G. R. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner while serving as a Constable of the Railway Protection Force of South-Eastern Railway was served with a suspension order dated 3-12-87. By that order the petitioner was placed under suspension on ground of act of indiscipline. Subsequently however by an order dated 25-1-88 the said suspension was revoked. A domestic enquiry however was started against the petitioner. The statement of charge had been annexed as Annexure-C to the writ petition. The charge against the petitioner was that he created nuisance in G. R. C. hospital premises and also misbehaved with on-duty DMO/casualty at G. R. C. on 1-12-87. In the statement of allegation in connection with the said charge, it is stated that the petitioner had 'c' shift duty on 31-11-87 but he remained absent on that date and sent one intimation of indisposition to the RPF-Post/grc through his daughter and on 1-12-87 he was issued with a medical memo from the post on his demand and the petitioner attended GRC hospital on the date in a drunken state and on being asked about his drunkenness by Dr. (Mrs.) N. Kohili, he started shouting and created nuisance in the hospital premises and also misbehaved with the said doctor and threatened to do harm on the way of her going out of hospital. It is also stated therein that all these acts of misbehaviour on the part of a member of the Disciplined Force amount to gross indiscipline. The charge-sheet was drawn up on 25-1-1988 and was issued under the signature of the Assistant Security Commissioner, RPF/s. E. Rly. /shalimar. The petitioner gave reply to the charge-sheet. The Enquiry Officer after completing the enquiry held the petitioner guilty of the charge. The Disciplinary Authority on the basis of the finding of the Enquiry Officer dated 5-1-89 issued a notice to the petitioner, after agreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, proposing to impose the penalty of removal from service and invited representation from the petitioner on the proposed penalty by his letter dated 25-7-89 which is Annexure I to the writ petition. Thereafter the petitioner moved the present writ petition under Article 226 challenging the charge-sheet dated 25-1-89, the finding of the Enquiry Officer dated 5-1-89 and the purported show-cause notice dated 25-7-89. Thereafter the petitioner moved the present writ petition under Article 226 challenging the charge-sheet dated 25-1-89, the finding of the Enquiry Officer dated 5-1-89 and the purported show-cause notice dated 25-7-89. On 7-11-89 the learned Judge who dealt with the matter granted liberty to the petitioner to file supplementary affidavit on receiving the order removing him from service. In the supplementary affidavit the petitioner has challenged the order of the Divisional Security Commissioner, RPF, S. E. Rly. Kharagpur removing the petitioner from service as a disciplinary measure. ( 2 ) IT may be mentioned here that both the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959 and the Railway Protection Force Regulations 1966 were repealed by the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987. It has been contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner without making any preliminary enquiry into the matter. This however cannot be a ground for quashing the charge-sheet or the domestic enquiry when the petitioner has been asked to meet the specific charge mentioned in the charge-sheet. In this case, it also appears that the charge-sheet contained specific charge against the petitioner and the matter was initiated after the doctor on duty at the GRC hospital made a written complaint about the misconduct of the petitioner. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was not supplied with the documents and the statements of PWs and the names of the PWs were not mentioned in the charge-sheet. This, according to the learned Advocate for the petitioner, violates natural justice and that being so, the departmental enquiry is liable to be quashed on that ground. In this connection, the learned Advocate for the petitioner also attracts my attention to Annexure-D to the writ petition which is an application made by the petitioner in February, 1988 to the Assistant Security Commissioner requesting to arrange to supply certain statements and extracts of certain documents mentioned therein. From Annexure-Y to the affidavit-in-opposition it appears that by letter dated 16-3-88 the Assistant Security Commissioner informed the petitioner that he was permitted to see the relevant and available documents in connection with the charge-sheet issued against him and take extracts thereof in presence of O. C. , RPF, GRC within 3 days of the receipt of the letter. From Annexure-Y to the affidavit-in-opposition it appears that by letter dated 16-3-88 the Assistant Security Commissioner informed the petitioner that he was permitted to see the relevant and available documents in connection with the charge-sheet issued against him and take extracts thereof in presence of O. C. , RPF, GRC within 3 days of the receipt of the letter. The petitioner was further advised in that letter to submit his explanation within 3 days of perusal of records positively. We thus find that the petitioner was granted opportunity not only to inspect the documents in connection with the charge-sheet but also to take extracts thereof. In his application also the petitioner mostly wanted extracts of documents. Therefore it cannot be said that the petitioner was given no opportunity to peruse the documents and take extracts thereof. From Annexure-E to the writ petition it appears that the petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet on 22-4-88. In that reply he did not make any grievance whatsoever that he was not allowed to inspect or take extracts of the concerned documents or that he had been in away prejudiced in that respect. As we have seen, as a matter of fact, opportunity was extended to him in writing to inspect and take extracts of the relevant documents. In the circumstances, as noted above, the petitioner cannot now make a grievance that the relevant materials were not made available to him. The learned Advocate for the petitioner in this connection