J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE short question which has surfaced in this petition is as to whether the impugned order passed by the Special Secretary (Revenue) State of Gujarat on 26. 6. 1981 converting the appeal into a revision after four years allowing the revision and remanding the matter to the DDO at Rajkot is legal and valid or not. ( 2 ) ORDINARILY an order of remand passed in a revision under section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code (BLRD for short) does not involve a question of invoking power of Article 227 of the Constitution of India and this court should be at loathe to interfere with such an order. But in the present petition not only there are special circumstances but flagrant and patent illegality while passing the impugned order which would warrant interference of this court even while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the merits of the present case a few material and relevant facts need narration. The petitioners are the aggrieved parties by the impugned order. They had purchased agricultural lands bearing Serial Nos. 947 949 and 1113 admeasuring in all 21 acres- 3 gunthas situated in village Jasdan for Rs. 64 0 by a registered sale deed dated 19. 4. 1969 and also a land bearing revenue survey number 1112 admeasuring 4 acres -17 gunthas for Rs. 27 0 in the year 1971 from Abbasshah Ahmedshah and eight other persons who were the owners of the said lands. These disputed properties came to be purchased by the petitioners by two registered sale deeds. ( 4 ) CIVIL suit no. 64 of 1971 was filed in a representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure for and on behalf of Jasdan Sunni Muslim Jamat challenging the sale deeds in favour of the petitioners. The said suit was dismissed on 24. 10. 1975. First appeal No. 195 of 1976 was preferred which ultimately came to be. dismissed by this court by a division bench on 15. 3 The leaders of the said Jasdan Sunni Muslim Jamat had also preferred an application before the Deputy Charity Commissioner on 13. The said suit was dismissed on 24. 10. 1975. First appeal No. 195 of 1976 was preferred which ultimately came to be. dismissed by this court by a division bench on 15. 3 The leaders of the said Jasdan Sunni Muslim Jamat had also preferred an application before the Deputy Charity Commissioner on 13. 1 for registration of a public charitable trust wherein it was stated that four pieces of lands out of the disputed lands were the properties of the ownership of the said Jamat. The Deputy Charity Commissioner held in favour of the petitioners on 7. 7. 1967 that the said landed properties are not the properties of Jasdan Sunni Muslim Jamat but were the private properties of Jasdan Darbar. An appeal was preferred before the Charity Commissioner Gujarat State which also came to be dismissed on 17. 2. 1969. ( 5 ) AFTER introduction of Saurashtra Barkhali Abolition Act 1951 the competent authority like the Mamlatdar of Jasdan taluka issued an occupancy certificate in the name of owners and sellers of the landed properties to the petitioners under section 12 of the said Act. ( 6 ) AFTER purchasing the disputed properties a mutation entry was made after hearing objections from the leaders of the said Jamat. The objections were rejected by the competent revenue authority. Even an appeal against the decision of the Mamlatdar was preferred which also was dismissed and the petitioners succeeded even in the revision before the Special Secretary (Revenue ). ( 7 ) THE aforesaid history and factual set up is narrated so as to examine and appreciate the main issue in focus in this petition. The petitioners after purchasing the properties had applied to the competent authority for permission for converting part of the disputed properties into non-agricultural use. The petitioners had applied for on 4/12/1976 for such permission in respect of 7 acres-20 gunthas of land out of Serial Nos. 947 and 949 by invoking provisions of section 65 of the BLRD to the district Panchayat. The district panchayat had granted the permission as requested on 26. 4. 1977. Thereafter the said mutation entries were recorded in the revenue record by entry no. 2216 on 22. 6. 1978. The petitioners have been paying N. A. assessment of Rs. 7 0 per annum. The district panchayat had granted the permission as requested on 26. 4. 1977. Thereafter the said mutation entries were recorded in the revenue record by entry no. 2216 on 22. 6. 1978. The petitioners have been paying N. A. assessment of Rs. 7 0 per annum. The boundaries are marked on each plot in both the survey numbers after getting N. A. permission from the competent authority. The petitioners have also sold some of the plots to other persons for the purpose of construction. ( 8 ) RESPONDENTS nos. 2 and 3 who are neighbouring field owners preferred an appeal under section 203 of BLRD on 10. 1. 1981 after long spell of four years even from the date when the N. A. permission was accorded. The period for filing an appeal under section 203 is prescribed and the limitation is 60 days in case of an order of the Collector or 90 days in case of an order passed by an authority below the rank of the Collector. Therefore the appeal was not in time. Therefore a time barred appeal preferred by respondents nos. 2 and 3 before the special secretary (Revenue) was converted into a revision suo motu under section 211 of BLRD only at the time of hearing of the appeal. ( 9 ) THE Special Secretary (Revenue) after hearing the parties exercising his powers under section 211 of BLRD quashed the order passed by respondent No. 4 DDO on 26. 4. 1977 and remanded the matter to respondent no. 4 on 26. 6. 1981. Hence this petition by the aggrieved persons who are owners of the disputed lands. ( 10 ) LEARNED advocate Mr. Mehta for the petitioners has seriously contended that the special secretary ought not to have exercised the revisional powers and that too converting the appeal into a revision suo motu under section 211 of the BLRD after lapse of four years and that too in case where permission for non-agricultural use was granted by respondent no. 4 as early as on 26. 4 It is then seriously contended that exercise of power of revision under section 211 after lapse of four years cannot be said to be proper legal and valid as the same was not exercised within reasonable time. 4 as early as on 26. 