H. L. GOKHALE, J. ( 1 ) HEARD Mr. Rajesh Dave for the petitioner and Mrs. Vasavadatta a. Bhatt for the respondents. The petitioner was appointed as a driver under second respondent-Urban Land Tribunal by the order dated 10-11-1989. The condition No. 1 of appointment order states that the said appointment was only for one year on a probationary basis. These conditions are in Gujarati. The paragraph prior thereto, however, uses the English word "probation". The petitioner was given an extension for a period of six months by order dated 28-11-1989. The said letter also says that the petitioners probationary period was being extended by further six months. The services of the petitioner were subsequently terminated before the expiry of the said period of six months by order dated 9-5-1990 stating therein that his services were not required. The said order of termination is challenged in this petition. ( 2 ) I have heard Mr. Dave in support of the petition who has made various submissions. Firstly, he has tried to contend that although the post on which the petitioner was appointed was not a permanent one, his appointment was on a temporary basis and not as a probation. He tried to derive the advantage from the gujarati words "taddan Hangami Dhorane" used prior to the words "probationary driver" in the paragraph prior to the conditions. The words "taddan Hangami dhorane" would mean "purely temporary basis". These words cannot enhance the status of the petitioner to that of temporary employee. The phrase of "purely temporary basis" used in the present order is only by way of emphasis. The condition no. 1 of the appointment order specifically states that the appointment of the petitioner was for one year on probationary basis ("ajmayashi Dhorane" ). The same phrase is used in the letter dated 28-11-1989 extending the probationary period. Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was appointed on temprorary basis. ( 3 ) BASED on this averment, Mr. Dave tried to contend that since he was in a temporary post, a necessary notice prior to termination was required to be given under Rule 33 (1) (b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959, as applicable in gujarat. Based further thereon he relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court delivered in the case of Sub-Div. Dave tried to contend that since he was in a temporary post, a necessary notice prior to termination was required to be given under Rule 33 (1) (b) of the Bombay Civil Service Rules, 1959, as applicable in gujarat. Based further thereon he relied upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court delivered in the case of Sub-Div. Soil Conservation Officer v. M. M. Saiyed, reported in 1990 (1) GLR 495 to contend that since the requisite notice was not given, the termination of the petitioner was bad in law. However, since the appointment of the petitioner was not on a temporary basis, the ratio of the said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. ( 4 ) MR. Dave then contended that the order of termination does not state any reasons and, therefore, the same is bad in law. The order of termination states that the petitioner was appointed initially on a probationary basis for one year and the said period was subsequently extended by six months. If further states that since his services were no longer required, he was being relieved by virtue of the said order. Now, if one sees the appointment order, condition No. 5 of that order clearly states that during the course of the probationary period the probationer can be relieved without any notice in case the petitioners performance is not statisfactory or for any other reason. This being the term of the employment and when the post itself was temporary one, no reasons were required to be given to the petitioner and the said order cannot be said to be in breach of any principles of natural justice in that behalf though the submission is not advanced before me in that manner. ( 5 ) THE next submission of Mr. Dave is that the impugned order is basically a punitive one and that being so, the petitioner should have been given the opportunity of being heard by holding a regular enquiry. Now, as stated above, the order on the face of it is an order of simple discharge from service since the petitioners services were not required and the same had been issued before the period of probation was over. The said order does not make any allegations against the petitioner and, therefore, it cannot be said to be punitive one. Mr. The said order does not make any allegations against the petitioner and, therefore, it cannot be said to be punitive one. Mr. Dave further tried to contend that when the petitioner lodged a complaint in the office of the labour Commissioner, a reply was given by the respondents and the said reply showed the reasons behind the termination which indicated that actually the intention was to punish the petitioner. He has tried to draw the advantage from the said reply dated 6-12-1993. The said reply states in para 2 that the petitioner was on a probationary basis and in case he remained absent or his performance was not satisfactory, he was liable to be terminated without any notice. Para 3 of the said reply points out to the manner in which the petitioner functioned while working as a driver indicating his unsuitability for the said post. Paras 4 and 5 point out that the petitioner was not remaining present from time to time and was leaving the office without any intimation and hence was given oral as well as written notices and that the petitioner had given reply stating that he would not repeat such things. Along with the said reply, the memos issued to the petitioner and his replies were enclosed. It was also stated in the said paragraphs that the petitioner was not behaving properly with the other employees and he had given an appology in writing, a copy of which was also enclosed therewith. Although the petitioner has annexed this reply to his petition, he has not enclosed the above annexures to this reply for reasons which are obvious. In any case, based on the various statements contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said reply it was contended that the said paragraphs contain allegations with respect to not performing the duties properly and habitual absence and since these allegations amounted to misconduct, an enquiry was necessary. As stated by me above, this explanation along with its annexures was tendered to the Labour Commissioner only after the petitioner lodged the complaint. In the termination order no allegation whatsoever was made and the reply before the Labour Commissioner only gives the reasons why the respondents thought it fit to discontinue the petitioner. As stated by me above, this explanation along with its annexures was tendered to the Labour Commissioner only after the petitioner lodged the complaint. In the termination order no allegation whatsoever was made and the reply before the Labour Commissioner only gives the reasons why the respondents thought it fit to discontinue the petitioner. It cannot be said that in the facts of this case, that the action was in any way by way of punishing the petitioner or it casts any stigma on him. ( 6 ) MR. Dave then relied on a couple of authorities in support