Judgment : This writ petition under Article 226 is directed against the notice dated the 29th June, 1993 by which the Doordarshan Authorities of the Calcutta Doordarshan Kendra communicated their decision to discontinue the telecast of the petitioner's sponsored programme 'Madhuri' with immediate effect. The Doordarshan Kendra, Calcutta introduced an entertainment programme under the caption Madhuri in Channel-I every Friday for a duration of 50 minutes from 6-25 p.m. with effect from 1st January, 1993. Initially that was an 'in house' programme of Bengali film songs. Seeing the popularity of the said programme Calcutta Doordarshan subsequently decided to offer the said programme to be sponsored by outside producer keeping the structure of the programme intact as per the guidelines of Doordarshan and to earn more revenue through the said programme. 2. By a letter dated the 17th April, 1993 the writ petitioner offered to produce Madhuri as a sponsored programme and assured that the programme produced by them would be of very high quality and would certainly enhance the existing popularity of Madhuri (vide, annexure-A to the affidavit-in-opposition). It was also mentioned in their letter that to prove their capabilities the petitioner was ready to produce an episode for preview of the Doordarshan Authorities. It is the case of the respondents that one of the main criteria for accepting offer of any sponsored programme is the technical quality of production and the manner in which it has been presented for telecast and that in the sponsored programme an outside producer is entitled to avail of a fixed 'free commercial time as permitted under the Doordarshan guidelines. The Doordarshan Kendra, Calcutta by its letter dated the 21st April, 1993, annexure-B to the A. O., informed the petitioner. in response to her proposal for producing Madhuri as a sponsored programme that the said proposal was acceptable to Doordarshan, subject to submission of pilot episode for consideration/preview of the Doordarshan Authorities. It was further mentioned in the said letter that if the pilot was found acceptable/suitable for telecast the petitioner would be allotted 10 slots at a time and that for each sponsored Madhuri programme the petitioner would have to pay Doordarshan, Calcutta Rs. 20,000/- as telecast fee. The petitioner was also requested to meet the Director, Doordarshan Kendra, Calcutta for detailed discussion. 20,000/- as telecast fee. The petitioner was also requested to meet the Director, Doordarshan Kendra, Calcutta for detailed discussion. It is the contention of the respondents that the pilot submitted by the petitioner was previewed by the Preview Committee, Doordarshan Kendra, Calcutta and then the Doordarshan Authorities wrote a letter dated the 14th May, 1993 to the petitioner, annexure-C to the A. O., that the petitioner might avail of the telecast time on Fridays at 6-25 p.m. with effect from 21st May, 1993 and this time slot allotment was for 10 weeks, i.e., 10 episodes with the telecast frequency of one episode per week and that the telecast fee was Rs. 20,000/- per episode. It was however mentioned therein that this time slot allotment was subject to certain terms and conditions mentioned therein which may briefly be stated thus:- (1) The technical quality, particularly that of film sequences and songs used should be good/telecastworthy for which it was required that the transfer to video should be properly done through telecine. The technical quality of the film song portion in the pilot episode was not quite satisfactory and required improvement. (2) The contractual formalities were required to be completed within 18th May noon. (3) All programme material including full scripts of all episodes and the completed cassettes for 4 episodes were required to be submitted within 18th May noon and no extension in episodes or the time span given for completion of contractual and other formalities was admissible under any circumstance. The petitioner was asked to confirm acceptance per bearer. 3. It is the contention of the respondents that the writ petitioner assured the Authorities of Calcutta Doordarshan that the quality of the said sponsored programme would be improved so that the same might betelecastworthy, but inspite of repeated complaints the petitioner failed and neglected to improve their programme and make it good and telecastworthy even upto the 5th episode. 3. It is the contention of the respondents that the writ petitioner assured the Authorities of Calcutta Doordarshan that the quality of the said sponsored programme would be improved so that the same might betelecastworthy, but inspite of repeated complaints the petitioner failed and neglected to improve their programme and make it good and telecastworthy even upto the 5th episode. It may be noted here that in reply to the said letter of Doordarshan dated the 14th May, 1993 the petitioner addressed to Doordarshan a letter dated the 18th May, 1993, annexure-B to the writ petition, wherein it was stated inter alia, that as the petitioner was taking the slot at a short notice they were unable to shoot the balance 3 episodes and that they would be however maintaining 2 episode deposit for the first month and requested for permission in that respect. With their letter dated the 26th May, 1993, annexure-C to the writ petition, the petitioner submitted the cassette containing the 2nd episode with an assurance that all the amendments as adviced by Doordarshan had been made to the satisfaction of the latter. Annexure D to the A. O. is a letter from Doordarshan to the petitioner dated the 27th May, 1993 wherein it was stated that Madhuri episode-2 scheduled for telecast on 28th May, 1993 had been previewed and it was found that the Audio and Video quality was not upto the mark and there was much more scope of improvement 'as more or less picture seemed to be de-focussed and audio muffled' and in some of the songs there was loss of frames which, in turn, was affecting songs. Certain other defects and undesirable aspects found ill the episode-2 were also mentioned in the said letter. In order to avoid repetition of songs the petitioner was asked to submit henceforward list of songs of every episode of the programme. It was 'once again emphasized that a lot need to be done to improve upon the quality of both audio and video in the interest of viewers'. 4. In order to avoid repetition of songs the petitioner was asked to submit henceforward list of songs of every episode of the programme. It was 'once again emphasized that a lot need to be done to improve upon the quality of both audio and video in the interest of viewers'. 4. By their letter dated the 27th May, 1993, annexure-E to the writ petition, the petitioner informed Doordarshan that they would like to change a few songs from the 3rd and the 4th episodes and requested Doordarshan to give them the original U-Matics containing those episodes and assured that the same would be returned by the 31st May, The Doordarshan Authorities, by their letter dated the 29th May, 1993, annexure-F to the writ petition, informed the petitioner that they had previewed the episodes 3 and 4 and noted down certain points regarding the said 2 episodes in respect of which rectification was considered necessary. The petitioner was accordingly asked to recast the said 2 episodes before telecast. The Doordarshan Authorities also expressed their opinion in the said letter that if the petitioner did not dub through telecine the production would not improve at all to make it telecastworthy and that it was essential to transfer the film songs through telecine. In that connection it was also offered to the petitioner by Doordarshan that if the petitioner found difficulty in securing telecine facilities, the petitioner could approach the Engineering Authority to allow them to use the telcine of Doordarshan Kendra against payment of requisite hiring charges for the same. The petitioner was further informed by that letter that from 3rd episode onward the petitioner would have to increase spot-buy upto 120 seconds episode wise and the rate of such spot-buy would be Rs. 15,000/- per 10 seconds. The petitioner was reminded that there should not be any compromise on the quality of the programme. 5. With their letter dated the 31st May, 1993 the petitioner submitted the U-Matic containing episode-3 after making necessary correction and also requested for getting back the U-Matic of episode-4 which was lying with Doordarshan. It was also mentioned in the said letter that episode-5 was already lying with Doordarshan (vide, annexure-G to the writ petition). 5. With their letter dated the 31st May, 1993 the petitioner submitted the U-Matic containing episode-3 after making necessary correction and also requested for getting back the U-Matic of episode-4 which was lying with Doordarshan. It was also mentioned in the said letter that episode-5 was already lying with Doordarshan (vide, annexure-G to the writ petition). With their letter dated the 4th June, 1993 which is also a part of annexure-G to the writ petition the petitioner submitted the U-Matic containing the 6th episode together with the list of songs used in the said episode. Again with their letter dated the 14th June, 1993 which is also a part or annexure-G to the writ petition the petitioner submitted the U-Matics containing episodes 6 and 7 together with the list of songs used therein with a recital that the episode-5 was already lying with Doordarshan, it was also assured in the said letter by the petitioner that they would deposit the episode-4 by 12 noon of the next day after making necessary corrections. In their letter dated the 17th June, 1993 which is a part of annexure-D to the A. O. and addressed to M/s. Tara Sinha McCann-Erickson Pvt. Ltd. (releasing agent) the Doordarshan Authorities regretted that inspite of repeated pursuance and request the producer of the programme, M/s. Jonaky Video Production (the petitioner's concern) was not furnishing the programmes which were of good telecastworthy quality. It was mentioned therein, in particular, that the 4th episode scheduled for 18th June, 1993 had been received at the Doordarshan end only in the afternoon of 16th June, 1993 and the same, on preview, was found to be of very poor quality and hence not fit to be telecast even with considerable compromise on quality. The Doordarshan Authorities also made a grievance that the producer was not keeping the immediate bank of complete episodes and moreover by reason of furnishing incomplete cassettes without proper labelling, tape details, commercial dope sheets, extreme confusion and difficulties were caused in the matter of smooth telecast of the sponsored programme. In that letter the Doordarsban Authorities requested the releasing agent to do the needful immediately for necessary rectification and submission of the programme cassettes after due checking. There was further request therein for furnishing the programme contracts on monthly basis to enable smooth telecast of the subsequent episodes and for treating the matter as priority. 6. In that letter the Doordarsban Authorities requested the releasing agent to do the needful immediately for necessary rectification and submission of the programme cassettes after due checking. There was further request therein for furnishing the programme contracts on monthly basis to enable smooth telecast of the subsequent episodes and for treating the matter as priority. 6. Then by their impugned letter dated the 29th June, 1993 which is annexure-H to the writ petition the Doordarshau Authorities, on making reference to their earlier letters dated the 27th May, 1993, 29th May, 1993 and 17th June, 1993, informed the petitioner that since the petitioner had failed to comply with the express communication of Doordarshan, repeated cautions and suggestions to improve the programme quality so that it could reach the standard of being good and telecastworthy, they had no other option but to discontinue the telecast of the petitioner's sponsored programme Madhuri with immediate effect. The cassettes of the remaining episodes, being episodes 6, 7 and 8 submitted by the petitioner, were also returned with the said letter. The petitioner being aggrieved by that letter of Doordarshan, has approached this Court in its writ jurisdiction for redress. It may be mentioned here that before approaching this Court the petitioner also addressed two letters dated the 2nd July, 1993 and the 7th July, 1993 to the Director, Calcutta Doordarshan which are annexures I and J to the writ petition, As the same did not yield the desired result the petitioner has approached this Court in its writ jurisdiction, It may be noted here that the 1st episode of the petitioner's sponsored programme Madhuri was telecast on 21st May, 1991, the second on 28th May, 1993, the third on 11th June, 1993, the fourth on 18th June, 1993 and the fifth on 15th June, 1993 and thereafter the telecast was discontinued as communicated by Doordarshan to the petitioner by their impugned letter dated the 29th June, 1993. 7. It is the contention of the petitioner that the action of the Doordarshan Authorities in cancelling the agreement and in discontinuing the telecast of the remaining episodes being episodes Nos. 6 to 10 is malafide, unjustified, arbitrary, without authority, capricious and contrary to all norms and practices and is invalid, being in excess of authority. