M. RAMAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) THE facts and the circumstances and the question of law arising in these two appeals being common, we dispose of them by the following common Order, referring to the averments stated in writ appeal No. 745 of 1994. ( 2 ) FOR the sake of convenience, we go by the ranks of the parties in this appeal. ( 3 ) BRIEF facts of the case necessary for the disposal of the seappeals are as follows: the appellant in both the appeals is a society called 'state government houseless harijan employees association', barline road, tumkur, registered under the provisions of the Karnataka societies Registration Act, 1960 ('the act' for short), the main object of which being to distribute sites to its members by acquiring certain lands. On the recommendation of the district and state level acquisition committee, respondent 1 state acquired in the year 1987 15 acres of land in sy. No. 49/1 of maralur village, kasaba hobli, tumkur taluk under the notification under the sections 4{1) and 6 (1) of the i. a. nd acquisition ACT and when the i. a. nd acquisition officer called upon the appeli. a. nt to deposit Rs. 19,01,915, the i. a. tter did so. Thereafter an award came to be parsed on 15-9-1992. Respondents 4 to 6, owners of the i. a. nd, aggrieved by the acquisition of i. a. nd filed writ petition No. 21438 of 1991 impleading amongst others the appeli. a. nt as respondent 4 on the ground that it was not i. a. wful for the appeli. a. nt to acquire i. a. nd for housing purpose but withdrew it on 6-7-1993 following the letter dated 5-7-1993 of respondent 1 state to respondent 3 i. a. nd acquisition officer not to give possession of the i. a. nd to the appeli. a. nt-society. Aggrieved by this letter, the appeli. a. nt filed writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 against the respondents and one s. Shafi ahmed, local m. l. a. , for a deci. a. ration that the said letter was illegal and void and for a direction to them not to interfere with the acquisition proceedings. a. nt-society. Aggrieved by this letter, the appeli. a. nt filed writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 against the respondents and one s. Shafi ahmed, local m. l. a. , for a deci. a. ration that the said letter was illegal and void and for a direction to them not to interfere with the acquisition proceedings. During the pendency of this writ petition, respondent 1 is stated to have issued a notification No. Rd 177 aqt 91, dated 2-8-1993 denotifying the i. a. nd acquired already under sections 4 (1) and 6 (1) notifications. Therefore, the appeli. a. nt-society had to file an application (i. a. No. Iii) for amendment of the prayer by substituting additional prayer. It had also filed i. a. . No. Vi for interim direction not to proceed with the denotification, pending disposal of the writ petition. In the meanwhile, the appeli. a. nt also filed applications (i. as. Iv and v) seeking to implead certain persons as respondents. The learned single judge, by his common Order dated 10-12-1993, allowed i. a. s. iii, iv and v and rejected i. a No. Vi. It is the case of the appeli. a. nt that pursuant to the Order allowing i. a. . Iii for amendment of the prayer, amendment was, in fact, not carried out and consequently the rejection of i. a. No. Vi for interim direction had no relevance. But, subsequently, however, the appeli. a. nt filed writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 seeking to quash the denotification dated 2-8-1993. During the pendency of this petition, it also filed a memo for leave of the court to withdraw writ petition No. 27025 of 1993, which was strongly opposed by the respondents. However, the learned single judge taking both the writ petitions together for hearing, by his Order dated 8-2-1994 impugned herein permitted the appeli. a. nt to withdraw writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 but dismissed the other writ petition No. 44142 of 1993. Hence the appeli. a. nt has filed these appeals writ appeal No. 745 of 1994 against dismissal of writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 and writ appeal No. 1080 of 1994 against permission to withdraw writ petition no, 27025 of 1993. ( 4 ) WE have heard the learned counsel on both sides. Hence the appeli. a. nt has filed these appeals writ appeal No. 745 of 1994 against dismissal of writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 and writ appeal No. 1080 of 1994 against permission to withdraw writ petition no, 27025 of 1993. ( 4 ) WE have heard the learned counsel on both sides. ( 5 ) SRI T. Radhakrishna, learned counsel for the appelant, having taken us through the grounds of appeal, Order made by the learned single judge and the reasoning thereon and also the averments in writ petition No. 44142 of 1993, submitted that the learned single judge was not justified in dismissing the said writ petition on the ground of suppression of fact of filing the earlier writ petition viz. , writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 by the appeli. a. nt, pi. a. cing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in G. Narayanaswamy Reddy (Dead) by L. rs. And Another v. Government of Karnataka and another, the facts of which, according to the learned counsel, are entirely different from those of the present case. Therefore, his submission is that the Order under appeal cannot be sustained and the same be set aside. ( 6 ) SRI U. L. Narayana Rao, learned senior counsel for respondents 4 to 6, argued in support of the Order appealed against. He submitted that regard being had to the averments contained in paragraphs 6 and 13 of writ petition No. 44142 of 1993, it was clear that the appellant made a false statement to his knowledge which amounted to suppression of fact. Therefore, the learned single judge rightly held that for his own conduct, the appellant had to lose his case. This view of the learned single judge must be held to be correct. ( 7 ) SRI Subramanya Jois, learned senior counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, supporting the Order