M. V. TAMASKAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is filed against the judgment and decree passed by the First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Balaghat in Civil Suit No. 6b/ 8-B decided on 10-4-1990, decreeing a claim for damages valued at Rs. 30,000/ -. ( 2 ) LAXMINARAYAN was a son of one Chandanlal. Chandanlal and Mehtar are residents of the same village. Laxminarayan was a student and living at Balaghat. Chandanlal came to the house of Mehtar and proposed the marriage between his son Laxminarayan with Sumitra Bai, daughter of Mehtar aged about 16 years. After the said proposal made to Mehtar, Laxminarayan started visiting the house of Mehtar and persuaded Sumitra Bai to co-habit with him as they were going to be married soon. A suit was filed on the allegation that on 15-4-1986 Mangni took place and the marriage ceremony was to be performed in April, 1987. The defendants denied that there was any such Mangni or contract to marry and denied that there was any cohabitation by Laxminarayan with Sumitra Bai. ( 3 ) SUMITRA Bai became pregnant and delivered a still born child. A panchayat was held, a report was also lodged in the police station. In the Panchayat, the Sarpanch Chandanlal was present. Sumitra Bai made allegations that she had become pregnant through Laxminarayan. ( 4 ) ON the basis of these allegations, a suit for damages was filed, claiming Rs. 70,000/ -. However, the trial Court granted a decree for Rs. 30,000/ -. This judgment and decree is assailed by the learned counsel for the appellants on various submission. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the marriage under Hindu Law is not a contract and therefore, no damages can be awarded for breach of contract of marriage. Alternatively, it was submitted that no contract has been proved nor it has been shown that any ceremony was performed. It is also submitted that it may be criminal offence, but no claim can be made for the same in civil proceedings. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the evidence on the record on the first submission whether there was Mangni on 15-4-1986 at the house of Mehtar by Chandanlal, P. W. I Mehtar in his evidence clearly states this fact. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the evidence on the record on the first submission whether there was Mangni on 15-4-1986 at the house of Mehtar by Chandanlal, P. W. I Mehtar in his evidence clearly states this fact. His evidence is tried to be demolished on the ground that he has not stated anything regarding the functions to be followed in respect of Mangni. ( 6 ) IT has not been stated in the written statement that any ceremony is to be performed for Mangni. It is true that ceremonies are required to be performed for marriage without which the marriage would be void. The learned counsel also referred to the evidence of Sumitra Bai and Dulichand (P. W. 3 ). The evidence of Dulichand was tried to be demolished on the ground that he went forward and said that Rs. 10/- were given by Chandanlal after the Mangni. The evidence of P. W. 2 Sumitra Bai was criticised on the ground that she was not able to tell about the month in which the ceremony took place. ( 7 ) THE evidence of these three witnesses appears to be quite reliable. The trial Court has believed the evidence of these witnesses and there is nothing to discredit them. It is clear that taking advantage' of this Mangni, the appellant Laxminarayan started visiting the house of Mehtar and had relationship which culminated in pregnancy of the girl. ( 8 ) SUMITRA Bai believed that she was having a fair relation with Laxminarayan because of the Mangni whereas Laxminarayan had ulterior motive at the back of his mind and was merely taking advantage of the fact and ravishing the poor lady, who became pregnant before marriage, which does cast a stigma. It also makes the life of the woman miserable and it is also difficult to get married to a suitable match. ( 9 ) THE present suit has been filed for damages on account of the act on the part of the defendants refusal to marry resulting in plaintiff being responsible for carrying pregnancy illegitimately. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit is not framed to claim damages on the ground of defamation and mental torture, etc. but on the ground of breach of contract of marriage. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit is not framed to claim damages on the ground of defamation and mental torture, etc. but on the ground of breach of contract of marriage. If we read the plaint and the relief, it is quite clear that the damages have been claimed for the overall circumstances on the basis of which P. W. 2 Sumitra Bai was made to suffer indignity, defamation, mental torture as also physical discomfort. ( 10 ) THE statement of law is contained in Datt on Contract under Section 73 at page 576 as under:-"an express repudiation of a contract to marry may be treated as a as a breach and gives rise to an action for damages at once. Giving such notice at the earliest moment tends to mitigate, while delay in giving it necessarily aggravates, the injury to the party wronged. In case of seduction under a promise to marry the plaintiff and subsequent refusal to marry, the plaintiff is entitled not merely to the loss sustained by not becoming the wife of the defendant but to compensation for aggravation of that loss by reason of her prospects of marrying being Materially assended. A suit lies to claim damages for breach of promise of marriage. Damages awarded in English law for the breach of promise to marry from an exception to the general rule of damages in an action on breach of Contract where such damages are limited to the consequences of the breach alone. In the former case the damages are in the nature of an indemnity to the injured party for the loss she has sustained and embrace compensation for injuries to the feelings, affections, wounded pride, as well as for the loss of marriage. But in this country the law seems to be different. In a case for damages for breach by defendant of his contract to give his daughter in marriage to the plaintiff, the ordinary damages which follow from S. 73 should be allowed as in the case of any other contract. Under S. 65 the plaintiff is entitled to the return of his consideration, or compensation in respect of it, as on a failure of consideration. Under S. 65 the plaintiff is entitled to the return of his consideration, or compensation in respect of it, as on a failure of consideration. The principles on which damages are allowed by the English law as peculiar to the breach of a contract to marry should not be applied to the case of breach of a promise for valuable consideration made by the father of a girl to give her in marriage. In one case damages were awarded against the father of the girl for breach of a promise to marry her to the plaintiff, although it was pleaded that she was not willing to marry the plaintiff for some time. But it has been pointed out that "the Hindu law, by which these parties are governed, enacts that a father may break of his daughter's engagement should a more suitable bridegroam be available. "( 11 ) PRINCIPLE stated is only, in relation to breach of promise. But where under the garb of promise to marry, the girl is lured and subjected to physical criminal conversation, resulting in pregnancy the extent of damages will differ, on various counts, such as : physical pain, indignity, chances of marriage becoming dim, social stigma. ( 12 ) THE damages are awarded to compen-sate for the factors stated above. The pregnancy was the direct result of the act of Mangni. The refusal to marry aggravated the injury caused Thus, the damages cannot) merely be nominal but substantial. ( 13 ) MERELY because the appellants have been acquitted in the criminal case, it does not mean that no suit for damages can lie in Tort. Dignity of a woman in Hindu society is very much like glass-pan which crackes at the slightest injury. There being enough evidence on the record. The trial court rightly passed a decree against the defendants-appellants. ( 14 ) THE learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the decree for Rs. 30,000/- is also on higher side, it should not have been more than nominal decree. The chastity and the human dignity of a Hindu lady cannot be valued so low as is being tried by the learned counsel for the appellants. Had the defendants filed the cross-objections, the claim could have been enhanced, but since no crossobjections have been filed the amount awarded under the decree is affirmed. The judgment and decree do not suffer from any illegality. Had the defendants filed the cross-objections, the claim could have been enhanced, but since no crossobjections have been filed the amount awarded under the decree is affirmed. The judgment and decree do not suffer from any illegality. The appeal is dismissed accordingly with costs. Appeal dismissed. .