Judgement SAHAI, J. :- The appellant aggrieved by his conviction under Section 302 IPC and imprisonment for life, awarded thereunder vide order dated 8-7-1992 passed by the Additional Sessions. Judge, Greater Bombay in Sessions case No. 175/89, has preferred the present appeal. 2. That the prosecution case in brief as emerging from the recitals contained in the FIR and depositions of the two eye witnesses namely P.W. 2 Mahadeo Janu Jakhal, and PW 11 Jitendra Natvarlal Rawal as under :- The informant Mahadeo Janu Jakhal PW 2, is a resident of 39, Telggulli, Vithalvadi, Bombay. He is alleged to have been carrying on business of jewellery in a shop located on the ground floor of Dhanak Mansion in Telgulli. On 13-9-88, at about 1.30 p.m. when the informant was in the shop he saw altercation and fighting going on, between the appellant Pandurang Agre and Ramchandra Vairag. It is alleged that the appellant was beating Ramchandra Vairag and suddenly took out a knife from the pocket of his trousers and inflicted one blow with it on the chest of Ramchandra Vairag. It is alleged that after receiving the knife blow, Ramchandra Vairag ran for some distance but, thereafter, fell down. A large crowed gathered at the place of incident. The informant thereafter went to the police station L. T. Nagar and made his FIR at 2.30 p.m. the same day. The evidence of informant in the Trial Court is that from the place of incident to the police station L. T. Marg is 15 to 20 minutes walk. At the police station, L. T. Marg, a case u/S. 302 IPC was registered against the appellant. 3. It is alleged by the prosecution that immediately after the incident, ASI Laxman Jadhav, PW 8 who was attached to the Colaba police station and was on a wireless van received the message at 1.10 p.m. from the control room that one person was lying in a wounded condition in Telgulli Vithalwadi, Bombay. Immediately, the ASI Laxman Jadhav proceeded to Telgulli and put the person who was lying at the place of the incident in the van and took him to G.T. Hospital. At the aforesaid Hospital, ASI Laxman Jadhav was informed that the victim was already dead. Investigation of this case was conducted by PI Wagh PW 13. Immediately, the ASI Laxman Jadhav proceeded to Telgulli and put the person who was lying at the place of the incident in the van and took him to G.T. Hospital. At the aforesaid Hospital, ASI Laxman Jadhav was informed that the victim was already dead. Investigation of this case was conducted by PI Wagh PW 13. At the Hospital, PI Wagh recorded statement of ASI Laxman Jadhav and verified from the doctor about the death of victim. On being told, that the victim was dead he called two panchas and prepared the inquest report. It is alleged that the same day at about 3 or 3.30 p.m. the appellant who was sleeping in Mumbadevi garden was arrested. During the investigation, a broken part of the knife which is alleged to have been used during the incident was taken into possession by the prosecution. After taking other steps in investigation, like recording statements of witnesses etc. PI Wagh, PW 13, submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant in the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Court, Esplanade, Bombay. 4. Going backwards, on 1-10-88, between 12 p.m. and 2 p.m. the post mortem examination of the dead body of the deceased was conducted by Dr. Ashok Shinde, P.W. 10. On the person of the deceased, Dr. Shinde found the following ante mortem injuries : 1) Contused abrasion on forehead in between two eye brows 1.4 cm x 1.3 cm. 2) C.A. on left zygoma 1.6 cm x 1.4 cm. 3) C.A. on left mandeble jaw laterally 0.8 cm x 0.5 cm. 4) C.L.W. on chin on neck apart, front 2.8 cm x 0.5 cm. 5) Grazed abrasion on the manibrium (chest) 4 cm x 3cm 6) ISW on left side chest 3.5 cm away from midline 5.5 cm below and medially to left nipple, oblique 2.3 cm x 0.5 cm with tailing upwards and medially 0.5 cm lower and lateral angle abuse. 7) C.A. on right knee front 1.6 cm x 1.4 cm. The injury No. 6 was in normal language observed on slightly left side of the chest nearing the middle of the chest. On disSection and internal examination of the corpse, Dr. 7) C.A. on right knee front 1.6 cm x 1.4 cm. The injury No. 6 was in normal language observed on slightly left side of the chest nearing the middle of the chest. On disSection and internal examination of the corpse, Dr. Shinde noticed following internal injuries corresponding to external injury No. 6 :- Penetrate skin and muscles underneath Penetrate left side chest 5th I.C., space 2.5 cm away from midline oblique 2 cm x 0.5 cm Penetrate pericardium Penetrate right ventricle near interventricula septum oblique 1.4 cm x 0.5 cm. In the opinion of Dr. Shinde, the deceased died on account of hemorrhage and shock due to incised injury of chest involving heart. In the opinion of Dr. Shinde, injury No. 6 accompanied by corresponding internal injuries was sufficient in normal course to cause death. The doctor also stated that aforesaid injury No. 6 could be caused by Article No. 1 (knife alleged to have been used in the incident) shown to him. 5. In the Trial Court, a charge under Section 302 IPC was framed against the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty. The appellant stated that he had been falsely implicated in the instant case. 6. During the trial, as many as 13 witnesses were examined by the prosecution. In addition it also tendered and proved various exhibits in support of its case. No witnesses were examined by the appellant in his defence. The learned Trial Judge believed the evidence adduced by the prosecution rejected the defence of the appellant and passed the impugned order giving rise to this appeal. 