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the Doordarshan Authorities have failed to consider that more than Rs. 6 to 10 is malafide, unjustified, arbitrary, without authority, capricious and contrary to all norms and practices and is invalid, being in excess of authority. It is also the contention of the petitioner that the Doordarshan Authorities have failed to consider that more than Rs. 8 lakhs wert invested by the petitioner in the said remaining episodes and the action of the Doordarshan Authorities in arbitrarily discontinuing telecast of those episodes would put the petitioner to great financial loss as well as loss of faith to the sponsors. It may be mentioned here that on receipt of the impugned letter of Doordarshan dated the 29th June, 1993 the petitioner on 2nd July, 1993 addressed a letter to the Director, Calcutta Doordarshan which is annexure-I to the writ application stating therein inter alia as to how the petitioner had to complete the episodes in a short time and therefore there might have been some shortcomings in the programme. It was further stated therein that the petitioner had been maintaining a close contact with the Doordarshan and had rectified or changed the required portions as and when called upon to do so and had all along taken well known personalities to compere the programme and had ensured that the quality of the programme was kept uniform. In chat letter the Director. Calcutta Doordarshan was requested to preview all the episodes for being convinced that the petitioner's contention was not wrong However in that letter the petitioner stated that they were further willing to fully cooperate with Doordarshan and were prepared to carry out all the required changes in the episodes and also sought for advice about the required changes with an assurance that such changes would be appropriately carried out to the satisfaction of Doordarshan. The petitioner also requested the Director, Doordarshan to re-consider their decision to discontinue the telecast of the remaining episodes. The said letter was followed by another letter of the petitioner dated the 7th July, 1993. The petitioner also requested the Director, Doordarshan to re-consider their decision to discontinue the telecast of the remaining episodes. The said letter was followed by another letter of the petitioner dated the 7th July, 1993. In that letter it was stated inter alia that the main complaint that Doordarshan had against their program me was regarding poor telecine quality and the petitioner assured that they were prepared to get the songs telecined at Doordarshan itself as had been earlier offered to them and the necessary costs in that regard would be paid by the petitioner to Doordarshan, in that letter also it was reiterated by the petitioner that they had invested huge amount of money in the remaining episodes and they would be put to total loss if their case was not sympathetically considered. 8. It is the case of the respondents that the arrangement by which the petitioner was offered to telecast the sponsored programme in 10 episodes was terminable according to the guidelines governing Doordarshan's sponsored/time slot programmes and that the Director of Doordarshan Kendra had the exclusive power to cancel any programme if according to him such programme was not good and telecastworthy. It is the further contention of the respondents that the relief sought for by the writ petitioner is virtually enforcement or specific performance of contract or arrangement which is not permissible on a writ petition. It is also the specific case of the respondents that the episodes of the petitioner's programme were found not upto the mark and inspite of repeated opportunity given to the petitioner as well as assurance given by the petitioner to improve the quality of the programme the petitioner's programme continued to deteriorate day by day in technical quality and ultimately the respondents were constrained to discontinue the telecast of the sponsored programme in the interest of millions of viewers as well as in the interest of Doordarshan. According to the respondents even the Programme Advisory Committee, the highest level advisory body of the Doordarshan Kendra comprising of eminent non-official persons from different fields strongly criticised the sponsored programme, particularly the script, narration and its presentation part and that in the trans mission reports evaluating and reviewing daily programmes telecast by the Kendra, the Officer-in-Charge adversely criticised the programme. It is the further case of the respondents that contract forms were signed only upto the 5th episode of the programme and no contract was signed for the subsequent episodes and therefore there was no question of cancellation of contract for the discontinued episodes. The respondents canvass that the writ petition is not maintainable at all as it seeks to challenge an administrative decision taken in exercise of the power or the Doordarshan Authorities. 9. As we have seen, after previewing the pilot submitted by the petitioner the Doordarshan Authorities by their letter dated the 14th May, 1993 granted time slot allotment in favour of the petitioner for telecasting 10 episodes of their. sponsored programme Madhuri to be composed of Bengali film songs on each Friday at 6-25 p.m. with effect from 21st May, 1993 subject to certain conditions mentioned therein including the condition that the technical quality, particularly that of film sequences and songs used should be good and telecastworthy and completion of contractual formalities etc. By that letter the petitioner was also asked to submit programme material including full scripts of all episodes, and the completed cassettes for 4 episodes within certain date mentioned therein. It is the contention of the respondents that formal contract was executed only in respect of the five episodes which had been telecast and there was no formal contract for the remaining five episodes. There has been a sharp controversy between the parties on the point whether the petitioner can seek relief from a writ court in a matter like this. It is the contention of the respondents that the petitioner is in fact trying to enforce specific performance of contract which cannot be done by a writ petition. It is the further contention of the respondents that if the petitioner seeks to base his case on aplea of violation or breach of a concluded contract, in that case also a writ petition is not maintainable and the petitioner will have to seek relief in a civil suit in appropriate court. The petitioner's contention is that the Doordarshan Authorities have acted in a grossly arbitrary manner in discontinuing the telecast of the remaining five episodes of the sponsored programme Madhuri and have acted in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that itself is a sufficient reason why the petitioner is entitled to seek relief under Article 226. 10. 10. In formulating the argument as to whether a writ petition is at all maintainable for relief against any alleged violation or breach of contract each side has relied upon a number of judicial pronouncements. The learned Advocate for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (1) Harshankar v. Dy. E & T Cammr., AIR 1975 SC 1121 in support of his argument that a writ petition is not an appropriate remedy in respect of any contractual matter. In that case there was a concluded contract and the Supreme Court found that the writ petitioners displayed ingenuity in their search for invalidating circumstance and held that a writ petition was not an appropriate remedy for impeaching contractual obligations. The ratio of that decision seems to be that the person who had entered into a contract cannot avoid his contractual obligation by a writ petition. The facts of our present case are however totally different and here the petitioner is not claiming any relief to wriggle out of his contractual obligation. In the said case the petitioner inter alia took a plea that the action of the respondents infringed upon his fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants but the Supreme Court did not find the plea tenable in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and held that there was no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. In (2) S. Narayan Iyer v. Union of India, 1976(3) SCC 428 the writ petitioner challenged the telephone rates and charges and prayed for a direction upon the telephone authorities to forbear from enforcing the revised telephone tariff as per the Indian Telegraph Amendment Rules, 1966 under which the rental and call charges were increased. The Supreme Court in disallowing relief to the petitioner observed that the courts had no jurisdiction under Article 226 to go into the reasonableness of rates which are decided as policy matter in fiscal planning and there is legislative prescription of rates and that rates are a matter of legislative judgment and not for judicial determination. The Supreme Court in disallowing relief to the petitioner observed that the courts had no jurisdiction under Article 226 to go into the reasonableness of rates which are decided as policy matter in fiscal planning and there is legislative prescription of rates and that rates are a matter of legislative judgment and not for judicial determination. The Supreme Court observed also that the subscriber to a telephone enters into a contract with the State and he has the option to enter into the contract or not, but if he does so he has to pay the rates which are charged by the State for installation and he cannot say that the rates are not fair. It was also noticed by the Supreme Court that section 7 of the Indian Telegraph Act empowers the Central Government to make rules inter alia for rates and these rules are laid before each House of Parliament and the rules take effect when they are passed by the Parliament and that the question of rates is first gone into by the Tariff Enquiry Committee which is headed by non-officials and the tariff rates are placed before the House in the shape of budget proposals and the Parliament goes into the budget proposals and the rates are sanctioned by the Parliament which thus , become a legislative policy as well as a legislative process. In view of these circumstances the Supreme Court refused to enter into the question, on the basis of writ petition, as to whether the telephone rates were fair or not. It is needless to mention that the facts of that decision are totally different from the facts involved in the present case and the ratio of that decision has no application to the present case. 11. In (3) State Bank of Haryana v. Jage Ram, 1980(3) SCC 599 the writ petitioner offered bid in auction of retail vend of country spirits. His bid was accepted and he was granted licence on certain terms and conditions. There was provision for payment of charge by the licensee in equal instalments. On default in payment of two instalments the State cancelled his licence after allowing him to show cause and then re-auctioned the vend and proceeded to recover the resulting loss from the defaulter licensee. The licensee filed a writ petition before the High Court and the matter was ultimately taken to the Supreme Court. On default in payment of two instalments the State cancelled his licence after allowing him to show cause and then re-auctioned the vend and proceeded to recover the resulting loss from the defaulter licensee. The licensee filed a writ petition before the High Court and the matter was ultimately taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that the writ petitioner entered into a contract with the State authorities with the full knowledge of conditions which they had to carry out in the conduct of their business, on which they had willingly and voluntarily embarked and that the occurrence of a commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in the r performance of those conditions, like the sale of liquor being less in summer than in winter, can provide no justification for not complying with the terms of the contract which they had accepted with open eyes and that the writ petitioners could not therefore invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court to avoid the contractual obligations incurred by them voluntarily. The said decision has also no application to our present case inasmuch as here the petitioner has not come forward for any relief to avoid contractual obligations. On the other hand, in the present case the grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents have arbitrarily withdrawn the arrangement or contract, whatever may it be. In (4) Divisional Forest Officer v. Biswanath Tea Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 SC 1368 the petitioner filed a writ petition to enforce an alleged right to remove timber without the liability to pay royalty. The matter depended upon the question as to whether the petitioner was entitled to cut and fell timber from the grant area for its use elsewhere outside the grant area. Obviously the question of interpretation of the terms of the contract or grant and obviously any claim for relief in a writ petition which is dependent on the interpretation of such contractual terms is not entertainable by the writ court for remedying a Violation of mere contractual obligation. The present writ petition however does not project any case of such nature. 12. The present writ petition however does not project any case of such nature. 12. In (5) Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajoy Pal Singh, AIR 1989 SC 1076 , the said Authority, BDA undertook the construction of dwelling units for people belonging to different income groups and issued advertisement offering to register names of intending applicants desirous of purchasing dwelling houses/flats in anyone of the different income groups intended to be constructed by it. A brochure was issued by BDA to the intending purchasers containing general terms and estimated costs of dwelling houses. The note given in the brochure clearly stated that the cost shown therein was only estimated cost and it would increase or decrease according to the rise or fall in the price at the time of completion of the houses/flats. Many persons got themselves registered for allotment of flats/houses. A notice was subsequently issued by the Development Authority increasing the price of houses, the amount of instalment and interest. The allottees were asked to send their written acceptance of the revised price/instalments to the BDA. Most of the allottees except few gave unequivocal and unconditional written consent. Some of the allottees however challenged the revised terms and conditions of the BDA on the ground that BDA was estopped from changing the conditions subject to which the allottees had applied for registration and deposited the initial payment and that the arbitrary and unilateral stand of the respondent was to the prejudice of the allottees. The BDA took the plea that the brochure issued by it contained clauses by which right was reserved to BDA in its discretion to change, alter or modify any of the terms and/or conditions of the allotment given in the brochure and that its decision would be final with regard to any matter concerning the registration and allotment and that the BDA had right to relax any condition in its discretion. It was also the plea of BDA that the declared policy of the BDA was 'no profit no loss' and it had fixed the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of instalments after taking into consideration the escalation of the building material. It was also the plea of BDA that the declared policy of the BDA was 'no profit no loss' and it had fixed the cost of the houses/flats and the rate of instalments after taking into consideration the escalation of the building material. labour charges, cost of transport and the allied valuable factors which all entered into the price fixation and as such the High Court was not correct in going into the question of computation of cost of the construction of the houses/flats and the plea of clerical mistakes while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226. It was further argued in that. case on behalf of the BDA that in price fixation the executive had a wide discretion and it was only answerable provided there was any statutory control over its policy of price fixation and it was not the function of the High Court to sit in judgment over such matter in economic policy and that after the parties had entered into the field of ordinary contract the relations were no longer covered by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which would determine the rights and obligations of the parties inter se. The Supreme Court in the background of the facts and circumstances observed that it could not be said that there was mis-statement or incorrect statement or any fraudulent concealment of the information supplied in the brochure published by the BDA on the strength of which all the applicants falling under various categories applied and got their names registered and in such a circumstance the writ petitioners could not be heard to say that the BDA had arbitrarily and unreasonably changed the terms and conditions of the brochure to the prejudice of the respondents. In paragraph-18 of the said decision in BDA Authority (ibid) the Supreme Court noticed that by the terms and conditions of the brochure the BDA had reserved its right to change the terms and conditions as and when felt necessary, 'evidently depending upon the escalation of prices'. In paragraph-18 of the said decision in BDA Authority (ibid) the Supreme Court noticed that by the terms and conditions of the brochure the BDA had reserved its right to change the terms and conditions as and when felt necessary, 'evidently depending upon the escalation of prices'. