JUDGMENT - Dr. E.S. DA SILVA, J.:---These two Writ Petitions which can be conveniently disposed of by a common judment challenge the Award dated 9th November, 1989, whereby the Industrial Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal) held that the termination by the petitioners of the services of the respondents No. 2 to 5 was neither legal nor justified. By the aforesaid Award the Tribunal has further held that the retrenched workmen were not entitled for reinstatement of service and instead the petitioners were directed to pay to each of them a sum of Rs. 30,000 by way of compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. In Writ Petition No. 214/1990 the petitioner specifically challenges the adequacy of the compensation awarded to him by the Tribunal. 2. The case of the petitioners is that they are apartnership firm running four departments dealing with different lines of business, namely, (i) Burmah-Shell Dealers,(ii) Automobile Dealers in respect of premier cars and Commercial Vehicles and Bajaj Tempo Vehicles, (iii) Automobile Workshop to give service to their agency vehicles only and (iv) Spare Parts Shop at various places in Margao. According to the petitioners these departments are distinct and complete units, each of them constituting a separate establishment. The employer has his Head Office at Margao where the business of automobiles is attended to in addition to over all control over all the above mentioned departments. It was stated that they had three Pumping Stations at the relevant time, namely, 1) B.O.C. Puming Station at Margao Bus stand consisting of 2 petrol and 1 diesel pumps, 2) Cortalim Road Pumping Station on Margao/Cortalim Road consisting of 1 petrol and 1 diesel pumps, and 3) Shell Service Station near Margao Municipality consisting of 1 petrol and 1 diesel pumps. The total staff employed at the relevant time consisted of 20 employees collectively at 5 pumping stations, 10 employees at the Head Office, 12 employees in workshop and 5 employees in Spare Parts Shop. The total staff employed at the relevant time consisted of 20 employees collectively at 5 pumping stations, 10 employees at the Head Office, 12 employees in workshop and 5 employees in Spare Parts Shop. In December, 1973/January, 1974 all the partners of the petitioners conducted overall review of the companys working in all the departments on account of continuous accelerated reduction in sale of petrol and petroleum products consequent upon the spurt in prices thereof, introduction of the scheme of restricted supply and quota for diesel by the Oil Company, restricted supplies and quota of business in the commodities for which the employer is the selling agents and sharp decline in the margin of profits on the investment risked due to steep rise in the cost of the said commodities. After deliberations and taking into account these facts the partners unanimously decided to re-organize all lines of business by adopting some measures of economy amongst others by curtailing actual working hours in the Pumping stations, abolishing clerical work at the Pumping Stations as well as the post of a driver of the office vehicle closing down one of the petrol pumps and curtailing the repair work in the Workshop besides retiring those employees who have crossed the age of superannuation. In pursuance of the above policy a re-organization scheme was adopted and the same was implemented in all the areas where the petitioners business was being conducted. As a result 13 employees working in 3 different units i.e. 9 employees working at the Pumping Stations, 2 employees working at the Head Office and 2 employees working at the Workshop were rendered surplus. Eleven of these employees were retrenched from service from 25-5-1974 by one months notice and two employees were retrenched from service from 25-5-1974 by one months notice while two employees were retrenched from service from 1-4-1974 by one months notice. In addition two staff members from Head Office who had crossed the age of superannuation were retired from service with effect from 1-4-1974. The retrenchment was effected on the basis of seniority of employees in particular categories in each of the concerned department. The procedure for retrenchment in section 25 -G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) namely, the principle "last come, first go" was strictly followed even in the absence of any rules framed by the Government in this behalf. The procedure for retrenchment in section 25 -G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act) namely, the principle "last come, first go" was strictly followed even in the absence of any rules framed by the Government in this behalf. The employer prepared and exhibited on 5/6th February, 1974 in every department lists of employees showing category-wise their seniority amongst them at no time the petitioners received any objection in writing or otherwise from the employees in respect of the seniority lists prepared. Further all the prerequisites of retrenchment provided in section 25-F of the Act, namely, one months notice or notice pay, payment of compensation equivalent to 15 days average salary for every completed year of continuous service and notice to the Government of Goa, and to other authorities were also complied with by the petitioners. 