JASPAL SINGH, J. ( 1 ) UNDER section 226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the prosecutor is required, while opening the case for the prosecution, to describe the charge against the accused. With this part over comes the duty of the court to pass an order either under section 227 or section 228 of the Code. However, that order is passed only after considering the record of the case, the documents submitted therewith and hearing the submission of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. If "the judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing" as required by section 227. However, if "the judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. which. . . . . . . . . . . . (b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused" as enjoined in section 228. ( 2 ) THE dispute in this case is as to whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge ought to have proceeded under section 227 or under section 228 of the Code. However, let me first provide the background. ( 3 ) SEEMA was the name of the deceased. She was married to Sushil Batra on March 7, 1991 and died an unnatural death on November 2, 1992 due to consumption of Baygone Spray. The First Information Report was recorded on the statement of Vipin Babbar, the brother of the deceased. On completion of investigation, report was filed under section 173 of the Code, and on June 5, 1993 the learned Additional Sessionsjudge framed charges undersections 498a,304b and in the alternative under section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. Two of the. accused so charged arc Ashok Kumar Batra and Saroj Satija. They have, by w*ay of separate petitions, sought the quashing of the charges so framed. The present is an exercise to deal with both these petitions. ( 4 ) AS noticed in the preceding paragraph, it was the statement of Vipin Babbar which saw the recording of the First Information Report. Besides him, the other statements which were recorded under section 161 of the Code were of Narinder Kumari, Naresh Babber and Renu (the mother, brother and sister of the deceased respectively ). ( 4 ) AS noticed in the preceding paragraph, it was the statement of Vipin Babbar which saw the recording of the First Information Report. Besides him, the other statements which were recorded under section 161 of the Code were of Narinder Kumari, Naresh Babber and Renu (the mother, brother and sister of the deceased respectively ). It may be mentioned that their statements were also recorded by the Sub Divisional Magistrate. Sudesh Arora a relation of the deceased, was yet another whose statement was also recorded. ( 5 ) THE summum bonum of the material collected during investigation is that soon after the marriage the husband of Seema and his other relations started exessing their dissatisfaction over the dowry brought by her and demands came to be made for more and more. It was on account of this that the deceased was subjected to mental as well as physical cruelty making her life miserable. It appears that specific demands were made for a bigger refrigerator and for Rs. 100,000. 00 for a car. Yet another item for which demand was made is Videocon Washing Machine. What further emanates from the material on record is that the deceased was feeling so miserable that she had even been thinking of leaving the matrimonial home. Apparently this was because of the hostile attitude of her husband and his other relations. The atmosphere at her matrimonial home had become so polluted that one of the brothers of her husband would not even talk to her and if served with food, would throw it away. lam mentioning all this with a view to show how tormenting it might have been for the deceased to face the situation. ( 6 ) COMING to the specifics, Vipin Babbar entirely blames "sasural Wale" (the in-laws) of the deceased for the suffering of the deceased. Not only that, he clearly mentions Ashok, petitioner as being a party to it and subjecting her to cruelty. Coming to Narinder Kumari she clearly names Saroj ("badi Nanad") and Ashok as the culprits subjecting her to cruelty and making demands for more dowry. True, Naresh Babbar does not specifically name Ashok, petitioner but the expression "yeh Log" (these people) is not without significance. He too speaks of dissatisfaction over dowry as the cause of his sister s death and about her being subjected to cruelty by them. True, Naresh Babbar does not specifically name Ashok, petitioner but the expression "yeh Log" (these people) is not without significance. He too speaks of dissatisfaction over dowry as the cause of his sister s death and about her being subjected to cruelty by them. In any case, he specifically names Saroj, petitioner, as one of the persons responsible for his sister s death. ( 7 ) COMING tothestatementofrenu,shegivesa detailed account of the suffering of her deceased sister and how cruelly she was treated by her husband and his other relations. She specifically names the petitioners Ashok as well as Saroj as the persons expressing displeasure over the dowry brought and making demands for more. She asserts that Saroj and others used to subject the deceased to physical and mental torture. She has even narrated an incident when Saroj had taunted the deceased in her very presence and had ordered her to manage the kitchen despite the fact that due to her pregnancy the deceased had been advised complete bed rest. The witness has specifically blamed Ashok, petitioner also p73 for the unnatural death of her sister. ( 8 ) IT was argued by Mr. K. K. Sud, Advocate for the petitioner that the entire prosecution version was false and concocted and that the mother, father, brother and sister of the deceased were a party to a diabolical plan to ruin the accused. He wanted me to dissect the material collected and examine it critically and told me that it was the only way the truth, veracity and effect of the material collected could be known. However, no judgment was cited in support. ( 9 ) I feel the approach suggested by Mr. Sud deserves to be scrupulously avoided. True, as laid d own by the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Panjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijju AIR 1990 SC 1962 , the court cannot be expected even at the initial stage of consideration under section 227 and 228 of the Code to "accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case". But then, while deciding the matter under section 227 or section 228 of the Code the court is not to apply exactly the standard of test and judgment which it finally applies before recording a finding of guilt or otherwise. But then, while deciding the matter under section 227 or section 228 of the Code the court is not to apply exactly the standard of test and judgment which it finally applies before recording a finding of guilt or otherwise. It would be no stage to judge meticulously the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence. This being the initial stage of the trial, the Court is not called upon to decide whether the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith provide sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to culminate in his conviction. What is required to beseen is whether there is a strong suspicion which may lead the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence. To quote the Supremeourt: "the standard of test, proof and judgment which is to be REFERRED TO finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be REFERRED TO at the stage of sections 227 and 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged; may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. " (Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja AIR 1980 SC 52 ) ( 10 ) THUS the correct approach would be "to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of a!l the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence. . . . . [see Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja AIR 1990 SC 1962 at page 1967], and, with respect, rightly so for the Judge "cannot act merely as a post office or a mouth-piece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial" (Sec: Union of India v. Prafulla Kumur Sumal AIR 1979 SC 366 ). ( 11 ) THE resume of the evidence given above shows what the prosecution has up its sleeves and what it proposes to prove. It matters not whether it does ultimately succeed or not in proving its case. What is important at this stage is that the record of the case does go to show that there is ground enough for presuming that the accused have committed the offences charged. They have been specifically named and have been shown to be party to making demands for dowry. They openly projected their dissatisfaction over the dowry already brought and subjected the deceased, on that score (and on account of her failure to satiate their thirst for more), to maltreatment making her life so. miserable as to drive her to commit suicide or lead to her unnatural death. And, we must not forget that the marriage had not seen the passing of many seasons before the deceased went to eternal sleep on account of death which was unnatural. Here is a case where legal presumption too is at full play. If, on account of the material collected, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has proceeded to frame charges, surely he cannot be faulted for the same, for the material provides sufficient basis, factual as well as legal to warrant it. ( 12 ) BOTH the petitions stand dismissed. However, the last word. Nothing said in this order shall be read as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case April 18, 1994