J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) A very significant and substantial question of law has arisen as to whether an appeal would lie against the decision of the Special Mahalkari, ("the mamlatdar" for short) who has decided the question about the tenancy rights and resultant compensation, in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) IT would be pertinent to have a close look to the material facts giving rise to the present petition and the merits of the aforesaid question. The petitioner purchased agricultural lands bearing S. nos. 5 and 6/1 of village Mokha of Mundra taluka of Kutch district by a registered sale deed dated 10. 4. 1950 from respondent No. 2, Panbai Velji. (the disputed property for short ). Thereafter, respondent No. 1 claiming to be a tenant in respect of the disputed land applied on 30. 3. 1963, before the revenue authority who was known as Special Mahalkari at the relevant point of time in Kutch region. The case was registered as 158 of 1963 under the Bombay Inams (Kutch area) Abolition Act, 1958 (kutch Inams Act for short ). After observing necessary procedure, and hearing the petitioner, the Mamlatdar allowed the application and granted occupancy certificate in respect of the disputed land. The case was decided on 6. 3. 1964. He held that (i) respondent No. 1 -tenant is entitled to occupancy certificate in respect of the disputed land (ii) respondent No. 2 is the Inamdar from whom the petitioner had purchased the disputed land and (iii) Rs 93/- deposited by respondent No. 1-tenant came to be ordered to be paid to the petitioner. ( 3 ) BEING dissatisfied by the said order, the petitioner questioned it by filing two appeals before two forums. He filed an appeal before the Deputy Collector, Anjar and later on, he also filed an appeal before the Special Secretary on 28. 4. 1964. The appeal preferred before the Deputy Collector came to be transferred to the Deputy Collector at bhuj on account of territorial or geographical division and he decided the appeal against the petitioner holding that he had no jurisdiction to hear such appeal, with the result that the memo of appeal was returned to the petitioner or presentation to the proper forum. It may also be noted that the appeal filed by the petitioner before the special secretary concurrently was also decided on 1. 1. 1965 wherein it was held that the appeal was not competent before that forum (Special Secretary ). ( 4 ) THE petitioner carried the matter further in revision being aggrieved by the decision of the Deputy Collector before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal which was registered as revision No. 1 of 1976. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal reached to the conclusion on 17. 12. 1976, that the petitioner was not heard by the appellate authority and, therefore, while allowing the revision, the matter was remanded to the Deputy collector for fresh hearing on merits. ( 5 ) HAVING examined the file on remand from the GRT, the Deputy Collector, Bhuj again heard the parties and decided on 31. 7. 1978 dismissing the appeal holding that the appeal was not competent before him. Therefore, the petitioner again knocked the doors of the GRT by filing revision No. 18 of 1878 under Sec. 18 of the Kutch Inams Act. The grt dismissed the revision on 17. 7. 1979. Hence, the petitioner has come to this court by filing this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 6 ) IN the impugned order, the GRT dismissed the revision holding that the revision is incompetent. The impugned order of the Deputy collector held that the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order of the Mamlatdar does not lie and also dismissed the appeal. It appears from the facts of the present case that the petitioner has been sent from pillar to post for challenging the order of the Mamlatdar. The correctness of the impugned orders is under direct challenge in this petition. ( 7 ) WITH a view to examine the merits of this case, again, a cursory took at the ultimate finding reached by the Mamlatdar in case No. 158/63 is warranted. He has held : (i) that respondent-tenant is entitled to the occupancy certificate in respect of the disputed land (ii) that respondent No. 2 is the Inamdar from whom the petitioner had purchased the land and (iii) that the amount of Rs 93. 00 deposited by the tenant by way of six time assessment in respect of the disputed land is ordered to be paid to the petitioner. 