JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava 1. THE Petitioner,, who had initially been recruited as a Routine Grade Clerk in the year 1959 and later on had been promoted on the post of Superintendent Grade-2 in the year 1992, which post carries a time scale of pay of Rs. 1400-2600 has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition feeling aggrieved by the action of the respondent authorities to superannuate him on his attaining the age of 58 years. 2. IT appears that the Additional Secretary, Secondary Education, Regional Office, Allahabad issued a Circular dated 15-7-1993, requiring all the Superintendents and Section Officers of the Regional Office to ensure that no dues are payable by the employees falling in category 3 and 4 as well as regularised workmen who were going to retire in the year 1994, the particulars whereof were furnished in the attached list. This circular appears to have been issued with the objective that the issuence of a 'no dues' certificates in favour of the Superannuating employees may not be unnecessarily delayed and the post retirement benefits may be made available to these employees at the earliest The list appended to the aforesaid Circular contained the name of the petitioner indicating his date of retirement as 28-2-1994 on which date he was to reach the age of superannuation of 58 years. IT further appears that the petitioner submitted a representation to the Chief Secretary (Education) Government of U. P. Lucknow bringing to his notice that he was going to attain the age of superannuation in the month of February, 1994 and claiming that his date of birth as entered in High School certificate was not correct but his application seeking correction of the date of birth was rejected although on the basis of his correct dated of birth, he could continue for two years more in service, the petitioner, in the aforesaid representation prayed for an extension of service for a period of two years taking into consideration his past performance in the service. The representation of the petitioner seeking extension of service appears to have been recommended by the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, Allahabad vide the letter dated 30-12-1993. The representation of the petitioner seeking extension of service appears to have been recommended by the Secretary, Board of Secondary Education, Allahabad vide the letter dated 30-12-1993. During the pendency of the representation submitted by the petitioner seeking extension of service for a period of two years, the respondent authorities sought to implement the decision dated 15-7-1993 to which a reference has already been made above, whereupon the present writ petition was filed on 16-2-1994 seeking the quashing of the order dated 15-7-1993 and a direction in the nature of mandamus requiring the respondents not to give effect to the aforesaid order and further not to retire the petitioner at the age of 58 years. The petitioner further prayed for the issuance of a direction holding the Rule 56-A of U. P. Fundamental (First Amendment) Rules, 1987 as ultravires. 3. I have heard Sri Pradeep Chandra, learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned Standing Counsel representing the, respondents and have carefully perused the record. 4. THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has asserted that the Board of Secondary Education had always been treated as a department of Government for all purposes other than those powers which the U. P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P.. (U. P. Act No. 2 of 1921) Act itself had specifically conferred and made the Board autonomous to that extent and the status of the petitioner is that of civil servant under the State. He has placed strong reliance on a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gulam Haqqani Khan v. State of U. P., AIR 1962 Alld. 413. What has been urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that in the circumstances the provisions contained in the Fundamental Rules 56 of Financial Hand Book, part 2 and 4 become applicable to the petitioner and since by virtue of U. P. Fundamental (First Amendment) Rules, 1987, the age of superannuation so far as the employees falling in group 'D' are concerned has been provided as 60 years, the age of superannuation of the petitioner who is an employee falling in category group 'C' should also be put at par with the category group 'D' employees and under the law, the petitioner cannot be retired from service at the age of 58 years. THE learned Counsel for the petitioner has further asserted that the impugned action of retiring the petitioner at the age of 58 years is wholly illegal, void being not only arbitrary but discriminatory being violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as the rule in question seeks to treat equals unequally. THE petitioner in support of his submission has heavily relied upon the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Girija Prasad Singh v. State of U. P. and others (Civil Misc. writ petition No. 6896 of 1993, decided on 12-7-1993), a true copy of which judgment has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition, wherein while considering Rule 20 of the U. P. Recognised Basin Schools Junior High School) Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Clerks and Class IV Employees Rules, 1994, which provides the age of superannuation for the clerks to be 58 years and for class IV employees to be 60 years was held to be unconstitutional, arbitrary and discriminatory on the