B. M. MITRA, J. ( 1 ) THE instant Misc. Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 8th May, 1990 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, 6th Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 442 of 1988 and in terms of the order passed therein the appeal was allowed and the Appeal Court remitted the case back to the Trial Court. The Trial Court by its judgment and order No. 47 dated 29. 8. 88 disposed of an application on twin points namely, whether the suit is maintainable in view of non-joinder of necessary ,parties and the point of limitation. The Trial Court has recorded a finding while making disposal of the said application that the suit is barred by law of non-joinder of necessary parties. A suit may be bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, but it is difficult to reconcile to the proposition of law that there may be an absolute bar of a suit flowing from non-joinder of necessary parties. That apart the said point cannot be taken up as a preliminary point within the meaning of the proviso superseded to Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil procedure which contemplates preliminary points being restricted to the eventualities- (1) where the Court is not competent to try the suit for want of jurisdiction, and (2) where a bar has been created by operation of law and/or self contained statute. The point about non-joinder of parties does not ipso facto satisfy the teat of the preliminary point. Another point was, a point of maintainability and the Appeal Court has reversed the finding of the Trial Court on the footing that the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law and as such the same cannot be gone into at the point of threshold by way of preliminary point nor it can be included within the ambit of the proviso to Order 14 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court passed a peculiar order while making disposal of the said petition by simpliciter holding that the suit is not maintainable. The same is preceded by finding that the suit is barred by limitation and the court fees paid are correct. The expression in the penultimate portion about payment of court fees is of germane sequence. ( 2 ) MR. The same is preceded by finding that the suit is barred by limitation and the court fees paid are correct. The expression in the penultimate portion about payment of court fees is of germane sequence. ( 2 ) MR. M. L. Bhattacharyya, learned Advocate appearing for the appellant, has primarily centred his attention on the proposition that no appeal lies against the order passed by the Trial Court as it does not satisfy the meaning of the expression "decree". The term "decree" has been defined in section (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. "decree" means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to, all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. ( 3 ) THE expression used in the defination column about conclusive determination of the rights of the parties is of pivotal significance and the same determination may relate to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit as may be either preliminary or final. Mr. Bhattacharyya has also tried to draw a line of distinction between the right to sue or to proceed with the suit in the form of carriage of proceeding and determination of relevant issue arrived at the trial. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya, if a parry is precluded at the point of threshold to embark into a journey for a legal combat in the field of determination either of the issues or of the controversies involved therein, that cannot satisfy the test of definition of a decree. Mr. Bhattacharyya has made copious references from earliest decisions of this Court in order to substantiate his points that the impugned order passed by the trial court partakes of the character of a decree within the meaning of section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his contention Mr. Bhattacharya has referred to a decision in the case of Shib Sharan Sha v. Janaki Nath Dey and Others, reported in 18 CJ 78 where it was held that where out of manifold issues only two issues were taken up for hearing and they were decided. In support of his contention Mr. Bhattacharya has referred to a decision in the case of Shib Sharan Sha v. Janaki Nath Dey and Others, reported in 18 CJ 78 where it was held that where out of manifold issues only two issues were taken up for hearing and they were decided. The other issues being left off to be proceeded whit on a later date, the same will not he open to an appeal as it cannot be deemed as a decree. Mr. Bhattacharyya has also referred to the case of Manash Ranjan Chakrabarly v. Tropical Accumuslators Ltd. , reported in AIR 1957 Cal 135 where it has been held that the order holding that the Court has jurisdiction to try to the suit as preliminary issue is neither a decree nor an order appellable under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Bhattacharyya has also referred to some other decision of contemporaneous period namely, the decisions reported in AIR 1964 SC 497 at paragraphs 36 and 37 and he has also relied on another decision which is reported in Cal. Law Times 1989 Vol. II Page 196. It is the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya that the order impugned does not and cannot come within the ambit of the connotation of the expression "decree". ( 4 ) THIS Court has given its anxious consideration to the submissions of Mr. Bhattacharyya and this Court finds that the Trial Court has recorded two vital things namely, the suit is not maintainable and court fees paid there are correct. A reference may also be given in this context to the language of Order 20 Rule 6a of the Code where pursuant to the amendment of the Civil Procedure Code it has been specifically laid down that where a decree has not been drawn up an appeal may be preferred and the last paragraph of the judgment shall for the purpose of Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code he treated as a decree. ( 5 ) THIS Court could not agree with the submissions of Mr. ( 5 ) THIS Court could not agree with the submissions of Mr. Bhattacharyya because according to the opinion of this Court that when the order of the learned Trial Judge conclusively determined the rights of the parties touching the matter in controversy as a result of which the suit could not have been proceeded with determination of reliefs of the suit in eventualities will coincide with the termination of the pending lis. A reference may also be given in this context to the case of Kanji Hirjibhai Gondalia v. Jivaraj Dharmshi, reported in AIR 1976 Guj 152 wherein it has been held that where the decision of the learned Trial Judge so far as the relief for possession was concerned was a substantive decision which was negatived because of the disposal of a preliminary point. Even by way of an analogous illustration a reference may be made about an order passed under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure whereby the Court disallows the plea of a person to get any damage against some of the defendants and as between such persons and others the order according to that decision must be considered to be a decree within the meaning of Subsection (2) of section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the same has been held to be appellable. Next a reference may he made about the case of Narayan Chandra De v. Pratirodh Sahini, reported in AIR 1991 Cal 53 where a learned Single Judge of this Court held that counter claim for all intentions and purposes will be deemed as a suit and dismissal of the counter claim as non-maintainable will amount to a decree. Mr. Bhattacharyya has referred to the decisions which in my opinion do not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case. Even if an issue is determined but the lis continues, the same altogether projects a different scenario. Prevention of a party litigant to come at the stage of an effective combat resulting in total denial of all the reliefs claimed by him irrespective of the controversies in the suit cannot but be deemed to have the effect of a decree. Even if an issue is determined but the lis continues, the same altogether projects a different scenario. Prevention of a party litigant to come at the stage of an effective combat resulting in total denial of all the reliefs claimed by him irrespective of the controversies in the suit cannot but be deemed to have the effect of a decree. This Court further feels that the reasoning as prompting this High Court to pass the aforesaid judgment squarely applies to this case also because here the decision in question is likely to drop a final curtain with regard to the scrutiny of the rights of the parties being much short of determination of their rights. The operative portion of the judgment of the Trial Court that the suit is not maintainable and the court fees paid are correct cannot leave any room for doubt that the suit is finally disposed of. Mere emission either to draw a decree or to record that the suit is dismissed will not bring it outside the purview of the decree. If the suit is vested with pernicious consequence of dismissal in complete denial of the reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs, the same assumed the texture of a decree. Accordingly this Court cannot accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya appearing on behalf of the appellant. This Court further feels that the Appeal Court has rightly remitted the case back on remand because the points which have been disposed of as preliminary could not have been done so by the learned Trial Court as the preliminary points have a distinct connotation after the amendments of the Civil Procedure Code. Accordingly, the judgment of the Appeal Court is hereby sustained. The appeal thus stands dismissed. There shall, however, be the direction upon the learned Munsif for expeditious disposal of the suit. There will be no order as to costs. No decree need be drawn up. Appeal dismissed.