00 deposited by the tenant by way of six time assessment in respect of the disputed land is ordered to be paid to the petitioner. ( 8 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that the following three statutes were applicable in the Kutch region at the time when the controversy between the parties arose : (1) The Bombay Inams (Kutch area) Abolition Act, 1958 ("kutch Inmas Act for short ). (2) The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch area) Act, 1958 (kutch Tenancy Act for short ). (3) Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (the Code for short ). ( 9 ) THE relevant application was filed under sec. 18 of the Kutch Inams Act before the tribunal. The tribunal took the view that the decision given by the Mamlatdar is under section 7 of the Kutch Inams Act in an application made by respondent No. 1. The said application was granted and occupancy rights are given to respondent No. 1 by the mamlatdar, as observed hreinabove. The tribunal found that the impugned order of the mamlatdar was under sec. 7 of the Kutch Inams Act, granting only occupancy rights and, therefore, no appeal is provided against such an order under the said Act. Therefore, the revision was dismissed. Sec. 7 of the Kutch Inams Act makes a provision for conferment of occupancy right in respect of land in inam village or of Inam Land to which sec. 6 does not apply. It will be, therefore, necessary to refer to the relevant provision of sec. 7 (1) which reads as under :""7. (1) In the case of any land comprised in an inam to which the provisions of sec. 6 does not apply. It will be, therefore, necessary to refer to the relevant provision of sec. 7 (1) which reads as under :""7. (1) In the case of any land comprised in an inam to which the provisions of sec. 6 do not apply- (A) if such land is in the possession of the inamdar as Gharkhad land, the inamdar, (B) if such land is held by a person as sub-inam, such person, (C) if such land is in the possession of a butadar, ret butadar or any other person holding it as a tenant, such butadar, ret butadar or other person, and (D) if such land is in the possession of a person holding through or from the inamdar and to whom clauses (b) and (c) do not apply, the inamdar, shall be primarily liable to the State Government for the payment of land revenue in respect of the land and he shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sees. (2), (3), (4) and (5), be entitled to all the rights and shall be liable to all the obligations in respect thereof as an occupant under the Code and the rules made thereunder. " ( 10 ) IT appears from Sec. 7 (1) (c) that the Tribunal, in the impugned, order found that the decision of the Mamlatdar was rendered in an application of respondent No. 1-tenant which was under Sec. 7 (1) (c ). It is also found that Sec. 8 of the said Act is not applicable. Sec. 8 empowers the Collector to determine the claim of holders of incumbrances. After the amendment was made in 1965, a provision is also made for appeal and revision but the dispute between the parties in the present case is prior to the date of the amendment. Therefore, it would not be necessary to discuss the amended provisions of section 3 of the said Act. It will be now necessary to refer to the relevant provisions for appeal under the Kutch inams Act. Sec. 18 provides for an appeal against certain decisions of the Collector. An appeal is provided in such cases to the GRT. Therefore, it would not be necessary to discuss the amended provisions of section 3 of the said Act. It will be now necessary to refer to the relevant provisions for appeal under the Kutch inams Act. Sec. 18 provides for an appeal against certain decisions of the Collector. An appeal is provided in such cases to the GRT. Sec. 18 reads as under :"an appeal shall lie- (A) against an award made by the collector under Sec. 15 or 16, and (B) against a decision of the Collector under Sec. 7a or 8 to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Bombay Revenue tribunal Act, 1957, notwithstanding anything contained in the said Act. " ( 11 ) IT is explicit from a plain perusal of the aforesaid provisions relating to the appeal that the order passed by a revenue authority under Sec. 7 or a decision as to whether any person is a tenant or not, is not made appealable under Sec. 18. Therefore, obviously, an appeal would not lie under section 18 of the Kutch Inams Act against the impugned order of the Mamlatdar. It is not disputed that there is no revision for revision under the kutch Inams Act. Therefore, obviously, the question of filing an appeal or revision under the kutch Inams Act would not arise. ( 12 ) THE question which now would come into focus is as to whether the impugned decision of the Mamlatdar is intended to be a final verdict by the legislature ? In this connection, the provisions of the Code are required to be, examined. Sec. 203 of the Code in Chapter XIII makes a provision for appeal. There is no dispute about