view that a clerical job does not call for any special skill and the nature and function of employees falling in class 3 and class 4 were basically the same. It was observed in the aforesaid decision Chat Clerks can continue to be fit to work up to the age of 60 years and therefore, it would be unfair to retire them at the age of 58 years as they do not have to do strenuous physical work like a soldier or 'Lashkurer'. THE learned Single Judge in the foresaid decision recommended that the State Government should raise the age; of superannuation for all clerks up to 60 years where the nature of the work does not require special physical efforts. In order to appreciate the controversy raised in this case and the implications arising under the amended Fundamental Rule 56, it will be appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of Fundamental Rule 56 of the U. P. Fundamental Rules contained in Financial Hand Book Vol. 2 parts 2 to 4, the English version whereof as notified by the State Government is as follows. The petitioner has already annexed the Hindi version of the Fundamental Rule 56 as amended in 1987 as Annexure-5 to the Fundamental Rules. "56. 2 parts 2 to 4, the English version whereof as notified by the State Government is as follows. The petitioner has already annexed the Hindi version of the Fundamental Rule 56 as amended in 1987 as Annexure-5 to the Fundamental Rules. "56. (a) Except as otherwise, provided in other Clauses of this rule, every Government servant shall retire from service on the after non of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty eight years. He may be retained in service after the date of retirement on superannuation, with the sanction of the Government, on public grounds, which must be recorded in writing but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances : Provided that a Government Servant recruited before November 5, 1985 and holding the Group 'D' post shall retire from service on the after noon of the month in which he attains the age of 60 (sixty) years, Explanation-The above proviso shall not be applicable in those cases where the status of a post/posts referred to in the above provision, has been changed after February 27, 1982 and categorised in higher group of post/posts". 5. IT may be noticed that the posts falling in group 'D' or class IV posts are of various categories These categories have indicated in The Class IV Employees Services, Rule 1975' which applies to all class IV, now group 'D' posts, the pay scales of which at the commencement of the aforesaid Rules was Rs. 165-Rs. 215, in the subordinate offices under the control of the Government excluding the U. P. Secretariate Office, Office of State Legislature, Public Service Commission, Lok Ayukt, High Court and Subordinate Courts under the control or Superintendence of the Advocate General Uttar Pradesh and the establishment under the control of the Advocate General. The categories of such Group 'D' posts as indicated in the aforesaid rule included the posts of Peon, Messenger, Chowkidar, Mali, Farrash, Sweeper, Waterman/Bhishti, Tindal, Thelaman, Fire-guard, Record-Lifter and every non-technical post, Jamadar, Daftari, Book-binder cyclostyle operator etc. 6. The categories of such Group 'D' posts as indicated in the aforesaid rule included the posts of Peon, Messenger, Chowkidar, Mali, Farrash, Sweeper, Waterman/Bhishti, Tindal, Thelaman, Fire-guard, Record-Lifter and every non-technical post, Jamadar, Daftari, Book-binder cyclostyle operator etc. 6. THE provisions contained in the aforesaid First Amendment Rule, 1987 which was enforced with retrospective effect from 5-11 85 stipulate that subject to the exception provided in the rules every government servant shall superannuate/retire on the day he attained the age of 58 years and such a person superannuating at the age of attaining 58 years might be retained in service after the date of compulsory retirement, with the sanction of the government on public grounds, which must be recorded In writing but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances. THE proviso added to the fundamental rule 56, however, stipulates that all those employees belonging to group D' who had been recruited prior to 5-11-85 and were holding a post falling in the category of group 'D' shall retire on attaining the age of 60 years. There is an explanation added to this proviso which stipulates that this exception will not apply to those cases where a post falling in group 'D' an on 27-2-82 had been re-categorised and was included in the posts of higher categories carved out of the said cadre. It has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is a discrepancy in the English version and the Hindi version of the text of U. P. Fundamental (First Amendment) Rules, 1987. The contention is that the proviso contemplates the grant of benefits of service upto the age of 60 years to all the employees of group 'D' category who had been recruited prior to 5-11-85 irrespective of the fact whether, they, on the date of enforcement of the rules were not continuing to hold a post falling in group 'D'. In this connection suffice to say that this Court in its division in the case of Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1962 Alld. 240 had clarified that: in a case of conflict or divergence between two versions the English version may reign supreme and supersede the Hindi one. In this connection suffice to say that this Court in its division in the case of Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd., Meerut v. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1962 Alld. 240 had clarified that: in a case of conflict or divergence between two versions the English version may reign supreme and supersede the Hindi one. Further a larger Full Bench of this Court in its decision in the case of Smt. Ram Rati, v. Gram Samaj, Jehwa, 1974 RD 163, had pointed out the official language of the State of U.P. is Hindi so that the Legislature of this State can pass ordinances, Acts etc., in the Hindi language yet its translation in the English language shall be regarded its authoritative text and shall prevail over its Hindi version. Consequenty, the English version of the U. P. Fundamental (First Amendment) Rules, 1987 has to be looked into for finding out the real meaning and object in case of any divergence in both the texts. A perusal of the English version off the proviso clearly indicates that only those employees falling in group 'D' were entitled to the benefit of continuance in service upto the age attaining 63 years who had been recruited prior to 5-11-85 and were holding the post in that category on the date when the rules were enforced. The intention that the employee in order to be entitled for continuing in service up to his attaining the age of 60 years must be continuing to hold the post falling in group 'D' category is further dear from the explanation added to the proviso which clearly excludes those employees who had been initially recruited as group 'D' employees but their posts had subsequent to 27-2-83 got included in any higher category of posts. 7. IT may further be noticed that the petitioner himself vide his application dated 21-12-93 referred to in paragraph 8 of writ petition had sought for an extension of service permissible under Fundamental Rule 56 as amended in the year 1987, on the ground that lite had served the department honestly and with devotion and his work had also been appreciated. IT may further be noticed that the petitioner himself vide his application dated 21-12-93 referred to in paragraph 8 of writ petition had sought for an extension of service permissible under Fundamental Rule 56 as amended in the year 1987, on the ground that lite had served the department honestly and with devotion and his work had also been appreciated. The mere fact that the petitioner had sought for an extension in service as referred to above indicates that by the date the representation had been filed the petitioner had no grievance against the fixation of the age of 58 years as the age of superannuation and that is why he had sought for an extension of service which could be granted With the prior sanction of the State Government on public grounds to be recorded in writing. However, it appears that when the sanction of the State Government sought for in the application referred to above was not forth-coming the petitioner filed this writ petition on 14-2 94 challenging the Fundamental Rule 56-A as amended fixing 58 years as the age of superannuation for employees other than those who fell in the categories of group 'D' to be ultra-vires on the ground that it was Violative of the guarantee of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. 8. THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner in respect of the above is that the amended rule provides the age of superannuation for employees falling in group 'D' to be 60 years but for employees falling in group 'C' the age of superannuation which has been fixed is only 58 years. This non-enhancement of the age of retirement to 60 years in case of employees falling in group 'C or higher groups is, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, per se, arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and amounts to denial of equality before law and equal protection of laws. It is urged that as such it is violative of the guarantee of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. It is urged that as such it is violative of the guarantee of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. The contention is that the various categories of posts compendiously called group 'D' posts and all the posts which are compendiously called group 'C posts in reality, form one class which is 'inferior class' of service and there is no logic or justification for according a differential treatment to the employees like the petitioner who are placed in group 'C in the matter relating to the attaining of the age of superannuation, consequently, it is claimed that the petitioner is entitled to continue in service up to the age of sixty years. It has also been urged that pending decision the retirement of the petitioner with effect from 28-2-94 be declared illegal, viod and the same be quashed. 9. THE learned Standing Counsel representing the respondents has, however, contended that on the pleadings of the petitioner no discrimination can be said to have been made out against the petitioner as compared to the persons falling in group 'D' category who are covered under the proviso to Fundamental Rule 56-A ass amended. It has been pointed out that the conditions relating to recruitment and other conditions of service of employees falling in group 'D' and the employees falling in group 'C or upward categories are governed by different rules and the petitioner has absolutely failed to prove and establish that the Fundamental Rule 56 as amended seeks to treat equals unequally to the prejudice of the employees categorised as group 'C' employees or employees in any higher category. It has further been contended that the employees