JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. The petitioner has originally prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to pay salary to him from January 1989. 2. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. The petitioner was working on daily wages in the Bihar T.B. Administration Training Centre, Patna since, 1984. Allegedly by a letter dated 24.7.1984, the Commissioner Department of Health bad issued a direction to adjust the daily rated workers who were working in the T.B Administration Training Centre against admitted vacant post pursuant where of allegedly the petitioner was given an offer of appointment on 3.4.87, which is contained in Annexure 2 to the writ application. From perusal of the said offer of appointment, it would appear that the petitioner was appointed on adhoc basis till further orders by way of posting and adjustment. Allegedly thereafter the Dy. Director, T.B. directed the civil surgeon, Hazaribagh to adjust the petitioner and pursuant there to the civil surgeon- cum- chief medical officer having found that the petitioner cannot be adjusted at Hazaribagh directed his adjustment in Sub-divisional Hospital, Chatra on the post of clerk under the post delivery scheme. 3. In the counter-affidavit it has been stated that the Civil Surgeon• Cum Medical officer, Hazaribagh thereafter realised that the said order of adjustment was illegal and directed termination of the service of the petitioner by memo no. 1724 dated 2.9.87. The petitioner was however, paid his salary for the perion 23.7.87 to 9.9.87, i.e. during the period which he actually worked. However, the Deputy Director, T.B. Namely, Sri A.A Mallik, who had earlier directed adjustment of the petitioner in the office of the Civil Surgeon cum Chief Medical Officer, Hazaribagh, again returned back the services of the petitioner by his letter dated 6.7.1988 which was complied with but again the said order of adjustment was found to be illegal and irregular and service of the petitioner was again terminated on 9.12.88. Thereafter no order has been passed for the petitioner's adjustment or posting by the Deputy Director, Health Services. 4. It is contended that a large number cases were filed in this court for payment of salary and various orders had been passed by this Court in different writ applications in this regard at the stage of admission either on con cession or otherwise. 4. It is contended that a large number cases were filed in this court for payment of salary and various orders had been passed by this Court in different writ applications in this regard at the stage of admission either on con cession or otherwise. However, from perusal of the said orders, some of which have been annexed with the writ application, it does not transpire that in those cases the legality or validity of the appointment of the writ petitioners there of had ever been questioned. 5. However, the matter came up for consideration before a Bench of this Court in CWJC No. 857 to 871, 520, 615, 858, 859, 860 961, 962, 863 and 463 of 1992. This Court directed the State Government to conduct a thorough enquiry to find out the genuineness or otherwise of the appointment made by Sri Mallik. Pursuant to the said observation, the Government constituted a screening committee which gave opportunity to the appointees to have their say in the matter and after examination of the individual cases, causes shown documents produced, the records available in the department as also upon personal hearing prepared a record of deliberations. In paragraph 9 of the counter'-affidavit it is stated : “The committee found that not a single case of appointment which was made by the then Deputy Director, Tuberculosis, Bihar, Patna, namely, Dr. A.A. Mallik was in accordance with law and the government being satisfied that none of the appointees of Dr. A.A. Mallik after 1980 were appointed in accordance with law and gross irregularity were committed decided that all appointments made by Dr. Mallik after 1980 be cancelled and accordingly, the Govt. issued order contained in memo no. 528(2) dated 30.04.1993 whereby and whereunder the services of all those persons, who were appointed illegally in complete violation of article 16 of the constitution of India and various Circulars of the government of Bihar in matters of appointment cancelled all appointment made by Dr. A.A. Mallik.” 6. The State Government thereafter issued an order dated 30.4.1993, as contained Annexure-4 to the counter affidavit. The petitioner thereafter filed an application for amendment of the writ application questioning the said order, which is contained in Annexure-33 there to. 7. The contentions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner are as follows:- 1. A.A. Mallik.” 6. The State Government thereafter issued an order dated 30.4.1993, as contained Annexure-4 to the counter affidavit. The petitioner thereafter filed an application for amendment of the writ application questioning the said order, which is contained in Annexure-33 there to. 7. The contentions of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner are as follows:- 1. The services of the petitioner having been terminated without issuing any individual notice to show cause or without framing specific charges against him; the same is illegal. (ii) In terminating the service of the petitioner, there has been a clear violation of the principle of natural justice and publication of notice in the news paper in this regard was wholly illegal. In support of the aforementioned contentions, reliance has been placed in the case of Shrawan Kumar Jha and ors-Vrs-State of Bihar and ors. ( AIR 1991 SC 309 ) and Delhi Transport Corporation Vrs DTC Mazdoor Congress and ors. ( AIR 1991 SC 101 ). (iii) In any event as the petitioner had worked for a period of more than 10 :Jean his services should have been regularised. Reliance in this contention has been placed in the case of H.C. Puttaswamy and others Vs. The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 295. (iv) There was absolutely no reason as to why the services of so many persons were terminated by one stroke of pen with effect from 1.1.1980, nor was there any reason or rationale for fixing 1.1.1980 as the off date. (v) The State of Bihar had also in the floor of the Assembly stated that the procedure adopted for adjustment was legal and thus they being bound thereby and the state is estopped and precluded from terminating the services of the petitioner. 