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1994 DIGILAW 251 (CAL)

MAGNUM ENTERPRISES REPRESENTED BY SURINDRA BANTTA v. STATE AND SANJIB KISORE BASU

1994-08-12

N.K.BHATTACHARYYA

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N. K. BHATTACHARYYA, J. ( 1 ) NO one appears on behalf of the State of West Bengal in spite of notice and the affidavit of service having been filed. Let the affidavit of service affirmed on 3rd February, 1994 be kept on record. ( 2 ) - This revision is at the instance of the partnership firm under the name and style of M/s. Magnum Enterprises, represented by one Surinder Bantia, a partner of the Firm. The petitioner herein challenged the order dated 4th May, 1992 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 5th Court, Alipore, South 24-Parganas, in Case No. C 393 of 1992, directing issuance of warrant of arrest against the firm. ( 3 ) THE fact giving rise to this present revisional application is that the opposite party no. 2 herein filed a petition of complaint before the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, against the Firm, petitioner herein, and its partner Sri Surinder Bantia and the Manager of the Firm, Sri Bejoy Bahadur Singh, alleging an offence against these accused persons under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The partner and the manager of the firm in answer to the summons as issued by the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, appeared before the court on the 4th May, 1992 and they informed the court that the accused no. 1 being the firm, cannot appear before the court Upon the prayer of the learned Advocate for the complainant the learned Magistrate by his order no. 4 dated 4th May, 1992 directed issuance of warrant of arrest and proclamation of attachment. ( 4 ) THE firm being represented by Sri Surinder Bantia has come up in revision. ( 5 ) APPEARING for the petitioner, Mr. Asoke Kumar Mukherjee, learned Advocate, contended that the firm is not a juristic person and as such no warrant of arrest or process can be issued against that firm. In this context he referred to Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act. His next contention was that the firm even if a juristic person, though it is not, cannot have any mew rear in an offence under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code and in the absence of mens rea no process or warrant of arrest can be issued against the firm. In support of his argument strong reliance was placed by him in the case of A. K. Khosla and Ors. In support of his argument strong reliance was placed by him in the case of A. K. Khosla and Ors. v. T. S. Venkatesan and anr. reported in 1992 Cr LJ 1448. He particularly laid stress on paragraph 9 of that judgment at page 1455, where a single Judge of this Court relied on the judgment in the case of Sunil Chandra Bunerjee v. Krishna Chandra Nath reported in AIR 1949 Cal 689 where the court in that judgment had held, inter alia, that "the Bank is a person, but it is a juridical person and not an actual person. The Bank is such that it cannot be said to have the mens rea requisite for the offence of cheating. The Bank as such cannot be punished for cheating because it has no physical body. " On the basis of A. K. Khosla's case (supra) Mr. Mukherjee also tried to contend that the other tear laid down in that case is that where there is no other alternative for the court, but to impose a sentence of imprisonment in that case too, the court is not competent to issue either process for warrant of arrest against the firm or even against the juridical person. ( 6 ) THE learned Advocate for the opposite party no. 2, Mr. Md. Shafiul Alam, on the other hand, contended by referring to section 63 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 that a mode has been prescribed for service of process upon a firm or a company. He also referred to Section 141 (2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act for the purpose of showing that where an offence has been committed by a Company with the consent or connivance of or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary, or other officer of the Company, such director, Manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. He strongly relied on the expression "also" in that section which denotes (a) 'company means any body corporate and includes a turn or other association of individuals; and (b) 'director', in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. So, the process should be issued against the company. He strongly relied on the expression "also" in that section which denotes (a) 'company means any body corporate and includes a turn or other association of individuals; and (b) 'director', in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm. So, the process should be issued against the company. In Support of his contention he also relied on the gist of a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Dilip Kumar Jaiswal v. Debapriya Banerjee reported in 1993 Crl LJ 2165. The case is regarding the offence under section 138 (7), 141 (as amended) by the Banking Public Financial Institution and Negotiable Instruments Law Amendment Act, 1988. In that decision it has been held, inter alia, that when a cheque was signed by the petitioner and was issued by him for a private limited company viz. Hisco Steel Private Limited, as Director, the liability to make the payment being that of the limited company it was the limited company which was the drawer of the cheque and not the petitioner who is one of its director. During the time of issuing the cheque he was acting for and on behalf of the limited company. Therefore, the cheque so issued by the limited company was by the limited company and as a limited company has to act through its instrumentality such as a director or a secretary or any other financial officer. But that would not make him the maker of the cheque Rod the company is to be held to be the maker of the cheque. ( 7 ) HEARD the submissions of the learned Advocates for the parties. Considered the materials on record. It is well settled by judicial decisions that a firm is a short collective name for the individual partner who constitute the firm and is not a legal entity or artificial person as a corporation is, although for convenience the firm name truly be used for the purpose of suing and being sued. The use of the word 'firm' in a suit or proceeding (Or. XXX, r. 1, Civil Procedure Code) is nothing more than a convenient method for denoting the persons who constituted the firm at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. The use of the word 'firm' in a suit or proceeding (Or. XXX, r. 1, Civil Procedure Code) is nothing more than a convenient method for denoting the persons who constituted the firm at the time of the accrual of the cause of action. That being the position, the firm is not a juristic person and it cannot have any mens rea in case of cheating, particularly in an offence under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. ''his Court has repeatedly held that in the absence of mens rea, so far the company or a firm is concerned, no process can be issued against either the firm or the company. That is also the view taken in the case of A. K. Khoslo (supra) and Sunil Chandra Banerjee (supra ). ( 8 ) I cannot agree with the contention of Dr. Mukrerjee so far as it relates to the question of sentence. In an offence under section 500 of the Indian Penal Code, provision of alternative sentence is there i. e. either simple imprisonment or fine. So, that contention of Mr. Mukherjee is of no avail. The contention of the learned Advocate for the opposite party No. 2, Mr. Alam is also of no avail in this ease inasmuch as undoubtedly in the case of issuance of a cheque on behalf of the company or director or manager etc. there will be a vicarious liability as the cheque is to be deemed to have been issued on behalf of the company abut this is not the case like that. This is a case of libel and for that there must be a question of mens rea. The firm not being a physical embodyment can have any mens rea and as such no process can be issued against the firm. In that view of the matter, the impugned order so fat it relates to issuance of warrant of arrest and the proclamation of attachment relating to the firm is hereby set aside. The revisional application is thus allowed. Let xerox copies of this order be made available to the learned Advocates on record for both parties on their usual undertakings and upon compliance with necessary formalities. Application allowed.