under appeal, also argued on the line of argument of Sri U. L. Narayana Rao. He submitted that the appeli. a. nt had not come to the court with clean hands, inasmuch as he intentionally suppressed the material facts in particui. a. r rejection of i. a. No. Vi filed in writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 and his failure to obtain interim Order of stay, and the statement contained in paragraph 13 was false to his knowledge. a. nt had not come to the court with clean hands, inasmuch as he intentionally suppressed the material facts in particui. a. r rejection of i. a. No. Vi filed in writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 and his failure to obtain interim Order of stay, and the statement contained in paragraph 13 was false to his knowledge. He therefore submitted that the learned single judge being justified in coming to the said conclusion, his Order impugned herein need not be interfered with. ( 8 ) THE learned single judge has observed in paragraph 17 of the Order under appeal as follows:"in view of the conduct of the petitioner in trying to pervert the system and overreach the court, I dismiss writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 with costs, without considering the same on merits. Advocate fees Rs. 2,000/ -. " ( 9 ) PARAGRAPH 18 thereof pertains to the other writ petition. It reads: "writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 is permitted to be withdrawn in view of the memo filed by the petitioner. " ( 10 ) LET us extract paragraphs 6 and 13 of writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 to appreciate the rival contentions taken on both sides. Paragraph 6 reads:"the petitioner had filed a writ petition in writ petition No. 27025 of 1993, the moment it came to know that the first respondent had issued instructions on 5-7-1993 to the third respondent to stop further proceedings in the acquisition of the i. a. nd in question challenging the instruction issued in letter dated 5-7-1993 (annexure-e), this Hon'ble court was pleased to issue an ad interim Order on 2-8-1993 staying all further proceedings in pursuance of the letter at annexure-e and restraining the respondents 1 and 2 and also divisional commissioner from proceeding further with the matter. Copy of the Order is produced and marked annexure-g. The petitioner informed the I respondent about the passing of the Order by this Hon'ble court on the same day and copy of the communication served on the I respondent on 2-8-1993 in this connection is produced and marked annexure-h. In spite of this Order of this Hon'ble court, the I respondent has issued a notification under Section 48 (1) on 2-8-1993 in rd 177 aqt 91 and got it published in the official gazette dated 5-8-1993 (annexure-f ). The said notification is therefore illegal and liable to be quashed. The said notification is therefore illegal and liable to be quashed. "paragraph 13 reads:spara> "the petitioner has not filed any suit or petition for the sole purpose of quashing the notification at annexure-f and no such suit or petition is pending before any court or tribunal. But the petitioner has filed application in writ petition no, 27025 of 1993 only as a consequential relief and it is not likely to provide any effective or efficacious remedy and therefore the petitioner is filing this writ petition invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Hon'ble court independently for an effective and efficacious relief. " ( 11 ) IT is the statement of averments made in paragraph 13 as above that has presumably become the basis for the learned single judge to arrive at the conclusion that there has been suppression of fact by the appeli. a. nt and on which he proceeded to reject the writ petition in limine without going into the merits of the case. ( 12 ) WE have carefully gone through the averments in theabove paragraphs to find out to what extent the statement made therein is false to the knowledge of the appeli. a. nt and whether he has intentionally suppressed any material facts which he ought to have stated to maintain the petition. ( 13 ) WHAT has been sought to be quashed as illegal and void in writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 is the letter dated 5-7-1993 of the state government addressed to the assistant commissioner, tumkur, informing him not to hand-over possession of the i. a. nd to the appeli. a. nt until further orders, whereas the challenge in writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 is against the denotification dated 2-8-1993. One thing is clear that as on the date when writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 was filed, the denotification in question was not in existence, inasmuch as it came to be issued on 2-3-1998 subsequent to the filing of the writ petition on 9-7-1993. The attempt of the appeli. a. nt to seek relief against this notification in his application (i. a. No. Iii) in writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 having become futile for the reasons stated in the averments of the memorandum of appeals, he filed writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 seeking to quash the said notification. The attempt of the appeli. a. nt to seek relief against this notification in his application (i. a. No. Iii) in writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 having become futile for the reasons stated in the averments of the memorandum of appeals, he filed writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 seeking to quash the said notification. Therefore, his statement in paragraph 13 that he has not filed any suit or petition for the sole purpose of quashing the denotification impugned there at annexure-f, is correct and it does not amount of either suppression of fact or false statement. ( 14 ) NOW let us consider the legal implication of the words "misstatement" or "suppression of fact". "misstatement" or "misrepresentation" can be made by a mistake or inadvertantly. Whereas suppression of truth carries with it the doctrine "suppressio veri and suggestio falsi". This legal maxim