, therefore, the fruits of this decree deserve to be taken to its logical end. So far as the question of relief to be given to the petitioner is concerned, it needs to be considered with reference to each spell of time as under :1. 6-11-1968 to 31-5-1971- period for which petitioner has claimed Rs. 5,376. 2. 1-6-1971 to 24-4-1980 - the period during which the matter remained subjudice before the trial Court, first appellate Court and the High Court in second appeal. 3. 25-4-1980 to 10-11-1992 - the date after the decision of the Second appeal till the date, when the petitioner first came to know about the decision of the High Court in his favour in the Second Appeal. 4. 11-11-1992 to 8-10-1993 - the period during which the petitioner gave notice to the Corporation, filed contempt application and filed execution application and ultimately present Special Civil Application under Art. 226. ( 12 ) SO far as the first period from 6-11-1968 to 31-5-1971 is concerned, the petitioner has been held to be entitled to Rs. 5,376. 00 by the trial Court. For the period from 1-6-1971 to 24-4-1980, the matter has remained sub-judice before the courts at different stages and it was also pointed out by the learned Counsel for the Corporation Mr. Munshaw that there was a stay order in favour of the Corporation during the pendency of the appeal and that the petitioner had not done any work during this period. Munshaw that there was a stay order in favour of the Corporation during the pendency of the appeal and that the petitioner had not done any work during this period. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the decree passed in favour of the petitioner attained finality only on 24-4-1980 and prior to that, both the sides were contesting and the matter was sub-judice. It is also a fact that during this period, the petitioner did not render any service to the Corporation and during the pendency of the first appeal filed by the Corporation, there was a stay order in favour of the Corporation. Looking to all these facts, when the Corporation was pursuing its legal remedy against the decree and the petitioner did not do any work, I do not feel inclined to give direction for the payment of any wages to the petitioner for the period when the matter remained sub-judice before the Courts and the decree passed by the Civil Court attained finality by the order passed by the High Court in Second Appeal filed by the petitioner. ( 13 ) SO far as the period beyond 24-4-1980 to 10-11-1992 and thereafter till the date of filing this Special Civil Application, that is, 8th October, 1993, is concerned, the learned Counsel for the petitioner himself has made a candid statement that he does not press his claim for wages for this period. So far as the question of relief of reinstatement is concerned and the wages for the period beyond 8th October, 1993 till the date on which the petitioner is taken back, I find that the dismissal order has been held to be illegal, void and ineffective by the Court and, therefore, the petitioner deserves to be taken back in service and he is also held to be entitled to the wages for the period from 8th October, 1993 till the date of filing of the present Special Civil Application and till the date he is taken in service. ( 14 ) THE up shot of the aforesaid discussion is that this Special Civil Application succeeds in part and a writ is issued against the respondent-Corporation to take the petitioner back in service with continuity of service as if dismissal order had never been passed against him except for the wages for the period prior to 8th October, 1993 and to pay him a sum of Rs. 5,376. 00 as per the decree and to pay him the wages for the period beyond 8th October 1993 after fixing his pay notionally as if he had continued in service throughout till the date he is taken back in service. The directions as aforesaid for the purpose of taking him back in service shall be carried out within a period of one month from the date the certified copy of the judgment is made available to the concerned authority of the Corporation and within yet another month thereafter, the wages for the period beyond 8th October, 1993 shall be paid after notionally fixing the petitioners salary as directed above. This petition is accordingly allowed and the rule is made absolute in terms indicated above. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. .