JUDGMENT : B.N. Srikrishna, J. 1. Though the facts are slightly different in these two writ petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the question of law which is required to be decided in both the writ petitions is the same. The Respondents are the same and the petitioners are the workmen of the First Respondent. Hence it would be convenient to dispose of both writ petitions by a common judgment. First, a short recital of the relevant facts in both petitions. 2. Writ Petition No. 5603 of 1986 : (a) The petitioner was served with the charge-sheet dated 11th November, 1978, alleging that on 10th November, 1978, at about 5-40 p.m., he along with some other workmen assaulted the staff members of the First Respondent who had joined duty, while they were on their way home by bicycle about 50 meters from the gate of the factory. At the material time there was a strike called by the Union of Workmen to which the petitioner belonged. Some of the other workmen of the First Respondent did not join the strike and were reporting for duty. In order to coerce those non-striking workmen into joining the strike, the assault was engineered against them in which it was alleged that the petitioner was a participant. An enquiry was held against the Petition under the provisions of the Model Standing Orders. Sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner to defend himself against the charges alleged against him. The Enquiry Officer made a finding that the petitioner was guilty of the misconduct alleged against him and the Respondent, after considering all relevant circumstances including the past record of the petitioner, dismissed him from service. This petitioner demanded that the order of dismissal passed against him be revoked and that he be reinstated in service with continuity of service and full back wages. His demand not having been conceded, resulted in an industrial dispute which was processed unsuccessfully in conciliation proceedings and finally resulted in Reference (IDA) No. 71 of 1980 being made to the First Labour Court. Pune for adjudication under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). (b) Before the Labour Court, the parties went on trial, in the first instance, on the issue as to the legality and validity of the domestic enquiry. Pune for adjudication under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). (b) Before the Labour Court, the parties went on trial, in the first instance, on the issue as to the legality and validity of the domestic enquiry. Neither party led any oral evidence, but relied on the documents placed on record which were admitted on both sides. After hearing the parties, the Labour Court, by its order dated 16-4-1985, raised the following points and answered them as under : "POINTS : (1) Does second party prove that the enquiry held by the first party is against the provisions of the Standing Orders applicable to the parties? (2) Does he prove that the finding of the Enquiry Officer is perverse? FINDINGS : (1) No. (2) No." (Before the Labour Court the first party was the Employer and the second party was the Petitioner-workmen). (c) By his order dated 16-4-1985 the learned judge of the Labour Court held the enquiry to be legal and valid, the findings recorded to be proper and directed that the case be heard further on another points. The Labour Court thereafter raised further points for consideration and answered them as under : "POINTS : (1) Does second party prove that dismissal is not justified in his case? (2) Does he prove that he is entitled to be reinstated in service on his original post with continuity of service? (3) Does he prove that he is entitled to back wages? FINDINGS : (1) No. (2) No." (3) No." (d) By the final Award dated 30-1-1986 made by the first Labour Court, the demand made in the reference was rejected with no order as to costs. (e) Writ Petition No. 5603 of 1986 impugns the said Award. 3. Writ Petition No. 3021 of 1988 : (a) The Petitioners are all ex-workmen of the First Respondent-Company. There was a strike called by the Union to which the Petitioner belong. On 10th November, 1978, at about 5-40 p.m. there was an incident of assault on some of the non-striking workmen of the First Respondent at a distance of about 50 meters from the main gate of the First Respondent-Company. There was a strike called by the Union to which the Petitioner belong. On 10th November, 1978, at about 5-40 p.m. there was an incident of assault on some of the non-striking workmen of the First Respondent at a distance of about 50 meters from the main gate of the First Respondent-Company. (b) The Petitioners 1 to 7 were charge-sheeted on 11th November, 1978, alleging that they had committed the misconduct of an act subversive of discipline on the establishment by assaulting the non-striking workmen on 10th November, 1978 within close proximity of the factory gate. (c) Petitioner No. 8 was charge-sheeted on 16th November, 1978, on the allegation that on 15th November, 1978 at about 11-30 A.M. he along with some other co-workmen had stopped a car in which some officers and trainees were travelling, near Kavade Vasti, and assaulted them, causing them serious injuries. (d) Domestic enquiries were held on different dates in respect of the charge-sheets given to the different petitioners. All of them participated in the enquiry and were fond to be guilty of the misconducts alleged against them. They were dismissed from service consequent upon the findings at the Enquiries. Petitioners 1 to 8 challenged the orders of dismissal by raising industrial disputes which came to be referred to the First About Court, Pune by Reference (IDA) Nos. 12 of 1980, 75 of 1980, 86 of 1980, 14 of 1980, 15 of 1980, 72 of 1980, 87 of 1980 and 13 of 1980. (e) In all these references, the Labour Court tried the issue of legality and validity of the domestic enquiry in the first instance, and, by preliminary orders made on different dates in each reference, held the enquiry to be legal and valid and the finding of the Enquiry Officer to be proper. By the final orders made on deferent dates in each reference, the Labour Court rejected the references by holding that the dismissal order was justified in each case and held that the workmen concerned were not entitled to be reinstated in service or to any back wages. (f) Petitioners 1 to 8 have challenged the Awards rejecting relief to them, by Writ petition No. 3021 of 1988. 4. (f) Petitioners 1 to 8 have challenged the Awards rejecting relief to them, by Writ petition No. 3021 of 1988. 4. The dismissal orders came to be passed against all the nine workmen concerned in the two writ petitions in the course of the same transaction, namely, the attempt on the party of the Unionised section of workmen to coerce the non-striking workmen to abstain from work and join the strike, by assaulting some workmen travelling by bicycle and some officers and trainees of the Company, travelling by car, at places within a short distance of the main gate of the factory of the First Respondent. 