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case including the term by which BDA reserved its right to change the terms and conditions as and when felt necessary, evidently depending upon the escalation of the price and in view of the plea taken by the BDA that in accordance with such terms and conditions the BDA fixed the costs of the houses/flats and the rates of instalment after taking into consideration the escalation of the building material, labour charges, costs of transport and allied valuable factors which all enter into the price fixation the Supreme Court felt that the writ petitioners could not be heard to say that the BDA had arbitrarily and unreasonably changed the terms and conditions of the brochure. The Supreme Court also observed in paragraph-19 of the said decision that the factual position of the case clearly and unambiguously revealed that the writ petitioners after voluntarily accepting the conditions imposed by the BDA had entered into the realm of concluded contract pure and simple with the BDA and hence they could only claim the right conferred upon them by the said contract and were bound by the terms of the contract unless some statute stepped in and conferred some special statutory obligations on the pan of the BDA in the contractual field. The Supreme Court also noted in paragraph-21 (ibid) that there was a line of decisions including (6) Radha Krishna Aganral v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496 where the contract entered into between the State and the persons aggrieved was non-statutory and purely contractual and the rights were governed only by the terms of the contract and it was held that no writ or order could be issued under Article 226 so as to compel the Authority to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. This decision therefore is confined in its import only to cases where the petitioner seeks in a writ petition to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. 13. This decision therefore is confined in its import only to cases where the petitioner seeks in a writ petition to remedy a breach of contract pure and simple. 13. The learned Advocate for the respondents heavily relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1496 . The petitioners filed writ petitions against orders of the State Government revising the rate of royalty payable under a lease entered into by the petitioners with the respondents and after that, cancelling the lease. The petitioner's case was that the revision of rate of royalty payable by the petitioners for the lease was illegal during the subsistence of the lease, and, thereafter, cancellation of the lease itself was illegal for various reasons. The Supreme Court refused to interfere with the impugned actions of the State in the matter. The learned Advocate for the respondents relied on this decision in support of the proposition that in respect of concluded contract a breach of contract cannot be remedied by a writ petition. This decision will be further discussed by me at a later stage. The learned Advocate for the respondents also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (7) Food Corporation of India v. Jagannath Dutta, AIR 1993 SC 1494 . The petitioner had an agreement with the Food Corporation of India (FCI) by which he was given a storage agency by the FCI. Subsequently the FCI by a notice terminated the agreement. The said notice was challenged by a writ petition under Article 226. The High Court allowed the writ petition on the short ground that FCI had not taken any poJicy decision although the notice was purporting to have been issued on the basis of such policy decision. The Supreme Court however found that the action was based on a policy decision that the agreement with the storage agency was to be revoked on phased manner and set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismissed the writ petition. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court was not justified in quashing the impugned notice especially when the terms and conditions of the contract permitted the termination of the agreement by either of the parties and the High Court should not have gone into the question of contractual obligation in its writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court was not justified in quashing the impugned notice especially when the terms and conditions of the contract permitted the termination of the agreement by either of the parties and the High Court should not have gone into the question of contractual obligation in its writ jurisdiction. It is needless to mention that the said observation of the Supreme Court will have to be understood in the context of the facts and circumstances of that case. In paragraph-4 of the said decision the Supreme Court observed that the petitioner challenged the termination notice on the grounds that (i) clause 37 of the agreement was arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, (ii) clause 37 was unilateral, against natural justice, unlawful and as such was void under section 24 of the Contract Act, and (iii) the action of the FCI was arbitrary, against public policy and public interest. The Supreme Court thereafter observed that the High Court did not go into any of those questions and instead set aside the impugned notice on the short ground that the FCI had not taken any policy decision before terminating the agreement. This judgment of the Supreme Court when read as a whole would thus show that in observing that the High Court should not have gone into the question of contractual obligation, the Supreme Court did not impose any ban that in no circumstances the question of arbitrariness can be examined by writ court apart from the question of contractual obligation. Rather the Supreme Court gave clear indication that the High Court could have gone into the question whether the action of the FCI was arbitrary. As a matter of fact the Supreme Court examined the ground assigned by the FCI for terminating the agreement and found to have merit in it thereby ruling out by implication any arbitrariness on the part of the FCI in terminating the agreement by following the agreed procedure of giving two months' prior notice in writing. 14. The learned Advocate for the respondents also attracted my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (8) Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh, 1976(3) SCC 828 as well as to the decision in (9) Bihar E G.F. Co-op. Socy. v. Sipahi Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2149 . 14. The learned Advocate for the respondents also attracted my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (8) Kulchhinder Singh v. Hardayal Singh, 1976(3) SCC 828 as well as to the decision in (9) Bihar E G.F. Co-op. Socy. v. Sipahi Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2149 . In the case of Kulchhinder Singh (supra) the Supreme Court, in the factual background of the case observed that at its best, the writ petition sought enforcement of a binding contract but the neat and necessary repellant was that the remedy of Article 226 was unavailable to enforce a contract qua contract. The dispute in that case centred round an agreement between the staff and a co-operative bank on quota of promotions. In the case of Bihar E.G.F. Co-op. Socy. (supra) the Supreme Court observed inter alia that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance it may however be mentioned that in none of those two cases the question of arbitrariness or the violation of Article 14 was raised, considered or attracted. 15. A little digression here is perhaps necessary for tracing the development of law regarding an imperative aspect of Article 14 of the Constitution of India so that we may appreciate the ambit and import of some apparently divergent views of the Supreme Court expressed in certain decisions regarding the scope of interference by a writ court in the field of contract where the State is a party to the contract. Article 14 is indeed very simple in its purport and says that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Broadly speaking, the initial import of this Article was confined to the doctrine of non-discrimination in the matter of equality before law as well as equal protection of the laws, permitting however reasonable classification on the basis of intelligible differentia having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In other words, reasonable classification was permissible. Broadly speaking, the initial import of this Article was confined to the doctrine of non-discrimination in the matter of equality before law as well as equal protection of the laws, permitting however reasonable classification on the basis of intelligible differentia having a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In other words, reasonable classification was permissible. But in course of time a new dimension was added by judicial pronouncements to the original import of Article 14 and this new dimension is that Article 14 embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness. The said dimension or aspect of Article 14 was 'laid bare' by the Supreme Court for the first time in (10) E P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1974 SC 555 and this aspect of Article 14 thereafter got progressive reiteration of the Supreme Court in the subsequent decisions in (11) Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 , in (12) R. D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1628 and in (12) Ajoy Rasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487 . 16. In E. P. Royappa (supra) the Supreme Court observed thus : "From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment". Then in Maneka Gandhi (supra) the Supreme Court again observed thus: "Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence". Then in Maneka Gandhi (supra) the Supreme Court again observed thus: "Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence". Thereafter in International Airport Authority's case (supra) the Supreme Court observed thus in connection with the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 : "In requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory : but must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant consideration, because that would be denial of equality". Still later in the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajoy Rasia (supra) we get a rather graphic description us to the development of the doctrine or non-arbitrariness through judicial decisions as an inalienable import of Article 14. The Supreme Court in Ajoy Rasia observed thus : "It is sufficient to state that the content and reach of Article 14 must not be confused with the doctrine of classification, Unfortunately, in. the earlier stages of the evolution of our constitutional law, Article 14 came to be identified with the doctrine of classification because the view taken was that that Article forbids discrimination and there would be no discrimination where the classification making the differentia fulfils two conditions, namely, (i) that the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that that differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned legislative or executive action. It was for the first time in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu.........that this court laid bare a new dimension of Article 14 and pointed out that that Article has highly activist magnitude and it embodies a guarantee against arbitrariness............ "This vital and dynamic aspect which was till then lying latent and submerged in the few simple but pregnant words of Article 14 was explored and brought to light in Royappa's case and it was reaffirmed and elaborated by this court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India............ "This was again reiterated in International Airport Authority's case...... "This vital and dynamic aspect which was till then lying latent and submerged in the few simple but pregnant words of Article 14 was explored and brought to light in Royappa's case and it was reaffirmed and elaborated by this court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India............ "This was again reiterated in International Airport Authority's case...... It must therefore now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary must necessarily involve negation of equality......... wherever therefore there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an 'authority' under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. In fact the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Constitution." 