8. From perusal of letter dated 24.7.84, as contained in Annexure-I to the writ application, it does not appear that any policy decision was taken by the council of Ministers to adjust the service of daily rated workers. In absence of any legislative Act, or policy decision adopted by the State no person can be appointed on a regular basis in violation of the mandatory provision of the recruitment rules framed by the State of Bihar in terms of the provisions appended under Article 309 of the Constitution of India or in violation of Article 14 and 16 there of. The appointment by way of adjustment is unknown in law. In any event the said order itself reveals adjustment if any wall to be made for vacant 58 posts and only ill the said Department. 9. It may be noted that surprisingly adjustments were directed to be made without ascertaining the existence of vacancy. As noticed hereinbefore, the petitioner was first directed to be adjusted at Chatra as a clerk under post delivery scheme. Which has got nothing to do with the implementation of the Tuberculosis scheme in the State of Bihar. 10. It, therefore, appears strange as to how Dr. Mallik could transfer the said employee to different districts and direct the Civil Surgeon cum Chief Medical Officers to adjust them against the vacant posts. From the said purported order of adjustment, it is evident that the said order has been passed on an adhoc basis and till further order. Such appointment by way of adjustment can neither be said to be in accordance with law inasmuch all the procedure for recruitment were neither followed nor the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India were complied with. In any eventad ocarrangement cannot clothe the petitioner with a legal right to be absorbed in the State services on a permanent basis nor thereby did they derive any legal right to continue in service. It further appears strange as to how such orders could be passed by the Deputy Director, Health Services-T.B. Department to the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer, who arc themselves the appointing authority in terms of the provisions of the Bihar Service Code. So far as class-III and IV employees are concerned, the Civil Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer being the appointing authority, the cadre of such employees is a District Cadre and thus in the name of adjustment the employees of T.B. Department could not have been transferred to join their post belonging to another cadre. 11. The order passed by the Civil Surgeon Chief Medical Officer, Hazaribagh, as contained in Annexure-3 to the writ application itself would suggest that there was no vacancy at Hazaribagh. It is surprising as to how without ascertaining the existence of any vacancy, such orders of transfer/adjustment were directed to be made. The petitioner has also not disputed that his services have been terminated by the Chief Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer on 2.9.87. It is surprising as to how without ascertaining the existence of any vacancy, such orders of transfer/adjustment were directed to be made. The petitioner has also not disputed that his services have been terminated by the Chief Surgeon-cum-Chief Medical Officer on 2.9.87. Despite the same, he was again directed to be adjusted by Dr. Mallik himself but again his services were terminated on 9.12.88. The petitioner in the writ application did not question the said order of termination nor could he do so keeping in view the fact that the petitioner on his own showing was appointed only on an adhoc basis and till further orders. 12. From perusal of the impugned order dated 30th April, 1993, as contained in Annexure-33 to the application for amendment, it is evident that a committee was constituted pursuant to the order of this Court in C.W.J.C. Nos. 6134/90, 9314/91, 7980/91, 7121/91. 2277/92, 8018/92, 2464/92 and 5764 92. The matter was also enquired into by the Vigilance Department which Department had categorically arrived at a finding that all the appointments made by Sri Mallik after 1980 had been done without following the procedures for recruitment of employees by way of adjustment transfer. In the said ordered 30.4.93, the Commissioner of Health has further taken notice of the fact that in C.W.J.C. No. 5657/90, this court has clearly held that no permanent appointment can be permitted to be made by adopting a back-dook process, as the same would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. This Court further observed that such a situation was inconceivable as the then Deputy Director (T.B.) had asked the Civil Surgeon to adjust upon verifying their qualification, inasmuch as the appointing authority did not have even the knowledge as to whether the appointees bold requisite qualifications for appointment or not. There cannot. Therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that prior to issuance of the purported appointment letter, even the fact as to whether the concerned persons were eligible for appointment or not was Dot ascertained. In the laid impugned order, it was further noticed that in several writ applications this court had wondered as to why the State bad not taken any action against the persons, who were benefited by such orders. It was further observed that if the appointments made by Dr. In the laid impugned order, it was further noticed that in several writ applications this court had wondered as to why the State bad not taken any action against the persons, who were benefited by such orders. It was further observed that if the appointments made by Dr. Mallik was found to be illegal, the State would be at liberty to take such action, as it may deem fit and proper, against the erring officers. 