5. Though Ms. Sarnaik, learned Advocate for the Writ Petitioner in both the writ petitions, strenuously contended that the charge was false and fabricated, I am afraid, it is not possible to accept this submission. The Labour Court has scrutinised the evidence on record and recorded a clear finding that the enquiry was legal and valid and that the charge against each workmen has been provided at a properly held domestic enquiry. In the face of this clear finding that the findings of the Enquiry Officer were proper and not liable to be interfered with, it is not open to this Court, in writ jurisdiction, to consider whether the charge is proved or not. The submission, therefore, deserves to be rejected. 6. Ms. Sarnaik then contended that the enquiry was bad because the Enquiry Officer was a paid professional who held the enquiry. This submission also has no force as it is by now well settled law that, as long as no bias can be imputed to the Enquiry Officer, the fact whether he was paid professional or a whole time employee of the Employer, does not affect the validity of the enquiry held by him. 7. Ms. Sarnaik then contended that the enquiry was an attempt to victimise the workmen. I am afraid, this contention also fails. When there is a finding of proved misconduct, the charge of victimisation fails. In any case there was hardly any material on record before the Labour Court to sustain the catenation. 8. Finally, Ms. 7. Ms. Sarnaik then contended that the enquiry was an attempt to victimise the workmen. I am afraid, this contention also fails. When there is a finding of proved misconduct, the charge of victimisation fails. In any case there was hardly any material on record before the Labour Court to sustain the catenation. 8. Finally, Ms. Sarnaik contended that, even if all that was alleged against the petitioner-workmen was held to be proved, since the alleged acts did not occur within the premises of the industrial establishment of the First Respondent (in one case it occurred about 50 meters from the main gate of the factory, while in the other case, it is said to have occurred about 1 kilometer away from the gate of the factory), the acts proved against the workmen did not at all amount to the misconduct of "commission of any act subversive of discipline or good behaviour on the premises of the establishment", within the meaning of the applicable Standing Order. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. Vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut and Others, and it was contended that this judgment over-rules the earlier view taken by the Supreme Court in Mulchandani Electrical and Radio Industries Ltd. Vs. The Workmen, which took the view that the words "within the premises or precincts of the establishment", used in the concerned Standing Order, did not refer to the place where the act subversive of discipline was committed, but to the place where the consequence of such an act manifest itself. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Mulchandani observed, ".... an act, wherever committed, if it has the one effect of subverting discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment, will amount to misconduct under Standing Order 24(1). We are unable to agree that Standing Order 24(1) leaves out of its scope an act committed outside, though it may result in subversion of discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment in question. Such a construction, in our view, would be quite unreasonable". (Supra) In the submission of Ms. We are unable to agree that Standing Order 24(1) leaves out of its scope an act committed outside, though it may result in subversion of discipline or good behaviour within the premises or precincts of the establishment in question. Such a construction, in our view, would be quite unreasonable". (Supra) In the submission of Ms. Sarnaik, the judgment in Glaxo Laboratories (supra) takes a contrary view and over-rules the view taken in Mulchandani's case (Supra) and hold that, in order to fall within the ambit of the aforesaid Standing Order, the Act subversive of discipline must necessary be committed within the premises of the industrial establishment. I am afraid, it is not possible to accept the submission. This question has been coincided in several judgments o this Court wherein the view has been taken that there is no conflict between the said judgments of the Supreme Court. A proper reading of Glaxo's case (supra), would actually show that the rule in the case of Mulchandani has been emphatically reiterated. (see in this connection, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Suresh S. Patil v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. and Another 1993 2 CLR 231 , Murlidhar Raghoji Savant v. General Manager, Mather & Platt (i) Ltd. and others 1992 64 F.L.R. 78, Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. S. A. Patil & Ors. 1993 (1) CLR 667 and Bhavani Metal Works v. Pandurang R. Swami & others 1991 (1) CLR 147 . 10. In view of the consistent view taken by the different benches of this Court, as evidenced in the above judgments, it is not possible for me to accept the contention so strenuously canvassed at the Bar by Ms. Sarnaik. In my view, there is no conflict between Mulchandani and Glaxo. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mulchandani (supra) is clear. An act would be 'subversive of discipline within the premises of precincts of the industrial establishment', as long as the act has a rational and reasonable nexus with the industrial employment and has the deleterious consequence of subverting the discipline in the establishment, regardless of whether the act takes place within or outside the establishment. The emphasis is on the baleful consequence of the act, and not on its situs. The emphasis is on the baleful consequence of the act, and not on its situs. Applying this test to the facts in these two writ petitions it is clear that the acts alleged against the workmen fell clearly within the definition of the misconduct under the Model Standing Order 24(1) as 'commission of an act subversive of discipline or good behaviour on the premises of the establishment. The Labour Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in refusing relief to the workmen concerned. There is no merit in both writ petitions, which deserve to be dismissed. 11. In the result, Writ Petition No. 5630 of 1986 and Writ Petition No. 3021 of 1988 are both dismissed. Rules issued in both writ petitions are discharged. However, there would be no order as to costs.