refers to a decision of the Supreme Court in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 2118 . In that case the officer proceeded against requested for supply of copies of statements of witnesses recorded ex parte at the pre-enquiry stage and also of the documents on which reliance was placed by the Department to establish the charge before the enquiry commenced. The request made by the appellant was however turned down by the Disciplinary Authority, but the Disciplinary Authority granted permission to the officer concerned to inspect the copies of the statements and documents in question. The request of the officer for allowing him to be accompanied by his stenographer to whom he could dictate notes based on his inspection was however turned dawn by the Disciplinary Authority though the appellant was told that he himself could take such notes as desired on the basis of inspection made by him. The request of the officer for allowing him to be accompanied by his stenographer to whom he could dictate notes based on his inspection was however turned dawn by the Disciplinary Authority though the appellant was told that he himself could take such notes as desired on the basis of inspection made by him. In the said case as many as 38 witnesses were examined and as many as 112 documents running into hundreds of pages were produced to substantiate the charges. It is also to be mentioned that in that case there were as many as 8 charges. Taking an overall view of the matter the Supreme Court in that case held that there had been a denial of reasonable opportunity. The said decision was given in the facts and circumstances of that case and the same does not necessarily apply to other cases where the facts and circumstances may be substantially different. That the question whether there has been any denial of reasonable opportunity resulting in prejudice to the concerned employee depends upon the facts and circumstances, will be evident from the following observations of the Supreme Court in the said case :"10. And such a stance was adopted in relation to an enquiry whereas as many as 38 witnesses were examined, and 112 documents running into hundreds of pages were produced to substantiate the charges. In the facts and circumstances of the case we find it impossible to hold that Appellant was afforded reasonable opportunity to meet the charges levelled against him. Whether or not refusal to supply copies of documents or statements has resulted in prejudice to the employee facing the departmental enquiry depends on the facts of each case. We are not prepared to accede to the submission urged on behalf of the respondents that there was no prejudice caused to the appellant, in the facts and circumstances of this case. The appellant in his affidavit page 309 of the SLP paper book has set out in a tabular form running into 12 pages as to how he has been prejudiced in regard to his defence on account of the non-supply of the copies of the documents. The appellant in his affidavit page 309 of the SLP paper book has set out in a tabular form running into 12 pages as to how he has been prejudiced in regard to his defence on account of the non-supply of the copies of the documents. ( 3 ) AGAIN, in paragraph 11 of the said decision (supra) it has been further observed thus :"we do not consider it necessary to quote extensively from the authorities cited on behalf of the parties, beyond making passing reference to some of the citations, for, whether or not there has been a denial to afford a reasonable opportunity in the backdrop of this case must substantially depend upon the facts pertaining to this matter". ( 4 ) IT is therefore evident that the question whether there has been any denial of reasonable opportunity by reason of non-supply of copies of documents depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case which fell for consideration of the Supreme Court there were as many as 8 charges. The department examined as many as 38 witnesses and produced 112 documents running into hundreds of pages. The officer concerned applied for copies but the concerned authority not only turned down the same but also turned down his request to allow him to be accompanied by his stenographer so that he could dictate notes on the basis of his inspection. In our present case there was only one charge against the petitioner. The witnesses examined on behalf of the department were only five in number. The evidence of the witnesses was also rather brief as it appears from what has transpired from the affidavits and annexures thereto. The number of documents produced is only eight. On his request the petitioner was allowed to inspect the documents and take extracts of the same. The petitioner also asked for extracts mostly. Then again, it is not that the petitioner wanted to take the assistance of anyone else for inspecting the documents and for taking extracts thereof or that any such request was rejected or turned down by the departmental authorities. As we have seen, the petitioner in his reply to the charge-sheet also did not make any grievance that he was denied any reasonable opportunity to inspect or take extracts of the relevant documents or that he was in anyway prejudiced in this respect. As we have seen, the petitioner in his reply to the charge-sheet also did not make any grievance that he was denied any reasonable opportunity to inspect or take extracts of the relevant documents or that he was in anyway prejudiced in this respect. Having regard to the totally different factual perspective of the present case and having regard to the facts and circumstances including the simple nature of the charge and the evidence it cannot be said that there was any denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself or of any violation of natural justice. ( 5 ) IT is next contended on behalf of the petitioner that the charge-sheet was issued by the Assistant Security Commissioner RPF but that is not tenable as he is not the authority competent to pass the order of removal from service. In the present case the order of removal has been passed by the Divisional Security Commissioner, RPF. It is however contended that the Divisional Security Commissioner is