13. Pursuant to the observations made by this Court a general notice was published in daily news paper asking all such appointees to submit their explanation and they were also given opportunity of personal hearing in the matter from 17.8.92 to 29.9.92 Another opportunity was given for personal hearing from 13.10.92 to 22.10.92 by issuing another advertisement. In course of personal hearing the testimonials of the candidates and other documents are considered for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether the recruitment procedures have been followed or not. 14. It further appears that about 1100 employees submitted their explanation and other did not. The Vigilance Department had found that a large number of candidates were appointed in a irregular manner the said order/runs as follows: “No employment notice was published in News paper. Notice if at all was published on notice board only. Invariably whosoever approached was appointed on daily wages. It is not known whether they were full wages. Some of them claimed to have received only part payment. None could produce appointment letter on daily wage. It is not known from record of Dy. Director, s office, how much fund was made available to drawing and disbursing officers for payment of daily wage earners. The appointment letter of all is alike, while showing them to be engaged on daily wage they were regularized/absorbed, such persons were appointed to the post of bcg Technician who were not trained. At the time of appointment, they were not eligible. Reservation rules were not followed. Appointment of class IV posts were not made from district panel. There was no selection committee for selection of candidates. When appointment of five or more persons was done on any single day instead of a combined list. Separate list was prepared. There was nothing to show that roster was cleared. There was no proof of any recommendation of selection committee. 15. There was no selection committee for selection of candidates. When appointment of five or more persons was done on any single day instead of a combined list. Separate list was prepared. There was nothing to show that roster was cleared. There was no proof of any recommendation of selection committee. 15. In the impugned order dated 30.4.1993, the Health Commissioner has further found that the mandatory provisions required for recruitment of persons as stated in letters no. 16440 and 16441 dated 3.12.1986 relating to appointment in class-III and IV posts had not been followed at all. 16. The aforementioned facts reveal that fraud of a great magnitude had been practised by Dr. Mallik apparently in collusion and conspiracy with other officers. Apart from the fact that appointment by way of adjustment is wholly illegal being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as also recruitment rules, as noticed above, such a large number of persons have been directed to be appointed against 58 existing vacancies. From Annexure -I to the writ application, it appears that the number of vacancies were stated to be 58 in the representation of the concerned employees but no verification in relation there to had taken place. In the said letter, therefore, adjustment of the concerned persons was directed to be made against clear existing vacancies. 17. It is well known that when the appointment is made on the basis of forged or fabricated orders or in violation of such mandatory provisions of law the same are nullities and the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with in such a case. 18. Recently a Division Bench of this Court in Sitaram Thakur Versus The State of Bihar reported in 1994(1) PLJR 68 held as follows :- “In M.L. Gupta Vs. Instrumentation Ltd and ors-reported in 1992(1) PLJR-137 upon taking into consideration various decision of the Supreme Court and this court it has been held: ''Article 16 of the Constitution of India provides that all citizens of India are entitled to get equal opportunity for the purpose of obtaining employment in State Service. In order to fulfil such a condition, it is necessary to consider the case of all citizens who are eligible to be appointed. In order to fulfil such a condition, it is necessary to consider the case of all citizens who are eligible to be appointed. For that purpose it is necessary to call for the names from a Employment Exchange, but the same in some cases also requires due advertisement of a post in news papers by notifying the vacancies and the requisite qualification therefore so that all eligible candidates may apply for their appointment in the said post. It was further observed; from the decisions of the Supreme Court as also this Court, as referred to hereinbefore, it will thus be evident that any appointment which was made by a person having no authority to dose or the appointments which have been made without following the mandatory provisions of the recuitment rules and articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, such appointment should be held to be a nullity. In this view of the, matter in my opinion, this court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot direct regularisation of the services of the employees when the same would be violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution". The principle of natural justice as is well known is based upon two basis principles viz adut alteram partem and nameo Debito Esses Judex in prpriea causa. The principle of natural justice have been developed by the apex court from time to time adding new concepts therein. In some decisions the apex court has gone to the extent of holding that the principles of natural justice are embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution of Indian. In Union of India Vs. Tursi Ram Patel reported in AIR 1985 Supreme Court. 