belonging to group 'D' and the employees placed in higher categories belonged to two distinct categories of employees who are governed by different conditions of service as regard pay, perquisites, allowances administrative powers etc. and having regard to the lower emoluments and other benefits to which the employees belonging to group 'D' and the employees of higher categories, which they are entitled to get and also from the nature of their work and powers enjoyed by them, the fixation of different age of retirement for the different class of employees by itself could not be deemed to be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. THE emphasis of the learned Standing Counsel was on the fact that the employees falling in category group 'D' could not be deemed to stand at par with the employees falling in category group 'C or upward 'categories. 10. CLASSIFICATION on the basis of reasonable differentia is a well known basis. Ostensibly, often functions of two posts may appear to be the same or similar but there may be difference in degrees in their performance. Some times the quantity of work may be the same but the quality may differ. In this connection the observation of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978, reported in 1979 (1) SCC 380 particularly in paragraph 72 thereof may be usefully noticed. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court has stated several propositions which emerged various judgments of that court on the implications arising under Articles 14 of the Constitution of India. Some of the propositions which have a bearing on the controversy raised in the present case were as under:- (1) The first part of Article 14, which was adopted form the fresh Constitution, is a declaration of equality of the civil rights of all persons within the territories of India. It enshrines a basic principle of republicanism. The second part, which is a corollary of the first and is based on the last clause of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment of the American Constitution, enjoins that equal protection shall be secured to all such persons in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties without discrimination of favouritism. It is a pledge of the protection of equal laws, that is, laws that operate alike on all persons under like circumstances. (2) The State, in the exercise of its government power, has of necessity to make laws operating differently on different groups or classes of persons within its territory to attain particular ends in giving effect to its policies, and it must possess for that purpose large powers of distinguishing and classifying persons or things to be subjected to such laws. (3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. (3) The constitutional command to the State to afford equal protection of its laws sets a goal not attainable by the invention and application of a precise formula Therefore, classification need not be constituted by an exact or scientific exclusion or inclusion of persons or things. The courts should not insist on delusive exactness or apply doctrinaire tests for determining the validity of classification in any given case. CLASSIFICATION is justified if it is not palpably arbitrary. (4) The principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the Indian territory or that the same remedies should be made available to them irrespective of differences of circumstances. Id only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation, and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same. (5) By the process of classification, the State has the power of determining who should be regarded as a class for purposes of legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject. This power, no doubt, in some degree is likely to produce some inequality but if a law deals with the liberties of a number of well-defined classes, it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. CLASSIFICATION thus, means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. (6) The law can make and set (apart the classes according to the needs and exigencies of the society and as suggested by experience. It can recognise even degree of evil, but the classification should never be arbitrary, artificial or evasive. (7) The classification must not he arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely (1) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. (8) CLASSIFICATION necessarily implies the making of a distinction or discrimination between persons classified and those who are not members of that class. It is the essence of a classification that upon the class are cast duties and burdens different from those resiling upon the general public. In deed, the very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. It will be apparent from the above that the classification may be justified if it is not palpably arbitrary and all persons similarly circumstanced have to be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to even allege the crucial facts entitling him to be treated at par with employees falling in the category of group 'D'. On his own showing be had been promoted to the post of Superintendent grade II in the years 1992 and had been placed in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-2600. It should not be lost sight of that one who asserts discrimination on the basis of classification resulting in equals being treated unequally, must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon reasonable basis. While mathematical niceties and