not entitled to pass any such order. I however find no merit in this submission. In this case the Assistant Security Commissioner on receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer considered that the matter should be dealt with by the appropriate higher authority for consideration of imposing major penalty in view of the gravity of the offence and accordingly he forwarded the records to the Divisional Security Commissioner. Under Schedule III to the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1987 the Assistant Security Commissioner is authorised to impose certain punishments on an employee inter alia of the rank of the petitioner but not dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement. Under rule 152 (2) of the RPF Rules, 1987 a Disciplinary Authority competent under the rules to impose any of the minor punishments is also authorised to institute disciplinary proceedings for the imposition of any of the major punishments notwithstanding that such disciplinary authority is not competent under the rules to impose any of the latter punishments. Therefore there is nothing wrong in the initiation of the proceedings against the petitioner by the Assistant Security Commissioner. The said Schedule III to the RPF Rules, 1987 authorises the Divisional Security Commissioner to impose the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement on a member of the Force belonging inter alia to the rank of the petitioner. Therefore there is nothing wrong in the initiation of the proceedings against the petitioner by the Assistant Security Commissioner. The said Schedule III to the RPF Rules, 1987 authorises the Divisional Security Commissioner to impose the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement on a member of the Force belonging inter alia to the rank of the petitioner. Therefore there has not been any procedural irregularity in the Assistant Security Commissioner forwarding the matter to the Divisional Security Commissioner for further consideration when, after the submission of the enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer, the Assistant Security Commissioner felt that the imposition of a graver punishment needed consideration. ( 6 ) NEXT it has been contended by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the evidence adduced in the case does not warrant a finding that the petitioner is guilty in the charge framed against him. The petitioner has also annexed to the writ petition the deposition of two witnesses namely, Mrs. Rita Singh, staff nurse and Dipten Patra, hospital attendent as Annexures G and G1. In this connection, it is however to be stated that this Court sitting in its writ jurisdiction will not embark upon reappreciation of the evidence in order to test whether the finding of the Enquiry Officer is justified or not as could have been done by an appellate Court or an appellate authority. However the writ court can interfere if it finds that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is perverse or is manifestly contrary to or not home out by the evidence. This is however not a case of such nature. The evidence of the said two witnesses cannot be said to be destructive of the charge brought against the petitioner. Their evidence rather lends support to the fact that an incident occurred there and their evidence does not project anything which is necessarily incompatible with the charge brought against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer also had before him the other materials including the deposition of the doctor concerned, namely, PW-1, Dr. Mrs. N. Kohili and also her written complaint. Having regard to the totality of the evidence the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of the charge. He has also referred to the discharge memo issued by the house surgeon of ward no. 2 containing the remark 'alcoholic intoxication'. Mrs. N. Kohili and also her written complaint. Having regard to the totality of the evidence the Enquiry Officer found the petitioner guilty of the charge. He has also referred to the discharge memo issued by the house surgeon of ward no. 2 containing the remark 'alcoholic intoxication'. The Enquiry Officer in the background of the totality of the facts, circumstances and evidence discussed by him considered the question whether the delinquent constable attended the DMS casualty on 1. 12. 87 in a drunken state and misbehaved with the on-duty DMO, Dr. Mrs. N. Kohili and she recorded his finding that the delinquent was guilty of the charge. In looking at an enquiry report submitted after departmental enquiry it has to be remembered that such report, while it must be coherent and must be a product of application of mind to all relevant aspects, need not necessarily attain that standard of quality in logic and treatment as it expected of a judgment of a Court. The Court will not interfere with the finding of an Enquiry Officer, particularly in its writ jurisdiction, unless such finding is perverse or is contrary to or not borne out by the evidence manifestly although the Court may feel that a more critical analysis was possible. In the present case, I however do not find anything to hold that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is perverse or is manifestly not borne out by the evidence or is contrary to evidence. That being so, there is no scope for the writ court to enter upon a more critical analysis of evidence for testing whether a reverse finding would also have been a possible finding in the matter. ( 7 ) BY support of his argument that the charge-sheet was bad as it did not specify the documents by which the charge would be established and the witnesses who would depose in the enquiry, the learned Advocate for the petitioner referred to the decision of a learned Single Judge (Ajit Kumar Sengupta, J.) passed on 9th March, 1994 in Ramapati Singh v. The Chief Security Officer and Ors. , C. R. No. 4822 (W) of 1977. As we have seen, in the present case however the petitioner was given opportunity to inspect the records and take extracts thereof. , C. R. No. 4822 (W) of 1977. As we have seen, in the present case however the petitioner was given opportunity to inspect the records and take extracts thereof. Therefore even if no document or witness was specifically mentioned in the charge sheet except the complaint of Dr. Mrs. Kohili, that does not vitiate the enquiry when the petitioner on his request was granted the opportunity to inspect the relevant documents and take extracts, particularly where the charge is of a simple nature and the evidence is neither voluminous nor complex. ( 8 ) IT has been argued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate. In this connection, it has to be noted that the Divisional Security Commissioner, after the records of the proceedings were forwarded to him, considered the matter and by a fairly elaborate order dated 25. 