1416, the Supreme Court of India held. Principles of natural justice are not creation of Articles 14 of the Constitution of India but merely they are constitutional guardian. The Pcinciples of natural justice can be traced their ancestry to ancient civilisation and long past history." The Supreme Court in that Cine traced the history of the principles of natural justice in paragraph 72 to 80 of the judgment and thereafter discussed various principles involved therein in paragraph 81 to 83 there of. The Pcinciples of natural justice can be traced their ancestry to ancient civilisation and long past history." The Supreme Court in that Cine traced the history of the principles of natural justice in paragraph 72 to 80 of the judgment and thereafter discussed various principles involved therein in paragraph 81 to 83 there of. Thus Supreme Court held : “The principle of natural justice have thus come to be recognised as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this Court to be concept of equality which is the subject matter of that article. "Shortly, who put the syallogisn runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination, where discrimination is the res 1st of State action. It is a violation of Article 14. Article 14 however is not the sole repository of the principles of natural justice, what it does is to guarantee that any law of State action violating them will be struck down. The Principles of natural Justice however, apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal authority o. body of men not coming with in the definition of "State in Article 12 is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case the principles of natural justice required that it must be decide such matter faily and impartially". In Tusi Ram Patel's case (supra) the Supreme Court, there after held that a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication may exclude application of the principles of natural justice. The supreme court therefore, concluded that the principle, of natural justice not only can be modified but also it can be excluded. In Union of India Vs. J.N. Sinha reported in AIR 1971 Supreme Court-40, it has been held: "But if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of power concurred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provisions concurring the power, the nature of the power concurred, the purpose for which it is conferred, and the effect of exercise of that power." Reference in this connection may also be made to R.S. Das Vrs. Union of India reported in 1987 S.C. 593 Further, it is well known that there are certain exceptions to the principles of natural justice. In case of Maharsthra State Board of Secondary and High Secondary Education-Vrs K.S. Gandhi and others reported in 1991 (2) S.C.C. 716 it has been held: "From this perspective, the question is whether omission to records reasons vitiate, the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The omni presence and omni science (SIC) of the principles of natural Justice acts at deterance to arrive at arbitrary decision in flagrant infraction of a fair play. But the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a strait jacket formula as an obstact proposition of law. It depends upon the crux of the ease, nature of the enquiry and the effect of the order decisions on the right of the person and attendant circumstances". In National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Science Vrs K.K. Raman reported in 1992 SC 1806 it has been held that for selection or non-selection of a person in absence of a statutory requirement, the authority is under no legal obligation to record reason in support of its decision and even the principle of natural justice has no application in such a case. The supreme court in the case Dr. Suresh Chandra Verama and others Vrs- The Chacellor Nagpur University and others reported in 1990 (4) S.C.C. 55 held as follows :- When the refere, the services of the appellants are to be terminated in view of the change in the position of law and not on account of the demerits of misdeanour of individual candidates, it is not necessary to hear the individuals before their services are terminated the rule of audo ateram partem does not apply in such cases and the ref ore, there is no breach of the principle of natural justice. In the result, we are of the view that there is no merit in this case. The appeal, therefore, stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there is no order as to costs. It is, therefore, clear that a case where the services of the employees is terminated owing to any misdeameanour on his part of his demerits, the principle of natural justices are required to be complied with. Recently, the Supreme Court in Baikunth Nath Das and another Vrs-Chief Deputy Medical Officer Baripada and another reported in 1992 (2) SCC 299 has held that before passing the order of compulsory retirement the principle of natural justice not required to be complied with nor even adverse remarks against the concerned employees are required to be communicated The Supreme Court held : "Before parting with the case, we must refer to an agument urged by Sri R.K. Garg. He stressed what is called, the new concept of article 14 as adumbrated in Maneka Gandhi and submitted on that any and every action is open to judicial executive. The general principles evolved in the said decion is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principles of natural justice audi ateram partem is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quashi judicial in nature and because of the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the Govt. there is no room for importing the said facts of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement, is not a punishment nor doesit involve any stigma. In Vijay Bharti-vs.