17. We thus find that to the original concept of the classification theory of the equality clause of Article 14 a new dimension, namely, non-arbitrariness in State action was subsequently added by judicial pronouncements. This new dimension was for the first time laid bare by the Supreme Court in the decision of E. P. Royappa in or about 1974 and thereafter it steadily went on sprouting through different judicial pronouncements and rather came to take a most prominant role in the play of Article 14 by the time the Supreme Court rendered the analytical decision on the point in Ajoy Hasia (supra) in or about 1981. A study of the development of this new dimension of Article 14 as a guarantee against arbitrariness in State action will be of immense help in appreciating the manner and extent of gradual application of this dimension through judicial decisions in deserving cases in the field of contract and in resolving the apparent incongruity, if any, between some of the judicial decisions in the matter. 18. We would now refer to certain decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on the question of jurisdiction of writ court in contractual matters. 18. We would now refer to certain decisions relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioner on the question of jurisdiction of writ court in contractual matters. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (14) D. F. O. South Kheri v. Ram Sanehi, AIR 1973 SC 205 in support of the proposition that where the action of a public authority invested with statutory powers is challenged the writ petition is maintainable even if the right to relief arises out of an alleged breach of contract. That decision has also been relied upon to support the proposition that an administrative order which affects property or has civil consequences has to be made in a manner consonant with the rules of natural justice. In (15) Serajuddin & Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1974 Cal 296 the lessee was inducted to go into possession of the land and operate the mines in terms of an agreement that the lease deed would be executed. The grant however was revoked without any opportunity of being heard being given to the lessee on the ground that the lease deed was not executed. A Division Bench of this court deciding the case held that the purported revocation amounted to deprivation of a valuable right which had vested in the lessee and that once his legal right to the land and also the right to operate and exploit the mines is recognized he cannot be deprived of such a right without an opportunity of being heard being given to him and that even if the rights were based on a contract, the purported order of revocation must be struck down on the ground of violation of rules of natural justice. 19. 19. A learned Single Judge of this Court in (16) S. P. Das v. State of West Bengal, 1980 (2) CHN 480 went to the extent of observing that no doubt for a time the proposition which was laid down by the Supreme Court in a number of cases including Radha Krishna Agarwal's case over the years to the effect that when the rights of the parties flow entirely from a contract in the nature of a licence or otherwise, the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be invoked held the field, but after the International Airport Authority's case those decisions of the Supreme Court rendered earlier did not appear to be good law and that after the judgment in International Airport Authority's case it is a matter of total indifference whether the right of a party flows from a statute or under a contract. In the said case of S. P. Das the contract period was unilaterally shortened by the Government for no fault of the petitioner and without giving any opportunity to show-cause and the Court held that 'such action was arbitrary and struck down the same. In (17) M/s. Doki China Gurubalu & Sons and Co. v. State, AIR 1992 Orissa 189 as well as in (18) Prince International v. State, AIR 1992 Orissa 203, the Orissa High Court entertained writ petition for redressal of grievance against cancellation/termination of concluded contract and granted relief to the petitioner under Article 226 after discussing and distinguishing the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal's case and relying on certain other decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court decision in (19) Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corpn.. AIR 1990 SC 1031 was heavily relied on by the Orissa High Court in the said decision in Prince International's case. In (20) Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotus Hotel Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 848 , the said Corporation entered into an agreement in performance of its statutory duty to advance loan to a company and acting on such undertaking the company proceeded to undertake and execute project of setting up a 4-Star Hotel and the company incurred huge expanses and suffered liabilities to set up hotel but the Corporation subsequently backed out and the petitioner approached the court for relief under Article 226. The matter went up to the Supreme Court and it was contended on behalf of the Corporation that the dispute between the parties was in the realm of contract and even if there was a concluded contract between the parties about grant and acceptance of loan, the failure of the Corporation to carry out its part of the obligation might amount to breach of contract for which a remedy would lie elsewhere but a writ would not lie. In that connection the Supreme Court however observed that 'it is too late in the day to contend that the instrumentality of the State which would be 'other authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution can commit breach of a solemn undertaking on which other side has acted and then contend that the party suffering by the breach of contract may sue for damages but cannot compel specific performance of the contract'. It was also observed in the said decision that the principle of promissory estoppel would certainly estop the Corporation from backing out of its obligation arising from a solemn promise made by it to the respondents. It was further observed in that decision that if the appellant had entered into a solemn contract in discharged and performance of its statutory duty and the respondents acted upon it the statutory Corporation cannot be allowed to act arbitrarily so as to cause harm and injury, flowing from its unreasonable conduct to the respondents and that in such a situation the Court is not powerless from holding the appellant to its promise and it can be enforced by a writ of mandamus. Of course in that case the Corporation entered into the contract in discharge and performance of its statutory duty. 20. In (21) Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR 1993 SC 1601 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that in contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet and there is no unfettered discretion in public law and a public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good and this imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. In (22) Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U. P., AIR 1991 SC 537 , by one stroke the Government of U. P. terminated by a general order the appointment of all Government counsel in all districts with effect from a particular date and directed preparation of fresh panels to make appointments in place of existing incumbents. All existing appointments were terminated with effect from a particular date irrespective of the fact whether the term of the incumbent had expired or was subsisting. The validity of such State action was challenged by a writ petition. There also a question came up for consideration whether in respect of concluded contract Article 14 could be invoked. In that connection the following observations of the Supreme Court at page 549 (ibid) deserve attention :- "Applicability of Article 14 to all executive actions of the State being settled and for the same reason its applicability at the threshold to the making of a contract in exercise of the executive power being beyond dispute, can it be said that the State can thereafter cast off its personality and exercise unbridled power unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 in the sphere of contractual matters and claim to be governed therein only by private law principles applicable to private individuals whose rights flow only from the terms of the contract without anything more ? .We have no hesitation in saying that the personality of the State requiring regulation of its conduct in all spheres by requirements of Article 14, does not undergo such a radical change after the making of a contract merely because some contractual rights accrue to the other party in addition. It is not as if the requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations are alien concepts, which cannot co-exist". "This being the philosophy of the Constitution, can it be said that it contemplates exclusion of Article- 14 non-arbitrariness which is basic to rule of law from State actions in contractual field when all actions of the State are meant for public good and expected to be fair and just? We have no doubt that the Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the preamble. We have no doubt that the Constitution does not envisage or permit unfairness or unreasonableness in State actions in any sphere of its activity contrary to the professed ideals in the preamble. In our opinion it would be alien to the constitutional scheme to accept the argument of exclusion of Article 14 in contractual matters. The scope and permissible grounds of judicial review in such matters and the relief which may be available are different matters but that does not justify the view of its total exclusion. This is more so when the modern trend is also to examine the unreasonableness of a term in such contracts where the bargaining power is unequal se that these are not negotiated contracts but standard form contracts between unequal". 21. In Mahabir Auto Stores v. Indian Oil Corporation, AIR 1990 SC 1031 the petitioner was carrying on business of sale and distribution of lubricants for about 18 years as supplier from the respondent Indian Oil Corporation and was receiving supply of lubricants for that purpose from the said Corporation. The Corporation than abruptly stopped supply of lubricants to the petitioner without giving any notice or intimation to the petitioner. Such action on the part of the Corporation was found to be arbitrary by the Supreme Court. One of the questions in that case was whether the dealings between the parties amounted to a contract or a mere arrangement. The Supreme Court in paragraph-20 of the said decision in Mahabir Auto Stores (supra) observed inter alia that in the field of this nature fairness must be there to the parties concerned, and having regard to the large number or the long period and the nature of the dealings between the parties, the appellant should have been taken into confidence and that 'Equality and fairness at least demands this much from an instrumentality of the State dealing with a right of the State not to treat the contract as subsisting'. In paragraph-23 (ibid) the Supreme Court further observed inter alia that 'Fairness in such action should be perceptible, if not transparent'. 22. In paragraph-23 (ibid) the Supreme Court further observed inter alia that 'Fairness in such action should be perceptible, if not transparent'. 22. To my mind, after the decisions of the Supreme Court in International Airport Authority's case, AIR 1979 SC 1628 , Gujarat State Financial Corporation's case, AIR 1983 SC 848 , Mahabir Auto Stores case, AIR 1990 SC 1031 and Sreelekha Vidyarthis' case, AIR 1991 SC 537 and in view of the observation made by the Supreme Court in paragraph-7 of Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries' case, AIR 1993 SC 1601 that in contractual spheres as in all other State actions the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet, it is no more open to argue that the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked in respect of a concluded contract where the contract itself has been cancelled by the State by an action which is found to be arbitrary and which therefore cannot be a valid term of contract giving a right or power to the State to cancel the contract whimsically or arbitrarily. It is needless to mention that even when a concluded contract confers a right or power upon the Stale or its instrumentality entering into the contract to terminate such contract in exercise of its absolute discretion, such right or power cannot be exercised arbitrarily. As I have already pointed out, the learned Advocate for the respondents heavily relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal, AIR 1977 SC 1496 in support of his argument that after the parties have entered into a concluded contract the relationship between the parties is governed by the contraoctual terms and conditions and such a contract cannot be enforced by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. In this connection, it is however to be noted that the observations made in the said decision in Radha Krishna Agarwal will have to be understood in the context of the facts of that case. In this connection, it is however to be noted that the observations made in the said decision in Radha Krishna Agarwal will have to be understood in the context of the facts of that case. It would be a lop-sided argument to say that the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in International Airport' Authority's case (supra), Mahabir Auto Stores' case (supra) and Shrilekha Vidyarthis' case (supra) should be ignored in the matter of their applicability to concluded contract simply because the decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal's case was rendered earlier by a larger Bench or a Bench of equal Judge strength. It is not that hi the decision in Radha Krishna Agarwal's case Article 14 was excluded as a matter of dogma. In that case the petitioner challenged the Government's action in revising the rate of royalty payable by the petitioners under a lease of 1970 and in subsequently cancelling the lease in March, 1975. The petitioners' contention in that case was that the revision of rate of royalty payable by the petitioners for the lease to collect and exploit sal seeds from forest area was illegal during the subsistence of the lease and thereafter the cancellation of the lease itself was illegal for various reasons. The terms of the lease itself however contained a clause that the rate of royalty would be revised every 3 years cycle in consultation