perfect equality may not be required and similarity if not identity of treatment may be enough, still the petitioner has even failed to allege the basic facts regarding nature of duties or similarity in the functions which may lead to an inference or prove that the employees falling in group 'D' :and those falling in group 'C can and deserve to be treated to be at par belonging to the same class or so similarly situated which may, in the circumstances, make out a case of differential treatment offending the fundamental right guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It may further be noticed that in the service hierarchy the distinction between posts falling in the category of group 'D' as indicated herein before and the posts falling in categories higher than group 'D' category has an importance all of its own. The learned counsel for the petitioner has produced for the perusal of the court details and list of gazetted and non-gazetted posts of the State of U. P. Published by the State Government in the year 1991 corrected upto 1-4-90. In the aforesaid list published by the Director, Government Printing and Stationary (Lucknow) U. P. at page 282 the posts of Superintendent Grade II which post was held by the petitioner has been shown to be a 'Gazetted' post. It is common knowledge that a gazetted officer enjoys a higher status and prestige as compared to the non-gazetted officer or employees falling in group 'D'. The difference in pay scales and other facilities including perks etc., enjoyed by the gazetted officer are higher as compared to the employees holding the posts falling in group 'D' Even the nomenclature of the post held by the petitioner suggests that such a post cannot by any stretch of imagination be treated at par with a non-technical post, falling in group 'D'. 11. IN its decision in the case of K. Nagraj v. Chief Secretary of Andhra Pradesh, 1985 SC 551, the Apex Court had pointed out that not to provide for an age of retirement at all would be contrary to public interest because the State cannot afford the luxury of allowing its employees to continue in service after they have passed the point of peak and that rules of retirement do not take away the right of a member to his livelihood and the only right is to the right to bold office till the stated number of years. IN such a circumstance, it seems to me, that it is for the State to determine and lay down the policy of reckoning a stated number of years of office containing the crest whereafter Inevitably in the Descent justifying retirement. 12. IN such a circumstance, it seems to me, that it is for the State to determine and lay down the policy of reckoning a stated number of years of office containing the crest whereafter Inevitably in the Descent justifying retirement. 12. THE rule in question framed under Article 380 of the Constitution is indicative of the policy of the State which ordinarily, should not be disturbed unless ft is palpably unlawful more so when it is based on job evaluation which should be normally left to remain within the exclusive domain of the executive. It is appropriately, for the authorities concerned to determine as to what age should be the correct age of Superannuation keeping in view the requirement of service expected to be rendered by the employees. In the present case the assessment of fixing 60 years as the age of superannuation for employees falling in group 'D' and 58 year for others does not appear to be arbitrary, specially when, according a differential treatment in the matter of retirement age per se cannot be deemed to be offensive to the right of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. In the circumstances of the present case l am of the firm opinion that according a differential treatment in the age of superannuation to the employees holding posts in group 'D' and the employees holding the posts falling in category group 'C' or upward or higher categories cannot be deemed to be a case of arbitrariness or unjustifiable discrimination without any reasonable nexus between the classification and the object to be retained thereby. Further the impugned classification into two categories for the purposes of age of retirement apparently satisfies the test of valid classification. The impugned provision, therefore, can not be deemed to suffer from any constitutional invalidity. I am clearly of the view that these two categories do not form the same class which can be deemed to be similarly situated. Obviously, therefore, the impugned action cannot be deemed to be such which would fall within the vice of the aforesaid Articles and cannot, therefore, be deemed to be violative of the right of equality enshrined therein. 13. Obviously, therefore, the impugned action cannot be deemed to be such which would fall within the vice of the aforesaid Articles and cannot, therefore, be deemed to be violative of the right of equality enshrined therein. 13. LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has laid great emphasis on the fact that in the decision in the case of Girja Prasad Singh v. State of U. P. and others, decided by a learned Single Judge of this Court on 12-2-93, a provision contained in Rule 20 of U. P. Recognised Basic Schools (Junior High School) Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Clerks and Group 'Gha' Employees Rules 1984 was held to be unconstitutional as it provided that an employee holding the post off a Clerk is entitled to the same benefits as extended to an employee holding an inferior post in category Gha as clerical job does not call for any special skill and that there should be no difference in the age of superannuation prescribed for Principle, Head Master, Teacher, Librarian or inferior servant of a High School or Intermediate College. Strong emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel on the observations occurring in the aforesaid judgment to the effect that in the case of Clerks there should not be two different age limits of retirement and when the longevity of people has risen and the Clerks are fit to work up to the age of 60 years it would be unfair to retire them at the age of 58 years as Clerks do not have to do strong physical work like a soldier or luskerer. The learned Single Judge in support of his decision appears to have drawn support from observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 1991 UP LB EC 1387. According to the learned Single Judge the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court stood attracted in the facts and circumstances of that case. LEARNED Single Judge in the aforesaid decision had recommended to the State Government to amend the service rules of all clerical and other non-clerical employees in all services upto 60 years except where the nature of work required special physical effort indicating that normally all class III employees should be continued till 60 years. 14. LEARNED Single Judge in the aforesaid decision had recommended to the State Government to amend the service rules of all clerical and other non-clerical employees in all services upto 60 years except where the nature of work required special physical effort indicating that normally all class III employees should be continued till 60 years. 14. BEFORE considering the implications arising under the decision of the learned Single Judge referred to hereinbefore it will be useful to notice the following observations of the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Krishen Kumar v. Union of India, 1990 (4) SCC 204. ".........The doctrine of precedent, that is being bound by a previous decision, is limited to the decision itself and as to what is necessarily involved in it. It does not mean that this Court is bound by the various reasons given in support of it, especially when they contain "propositions wider than the case itself required". This was what Lord Selborne said in Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker's Trustees and Lord Halsbury in Quiun v. Leathern. Sir Frederick Pollock has also said: "Judicial authority belongs not to be exact words used in this or that judgment, nor even to all the reasons given, but only to the principles accepted and applied as necessary grounds of the decision." "......In other words, the enunciation of the reason or principle upon which a question before a court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or Judge-made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difficulty in order to be bound by it." Further as clarified by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra. AIR 1968 SC 647 , a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. AIR 1968 SC 647 , a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. It has further been observed in that case that it is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a Judgment and to build upon it. Considering the pleadings of the petitioner himself I have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the ratio of the decision in the case of Girja Prasad Singh (supra) has absolutely no application whatsoever to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner thereupon is totally misplaced. In the case of Girja Prasad Singh a different rule governing the service conditions of a clerk in a Junior High School with different service conditions was being considered, The question relating to the difference between a gazetted post and non-technical post falling in group 'D' was not involved in the aforesaid case. The service rules as involved in the present case and the implications arising thereunder did not come up for consideration in the case of Girja Prasad Singh (supra). Even in the decision of the Apex Court in the case of All India Judges Association v. Union of India (supra) it had been clearly observed that the nature of work was one of the considerations relevant to the fixing of age of retirement, and special features of the judicial officers taken to be a class by itself were emphasised pointing out that the judicial service stands by itself in the matter of the age of retirement. The nature of the work performed by an employee holding a post falling in group 'D' and the nature of the work performed by an employee falling in the category of group 'C' holding a gazetted post and categories higher than that category, cannot, by any stretch of imagination be held to be the same and in any case the nature of the work performed by a Superintendent grade II cannot be deemed to be similar or identical to the nature of work performed by a clerk of a Junior High School which receives grants-in-aid from State. As a matter of fact the decision in the case of All India Judges Association referred to in the case of Girja Prasad Singh (supra) was modified to a considerable extent in the latter decision of the Apex Court in Review Petition no. 249 of 1992 and writ petition civil no. 71 of 1993 Shamsher Bahadur Singh v. State of Bihar and others decided on 24-8-93 wherein while emphasising the importance of the nature of work in the matter relating to determination of the age of retirement it was clearly pointed out that the factors indicating having of a potential for continued utility and useful service also played a very important role therein. It was clearly indicated by the Apex Court it is fallacious to compare the judicial service with other services for any purpose since the judicial service by its very nature stands on a different footing and should be treated as such. