R. BHATTACHARYYA, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants, Bablu and Anarul Sheikh, who have suffered a conviction and sentence under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for having committed the murder of Manirul Haque on 21. 11. 83 at about 7. 30 a. m. , have come up in Appeal challenging the propriety and legality of the conviction and sentence. ( 2 ) MR. Talukdar, the learned Advocate, appearing in support of the Appeal before addressing ourselves to the merit of the Appeal has taken us through the judgement and the examination of the accused, in particular, Bablu Sk recorded by the learned trial Judge to indicate that the appellant was prima facie a minor as on the date of occurrence dated 21. 11. 83. ( 3 ) IT is glaring from his examination recorded under section 313 of the Cr. P. C. on 16. 12. 91 that he was 22 years of age. ( 4 ) THE learned trial Judge is categoric in the sentencing portion of the judgement about the claim put up dwelling on minority of his. ( 5 ) MR. Talukdar has submitted that by a mere arithmetical calculation, he was within the neighbourhood of 12 years, as evident. ( 6 ) ON perusal of the judgement, it is predominant that the beamed trial judge himself rejected the plea of minority by the reason of his failure to canvass such plea "at any stage of the trial. " The observation of the learned trial Judge is, therefore, extracted below for appreciation :-"it is seen that at the time of examination under section 313 Cr. P. C. accused Bablu Sk declared his age as 22 years. But, it appears to me seeing him personally that his age is much above the one declared by him. Moreover, it is seen that the accused did not raise the plea of minority at any stage of the case either in this Court or in the lower Court. " ( 7 ) THE above observations of the learned trial Judge does not find support from the record of the case. It is signally proved from Bablu's examination by the Court under section 313 Cr. P. C. that he cultivated such plea which was ignored. " ( 7 ) THE above observations of the learned trial Judge does not find support from the record of the case. It is signally proved from Bablu's examination by the Court under section 313 Cr. P. C. that he cultivated such plea which was ignored. It is apposite to mention that examination of the accused, as mandated by the Court, is a part of the trial which begins right from the stage of framing charge and recording of the plea of the accused which continues until the conclusion of the trial either by delivering a judgment of acquittal or conviction. It looms large from the legions of judicial precedents the above view Amrithappa and Another v. State of Karnataka, 1982 Cri LJ 1336 and Monaj Majumdar v. State of West Bengal, 1984 Cri LJ 28. But, it does not dispense with the intermediate step, as enshrined in the Code of Criminal Procedure viz. Section 233. It postulates the right of the accused to enter upon his defence unless acquitted by the Court. This right of the accused in the temple of section 233 of the Cr. P. C. affords him a right to canvass his own plea which does not exclude from the concept of trial. It we glance at his examination, it will show that at the very threshhold of his examination such plea towered its head. Such answer of the accused was not, therefore, an idle parade. ( 8 ) IN the backdrop of the above, it was not legitimate to conclude that the accused Bablu did not raise the plea of his minority, "at any stage of the case. " Such fording of the learned trial Judge on casual physical examination of the accused militates against the provision of section 233 Cr. P. C. , as tire obligation imposed by law is not relaxable, and, which does not even provide for imputation of knowledge of the Judge for determination of the same without being buttressed by the evidence of an expert. Though the Court is the expert of all the experts, yet the knowledge of the expert is essential which may be read as corroborative evidence. Though the Court is the expert of all the experts, yet the knowledge of the expert is essential which may be read as corroborative evidence. It has been forbidden by a catena of decisions, more often than not, that the Court should not take upon itself the task of an expert touching on "science or Art. " Even the comparison of signature or hand writing by the Judge, though provided under section 73 of the Evidence Act, 1872, but the Supreme Court has forewarned the Courts not to have recourse to such procedure -State Delhi Administration v. Paliram, 1979 SCC (Cri) 339: (1979)2 SCC 158 . ( 9 ) IN the situation, the accused was caught up or placed, it was the high time for tile learned trial Judge to cry a hault in the matter and to conduct an enquiry for ascertainment of his age through expert before the conclusion of the trial. We are tempted to refer to a decision of the apex Court while dealing with the West Bengal Children Act, 1959, which held in Gopinath Ghosh v. State, AIR 1984 SC 237 : 1984 Cr LJ 168 that. "care should, therefore, be taken that whenever a case is brought before the Magistrate and the accused appears to be aged 21 years or below, before proceeding with the trial or undertaking an enquiry, an enquiry must be made about the age of the accused on the date of the occurrence. " ( 10 ) IT appears on perusal of the above Act that no particular deadline has been fixed for resorting to such plea by the accused during the trial. It will be legitimate to hold that the concept of trial has received a wider connotation which includes the hearing of the Appeal. Hardly there is any distinction between the Civil Law and Criminal Law. ( 11 ) IN the light of the above, therefore the Court is not relieved of its obligation to induct itself to an enquiry to adjudge the truth or otherwise of the plea. It is notorious, that the above Act as on the date of commission of offence was very much alive which, afforded an umbrella for relief, had he been really a child. It is notorious, that the above Act as on the date of commission of offence was very much alive which, afforded an umbrella for relief, had he been really a child. ( 12 ) THUS, in the perspective of the judicial precedents, we decide to pass an order on the learned trial Judge to have the age of Bablu Sk. , the appellant, determined by proper enquiry in accordance with law. Such inquiry is to be held in order to determine the age of the appellant as on the date of commission of the offence i. e. on 21. 11. 83 and to certify his finding as to whether the accused Bablu Sk. , as on the date of commission of the offence, was a child within the realm of the West Bengal Children Act, 1959. ( 13 ) IN arriving at such conclusion, liberty is accorded to both the prosecution and the accused appellant to produce evidence oral and documentary as they may desire to give touching on the question of age of the appellant Bablu, liberty is also accorded to the learned trial Judge to have the appellant medically examined by the expert or experts in the profession of his district or by any other medical officer for the purpose of determination of his age. The learned Judge will also enquire and certify his finding as expeditiously as possible preferably within three months from the date of communication of this order to him. ( 14 ) A copy of this order alongwith the records of the Sessions trial be forwarded at once to the learned trial Judge, Murshidabad who after the enquiry is to remit his fording as to the age of the appellant along with the record of the sessions trial which included amongst others the record of the enquiry proceeding. We, however, make it clear that we have made my observation at this stage on the merit of the case. The matter is to appear in the list again immediately after reopening of the Court after Puja Vacation. This order has been passed upon hearing the parties. N. A. Chowdhury, J- I agree. Order accordingly.