with the lessee and the decision would be binding on the lessee. In view of such clause the revision of royalty fell within the terms and conditions of the lease and as such any dispute in the matter was also required to be decided on the basis of such contractual terms and conditions. The lease also contained a clause that the lessee had to establish a factory within the State of Bihar for processing of sal seeds and extraction of oil therefrom within a period of 5 years from the date of agreement, failing which the agreement itself was to terminate. Therefore the termination of the lease on the happening of a specified eventuality was also stipulated in the terms and conditions of the lease. Any dispute over the matter would therefore be a matter for decision in a civil suit with reference to the terms and conditions of the lease regarding termination. Therefore the termination of the lease on the happening of a specified eventuality was also stipulated in the terms and conditions of the lease. Any dispute over the matter would therefore be a matter for decision in a civil suit with reference to the terms and conditions of the lease regarding termination. Article 14 of the Constitution however figured for consideration in that decision, as it appears, only with regard to its original dimension relating to the doctrine of equality or non-discrimination and nothing more. Paragraph-20 of the said decision in Radha Krishna Agarwal (ibid) would rather make the position clear. From the said paragraph it would appear that it was argued by the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the State that no aspect of Article 14 was involved in that case where any comprison of the facts and circumstances of a particular petitioner's case with those of other persons said to be similarly situated was involved and in such a case there was no possibility of inferring a discrimination. On the other hand, it appears that the learned counsel for the petitioners argued in that case that there was discrimination between the petitioners and other parties governed by similar contracts in other areas. The Supreme Court indeed expressed doubt in that decision but did not. as it seems, record any conclusive decision about the entertainability of such a plea in writ jurisdiction over a contractual matter and rather observed in paragraph- 1 (ibid) that the allegations on which a violation of Article 14 could be based were neither properly made nor established and that before any adjudication on the question whether Article 14 could possibly be said to have been violated, as between persons governed by similar contracts, they must be properly put in issue and established. Again, in paragraph-25 of the said decision (ibid) it was observed by the Supreme Court inter alia that even if by some stretch of imagination some case of unequal or discriminatory treatment by the officers of the State of persons governed by similar contracts is sought to be made out, a satisfactory adjudication upon the unusual facts of such a case would necessitate proper pleadings supported by acceptable evidence. 23. 23. The decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal (supra) read as a whole would rather indicate that the ratio of the decision is that where the allegation is of a breach of contract pure and simple the same cannot be remedied by the court in its writ jurisdiction. And indeed this proposition is by now well-settled in view of a catena of subsequent decisions. But the said decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal, inspite of some doubt expressed, does not seem to have laid down any conclusive proposition that Article 14 cannot at all come into the picture in any circumstance in respect of the termination of a concluded contract. Rather it appears that the learned Solicitor General appearing in that case for the State accepted the position that Article 14 could come into play in such matter if discrimination could be shown by comparable facts and circumstances relating to the petitioners and others similarly circumstanced. And the Supreme Court, inspite of the effort on the part of the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case to show such discrimination, was of the opinion that the allegations on which a violation of Article 14 could be based were neither properly made nor established. It may be noticed that the only aspect of Article 14 which was sought to be invoked in the case of Radha Krishna Agarwal was the doctrine of equality or non-discrimination which was however found not sustained by pleadings nor established. The other dimension of Article 14, namely, the dimension of non-arbitrariness which was laid bare for the first time in the case of E. P. Royappa (supra) did not at all fall for consideration in the case of Radha Krishna Agarwal. Indeed, that new dimension at that time, if I may say so, was passing through its sprouting stage and was yet to attain its mature stature in the shape it assumed in the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajoy Hasia (supra) after travelling through the mile-stone decisions in Maneka Gandhi (supra) and International Airport Authority's case (supra). Indeed, that new dimension at that time, if I may say so, was passing through its sprouting stage and was yet to attain its mature stature in the shape it assumed in the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajoy Hasia (supra) after travelling through the mile-stone decisions in Maneka Gandhi (supra) and International Airport Authority's case (supra). In view of such development of the law relating to the new dimension of non-arbitrariness in Article 14 and the progressive growth of its applicability to different situations including the sphere of concluded contract also in appropriate cases, by reason of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court discussed earlier, it will be now a sheer anachronism to argue that the decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal should debar the High Court in its writ jurisdiction from taking into consideration the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court such as Mahabir Auto Stores and Sreelekha Vidyarthi, etc. in examining whether the action of the State in terminating or scrapping a contract or a semi-contractual arrangement between the parties is vitiated by arbitrariness and is violative of Article 14. The law has developed through judicial decisions from Radha Krishna Agarwal to Mahabir Auto Stores in the sphere of application of Article 14 to contracts and semi-contractual arrangements and this development is a gradual organic development and it will be now a vain attempt to try to efface this development by any mis-application of the decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal. The ratio of the Radha Krishna Agarwal's case is applicable and has been applied to cases where the grievance relates to a breach of contractual obligation pure and simple. The question whether in a particular case the grievance relates to a breach of contract pure and simple is a question of fact and this question of fact is a matter of substance and not of form. A writ court will indeed refuse to intervene if in any particular case the matter in substance appears to be a breach of contract pure and simple although the same has been presented before it by unduly painting it with a different colour simply for the purpose of bringing it within the jurisdiction of writ court. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 24. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 24. In fact there was a time when the Supreme Court held in (23) C. K. Achuthan v. State of Kerala, AIR 1959 SC 490 that no question of violation of Article 14 arises even where one out of the several persons is selected by the State for a particular contractual transaction. But then the Supreme Court in the later decision in (24) Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 266 held that Article 14 speaks of equality before the law and equal protection of the laws and that equality of opportunity should apply to matters of public contracts. Article 14 was thus applied to contract in the said decision although the said decision in Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd. has been read to speak of application of Article 14 at the threshold stage, namely, at the time of entry into contract. Indeed, the factual context of that case was such. But as we have seen, the law did not remain static there and has since developed through judicial decisions and the dimension of non-arbitrariness in Article 14 which has been described as a brooding omnipresence has been applied by the Supreme Court and the High Courts in striking down arbitrary action on the part of the State or its instrumentality where the State or its instrumentality, by such arbitrary action, tried to terminate or scrap a contract or arrangement short of formal contract. The chronological development of the potent dimension of non-arbitrariness implicit in Article 14 in addition to the doctrine of equality and non-discrimination also has, as a natural sequel, ushered in logical application of that potent dimension to the sphere of concluded contract and semi-contractual arrangement where such contract or arrangement is sought to be avoided by the State or its instrumentality arbitrarily, no matter whether such arbitrary action has been resorted to under the camouflage of any term of the contract or without such camouflage. The case of Radha Krishna Agarwal can be properly understood if we follow the development of the new dimension of non-arbitrariness of Article 14 and its application as a natural incident of such development to the sphere of concluded contract and semi-contractual arrangement. The case of Radha Krishna Agarwal can be properly understood if we follow the development of the new dimension of non-arbitrariness of Article 14 and its application as a natural incident of such development to the sphere of concluded contract and semi-contractual arrangement. In view of the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court as discussed including the decisions in Mahabir Auto Stores and Sreelekha Vidyarthi it can now be taken to be the settled law,-and this can be done without any conflict with the decision of the Supreme Court in Radha Krishna Agarwal-that writ court can certainly entertain the question whether the State or its instrumentality has terminated or scrapped any concluded contract or semi-contractual arrangement arbitrarily in violation of Article 14 and if so, the writ court can certainly undo such arbitrary action on the part of the State or its instrumentality where such arbitrary action has a prejudicial civil consequence on the aggrieved person and this function of the court, wherever it is found fit to be exercised, is not to be equated with the ordinary function of a civil court in enforcing specific performance of a contract. If the enforcement of a contract is a by-product of striking down of an arbitrary act operating in violation of Article 14 the writ court cannot help it. The argument of the learned Advocate for the respondents in this respect, relying on the provisions of the Specific Relief Act is therefore not tenable. There is also another aspect of the matter. If Article 14 forbids the State from acting arbitrarily, whatever may be the nature of the State action, and if Article 14 guarantees a fundamental right as indeed it does, the same cannot be eclipsed by contract because there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right. 25. There is also another aspect of the matter. If Article 14 forbids the State from acting arbitrarily, whatever may be the nature of the State action, and if Article 14 guarantees a fundamental right as indeed it does, the same cannot be eclipsed by contract because there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right. 25. From the discussion of the various decisions made above and the development of law on the subject it can now be taken to be settled that while a mere breach of contract, pure and simple, may not give rise to a cause of action for moving a writ petition and a writ petition may not, in all circumstances, be an appropriate remedy against a mere breach of contract or for enforcement of a mere contractual obligation, a writ court certainly has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition where the State or its instrumentality acts arbitrarily either apart from the contractual terms and conditions or in colourable exercise of the rights and powers conferred by such terms and conditions for the purpose of arbitrarily putting an end to the contract. Since the State as well as its instrumentality is constitutionally committed to the ideals of fair play in action the question of arbitrariness whenever it is raised with any degree of prima facie presentability may actuate the writ court to examine the matter, irrespective of the question whether the impugned action terminates an agreement or a concluded contract or an arrangement short of formal contract. Therefore the mere fact that any formal contract was yet to be signed between the petitioner and the Doordarshan Authorities in respect of the remaining five episodes of the sponsored programme Madhuri, cannot have any decisive consequence in the matter. The fact remains that there was an agreement or arrangement, whatever may it be, between the petitioner and the Doordarshan Authorities by which the petitioner was allotted time slot for telecasting ten episodes of the said sponsored programme. The fact remains that the Doordarshan had telecast five out of the ten episodes and while the process was on the move the Doordarshan Authorities by their impugned notice dated the 29th June, 1993 communicated to the petitioner their decision to discontinue the telecast of the said sponsored programme with immediate effect and returned the cassettes of the 3 episodes which were submitted earlier to Doordarshan Authorities for telecast. It is needless to mention that such discontinuance of telecast of the said sponsored programme has tremendous civil consequences upon the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner had already incurred enormous expenses in preparing those episodes which were yet to be telecast. Such action of the Doordarshan Authorities in discontinuing the telecast of the remaining episodes of the sponsored programme Madhuri has been assailed by the writ petitioner as an arbitrary act violating the norms and standards required of the Doordarshan to follow and adhere to in dealing with matters falling in the domain of its activities in view of the mandate of Article 14. This court can certainly entertain the question and examine whether the action of the Doordarshan Authorities in discontinuing the telecast of the remaining episodes covered by the agreement or arrangement for telecast of the same is vitiated by arbitrariness and lack of fair play in action violating Article 14 of the Constitution. 