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the petitioner cannot derive any assistance from the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Girja Prasad Singh (supra) and his contention in this regard is totally misconceived and not at all acceptable. 15. IT has next been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in any view of the matter in several cases this Court had granted stay orders to employees who were going to be retired at the age of 58 years who were allowed under the stay orders to continue till the age of 60 years. IT has been asserted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that finding a conflict between the decision of a learned Single Judge in the case of Girija Prasad Singh and another decision of a learned Single Judge in the case of Shyam Sunder Sharma v Tahsilder, 1993 )1) UP LB EC 1029 a learned Single Judge vide the referring order passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition no. 3391 of 1994 Ram Sewak Gupta v. State of U. P. and others and Ravindra Prasad Pandey v. Chief Revenue Officer, Gorakhpur and others dated 18-1-94 has referred the matter for consideration of a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement in the matter and it IT therefore, urged that during pendency of the reference the petitioner may not be retired on his attaining the age of 58 years and be allowed to continue. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that on a parity of reasoning the petitioner is entitled to the same treatment as meted out to the petitioners in the case of Girja Prasad Singh and Ram Sewak Gupta and Ravindra Prasad Pandey. 16. I have given my anxious consideration to the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. A perusal of the referring order dated 18-1-94 indicates that the writ petition of Ram Sewak Gupta arid Ravindra Prasad Pandey along with other writ petitions concerning the retirement of Lekhpals at the age of 58 years were required to be placed before the Honourable Acting Chief Justice for referring the matter to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement in the matter. The service conditions of Lekhpal are governed by statutory rules other than the one which is subject matter of consideration in the present case. The implications arising under the proviso to fundamental Rule 56 as amended by the amending rule of 1987 do not form the subject matter of consideration in the aforesaid writ petitioners. The rules of recruitment and the rules governing conditions of service relating to Lekhpal and the State employees governed by Fundamental Rule 56 are entirely different. The controversy as involved in the present case does not arise in the aforesaid case and cannot by any stretch of imagination be deemed to be affected by any decision by the larger Bench answering the reference. In this view of the matter I am not at all prepared to accept the submission of the learned counsel of the petitioner that he is entitled to any relief on the ground of parity as asserted and Ms submissions in this regard are totally misconceived and are not at all acceptable. In this view of the matter I am not at all prepared to accept the submission of the learned counsel of the petitioner that he is entitled to any relief on the ground of parity as asserted and Ms submissions in this regard are totally misconceived and are not at all acceptable. Lastly is has been contended that in some of the writ petitions which have been entertained by this Court interim orders have been issued where under the petitioner employees have been allowed to continue till their attaining the age of 60 years However, the learned counsel for the petitioner had not brought to my notice my instance wherein in a writ petition this Court was called upon to consider and decide the question as to whether an employee holding a gazetted post just like the petitioner was entitled to continue in service up to the age of 60 years on the ground that such benefit was extended to an employee falling in the category group 'D' as involved in the present case and where the constitutional validity of Fundamental Rule 56 as amended was to be considered. The petitioner has further failed to establish that in any such case any stay order as claimed in the present case had been granted. In fact in the absence of any pleading and further any material whatsoever indicating that in any other case with similar facts and identical controversy as are involved in the present case, any stay order has been granted, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that considering judicial comity, partly of reasoning, consistency of approach and uniformity in the exercise of judicial discretion, in order to avoid discriminatory treatment, the stay order as claimed by him should be granted in his favour. The submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this respect appear to be totally misconceived and are not acceptable. 17. IN the matter is Viewed from the angle indicated herein above, that being the only view, I find no difficulty whatever in holding that the writ petition is devoid of merits and is (liable to be and is hereby, dismissed. Petition dismissed.