which is the basis for the doctrine of "suppression of fact" must necessarily refer to "suppression of material fact". Secondly, according to prem's judicial dictionary, vol. Iv, 1964 edition, at page 1564, the suppression or concealment of a material fact must be such suppression or concealment as has in it some element of fraud. (please see re harris, (1899)2 q. b. 97) ( 15 ) THEREFORE, the court will have to see whether the appeli. a. nt has intentionally suppressed any material fact containing some element of fraud resulting in the court conferring certain benefit on him. Dealing with "mistake of fact" in Section 103 at p. 398 the learned author salmond on jurisprudence has stated as follows:". . . . . THE sole question which the courts would entertain was whether the defendant did the ACT compi. a. ined of. Whether he did it ignorantly or with guilty knowledge was entirely immaterial. This rule, however, was restricted to civil liability. It was early recognised that criminal responsibility was too serious a thing to be imposed upon an innocent man simply for the sake of avoiding a difficult inquiry into his knowledge and intention. In the case of civil liability, on the other hand, the Rule was general. This rule, however, was restricted to civil liability. It was early recognised that criminal responsibility was too serious a thing to be imposed upon an innocent man simply for the sake of avoiding a difficult inquiry into his knowledge and intention. In the case of civil liability, on the other hand, the Rule was general. The success with which it has maintained itself in modern i. a. w is due in part to its undeniable utility in obviating inconvenient or even impracticable inquiries, and in part to the influence of the conception of redress in minimising the importance of fault as a condition of penal liability. " ( 16 ) CONSIDERING the mistaken fact or misstatement or suppression of fact in particular suppression of material fact that would affect the decision of the court in the light of the above doctrine, we are clearly of the opinion that there is nothing either in paragraph 6 or in paragraph 13 of writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 which amounts to suppression of material fact containing an element of fraud and which, if acted upon, would affect the decision of the court. ( 17 ) WE will now proceed to consider the applicability of the decision relied on by the learned single judge in g. Nayaranaswamy reddy's case, (supra), to the case on hand. According to Section 11-a of the i. a. nd acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the deci. a. ration is stayed by an Order of a court shall be excluded. Further, in view of the first proviso to Section 11-a that where a deci. a. ration under Section 4 of the i. a. nd acquisition ACT has been published before the commencement of the said Amendment Act, the award must be made within a period of two years from such commencement, the Supreme Court there held that non-disclosure of fact that interim stay orders were passed in a writ petition staying further proceedings of acquisition in respect of i. a. nds in question in the special leave petition filed on the ground that the acquisition of i. a. nds in question i. a. pse as award was not made within two years of notification of deci. a. ration, would certainly amount to suppression of material facts. a. ration, would certainly amount to suppression of material facts. On facts, the Supreme Court discovered that the interim Order of stay granted by this court was suppressed before the Supreme Court by the person enjoying the benefits of the said stay Order till the opposite party filed the counter. It is for this reason the Supreme Court came down heavily to conclude as follows in para 2 thereof:"where a special leave petition was filed on the ground that the acquisition of i. a. nds in question i. a. psed as award was not made within two years of notification of deci. a. ration, the non-disclosure of fact that interim stay orders were passed in a writ petition staying further proceedings of acquisition in respect of i. a. nds in question would amount to suppression of material facts in view of Section 11-a of i. a. nd acquisition ACT which provided that the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of deci. a. ration is stayed by an Order of a court shall be excluded, and consequently, the special leave petition was liable to be dismissed. " ( 18 ) TO reiterate, their lordships of the Supreme Courthaving discovered that the petitioner there in intentionally suppressed the fact of stay Order granted by this court which was necessary for the court to consider the question of limitation, held that he was not entitled to the relief under Article 136 of the constitution as non-disclosure of the said fact amounted to suppression of material facts. Thus, the facts and circumstances obtained in the aforesaid case are entirely different from those of the present case. In that view of the matter, the decision of that case cannot be applied to this case and the reliance pi. a. ced on it by the learned single judge to reach the conclusion against the appeli. a. nt cannot be supported. ( 19 ) IN view of our discussion as above, we hold that the Order under appeal insofar as it rei. a. tes to dismissal of writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside. However, we uphold it permitting writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 to be withdrawn. ( 19 ) IN view of our discussion as above, we hold that the Order under appeal insofar as it rei. a. tes to dismissal of writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside. However, we uphold it permitting writ petition No. 27025 of 1993 to be withdrawn. ( 20 ) IN the result, we make the following:order writ appeal No. 745 of 1994 is allowed and the Order impugned therein insofar as it rei. a. tes to the dismissal of writ petition No. 44142 of 1993 is set aside. The writ petition is restored and it may be heard and disposed of on merits. Writ appeal No. 1080 of 1994 is dismissed. --- *** --- .