26. It was however argued that the action taken in the matter by the Doordarshan Authorities is nothing but an administrative action and therefore such action is not subject to judicial review in a writ petition. In this connection, the learned Advocate for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (25) U. P. Financial Corpn. v. M/s. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1993 SC 1435 where it has been observed inter alia by the Supreme Court that if the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi judicial authorities it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative athorities. But even in that case the Supreme Court observed in paragraph-11 (ibid) that only when the action of the administrative authority is so unfair and unreasonable that no reasonable person would have taken that action, can the court intervene. It was also observed therein that the obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice and this doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi judicial authorities are bound to observe. It was also observed therein that the obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice and this doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi judicial authorities are bound to observe. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the petitioner attracted my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (26) Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M/s. M & N Publications Ltd., Judgement Today 1993(1) SC 187 where it has been observed inter alia that once the procedure adopted by an authority for purpose of entering into a contract is held to be against the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution, the courts cannot ignore such action saying that the authorities concerned must have some latitude or liberty in contractual matters and any interference of the court amounts to encroachment on the exclusive rights of the executive to take such decisions. In (27) A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 it has been observed by the Supreme Court that with the increase of the power of the administrative bodies it has become necessary to provide guidelines for the just exercise of their power and that to prevent the abuse of that power and to see that it does not become a new despotism, the courts are gradually evolving the principles to be observed while exercising such powers and further that in matters like these, public good is not advarced by a rigid adherence to precedents and new problems call for new solutions. In (28) Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal, AIR 1990 SC 1402 it has been observed by the Supreme Court that the shift now is to a broader notion of 'fairness' or 'fair procedure' in the administrative action and as far as the administrative officers are concerned the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. In (29) Union of India v. Amrik Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 654 the Supreme Court observed that the doctrine of principles of natural justice and audi alteram partern are part of Article 14 and there are any number of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court regarding the scope of that doctrine. In (29) Union of India v. Amrik Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 654 the Supreme Court observed that the doctrine of principles of natural justice and audi alteram partern are part of Article 14 and there are any number of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court regarding the scope of that doctrine. Therefore there is no scope of gainsaying now in view of the consistent decisions of the Supreme Court that even administrative actions must satisfy the requirements of Article 14, namely, the requirements of non-arbitrariness and fairness in action. The impugned action of the Doordarshan Authorities cannot therefore be immune from judicial review by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction on any plea that the same is merely an administrative action. 27. Now coming to the factual aspects of the case, evidently there was an arrangement, be it contractual or otherwise, in which Doordarshan allotted time slot in favour of the petitioner for telecast of ten episodes of the sponsored programme Madhuri. Under this arrangement the Doordarshan had telecast five episodes and thereafter cancelled the arrangement by their impugned letter dated the 29th June, 1993 and discontinued the telecast of the remaining episodes of the petitioner's sponsored programme and returned the cassettes of the three episodes, namely, the 6th, 7th and 8th which were earlier submitted by the petitioner to Doordarshan and were awaiting telecast under the arrangement. It needs no emphasis that the cancellation of the arrangement and the discontinuance of the telecast has undoubted civil consequences visiting upon the petitioner inasmuch as the petitioner had put in huge expenses in preparing the remaining episodes and the cancellation of the arrangement half way would thus put the petitioner to huge financial loss. There is no doubt that this factor by itself cannot be a ground for striking down the impugned action of the Doordarshan Authorities in discontinuing the telecast of the remaining episodes of the petitioner. The Doordarshan Authorities have undoubtedly the responsibility to see, in the interest of the general viewers, that the programme to be telecast is telecastworthy. Even in the initial letter dated the 14th May, 1993 written by the Doordarshan Authorities to the petitioner by which the arrangement was made for allotment of time slot for ten episodes of the petitioner's sponsored programme, it was pointed out that the technical quality should be good and telecastworthy. Even in the initial letter dated the 14th May, 1993 written by the Doordarshan Authorities to the petitioner by which the arrangement was made for allotment of time slot for ten episodes of the petitioner's sponsored programme, it was pointed out that the technical quality should be good and telecastworthy. It was further mentioned in that letter that the transfer to video should be properly done through telecine. That letter was written obviously after previewing the pilot submitted by the petitioner. Since the arrangement was made after the pilot was previewed by the Doordarshan Authorities it is evident that the pilot was not considered to be wholly unworthy of telecast. It may be noted in this connection that it appears from the affidavit-in-reply of the petitioner and the annexures thereto that in some cases in respect of other programme proposed by other producers for telecast the Doordarshan Authorities did not hesitate to reject the pilot after previewing the same. The fact that the petitioner's pilot was not rejected and rather on the basis of that pilot the Doordarshan Authorities entered into an arrangement with the petitioner allotting time slot for ten episodes indicates that the petitioner's pilot was prima facie considered fit for telecast. Indeed in the letter dated the 14th May, 1993 it was mentioned by the Doordarshan Authorities that the technical quality of the film song portion in the pilot episode was not quite satisfactory and this required improvement. The pilot episode was therefore indeed found suitable for telecast although some improvement therein in respect of the technical quality was considered desirable. From the other correspondence which I have already mentioned in the earlier part of this judgment, it would appear that the Doordarshan Authorities were freely proposing modification or improvement for some other cassettes also which were submitted later by the petitioner for telecast and the cassettes moved to and from between the parties in that connection. It is of course the contention of the Doordarshan Authorities that inspite of their repeated advice the petitioner did not improve the audio and video quality of the cassettes, but they however telecast five episodes although they were not found upto the mark. 28. It is of course the contention of the Doordarshan Authorities that inspite of their repeated advice the petitioner did not improve the audio and video quality of the cassettes, but they however telecast five episodes although they were not found upto the mark. 28. By their letter dated the 14th May, 1993 the Doordarshan Authorities made the arrangement to telecast the first episode on 21st May, 1993 i.e., only one week after the letter was issued and the subsequent nine episodes were to be telecast in nine weeks thereafter. In the same letter the petitioner was asked to submit 4 completed cassettes for four episodes within 18th May noon. The petitioner received that letter on the 17th May at 3-00 p.m. and on the 18th May the petitioner wrote to Doordarshan Authorities that they would complete all formalities by 19th May and as the time was very short they were unable to shoot the balance three episodes and deposit the same by 21st and that they would however maintain two episodes deposit for the first month and requested for permission of the Doordarshan Authorities in that respect. It may be noticed that the contract forms for the 1st and 2nd episodes to be telecast on 21st May, and 28th May were signed on 19th May, that for the 3rd episode to be telecast on 11th June, the contract form was signed on 29th May, that for the 4th episode to be telecast on 18th June, the contract form was signed on 17th June and that for the 5th episode to be telecast on 25th June, the contract form was signed on 21st June. The preparatory transactions between the parties as involved in the telecast of the programme under the arrangement, it would appear, were operating on a scale of considerable flexibility rather than formal rigidity. The operational flexibility was also marked by continual interaction between the parties. or course, in their first letter dated the 14th May the Doordarshan Authorities advised the petitioner to cause transfer to video through telecine, but that was only advisory and not mandatory because the word used in that connection is 'should' and not 'must'. The operational flexibility was also marked by continual interaction between the parties. or course, in their first letter dated the 14th May the Doordarshan Authorities advised the petitioner to cause transfer to video through telecine, but that was only advisory and not mandatory because the word used in that connection is 'should' and not 'must'. In their letter dated the 29th May the Doordarshan Authorities while pointing out the shortcomings in episodes 3 and 4 expressed the opinion that if dubbing was not done through telecine the production would not improve at all to make it telecastworthy and it was essential to transfer the film songs through telecine. In that connection the Doordarshan Authorities also advised the petitioner that if she found difficulty in securing telecine facilities they could approach Doordarshan Engineering Authority to allow her to use the telecine of Doordarshan Kendra against payment of requisite hiring charge for the same. However the Doordarshan Authorities telecast the programme upto the 5th episode although it seems that telecine was not used by the petitioner for transfer to video. In their second letter dated the 7th July, the petitioner inter alia wrote to the Doordarshan Authorities after the cancellation of the arrangement that the main complaint against the petitioner's programme was that of poor telecine quality and that the petitioner was prepared to get the songs telecined at Doordarshan itself as had been earlier offered to her and the necessary costs in that regard would be paid to Doordarshan. In their first letter dated the 2nd July, after the scrapping of the arrangement the petitioner inter alia wrote to the Doordarshan Authorities that as the episodes were completed in a short time it was possible that there had been some shortcoming in the programme and they were willing to fully co-operate with the Doordarshan Authorities and were prepared to carry out all the required changes of the episodes. In their affidavit-in-opposition, the Doordarshan Authorities stated in paragraph-6 at page-7 that even the Programme Advisory Committee (PAC), the highest level advisory body of Doordarshan Kendra comprising of eminent non-official persons from different fields strongly criticised the sponsored programme, particularly the script, narration and its presentation part as would appear from the minutes of the PAC meeting dated the 7th July, 1993. Although the said averment projects an impression that the PAC meeting itself was held on 7th July, 1993 the record produced before me during the hearing however showed that the PAC meeting was held on 4th June, 1993 but the minutes of the meeting was recorded only on the 7th July, 1993. It is to be noted that three episodes were telecast even after the PAC meeting was held on 4th June. It is also the contention of the respondents that the officer-in-charge adversely criticised the programme produced by the petitioner in the transmission reports evaluating and reviewing daily programmes telecast by Doordarshan. There is no doubt, I would reiterate, that the arrangement under which the petitioner was allotted time slot for ten episodes of the sponsored programme does not give a blank cheque to the petitioner to dispense with the requirement of the standard of quality of the programme, particularly where the programme is an entertainment programme, and the necessity of maintaining certain telecastworthy standard in the interest of the viewers consistent with the standard generally maintained or sought to be maintained by Doordarshan. 