4 It is then seriously contended that exercise of power of revision under section 211 after lapse of four years cannot be said to be proper legal and valid as the same was not exercised within reasonable time. This submission appears to be weighty and full of substance in the circumstances of the present case and therefore though the impugned order is of remand one and though this court is entertaining a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution this court is inclined to allow this petition; ( 11 ) OF course the contention that special secretary (Revenue) had no authority to convert the appeal into a revision cannot be accepted the conversion of appeal into revision cannot be said to be permissible when exercise of powers under section 211 are required to be exercised within reasonable time as there is no statutory time of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers. Therefore it is seriously contended on behalf of the petitioners that the special secretary (Revenue) should not have exercised powers under section 211 and the order passed by him is illegal as it is not passed within reasonable time. ( 12 ) WHEN period of limitation is not prescribed and that too for exercise of revisional powers it has to be exercised within reasonable time. What is the reasonable time will always depend upon the facts and circumstances emerging from the record of each case. In the present case exercise of powers under section 211 is made after lapse of four years. Could this exercise after almost forty-eight months and that too setting aside an order passed by the competent revenue authority under section 65 of the BLRD be characterised as proper exercise within reasonable time of the powers under section 211 ? Obviously the answer would be in the negative. ( 13 ) NEEDLESS to mention that special scheme and provision is made under section 65 by virtue of which an application for conversion of non-agricultural purpose is not disposed of within a period of three months. By a deeming fiction an application for permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Therefore it could very well be seen from the said provision that there is element of urgency to deal with an application under section 65. By a deeming fiction an application for permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Therefore it could very well be seen from the said provision that there is element of urgency to deal with an application under section 65. When a special provision is incorporated under section 65 it undoubtedly shows that time is the essence of processing such application. The purpose is obvious. Therefore it becomes explicit that urgency in dealing with such cases under section 65 itself indicates the purpose of reasonable time within which the competent revenue authority must act under section 211 Section 65 clearly goes to show that the period of three months is considered sufficient for the Collector to make up his mind and the legislature has thought that the matter is so urgent that permission would be deemed to have been granted. A combined reading of sections 65 and 211 leaves no doubt that the revisional authority ought to have exercised its revisional power within reasonable time that is - within few months after passing of the order of the revenue authority under Section 65. ( 14 ) THE view which this court is inclined to take is also supported by a decision of the Apex Court in State of Gujarat vs. Raghav Natha 10 GLR 992 A similar question was involved in the said case and the revisional powers were exercised for quashing an order under section 65 of the BLRD after more than twelve months after the impugned order was passed. It was therefore held that considering the entire scheme of section 65 and the provisions of section 211 even period of twelve months was found not reasonable for exercise of revisional power by the competent authority. Whereas in the present case the revisional authority has exercised its powers after almost 46 months. Therefore it clearly appears that exercise of revisional power by the special secretary (Revenue) is not only improper but illegal and therefore even while exercising the extraordinary supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution this court has to put the impugned order in a proper legal shape. ( 15 ) NOT only that but the impugned order itself passed by the special secretary is otherwise also vulnerable. It is mentioned in the impugned order that the petitioners have failed to show as to from which date respondents nos. ( 15 ) NOT only that but the impugned order itself passed by the special secretary is otherwise also vulnerable. It is mentioned in the impugned order that the petitioners have failed to show as to from which date respondents nos. 2 and 3 were in know of the order passed under section 65. In fact the revisionist has to show that revision under section 211 is prefered within reasonable time. Respondents nos. 2 and 3 who were revisionists before the special secretary (Revenue) had utterly failed to show that the revision was within time. Even this itself is explicitly manifesting from the record of the present case that respondents nos. 2 and 3 are the neighbouring owners and they were in know of the passing of the impugned order long before. This aspect is ignored by the special secretary while exercising his revisional powers which is very material. On that ground also the petitioners are entitled to get the impugned order quashed. After having examined several facts and circumstances emerging from the record of the present case and patent and manifest illegality committed by the special secretary (Revenue) who has exercised the powers under section 211 of the BLRD this court has no hesitation that the petitioners must succeed and the impugned order should be quashed and set aside. ( 16 ) IN the net result the impugned order passed by the special secretary (Revenue) on 26. 6. 1981 is quashed and set aside and the order passed by respondent no. 4 under section 65 is restored. This petition is accordingly allowed with no order as to cost in the special circumstances of the case. Rule is made absolute. Petition Allowed. .