-State of Bihar reported in 1993 PLJR- a Full Bench of this Court held; "Before considering the argument that the right of some of the petitioners to future appointment has been affected, it would be proper to consider as towhat is the effect of saying that the appointment is irregular. In Vijay Bharti-vs.-State of Bihar reported in 1993 PLJR- a Full Bench of this Court held; "Before considering the argument that the right of some of the petitioners to future appointment has been affected, it would be proper to consider as towhat is the effect of saying that the appointment is irregular. Reference in this connection may be made to two cases decided by Mathew J, as a Judge of the Kerala High Court, the first case is that of P. Unnikrishnan-Vrs.- State of kerala 15' There on facts it was found that the petitioner was ineligible for being appointed to the service. The impugned order was, therefore, held to mean that it was a termination of an appointment which was itself void. In O.P. No. 973 of 1968 the same learned Judge pointed out the order in question only declared back the petitioner was not validly appointed to the post and that he 'should be reverted. The learned Judge observed. "It was not an order cancelling a valid or eyen a viodable order it was merely a declaration that there has been no appointment of the petitioner to the post, In the circumstances, I do not think that the natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the first to the second respondent. I also don’t think that in the circumstances there was any manifest injustice so that interference under Article 260 required. " In U.P. Junior, Doctors Action committee vs Dr. B. Sheelal Nandwani and ors. reported in 1991 S.C. 909 : 1992 (2) PLJR. 16 (S.C.), it has been held that principles of natural justice are not required to be compled with in a case where a candidate has secured admission on the basis of forged certificate. It has further been held by the Supreme Court that natural justice should be viewed in circumstantial flexibility 1991 (4) S.C.C. 584 ). It is also well known that the principles of natural Justice need not be complied with when it would result in futility. It is also a settled law that an appointment made in violation of article 16 of the Constitution of India or made by a person having no jurisdiction would be a nullity. The supreme Court in a recent decision in Ex Captn. K. Bala Subraminian and others Vs. It is also a settled law that an appointment made in violation of article 16 of the Constitution of India or made by a person having no jurisdiction would be a nullity. The supreme Court in a recent decision in Ex Captn. K. Bala Subraminian and others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others reported in 1991 (2) S.C.C. 708 has held" this High Court has, in our opinion rightly held that the direction contained orders dated 16th June, 1976 and June 15, 1977 were invalid, being contrary to the provisions contained in Rule 35 of the general rules, Since the said order were invalid the petitioner would, not claim any right on the basis of said order and therefore, no question of affording them an opportunity of hearing before passing the order dated 3rd March, 1980". In Ram Krishna Verma Vrs. State of U.P. reported In 1992 (2) S.C.C. 620 , it has been held that a party would not be entitled to his right of natural justice if undue advantage is obtained by protracting a proceeding some how and nullifying the objectives. In S.L. Kapoor-Vrs-Jogmohan and others A.I.R. 1981 Supreme Court-136). It has been held that although non-observance of principle of natural justice is itself prejudicial but in that case also it has been observed. "Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or in disputable facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approved the nonobservance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs.” 19. In C.W.J.C. No. 10378 of 1993 disposed of on 9.3.94, a Division Bench of this Court Noticed the observation made by the Supreme Court is 1993 (4) SCALE 597 bolding follows :- "The rules or instructions should be in compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The procedure prescribed shall be just fair and reasonable. In C.W.J.C. No. 10378 of 1993 disposed of on 9.3.94, a Division Bench of this Court Noticed the observation made by the Supreme Court is 1993 (4) SCALE 597 bolding follows :- "The rules or instructions should be in compliance with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The procedure prescribed shall be just fair and reasonable. Opportunity shall be given to eligible persons by inviting application through the public notification and recruitment should be according to the valid procedure and appointment should be of the qualified persons found for appointment to a post or an office under the State. Therefore, it must be held that power of relaxation exercised by the Govt. is ultra vires of the Rules and the High Court is right in holding that Government cannot relax the rules of recruitment to be made by the PSC. Government have no power to make regular appointment under the Rules without selection by the Public Service Commission under S. 133 (1) read with Rule 5 and schedule III of the Rules." 