29. In scrapping the arrangement by their impugned letter dated the 29th June, the Doordarshan Authorities referred to their earlier three letters dated the 27th May, the 29th May and the 17th June and then mentioned that the petitioner failed to comply with their express communication, repeated cautions and suggestions to improve the programme quality so that it could reach the standard of being good and telecastworthy and the Doordarshan Authorities had therefore no other option but to discontinue the telecast of the petitioner's sponsored programme with immediate effect. So, the precise ground on which the Doordarshan Authorities by their letter dated the 29th June proceeded to scrap the arrangement was that the petitioner failed to improve the programme quality so that the same could reach telecastworthy standard. Now if we look to the Doordarshan's letter dated the 27th May as referred to in the impugned letter dated the 29th June, 1993 we will find that the said letter dated the 27th May, pointed out some shortcomings in episode No.2 with a general observation that a lot need to be done to improve the quality of both audio and video in the interest of viewers. In their letter dated the 29th May, the Doordarshan Authorities mentioned some shortcomings in the episodes Nos. 3 and 4. In their letter dated the 29th May, the Doordarshan Authorities mentioned some shortcomings in the episodes Nos. 3 and 4. In both these letters the petitioner was asked to make correction accordingly. The petitioner re-submitted the respective cassettes and the Doordarshan telecast those programmes although it is the contention of the Doordarshan Authorities that the standard of those programmes was not made upto the mark. As I have already mentioned, in their letter dated the 29th May, Doordarshan no doubt advised the petitioner to transfer the film songs through telecine and offered the use of Doordarshan telecine for the purpose against payment of hiring charge. It has to be noted here that both the letters dated the 27th and 29th May seem to have been written on the basis of the shortcomings in the episodes Nos. 2, 3 and 4, obviously noticed after previewing the same. All the said 3 episodes, after re-submission by the petitioner were however telecast. So was telecast the episode No.5. The letter dated the 17th June, as referred to in the Doordarshan's impugned notice dated the 29th June, was written by the Doordarshan Authorities to the releasing agent of the petitioner. In the first paragraph of that letter criticism was made, on preview, about the poor quality of the 4th episode scheduled to be telecast next day, that is, on 18th June. As we have seen the 4th episode was telecast all 18th June and the 5th episode thereafter on 25th June. In the second paragraph of the said letter dated the 17th June, the Doordarshan Authorities made a grievance that the petitioner was furnishing incomplete cassettes without proper labelling tape details and commercial dope-sheets thereby causing extreme confusion and difficulties for smooth telecast of the sponsored programme. It may be noted here that this was not made a ground in the impugned notice dated the 29th June for scrapping the arrangement. In the last paragraph of the letter dated the 17th June, the Doordarshan Authorities requested the releasing agent to immediately do the needful for necessary rectification and submission of the programme cassettes after due checking and to furnish the programme contracts on monthly basis to enable smooth telecast of the subsequent episodes. In the last paragraph of the letter dated the 17th June, the Doordarshan Authorities requested the releasing agent to immediately do the needful for necessary rectification and submission of the programme cassettes after due checking and to furnish the programme contracts on monthly basis to enable smooth telecast of the subsequent episodes. It may be noticed in this connection that the arrangement was scrapped by the Doordarshan Authorities by their letter dated the 29th June, not because of lack of deposit of programme material or cassettes, As a matter of fact, as many as 3 cassettes, namely, the cassettes of the 6th, 7th and 8th episodes were already in deposit with the Doordarshan Authorities when they wrote the impugned letter dated the 29th June along with which those cassettes were returned to the petitioner. The only ground stated in the impugned letter dated the 29th June, was the failure of the petitioner to improve the programme quality so that the same could reach telecastworthy standard. It however does not appear that before scrapping the arrangement by their impugned letter dated the 29th June, the Doordarshan Authorities previewed the deposited cassettes of the 6th, 7th and 8th episodes which were yet to be telecast. The move of the Doordarshan Authorities in cancelling the unexecuted part of the arrangement for telecasting the petitioner's sponsored programme merely basing their opinion on the by-gone parts of the programme without previewing or judging the merit of the remaining episodes of the programme awaiting telecast, particularly when as many as 3 cassettes of such episodes were at hand for preview. seems to be an arbitrary action devoid of fair play, Having regard to the operational flexibility marked by continue interaction between the parties more or less resembling rather a dialectical process aimed at ensuring a presentable quality of programme, it was only proper that even if the Doordarshan Authorities had found shortcomings or deficiencies in the deposited episodes Nos. 6, 7 and 8 they, in all fairness, should have pointed out those deficiencies or shortcomings to the petitioner, as was done in the past, for rectification within a specified time limit, instead of abruptly scrapping the arrangement by taking the petitioner wholly by surprise and giving no opportunity to rectify the remediable deficiencies or shortcomings, if any. 30. 6, 7 and 8 they, in all fairness, should have pointed out those deficiencies or shortcomings to the petitioner, as was done in the past, for rectification within a specified time limit, instead of abruptly scrapping the arrangement by taking the petitioner wholly by surprise and giving no opportunity to rectify the remediable deficiencies or shortcomings, if any. 30. The Doordarshan Authorities, this litigation befalling them, rightly felt perhaps for the first time that the arrangement should not have been scrapped so abruptly and that is why in paragraph-8 of their affidavit-in-opposition they have stated that since the beginning of the 1st episode complaint had been lodged by the Doordarshan Authorities with the petitioner that the technical quality of the production was sub-standard and requested the petitioner to improve the quality of production in future otherwise the Doordarshan Authorities would have no other alternative but to withdraw the arrangement with the writ petitioner in connection with the sponsored programme Madhuri. The 'otherwise' clause of such averment on the part of the Doordarshan Authorities in the affidavit-in-opposition marks the crux of the matter but unfortunately the same is not sustained by records and this exposes the stark arbitrariness of the impugned action. There is no doubt that Doordarshan Authorities have to judge and ensure the technical quality of an entertainment programme in the interest of viewers, but having regard to the facts and circumstances discussed earlier, it was not expected and was indeed unfair that Doordarshan should have abruptly scrapped the arrangement without any prior notice or indication that unless the technical quality was improved in the suggested way the programme would be discontinued. In none of the correspondence including the impugned notice dated the 29th June, and the other letters dated the 27th May, the 29th May and 17th June any inkling was given that unless improvement was done in the required or desired manner the programme would be discontinued without further reference or notice. The 'otherwise' clause of the averments made in paragraph-8 of the affidavit-in-opposition is not sustained by the bunch of correspondence between the parties. The whole action of Doordarshan Authorities in abruptly scrapping the arrangement without giving any warning or notice to the petitioner that unless the desired improvement in the technical quality was made the arrangement would be liable to be scrapped is ruthlessly capricious. The whole action of Doordarshan Authorities in abruptly scrapping the arrangement without giving any warning or notice to the petitioner that unless the desired improvement in the technical quality was made the arrangement would be liable to be scrapped is ruthlessly capricious. In the circumstances, the respondent's action in terminating the arrangement in the manner in which it has been done is patently arbitrary and devoid of fair play and is liable to be quashed for that reason. 31. The action of the respondents in terminating the arrangement in the manner in which it has been done also offends against the doctrine of legitimate expectation on which the learned Advocate for the petitioner laid great emphasis. The doctrine of legitimate expectation is comparatively a recent development. A terse discussion of the topic is to be found at page-151 of volume-I(I) of Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition (re-issue). A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has a meaningful play particularly where the person in whose favour the expectation is generated has no enforceable legal right to receive the expected treatment. It is needless to mention that even a legal right of a person will generate an expectation, obviously legitimate expectation that the authority concerned will not violate his legal right, yet the expectation in such case will have only a supplemental. if not superfluous effect in the matter of enforcement of such right because even apart from legitimate expectation, a legal right, if it exists, is independently enforceable by reason of its own merit without depending upon the doctrine of legitimate expectation. This doctrine, in the arena of law and justice has rather a very positive and effective role where the person concerned has no legal right to receive such treatment but a legitimate expectation to be treated in a particular way has nonetheless been generated in his favour. It is also needless to mention that mere expectation will not suffice and what is necessary is legitimate expectation. The legitimacy or the reasonableness of the expectation indeed depends upon the facts and circumstances involved in each situation. It is also needless to mention that mere expectation will not suffice and what is necessary is legitimate expectation. The legitimacy or the reasonableness of the expectation indeed depends upon the facts and circumstances involved in each situation. That is why in the matter of its application the doctrine needs a careful and discreet handling. Inapt handling of this doctrine has the risk of turning it to an unruly horse. Again, the application of this doctrine even in cases where it rightly applies may involve different consequences casewise. It may be giving of locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review. It may mean that the authority ought not to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy. It may mean that the authority proposing to defeat a legitimate expectation should afford the person concerned an opportunity to make representation on the matter. There may also be other consequences (see, Halsbury, ibid). The decision of the Madras High Court in (30) Selvi Travels v. Union of India, AIR 1993 Madras 216 and the decision of the Supreme Court in (31) Navjyoti Coo-Group Housing Society v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 155 are illustrations of cases where the opportunity to make representation to the concerned authority against proposed action is the consequence of the legitimate expectation of the aggrieved person. The decision of the (32) House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All ER 935 as cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner along with the decisions referred to above is an instance where the legitimate expectation of the aggrieved person gave rise to a right to judicial review which was generated by denial of the legitimate expectation of getting an opportunity of making a representation before the impugned decision was taken by the authority to the prejudice of the aggrieved person. In this connection, it may be noted here that in the said decision of the House of Lords it was also held that administrative action is subject to control by judicial review under three heads, namely, (1) illegality, (2) irrationality and (3) procedural impropriety. It is needless to mention that those heads cover the doctrine of non-arbitrariness and fair play in action as ingrained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 32. It is needless to mention that those heads cover the doctrine of non-arbitrariness and fair play in action as ingrained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 32. In the present case it will be an extravagant proposition and an instance of the doctrine of legitimate expectation turning to be an unruly horse, to say that once the petitioner has been allotted time slot for telecasting 10 episodes of the sponsored programme Madhuri, a legitimate expectation in favour of the petitioner is generated to the extent that she must be allowed by Doordarshan to telecast all the 10 episodes without being subjected to any quality control requirements. As we have seen even in the very first letter allotting time slot in favour of the petitioner Doordarshan Authorities made it specific that the technical quality should be good/telecastworthy. Therefore the legitimate expectation in the present case cannot legitimately extend to the extent of raising an expectation in favour of the petitioner that she will have an unrestrained opportunity of telecasting all her stipulated episodes free from the legitimate requirements of quality control regarding the technical quality of the programme. But undoubtedly the course of dealings between the parties and the continual interaction as discussed earlier definitely raises a legitimate expectation in favour of the petitioner that the arrangement to telecast the episodes will not be abruptly scrapped and the door for rectification of the shortcomings if there be any, in any particular episode will not be closed without at least giving prior notice or warning that the arrangement would be liable to be cancelled or discontinued if necessary rectification as pointed out is not made within a reasonable period stipulated for the purpose. As we have seen the respondents abruptly withdrew and cancelled the arrangement to the prejudice of the petitioner without communicating to the petitioner as to what were the specific shortcomings, if at all, in the 6th, 7th and 8th episodes or in any of them and without giving any opportunity to rectify the same within any stipulated period. As we have seen the respondents abruptly withdrew and cancelled the arrangement to the prejudice of the petitioner without communicating to the petitioner as to what were the specific