of his submission. Firstly, he has relied upon the judgment of a single Judge of this Court delivered in the case of M. V. Makwana v. State of Gujarat and Anr. , reported in 1991 (1) GLH 1 : ( 1991 (1) GLR 179 ) wherein the Court has held that action of termination of a temporary employee for remaining absent frequently in the facts of that case amounted to a punitive action. There cannot be a dispute that frequent absence can amount to a misconduct. The question is whether in a particular case the action is being taken for a particular misconduct as such. Besides, the rights arising out of such action would depend upon the gravity of the misconduct alleged and the protection available to the employee would depend upon the status of his appointment. In the instant case the status of appointment of the petitioner was that of a probationer, liable to be terminated without a notice and the intention of the respondents was not to stigmatise the petitioner or to find out something or the other and to throw him out. Therefore, said authority will have no application to the facts of present case. ( 7 ) THE next judgment shown by Mr. Dave is an unreported judgment of this Court delivered in Special Civil Application No. 2501 of 1991. That was a case of a temporary employee in a permanent post who had been extended in his probation period from time to time and it was his apprehension that since he belonged to Scheduled Caste he was not being confirmed and he had written to the Commissioner of Scheduled Castes in that behalf and alleged that his discontinuation was effected for that reason. In the peculiar facts of the case, the learned Judge held that it amounted to taking a punitive action which cannot be said to be a case in the present petition. ( 8 ) MR. Dave has also relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court delivered in the case of Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1974 SC 2192 to contend that the form of the order is not decisive as to whether the order is by way of punishment and that in spite of an innocuously worded order terminating the services, the facts and circumstances of a case may establish that an enquiry into allegations of serious and grave character of misconduct involving stigma has been made in infraction of provisions of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. There cannot be any dispute about this proposition but I fail to understand how it can be extended to the present case. Merely because the present order of termination states that the services are discontinued since they are not required and subsequently the explanation is given when the petitioner lodged a complaint to the Labour Commissioner, it does not mean that there was any infraction of any such rights and that the action in any way cast a stigma. ( 9 ) SAMSHER Singhs case was that of subordinate judicial officer at the relevant time appointed on a probationary basis. In that case, the inquiry was conducted by the Director of Vigilance and the Statements of witnesses were recorded behind the back of the appellant concerned and thereafter the action was taken against him. There in the facts of that case the Supreme Court held, "the fact of holding an enquiry is not always conclusive. What is decisive is whether the order is really by way of punishment. If the facts and circumstances of the case indicate that substance of the order is that the termination is by way of punishment then a probationer is entitled to the protection of Art. 311. " The Supreme Court also held in that case that "in the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any termperamental or orther object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. " The Supreme Court also held in that case that "in the absence of any rules governing a probationer in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that on account of inadequacy for the job or for any termperamental or orther object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No punishment is involved in this. " ( 10 ) MR. Dave lastly relied upon the judgment of a single Judge of this Court delivered in the case of Miss Chaula Kuruwa v. Tourism Corporation of Gujarat, reported in 1991 (1) GLH 383 : ( 1991 (2) GLR 775 ) where the petitioner who was appointed as a Deputy Manager (Publicity) on a probation period of one year came to be terminated after two extensions on account of her work not being satisfactory. In the meanwhile, annual increments had been released to the petitioner though no details were supplied as to in what manner the work was not satisfactory. The termination was held to be arbitrary and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Dave submitted that since the termination order did not give any reasons in the present case also it should be held to be violatvie of Art. 14 of the constitution of India. As stated by me earlier, in the facts of the present case, the petitioner himself knew as to what were the complaints against him and he had apologised for his mistakes. He was already given opportunity to improve. As per the appointment order he was liable to be terminated during the probationary period without any notice the moment it was found that his services were not satisfactory. In the reply given before the Labour Commissioner the reasons have been explained which would show that on a number of occasions the petitioner was asked to give his explanation and he has given his replies including apology on one occasion. The aforesaid judgment, in my understanding, will have no application to the facts of the present case. In the reply given before the Labour Commissioner the reasons have been explained which would show that on a number of occasions the petitioner was asked to give his explanation and he has given his replies including apology on one occasion. The aforesaid judgment, in my understanding, will have no application to the facts of the present case. ( 11 ) IN this connection, it is material to note that it has been laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Municipal Corporation, Raipur v. Ashok Kumar Misra, reported in 1991 (3) SCC 325 that a mere expiry of any period of probation does not automatically entitle anybody for confirmation and the rights of a probationer will continue to be governed by the terms under which he has been appointed until his confirmation. This being the position, the appointment letter and the actions taken thereafter based thereon by the respondents are quite clear and valid in our case. ( 12 ) THE last submission advanced by Mr. Dave is that the action of the respondent No. 3 in declining the reference of the dispute to the appropriate Court, that is, Industrial Disputes Tribunal, was bad in law. The order of the Labour Commissioner dated 16-2-1994 states that since the Bombay Civil Service Rules were available to the petitioner, Industrial Disputes Act would not be applicatble to him. In the instant case, the petitioner was working as an employee of the Urban Land Tribunal, which in no case can be considered to be an industry and hence the denial of the reference cannot be held to be invalid. This being the position, I do not find any substance in the petition and the same is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. Notice discharged. .