20. In M.L. Gupta and ors Vrs. Instrumentation Ltd. through chairm and ors reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 137, one of us (S.B. Sinha. J.) had the occasion to extensively deal with various decisions of the Supreme Court of India as also of this Court. In that case it was noticed that the Supreme Court in its recent decisions did not take into consideration its earlier decisions which were binding upon its It was held; "Unfortunately, however, in none of the aforementioned case, the Supreme Court considered its earlier binding precedent on the question of manner of regularization, that is State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayappa (1967) I SCR. 128 and R.N. Nanjudappa V.P.T. Thimmiah reported in 1972 (2) SCR 799 . The afore mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court was followed by a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court in B.N. Nagarjan and others Vs. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1979 SC 1676 In R.N. Nanjudappa (Supra) the Supreme Court held that if an appointment is made in fraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, such appointment being illegal the same cannot be regularised. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1979 SC 1676 In R.N. Nanjudappa (Supra) the Supreme Court held that if an appointment is made in fraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, such appointment being illegal the same cannot be regularised. It was further held that ratification or regularisation is possible of an Act, which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-complinace with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. It held; Regularization cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules.” (Underlining is mine for emphasis). The supreme Court in that case negatived the contention that regularisation in employment is possible by taking recourse to Article 162 of the Constitution of India in the following words: “In the present case the contention on behalf of the respondents that the regularisation was itself is a mode of appointment under Article 162 of the Constitution is unsound. The rules came into existence in the present case in 1964. The regularisation was made with effect from 1968. Therefore, the rules became applicable. The regularisation in the present case was also bad because even without specific methods of recruitment appointment would be made only by selection or promotion or transfer from equivalent grade. The method of recruitment and qualification for each State Civil Service was to be set forth in the rules of recruitment of such service specially made in that behalf.” The Supreme Court held that Article 162 does not confer power to regularise nor does it confer power on the Govt. to make rules for recruitment or conditions of service. It was further held : "All that the public service Commission did was to regularise the appointment to the post of the principal. The regularisation by the State of appointment is with effect form 1968. This regularization is bad for following reasons. First regularization is not itself is a mode of appointment. It was further held : "All that the public service Commission did was to regularise the appointment to the post of the principal. The regularisation by the State of appointment is with effect form 1968. This regularization is bad for following reasons. First regularization is not itself is a mode of appointment. Secondly the mode of appointment are direct recruitments selection or promotion or appointing for reasons to e recorded in writing an officer holding a post for an equivalent grade by transfer from any other Service of the state. In B.N. Nagarjan and others Vrs State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1979 SC 1676 , it was held: It was argued that the regularisation of promotion gave it the colour of permanence and the appointment of the promotee as Assistant Engineer must therefore, be deemed to have been made substantively right from the first November, 1956. The argument, however, is unacceptable to us for two reasons Firstly, the words "regular" or 'regularisation' do not connote permanence. They are terms calculationed to condone any procedural irregularity and a remeant to cure only such defect as the attributable to the methology followed in making the appointment. They cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of nature of tenure of the appointment. (Underlining is mine for emphasis) In none of the cases referred to by the counsel for the petitioner, the aforementioned authoritative pronouncement of the supreme Court which have defined the term 'regular and regularisation' were taken into consideration. The decision of the Supreme Court referred to on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, will have to be considered from that angle. Thus, regularisation of casual labourers do not mean that they can be permanently absorbed in the State Service irrespective of the fact that there exists any vacancy or not. It has been held that respondent no.1 is a State. It, therefore, is bound to be equal opportunity of employment to all the candidates eligible, therefore, in terms of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India Permanent absorption of casual employees in the State Service, in absence of any statutory provision or a policy decision is thus "impermissible' In a given situation, it may be permissible for the Supreme Court to lay down a scheme or direct a scheme for permanent absorption of its employee be made by the State. Such a power exists in the Supreme Court by reasons of Article 142 of the Constitution of India as it may pass a decree or order for giving complete justice to the parties and such decree or order would be binding upon the State. 