shortcomings, if at all, in the 6th, 7th and 8th episodes or in any of them and without giving any opportunity to rectify the same within any stipulated period. The decision making process involved in the impugned decision of the respondents did not take into consideration the legitimate expectation of the petitioner in the facts and circumstances that if any shortcoming was found in the 6th, 7th or 8th episode by the respondents after preview, the same would be specifically pointed out for rectification as was done in respect of some earlier episodes. This is a vital infirmity in the decision making process which vitiates the impugned decision of the respondents. There is no doubt that the Doordarshan Authorities have a right to ask the petitioner to rectify the shortcomings, if there be any so as to make the episodes telecastworthy for an entertainment programme in the interest of the viewers and the petitioner indeed is also obligated to comply with the legitimate requirements of the Doordarshan Authorities regarding audio and video quality of the programme so as to make the same telecastworthy by the expected standard of an entertainment programme in the interest of the viewers, but the Doordarshan Authorities have to act and proceed in the matter not in an arbitrary way but in a manner consistent with the doctrine of non-arbitrariness and fair play in action as ingrained in Article 14 which unfortunately they did not do as elaborately discussed. The impugned letter dated the 29th June, 1993 of the Doordarshan Authorities communicating to the petitioner their decision to discontinue the telecast of the sponsored programme cannot therefore be sustained and the same must be struck down. 33. The learned Advocate for the petitioner in support of his argument regarding copy right, passing off and unfair competition attracted my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court of New South Wales-Equity Division in Hexagon Pty. Ltd. v. Austrilian Broadcasting Corporation, reported in 7 Austrilian Law Reports. Page-233. The learned Advocate for the respondents on the other hand attracted my attention to the decision in (33) K. Publishing House v. Tra. Co. Ltd. v. Austrilian Broadcasting Corporation, reported in 7 Austrilian Law Reports. Page-233. The learned Advocate for the respondents on the other hand attracted my attention to the decision in (33) K. Publishing House v. Tra. Co. Govt., AIR 1952 Travancore Cochin 38 in support of his contention that a writ does not lie in respect of infringement of copyright. It is however also argued by him that no question of copy-right is involved in this case. Since in the present case the petitioner's sponsored programme is a programme of Bengali Film Songs it cannot be argued on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has a copy-right in the matter of telecasting those film songs. The question of passing off and unfair competition also, for obvious reason, does not arise in the present case. 34. The only other aspect which is now required to be discussed is the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the Doordarshan Authorities cannot interfere with or violate the petitioner's freedom of expression as enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) by refusing to telecast the petitioner's sponsored programme Madhuri, In this connection, the learned Advocate for the petitioner attracted my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (34) Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Manuhhai D. Shah, AIR 1993 SC 171 . In that decision the Supreme Court dealt with two cases. In one of the cases the writ petitioner published a study paper portraying the discriminatory practices adopted by the LIC which adversely affected the interest of a large number of policy holders. As a counter to that study paper the LIC published an Article in their magazine 'Yogakshema'. The writ petitioner then requested the LIC to publish his rejoinder to the said article in the said magazine, but his request was turned down. He then filed the writ petition contending that the refusal to publish his rejoinder in the magazine violated his fundamental right under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The High Court held that in the interest of democracy and free society the magazine should be available to both an admirer and a critic, for dissemination of information and held that the UC had violated the writ petitioner's fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) by refusing to publish his rejoinder and directed the LIC to publish the same in the next issue of the magazine. The Supreme Court on appeal affirmed the decision of the High Court. It may be noticed that there the LIC had published an article in their magazine as a counter to a view expressed elsewhere about the discriminatory practices adopted by the LIC, but they refused to publish the rejoinder of the writ petitioner in the matter in their magazine. It is evident that in their magazine the LIC had published something controverting a view already expressed elsewhere in respect of a matter which was obviously a matter of interest and concern for the general public and the policy holders and therefore obviously refusal to publish the other view in the magazine was tantamount to suppression of the freedom of expression of a critic in respect of a view expressed and published in the very same magazine of the LIC. In our present case however, unlike the said LIC case, no question of any freedom of expression is involved inasmuch as the petitioner's programme has been discontinued not for suppressing any view point in any matter but for the simple reason that the technical quality of the petitioner's programme was not telecastworthy. 35. In the see odd case dealt with by the Supreme Court in that decision in LIC of India v. Manubhai (Supra) the writ petitioner had produced a documentary film on the Bhopal Gas Disaster titled 'Beyond Genocide'. This film was awarded the Golden Lotus, being the best non-feature film of 1987. The writ petitioner contended that at the time of presentation of the awards the Central Minister for Information & Broadcasting had made a declaration that the award winning short films would be telecast on Doordarshan. The writ petitioner submitted for telecast his film to Doordarshan but Doordarshan refused to telecast the same on the ground that 'the contents being outdated do not have relevance now for the telecast'. The writ petitioner ultimately filed the writ petition challenging the refusal on the ground of violation of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) and for a mandamus to Doordarshan to telecast the same. In the counter filed to the writ petition it was contended that although a decision was taken to arrange a fixed fortnightly telecast of award winning documentaries, no decision was taken to telecast all national award winning documentaries. In the counter filed to the writ petition it was contended that although a decision was taken to arrange a fixed fortnightly telecast of award winning documentaries, no decision was taken to telecast all national award winning documentaries. The Screening Committee which pre-viewed the writ petitioner's documentary film found that the film did not meet the requirement of the norm for selection of a film for telecast as it lacked moderation and restraint in judging things and expressing opinions. If also took into consideration, in refusing telecast, the fact that while most of the claims for compensation for the victims of Bhopal Disaster were sub-judice and political parties were raising certain issues, it was inexpedient and unwise to telecast the film and it was also feared that it would only end in further vitiating the atmosphere and would serve no social purpose. The High Court came to the conclusion that the writ petitioner's right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution obligated Doordarshan to telecast the film since the guidelines or norms on which the refusal was based were purely executive in character and not law within the meaning of Article 19(2). The High Court directed Doordarshan to telecast the film 'Beyond Genocide' at a time and date convenient to it keeping in view the public interest and on such terms and conditions as it would like to impose in accordance with law. Against that an appeal was preferred to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court however refused to interfere with the order of the High Court. The Supreme Court analysed the grounds of refusal a, advanced by Doordarshan and found, particularly in paragraph 23 of the said decision, that the grounds were factually not correct. In this connection, the Supreme Court observed there : "If the norm for appraisal was the same as applied by the censors while granting the 'D' certificate, it is difficult to understand how Doordarshan could refuse to exhibit it. It is not that it was not sent for being telecast soon after the disaster that one could say that it is outdated or has lost relevance. It is even today of relevance and the press has been writing about it periodically. The learned Additional Solicitor General was not able to point out how it could be said that the film was not consistent with the accepted norms set out earlier. It is even today of relevance and the press has been writing about it periodically. The learned Additional Solicitor General was not able to point out how it could be said that the film was not consistent with the accepted norms set out earlier. Doordarshan being a State controlled agency funded by public funds could not have denied access to the screen to the respondent except on valid grounds". The above observations would show that the question of relevance in the particular context may be a matter for consideration in judging the merit of the claim of the right to telecast or broadcast through State controlled media where such claim is based on freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a). In the said case Doordarshan refused to telecast the film on grounds which were directly related to the freedom of expression and therefore the grounds were subject to the test of Article 19(2) for their validity. In our present case, no question of freedom of expression is at all involved as a matter of relevance in the particular context. Here Doordarshan discontinued the petitioner's sponsored programme on the ground of deficiency in audio and video quality of the programme and not for anything relating to freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a). In the circumstances, it is difficult to accept the argument that the petitioner has an unrestricted right to telecast its sponsored programme Madhuri through Doordarshan as a part of his freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a) free from any control on technical quality of this entertainment programme Madhuri, technical quality being indeed a relevant factor for rendering the programme telecastworthy in the interest of viewers. In the present context Article 19(1)(a) is therefore not at all attracted nor is the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court applicable. Since however for reasons elaborately discussed earlier the impugned action of the Doordarshan Authorities has been found to be arbitrary and lacking fair play in action thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution, the intervention of this court is found to be necessary in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The impugned letter dated the 29th June, 1993 which is Annexure H to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The impugned letter dated the 29th June, 1993 which is Annexure H to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The petitioner is directed to re-submit the cassettes of the 6th, 7th and 8th episodes of the sponsored programme Madhuri to the Doordarshan Authorities within 10 days from this date and the remaining two cassettes namely the cassettes of the 9th and 10th episodes within one week thereafter, the Doordarshan Authorities, as was offered, will allow reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to use the telecine of the Doordarshan Kendra, Calcutta in connection with the preparation of or rectification in the said cassettes on payment of necessary charges. After submission of the cassettes by the petitioner as directed above the Doordarshan Authorities shall preview the same and inform the petitioner within a week from the date of such submission, about the necessary rectification, if any, legitimately required to be made in the said cassettes/episodes or in anyone or more of them so as to make the same telecastworthy in accordance with the usual standard followed by Doordarshan in the interest of the viewers. In that event such cassettes shall be re-submitted by the petitioner after necessary rectification within one week from the date of receipt of information from Doordarshan about the necessity of such rectification and thereafter the Doordarshan Authorities shall act in the matter in accordance with law. In the event, the petitioner refuses or falls to comply with this direction of the Court or with the legitimate instructions of Doordarshan Authorities for rectification as may be informed in compliance with this order, the Doordarshan Authorities will have the right to exercise its power to cancel the arrangement in a manner not inconsistent with the norms of fair play and non-arbitrariness. Since in view of the quashing of the impugned letter dated the 29th June, 1993 the arrangement between the parties for telecast of the petitioner's sponsored programme Madhuri revives automatically, the respondents, during the subsistence of this arrangement, shall not use the caption Madhuri for telecasting any programme except the petitioner's sponsored programme Madhuri nor shall permanently allot, to anyone else, during the subsistance of the revived arrangement, the time slot allotted to the petitioner under the said arrangement for telecast of the sponsored programme Madhuri. During the subsistence of the said arrangement the respondents however shall not telecast during the time slot allotted to the petitioner any particular film song included in any of the 5 episodes of the petitioner's programme which are yet to be telecast, a list of which songs has already been given by the petitioner to the Doordarshan Authorities. It is hoped that both parties complying with this order the telecast of the remaining five episodes will be completed within twelve weeks from the date, if not earlier. The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly. No cost is however ordered.