the fact that the code was applicable at the relevant point of time in the Kutch area. The Code is also defined in Sec. 2 (iii) of the Kutch Inams Act. That shows that the Code means Bombay land Revenue Code as extended to Kutch area. Thus, it is amply clear that the Code was applicable and in force in the Kutch region at the time when the dispute arose. It is in this context that provisions of Sec. 203 of the Code would assume significance. That shows that the Code means Bombay land Revenue Code as extended to Kutch area. Thus, it is amply clear that the Code was applicable and in force in the Kutch region at the time when the dispute arose. It is in this context that provisions of Sec. 203 of the Code would assume significance. Sec. 203 reads as under:""in the absence of any express provision of this Act, or of any law for the time being in force to the contrary, an appeal shall lie from any decision or order passed by a revenue officer under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, to that officers immediate superior, whether such decision or order may itself have been passed on appeal from a subordinate officers decision or order or not. " ( 13 ) IT is manifest from the clear reading of Sec. 203 that an appeal is provided against any decision or order passed by a revenue officer under the Code or any other law for the time being in force, to that officer immediately superior in the absence of any express provision of the Code or any law for the time being in force, to the contrary. The impugned order passed by the Mamlatdar deciding the status as a tenant and granting occupancy certificate under Sec. 7 of the Kutch Inams Act is not made appealable under the said Act. Therefore, it cannot be contended that provisions of Sec. 203 of the Code will not be attracted. In the absence of any express provision in the kutch Inams Act about the appeal or revision, obviously, therefore, Sec. 203 of the Code would be attracted and, therefore, an appeal is competent under Sec. 203 of the Code against the impugned order of the Mamlatdar. ( 14 ) IT appears that attention of the authorities below and the tribunal was not drawn to the provisions of Sec. 203 of the Code. ( 14 ) IT appears that attention of the authorities below and the tribunal was not drawn to the provisions of Sec. 203 of the Code. It cannot be presumed that the legislature intended to treat an order of the Mamlatdar under Sec. 7 of the Kutch Inams Act as a final verdict in a very important issue like deciding the status of the tenant and the resultant grant of occupancy certificate and, therefore, when no expression provision is made in the Kutch inamas Act, the provision made in the general law which was applicable at the relevant time would come into play. ( 15 ) IT is true that the petitioner being the appeallant before the Deputy Collector mentioned that the appeal was under Sec. 107 of the Kutch Inams Act. But instead of filing an appeal under Sec. 203 of the Code, the petitioner styled his appeal as under Sec. 107 of the Kutch Inams Act and obviously, it was not maintainable under Sec. 107. Unfortunately, attention was not drawn of the appellate authority or the revisional authority to the provision of Sec. 203 of the Code. Since this court is of the opinion that sec. 203 of the Code is attracted, an appeal lies to before the Deputy Collector, the matter could be remanded to the said authority for a fresh decision. As the matter is pending since more than 13 years, this court does not deem it expedient to direct the petitioner to file a fresh appeal under Sec. 203 of the Code and to have a fresh inning. Instead, in the larger interest of justice, the matter could be remanded to the Deputy Collector directing him to treat the appeal under Sec. 203 of the Code and dispose it of in accordance with law. Instead, in the larger interest of justice, the matter could be remanded to the Deputy Collector directing him to treat the appeal under Sec. 203 of the Code and dispose it of in accordance with law. ( 16 ) HAVING regard to the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove and the legal scienario enumerated hereinabove, the impugned orders passed by the Deputy collector and confirmed by the GRT are quashed and the matter is sent back to the Deputy collector, Bhuj for a fresh decision on merits in accordance with law after treating the appeal under Sec. 203 of the Code as early as possible but not later than three months from the date of receipt of writ from this court, as the dispute between the parties has unfortunately passed through long legal conduit pipe for more than three decades. ( 17 ) IN the result, the petition is allowed with no order as to costs. Rule is made absolute. .