21. This aspect of the matter has also been considered in Miss prasanna Kumari Amma-Vrs- B.S.F.C. reported in 1994 (I) PLJR 3 66. Nand Kumar Prasad Vrs State of Bihar reported in 1994 (I) PLJR 386 and Arjun Pd. Sharma vrs. The Bihar State Small Industries Corporation Ltd. and another reported in 1994 (l) PLJR page 480. 22. The Supreme Court recently in State of U.P. and others Vrs U.P. State Law Officers Association and other reported in 1994 (2) Supreme Court cases page-204 held as follows. "Those who come by the back door have to go by the same door. This is more so when the order of appointment itself stipulates that the appointment is terminable at any time without assigning any reason. Such appointments are made, accepted and understood by both sides to be purely professional engagements till they last. The fact that they are mace by public bodies cannot vest them with additional sanctity. Every appointment made to a public office, howsoever, made is not necessarily vested with public sanctity. There is, therefore, no public interest involved in saving all appointments irrespective of their mode. From the inception some engagements and contracts may be the product of the operation of the spoils system. There need be no legal anxiety to save them." 23. In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, there cannot be any doubt that the appointment of the petitioner was absolutely illegal and thus being a nullity, the principles of natural justice were not required to be complied with. 24. In any event in our opinion the procedure adopted by the Suite of Bihar having been done in compliance of the observations of this court no exception can be taken thereto. 25. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shrawan Kr. Jha and ors-Vrs-State of Bihar and ors, reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 309, upon which reliance has been placed by He learned counsel for the petitioner bas no application in the facts and circumstances of the case as the said decision was rendered in the fact and situation rendered therein. 25. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shrawan Kr. Jha and ors-Vrs-State of Bihar and ors, reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 309, upon which reliance has been placed by He learned counsel for the petitioner bas no application in the facts and circumstances of the case as the said decision was rendered in the fact and situation rendered therein. In this case the Supreme Court observed as follows :- "In the facts and circumstances of this Case, we are of the view that the appellants should have been given an opportunity of hearing before cancelling their appointments". 26. In that case the question of illegality of appointment of the petitioner was not raised. In Shrawan Kumar Jha, there sxisted a dispute as to whether the District Education Officer was the appointing authority or not. 27. The decision of the Supreme Court in Delhi Road Transport Corporation Vrs D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C 101 has also no application inasmuch as therein the Supreme Court was considering the validity of Regulation 9(b) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952. 28. That decision of the Supreme Court in H.C. Puttaswamy and ors Vrs The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court and ors reported in A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 295, in our opinion, has also no application to the fact of the present ease. The Supreme Court passed an order on huminatirian ground in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This court has no such jurisdiction. 29. We also cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that 1.1.1980 could not have been fixed as the cut-off date. From the impugned order, as contained in Annexure -33 to the application it would appear that it has been found that all appointments made by Dr. Mallik after 1980 are illegal and invalid in law. 30. We also cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that 1.1.1980 could not have been fixed as the cut-off date. From the impugned order, as contained in Annexure -33 to the application it would appear that it has been found that all appointments made by Dr. Mallik after 1980 are illegal and invalid in law. 30. So far as the contention of the learned counsel to the effect that the State of Bihar having given statements on the floor of the Legislative Assembly about the validity of the appointment cannot turn round and contend that the same was illegal is not relevant inasmuch as any statement made in the floor of the Assembly is not binding on the State when it has been found after due enquiry that the appointments were made in complete violation of the mandatory provisions of the recruitment rules as also articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 31. Further it is now well known that for obtaining a writ of or a writ of mandamus, the petitioner has to show existence of a legal right in himself. As noticed hereinbefore, he has failed to do so. Issuance of a writ of certiorari is also a discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under articles 226 of the Constitution of India. 32. In a case of this na1urc where such a large scale of fraud has been practised and further keeping in view the fact that the petitioner did not initially question the order of termination issued by the Civil Surgeon cum-Chief Medical Officer as far back as in the year 1988, in our opinion it is not a fit case in which we should exercise our discretion under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in favour of the petitioners 33. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this case and it is, accordingly, dismissed; but without any order as to costs. Shashank Kumar Singh, J.- I agree. Application dismissed.