3. The case of the respondents is that the employees of the petitioners had formed a Union sometime in January, 1974 and made collective demands on the Management on 7th February, 1974 asking for some form of Dearness Allowance to mitigate the high living cost and shrinkage of real wages. Thus the real reason for the retrenchment was to suppress the trade union activities of the workmen and stop them from forming a Union. It was further stated that the retrenchment was mala fide and not for proper reasons. The respondents disputed that there was any such short supply of petrol and diesel and that the sales on these commodities had gone down. They also denied that the Company had taken steps to close down one of their Petrol Pumps. The general policy of reorganisation scheme announced in the retrenchment notices was nothing else than to signal out certain employees for retrenchment which is actually victimisation. Besides the principle of "first come last go" was also violated by retaining junior employees and retrenching the senior ones. The retrenchment had actually created scare in the employees who stopped putting forward any demands on their employers for fear of also being retrenched resulting in the suppression of the legitimate trade union activities of the employees. The seniority list was also not prepared in all the categories of work in the establishment. The retrenchment had actually created scare in the employees who stopped putting forward any demands on their employers for fear of also being retrenched resulting in the suppression of the legitimate trade union activities of the employees. The seniority list was also not prepared in all the categories of work in the establishment. There has been no loss of business and sales of petrol and diesel from 1973 and 1974 or corresponding months did not show fall in the sales, On the other hand the sales of vehicles showed a sharp rise and brought huge profits to the company. The respondents state that the retrenchment was thus not called for and should be set side and all the retrenched staff reinstated in their former place of work with full back wages and continuity of service. The mere fact of having taken under protest the compensation offered should also not prejudice the Tribunal from adjudicating the merits of the retrenchment which was null and void. 4. On behalf of the petitioners several contentions were advanced by their learned Counsel Shri Kakodkar. In this respect I will make only a brief record of its sum and substance because in my view this petition can be disposed of on a single ground which seems to go to the very root of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to pass the impugned Award for lack of proper locus standi of the Union to spouse the cause of the former employees of the petitioners affected by the impugned retrenchment order. 5. The Award of the Tribunal found some of the petitioners retrenchment neither legal nor justified and despite of that no reinstatement of service was ordered and instead payment of some amount of compensation was directed to be paid by the petitioners in lieu of reinstatement and back wages. According to the petitioners the retrenchment was on account of scheme of reorganization of business work and being so unless it was held that the said scheme was mala fide the Courts should not interfere in this managerial discretion of the petitioners Company. The petitioners further contention is that for the purpose of retrenchment a seniority list was prepared category-wise because obviously the list could not be overall so as to cover all the four separate establishments run by the petitioners Company. The petitioners further contention is that for the purpose of retrenchment a seniority list was prepared category-wise because obviously the list could not be overall so as to cover all the four separate establishments run by the petitioners Company. Against this stand taken by the petitioners the respondents case was that the retrenchment was solely aimed at stopping the trade union activities of their workmen thus amounting to victimisation. 6. The main grievance of the petitioners learned Counsel was that the observations made by the learned Presiding Officer of the Tribunal in the impugned Award were totally biased being therefore irrelevant and unwarranted. At the very outset, the learned Counsel submitted with regard to the burden of proving all the allegations made by the respondents that the same was arbitrarily and unduly shifted on the petitioners when the liability to prove the facts alleged by the respondents Union should necessarily lie on the workmen. In this respect it was contended that those who sought for the reference were the employees through the respondents Union and therefore they had to establish violation of section 25 -F and 25-G by the petitioners when they decided to retrench them. It was therefore not proper for the Tribunal to shift the burden of proof on the employers in respect of the legal requirement for the purpose of passing the orders of retrenchment. It was further urged by the learned Counsel with regard to the compensation awarded to the respondents that having the retrenched employees accepted the compensation tendered under section 25-F the workmen should be stopped from raising any objection or seeking reference either by themselves or through the Union. The learned Counsel has invited my attention to section 25-F as well as its Clauses a), b) and c) contended that while a) and b) are mandatory, c) is merely directory. Therefore the order of retrenchment should comply with the conditions of recording proper reasons to retrench the workmen and offering or paying the compensation due to them at the time of retrenchment to be properly calculated as per the law . It was further urged that the Tribunal did not understand the reason given by the Management to retrench some of the employees consequent upon the rationalisation of their business. It was further urged that the Tribunal did not understand the reason given by the Management to retrench some of the employees consequent upon the rationalisation of their business. According to the learned Counsel the right of retrenchment could not be disturbed or interfered with except in case of proven mala fide on the part of the Management. That was a managerial discretion and the petitioners right to run the business on profits could not be disputed. Besides mala fide had to be specifically pleaded and proved. The learned Counsel contended that there was no positive finding given by the Tribunal and justified by reasons to the effect that the Management has acted with mala fide in retrenching some of their employees. The Tribunal was therefore expected to require from the respondents that mala fide should be proved by them so as to enable him to give a clear finding on this point in the impugned Award. It was further submitted that there are no categorical findings in respect of issues of points which were specifically raised by the petitioners in their pleadings