7. 89 Annexure-I to the writ petition agreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer that the petitioner was guilty of the charge and also tentatively proposed to impose the penalty of removal from service considering that the retention of the petitioner in service was undesirable and detrimental to the interest of the disciplined Force. The petitioner was accordingly given an opportunity of making a representation in the matter. The petitioner instead of making any representation in the matter against the show-cause notice moved the present writ petition. He however did not make any representation whatsoever to the Disciplinary Authority Eventually the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of removal from service. As regards the contention regarding the disproportionate punishment the learned Advocate for the petitioner referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Ramakanta Misra v. State of U. P. (1982) 3 SCC 346 . In the said case, as the Supreme Courts expressly observed, the Court was exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 over the decision of the Labour Court and therefore the Supreme Court could examine whether the Labour Court had properly approached the matter for exercising or refusing to exercise its power under section 11a of the Industrial Disputes Act. The said decision or the import of it is therefore not attracted to a case like the present one where the High Court is exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226. The said decision or the import of it is therefore not attracted to a case like the present one where the High Court is exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226. In the said Supreme Court decision the alleged misconduct consisted of use of indiscreet or abusive or threatening language and the management had not shown that there was any blameworthy conduct of the appellant during the period of 14 years service he rendered prior to the date of misconduct. In the circumstances the punishment of dismissal was set aside by the Supreme Court and instead, withholding of two increments with future effect was imposed. But in our present case the perspective is different. Here this is not the first delinquency of the petitioner. In paragraph-7 of the affidavit-in-opposition it has been divulged that the petitioner was earlier awarded penalty of reduction in pay twice, stoppage of increment thrice and was censured once for his unauthorised absence and also for his neglect of duty and misconduct during the period of service. As against that, the petitioner's plea in paragraph-5 of his affidavit-in-reply is that those earlier penalties were all minor ones and not major. In my opinion if the petitioner had been earlier punished departmentally 5 or 6 times with minor penalties of different nature it cannot be said that the penalty of removal from service for a fresh misconduct thereafter is disproportionate if the Disciplinary Authority has chosen to impose any such major penalty this time. The plea of disproportionate penalty is thus not tenable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. ( 9 ) IT is the contention of the petitioner that he was not given any opportunity to take the assistance of any-co-employee in the enquiry proceeding. This also does not appear to be factually correct. In the enquiry report itself the Enquiry Officer has recorded that the delinquent did not engage any defence counsel and he himself defended his case. By letter dated 21-6-88 which is Annexure-X to the affidavit-in-reply issued by the Enquiry Officer to the petitioner, the petitioner was specifically asked to submit a list of 3 names of his counsel in order of preference, belonging to SHM Division with their consent letter in advance. Inspire of that the petitioner did not engage anybody for his defence in the departmental enquiry. Inspire of that the petitioner did not engage anybody for his defence in the departmental enquiry. That being so, there is absolutely no merit in the petitioner's contention that he was not given any opportunity to take the assistance of co-employee in the departmental enquiry. It has however been submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the petitioner's choice for engaging a co-employee for assisting him in the departmental enquiry was limited only to employees belonging to SHM Division and such a limitation was a curtailment of the petitioner's reasonable opportunity to defend himself. This is absolutely lame contention. Rule 153 (8) of the RPF Rules, 1987 itself provides that the employee may be allowed to take the assistance of any other member of the Force as 'friend', but such 'friend' must be a serving member of the Force of or below the rank of sub-Inspector for the time being posted in the same division of the battalion where the proceedings are pending and not acting as a 'friend' in any other proceedings anywhere. That being so, the petitioner cannot complain that he was asked to choose an employee for assisting him in his defence from the SHM Division. Moreover, before the Enquiry Officer also he did not make any grievance that he should be allowed to choose his 'friend' for defence from any other department. In the circumstances, the plea that the petitioner was not given opportunity to take the assistance of an employee for his defence in the enquiry is wholly untenable. I find no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition therefore fails and the same is hereby dismissed. No cost is however ordered. Petition dismissed.