7. We have heard Mr. D. B. Tare, learned counsel for appellant and Mrs. Pingulkar Additional Public Prosecutor for the Sate of Maharashtra, at a considerable length. We have also gone through the depositions of the witnesses examined by the prosecution and the various Exhibits proved by the prosecution. We have also perused the impugned judgment. 8. As we have mentioned earlier, there are two eye witnesses of the incident namely Mahadeo Janu Jakhal (PW 2) and Jeetendra Natwarlal Rawal, PW 11. On going through their testimony, we find that the same inspires confidence. The learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any such infirmity in their statements which would shatter the core of prosecution case. We find that both these witnesses have explained their presence at the time and place of the incident. On going through their testimony, we find that the same inspires confidence. The learned counsel for the appellant could not point out any such infirmity in their statements which would shatter the core of prosecution case. We find that both these witnesses have explained their presence at the time and place of the incident. PW 2 Mahadeo Jakhal, has a shop contiguous to the place of incident. At the time of the incident, he was at his shop and there heard commotion hearing which, he came to the place of the incident and saw the incident. This appears to be both very natural and probable. The claim of PW 11 Jeetendra Natwarlal Rawal that he saw the incident also inspires confidence because, he says that at the time of the incident, he was standing near the betel shop of his friend situate in Telgulli. The aforesaid shop was near the place of incident and from there he saw the incident. Both these witnesses are wholly independent witnesses and the learned counsel for appellant could not point out to us any reason as to why they would falsely implicate the appellant. We should not lose sight of the fact that both these witnesses in their depositions in the trial Court stated that they knew the appellant and the deceased from before the incident. Assurance is lent to their testimony, amongst others, by two circumstances namely :- (A) A prompt FIR. As we have seen above, the incident took place on 30-9-88 at about 1.30 p.m. and the FIR was lodged very promptly at 2.30 p.m. the same day i.e., within one hour of the incident taking place. We need not emphasis the value which is attached to a prompt FIR. Promptness in lodging of FIR greatly diminishes the chances of false implication of accused and largely rules out the possibility of the informant being tutored. In this prompt FIR, the appellant is named and all the essential facts pertaining to the incident, including names of both witnesses, are mentioned. Promptness in lodging of FIR greatly diminishes the chances of false implication of accused and largely rules out the possibility of the informant being tutored. In this prompt FIR, the appellant is named and all the essential facts pertaining to the incident, including names of both witnesses, are mentioned. We are not prepared to believe that the name of the appellant who is the sole accused in the instant case has been falsely mentioned in the FIR because no ostensible reason for this has been shown and further we are not prepared to believe that the name of the real assailant would have been omitted and in his place for no reason or rhyme the name of the appellant would have been falsely inserted; and (B) Post-mortem report of the deceased. We have mentioned above the prosecution case was that at first a scuffle took place between the appellant and the deceased in which the former assaulted the latter and thereafter the former took out a knife from the trousers of his pant and inflicted one blow with the same on the deceased. The ante mortem injuries of deceased, which we have reproduced, in the earlier part of our judgment, corroborates this manner of assault deposed to by the 2 eye witnesses. 9. In our opinion, sufficient and credible material has been adduced by the prosecution, in the instant case, to establish its case against the appellant beyond any pale of controversy. 10. But, all the same one question still remains for determination and that is whether on the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the instant case, the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC has been rightly arrived at by the learned Trial Judge ? The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that even if the prosecution case is to be accepted, the liability of the appellant would not travel beyond that contemplated by the first part of Section 304 IPC. To the aforesaid contention, we have given our very anxious consideration and find considerable merit in the same. Let us briefly recapitulate the prosecution case. The prosecution case was that on 30-9-88, at about 1.30 p.m. an altercation and fight was going on between the appellant and deceased and the appellant was assaulting the deceased. To the aforesaid contention, we have given our very anxious consideration and find considerable merit in the same. Let us briefly recapitulate the prosecution case. The prosecution case was that on 30-9-88, at about 1.30 p.m. an altercation and fight was going on between the appellant and deceased and the appellant was assaulting the deceased. All of a sudden, the appellant from the pocket of his trousers is said to have taken out a knife and administered a blow with the same on the chest of the deceased. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the act of the appellant would not fall in any of the four clauses of Section 300 IPC. He contends that the appellants act would fall within the ambit of the first part of Section 304 IPC namely that the appellant inflicted a knife blow on the deceased he knew that his act was likely to cause the death of the deceased. Mrs. Pingulkar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor vehemently submitted that the act of the appellant would squarely fall within the first clause of Section 300 IPC. Her submission is that when the appellant assaulted the deceased with a knife on his chest, he had the intention to cause his death. Mrs. Pingulkar further contended that the circumstance that the day prior to the incident, a quarrel had taken place between the appellant and the deceased should also be construed as a pointer to the appellant's intention to kill the deceased. We regret that we cannot accede to her contention. Merely because, the appellant assaulted the deceased with a knife on his chest does not mean he had intended to kill him. The apex Court in the case reported in 1983 Cri LJ 429 : ( AIR 1983 SC 284 ), Jawaharlal v. State of Punjab, in paragraph 15 observed thus :- Paragraph 15 : "Merely because the blow landed on a particular spot on the body, divorced from the circumstances in which the blow was given it would be hazardous to say that the Ist appellant intended to cause that particular injury". Had the appellant straightway whipped out a knife and with the same assaulted the deceased, there would have been force in Mrs. Pingulkar's contention. However this was not the case here. Had the appellant straightway whipped out a knife and with the same assaulted the deceased, there would have been force in Mrs. Pingulkar's contention. However this was not the case here. Here first an altercation and fight between the appellant and the deceased took place and during the same, the appellant is said to have taken out a knife from his trousers and inflicted a blow with it un the chest of the deceased. Had the appellant intended to kill the deceased, there was nothing to prevent him from whipping out the knife in the beginning and assaulting the deceased with it. We further find that the evidence on record is that the deceased did not succumb to his injuries instantaneously. In our opinion, if the appellant intended to kill he deceased, he would have inflicted a second injury with the knife. There is no evidence to show that the witnesses and those present on the spot obstructed him in any manner from repeating the knife blow. Further, the knife which is alleged to have been used in the incident was recovered by the prosecution in a broken condition and during the course of hearing of this appeal, we had the benefit of seeing the same. It appears that it has been broken horizontally into two pieces. In spite of its broken condition, seeing its width and thickness, we are of the opinion that the knife used in the assault on the deceased must have resembled a pen knife and not one which is used in a homicidal assault. In view of the aforesaid reasons, we find that there is no merit in the submission of the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the appellant had the intention of killing the deceased and we accordingly, reject the same. On the facts stated above, it also cannot be definitely said that the appellant intended to cause the injury on the chest of the deceased and that being so, in our opinion clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC would have no application either. For application of clause thirdly there should intention to inflict the injury which has been actually inflicted and that intention, incur opinion has not been established beyond, reasonable doubt in this case. For application of clause thirdly there should intention to inflict the injury which has been actually inflicted and that intention, incur opinion has not been established beyond, reasonable doubt in this case. In our opinion, there is substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the act of appellant would fall within the ambit of part I of Section 304 IPC and not under Section 300 IPC. 11. Accordingly, we hold that the learned Trial Judge was wrong in convicting the appellant under Section 302 IPC and hence, we set aside his conviction on that count and instead convict him under the first part of Section 304 IPC. We have anxiously considered the question of the quantum of sentence to be awarded to the appellant. Taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, in our view a sentence of eight years R.I would meet the ends of justice. 12. In the result, this appeal succeeds in part. We set aside the conviction and sentence of life imprisonment awarded to the appellant under Section 302 IPC vide order dated 8-7-1992 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay in Sessions Case No. 175 of 1989, and instead find the appellant guilty of an offence under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentence him to undergo eight years rigorous imprisonment for the same. The appellant who is in jail, shall continue to remain there till he serves out his sentence. Muddemal articles to be sent by the office to the lower Trial Court. Appeal partly allowed.