and are crucial for determination of the controversy. In this respect it was contended that there was sufficient and substantive compliance of Clause a) and b) of section 25-F of the Act inasmuch as notice with reasons and payment of compensation was done by the petitioners to the retrenched employees. However, no finding with regard to such compliance or non-compliance was recorded by the Tribunal to the extent that nowhere it was stated that reasons were not given any payment was not done to the employees. Hence the only ground which could justify the impugned Award could be mala fides and in this respect also there is no such specific finding given by the Tribunal. The learned Counsel made also further grievance that the Tribunal did not appreciate that there was now a restricted quota in respect of a petroleum and diesel products which was pleaded by the petitioners thus affecting the economies of their business. This fact of the restricted quota was not at all disputed either by the respondents or by the Tribunal. Hence an inference should have been drawn that the petitioners had the right to re-organize the business in this context. This fact of the restricted quota was not at all disputed either by the respondents or by the Tribunal. Hence an inference should have been drawn that the petitioners had the right to re-organize the business in this context. Besides the Tribunal could not also go into the adequacy of the reasons given by the petitioner s to retrench the workers because the existence of the reasons invoked was the result of the undisputed fact that a restrictive quota of supply of fuel had been imposed on its dealers. Therefore it could not be said that there were no reasons to justify the re-organization of petroleum business so as to avoid loss thus leading them to reduce the strength of their staff. Further, the learned Counsel urged, the petitioners had averred and proved through oral and documentary evidence that each of the respondents workmen were holding separate jobs in different establishments. Only because the Tribunal had rejected the petitioners explanation this could not mean that the retrenchment of the workmen was mala fide. It was only a question of a view taken by the Tribunal vis-a-vis the view taken by the petitioners which could not therefore lead to the inference that the petitioners conduct was illegal and mala fide. It was then contended that any findings against the petitioners in this respect would be perverse as based on wrong and impermissible inferences being thus without any legal force. The learned Counsel also took exception of the very basis of the compensation awarded to the respondents workmen which was calculated at the rate of Rs. 2,000/- per year which, according to him, was not a basis at all. It was submitted that the respondents had admitted that they were all working on a gainful employment and hence the amount of Rs. 2,000/- per year awarded was just arbitrary and without factual foundation. It was also brought to the notice of the Court that the respondent No. 5s widow had already settled the matter with regard to her deceased husband and received a compensation of Rs. 20,000/- as full and final settlement of his claim. Respondent No. 2 had also received Rs. 10,000/- and odd towards final and full settlement of his original claim of Rs. 39, 000/- and odd. Hence the question of any further compensation to be paid to him could not and did not arise. 7. 20,000/- as full and final settlement of his claim. Respondent No. 2 had also received Rs. 10,000/- and odd towards final and full settlement of his original claim of Rs. 39, 000/- and odd. Hence the question of any further compensation to be paid to him could not and did not arise. 7. It is true that all these contentions raised by shri Kakodkar were sought to be answered by Shri Rebello, learned Counsel for the respondents, who in turn submitted with regard to the plea raised by the petitioners to the effect that there was no dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) and 2(a) available to the respondents either because the workmen were not members of the Union on the relevant date and/or that the General Secretary of the Union had not been authorized to sign any pleadings on behalf of the workmen that the petitioners never raised earlier such plea or even asked that an issue be framed accordingly by the Tribunal. Besides none of the respondents witnesses were cross-examined on this aspect and no suggestions were also put to them to drive out the petitioners contention in this regard. The learned Counsel also submitted that it has come on record that both the petitioners and the Union had participated in the proceedings before the Labour Commissioner and at no time the Management did object to it . It was further urged that there is evidence on record to suggest that the Union was actually formed in January, 1973 and only thereafter the first collective demand was made to the Management, on 19-2-1974. On the point of reference being made under section 2(k) or 2(a) of the Act it was argued that this question was immaterial because the only aspect which was relevant is whether there was a valid reference or not and also whether the petitioners have actually violated the provisions of sections 25-F and 25-G of the Act. The learned Counsel then contended that when a challenge is thrown by the workmen on the very validity of retrenchment it was for the Management to show that the termination of their services was not capricious, arbitrary or without reasons. At that stage the Tribunal could go into these reasons to find out whether the same were proper and justified reasons. At that stage the Tribunal could go into these reasons to find out whether the same were proper and justified reasons. It is in this background that the order of reference was to be seen in the context of the allegations made by the workmen against their retrenchment. Besides, according to the learned Counsel, the compensation paid by the petitioners was accepted by the workmen under protest and hence this would not bar them from raising the dispute. The learned Counsel also urged that when the Government made the Reference to the Tribunal holding that there was an industrial dispute and the employers sought to contest that any industrial dispute had arisen the Management was required to show that the question referred by the Government to the Tribunal was not amounting to any industrial disputes at all failing which the Tribunal was bound to find itself to the terms of reference. The learned Counsel then reiterated his submission that the challenge of locus standi belatedly raised by the petitioners was an after thought in view of the fact that the petitioners had already participated earlier in the conciliation proceedings thus acknowledging the locus standi of the Union to spouse the cause of the retrenchment . 8. Shri Sonak, on behalf of the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 214 of 1990, has also commented, while challenging the merits of the compensation awarded to the workman Hegde in lieu of reinstatement with full wages, on the gross inadequacy and want of any basis either on facts or in law with regard to the paltry sum of Rs. 30, 000/- awarded to him. In this respect the learned Counsel urged that the normal rule when the retenchment is found to be bad is reinstatement of the workmen with full back wages and only in case this is not possible then compensation is to be paid. Besides, the burden of proving that Hegde was in gainful employment elsewhere was lying on the Management. According to the learned Counsel the compensation awarded was to upto up-to-date (sic). Admittedly the termination of services of the employee was on 24-3-1974 and the Award was passed by the Tribunal only on 9-11-1989 i.e. after about 16 years, for this entire period the compensation was calculated at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per year. According to the learned Counsel the compensation awarded was to upto up-to-date (sic). Admittedly the termination of services of the employee was on 24-3-1974 and the Award was passed by the Tribunal only on 9-11-1989 i.e. after about 16 years, for this entire period the compensation was calculated at the rate of Rs. 2000/- per year. It had come on evidence that Hegde at the time of his retrenchment was being paid the salary of Rs. 320/- per month. Being so only towards back wages for a period of about 16 years the compensation would work out at around more than Rs. 61,000/-. Besides that Management had to account also for increments on wages and other benefits including interest which had not been awarded to the workmen. Further the observation of the Tribunal that the workmen were gainfully employed was immaterial once the Management of the petitioners had not been able to adduce any cogent evidence in this regard. As such, according to the learned Counsel, this aspect would become irrelevant as there was no discussion by the Tribunal as to why the normal rule was departed from in this case. The learned Counsel urged that although gainful employment was to be taken into account for quantifying the compensation, however, it was for the Management to prove how much the workmen had earned towards their employment during the period of retrenchment. The burden of proving this fact was lying on the petitioners and no reasons were given by the Tribunal to deny to Hegde full back wages more so when there was not even a plea on the part of the Management in his case that he was in gainful employment elsewhere throughout this time. 9. However irrespective of all these submissions on the part of the learned Counsel it seems to me that in the process the real issue in the case was grossly missed and this, in my view, is not the one which concerns with the question as to whether the impugned Award is correct or valid and/or based on a proper appreciation of the facts and the evidence available on record or according to the settled principles of law applicable to the circumstances. The grievance of the petitioners is that inspite of the fact of the plea of lack of locus standi of the respondents Union having been expressly and elaborately raised by them before the Tribunal in their statement of claims no finding on this crucial issue, which was challenging the very jurisdiction of the Tribunal to adjudicate the remaining aspects of the subject-matter of the Reference, was clearly recorded in the Award by holding that the Tribunal was competent to do so for the reason that a valid Reference had been made by the Government at the instance of the respondents Union with regard to the industrial dispute spoused by them on behalf of the retrenched workmen. This, according to me, was the crucial issue which, basically and essentially involving disputed questions of fact, the Tribunal was expected and required to answer firstly consequent upon the challenge thrown by the petitioners that there being no industrial dispute validly raised by the respondents Union there was thus no valid or competent Award made by the Tribunal in this regard. 10. I have gone through the impugned decision of the Tribunal and I am satisfied that the point raised by the petitioners to the effect that the reference was invalid and impermissible was not dealt with in the award at all and that even if a separate issue had not been framed in this regard the Tribunal was always required at the first instance to specifically deal with all the points raised by the petitioners including the issue of affecting its very jurisdiction. This fact by itself is likely to render the award of the Tribunal ex facie bad and vitiated being thus bound to be unsettled. Needless to say that in the circumstances all the other questions raised by the learned Counsel for the parties are to be kept alive pending the final adjudication of the preliminary issue of jurisdiction involving the plea of locus standi. 11. In the result the writ petition is allowed and the impugned award of the Tribunal is hereby quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to the Tribunal with a direction that a specific finding be recorded on the plea of locus standi and/or jurisdiction raised by the petitioners in this case. To that extent Rule is accordingly made absolute but there will be however no order as to costs. Petition allowed. *****