Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1994 DIGILAW 268 (ALL)

KESHAV PRASAD TRIPATHI v. STATE OF U P

1994-03-19

V.N.MEHROTRA

body1994
V. N. MEHROTRA, J. This revision has been filed against the judgment dated 15-4-1993 passed by the Special Judge (D. A. A.), Banda in Criminal Revision No. 83 of 1990- Keshav Prasad Tripathi v. Kamal Kumar Pandey and others. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the present applicant Kamal Kumar Pandey moved an application on 20-8-1988 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Atarra, Banda asserting that he was in possession over the land in dispute (Bara) shown in the map attached to the application. The applicant further asserted that the opposite parties were trying to take forcible possession over the same. 3. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate concerned called report from the police of Police Station concerned. The police reported that there was a dispute relating to the land in dispute between the parties which is likely to cause breach of peace. On the basis of this report, the learned Magistrate passed preliminary order under Section 145 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 31-8-1988. He also passed order under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. on the same day directing the attachment of the property. 4. In pursuance of the notices issued by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate concerned, the present applicant Kamal Kumar Pandey and opposite party No. 1 Keshav Prasad Tripathi filed their written statements. The remaining opposite parties did not file any written statement. In his written statement, the opposite party No. 1 asserted that he had purchased the northern portion of the Bara measuring 50 X 30 from Smt. Savitri Devi by registered sale-deed dated 18-7-1988. He further asserted that from the date of sale, he came into possession over the property and since then he was in actual possession of the same. The opposite party No. 1 further asserted that the sourthern portion of the disputed Bara was in possession of his brother Sachchidanand Tripathi in accordance with the mutual settlement between him and Smt. Savitri Devi. The opposite party No. 1 asserted that the applicant was never in possession over the land in dispute. He also asserted that at the time of attachment of property by the Police, he (opposite party No. 1) and his family members were actually found in possession by the S. I. con cerned. 5. Both the parties produced oral and documentary evidence in support of their claims. He also asserted that at the time of attachment of property by the Police, he (opposite party No. 1) and his family members were actually found in possession by the S. I. con cerned. 5. Both the parties produced oral and documentary evidence in support of their claims. The learned Magistrate by his order dated 30-7-1990 held that the applicant Kamal Kumar Pandey was in actual possession over the land in dispute. He also directed that the land in dispute be released in his favour. 6. The oppossite party No. 1 then filed a revision against the order by the learned Magistrate. This revision was heard by Sri Man Pokhi Lal Sharma, Special Judge (D. A. A.), Banda. He allowed the revision by his order dated 15-4-1993 holding that Kamal Kumar Pandey was never in posses sion over the land in dispute. He further directed that the revisionist Keshav Prasad Tripathi and others be put in possession over the land. 7. In this revision filed by applicant Kamal Kumar Pandey, it has been contended that the learned Special Judge has wrongly reassessed the evidence produced by the parties and has given finding of fact which could not have been done in a revision. It has also been contended that the learned Magistrate has considered the entire evidence produced by the parties and thereafter has come to a definite finding regarding the possession over the land in dispute. However, the lower revisional court has on the basis of its reasoning wrongly held that the opposite party No. 1 was in possession over the land in dispute. It has also been contended that the lower revisional court has wrongly con sidered the report dated 9-9- 1988 by the police to hold that the opposite party No. 1 was in possession over the land in dispute. 8. On behalf of the opposite party No. 1, it has been contended that the revisional court was right in re- examining the matter as the learned Magistrate had not considered some vital evidence and the view taken by him was perverse. It is asserted that the material on record was sutficiuiu to prove the possession of the opposite party No. 1 over the land in dispute. 9. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also exa mined the record of the case. It is asserted that the material on record was sutficiuiu to prove the possession of the opposite party No. 1 over the land in dispute. 9. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also exa mined the record of the case. In a criminal revision, the revisional court should not ordinarily re-assess the evidence and cuine to a different finding on the question of fact. However, in case it is found that the Magistrate concern ed has over-looked some importance piece of evidence or the reasoning by the learned Magistrate is perverse, then the revisional court can re-examine the evidence. In the present case, the revisional court had laid much emphasis on the fact that the Fard Kurki dated 9-9-1988, which was prepared at the time of attachment of the property, showed that the opposite party No. 1 and his family members were found to be in possession over the land in dispute when the S. I. reached the spot for effecting the attachment. The learned Special Judge has, after relying on this document, observed that as the opposite party No. 1 was in possession over the land in question on the date of attachment, in view of the contents of this document and as it has not been pleaded by the applicant that he was at any stage of time dispossessed from the property by the opposite party No. 1, then it must be held that the opposite party No. 1 was in actual possession over the land in dispute on the date of preliminary order or on the date on which the police report was called by the Magistrate. In my view this reasoning is obviously faulty. The police report regarding the factum of possession over the property in dispute was irrelevant and inadmissible in evidence. The opposite party No. 1 did not examine the S. I. concerned in court to prove this report and to assert that he actually found the opposite party No. 1 in possession at the time of attachment of property. This police report cannot be said to be evidence for the purposes of deciding the question of possession under Section 145, Cr. P. C. Reference may be made to the case Km. This police report cannot be said to be evidence for the purposes of deciding the question of possession under Section 145, Cr. P. C. Reference may be made to the case Km. Beni Base and another v. District Magistrate, Allahabad and others, 1985 AWC 543, in which a similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of this Court. Thus the basis on which the lower revisional court held that the opposite party No. 1 was in possession over the property in dispute does not exist 10. The learned Special Judge has also referred to the fact that Sachchidanand Tripathi was not made a party by the applicant. The learned Magistrate has considered this aspect of the matter as will appear from the record, the proceedings under Section 145, Cr. P. C. were initiated in respect of the entire Bara and the same was also attached under Section 146 (1), Cr. P. C. The applicant has impleaded four persons asserting that these persons were trying to dispossess him from the property. The police reported about the existence of dispute between the applicant and these four persons. The proceedings were contested by the opposite party No. 1 alone. Even after the attachment of the entire Bara, Sachchidanand Tripathi did not contest the proceedings. In case he was a person interested, he could have obviously appeared before the Magistrate concerned to contest the proceedings. How ever, he has not done so. In any view of the matter, the Magistrate has to find out as to whether there was any dispute regarding possession and if so, which of the parties before him was in actual possession over the land in dispute. In the circumstances, merely because Sachchidanand Tripathi was not impleaded as a party it cannot be said that the proceedings under Section 145 (1), Cr P. C. were without jurisdiction. 11. The learned Special Judge has also referred to the sale-deed executed by Smt. Savitri Devi opposite party No. 2 in favour of opposite party No. 1 on 18-7-1988. Objection was raised before the learned Magistrate about the adinissibility of this document as it had been impounded on account of sufficient stamp duty was not paid. The learned Magistrate observed that in the proceedings under Section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. , the question of title is not releva-it and only the question oi possession is to be considered. Objection was raised before the learned Magistrate about the adinissibility of this document as it had been impounded on account of sufficient stamp duty was not paid. The learned Magistrate observed that in the proceedings under Section 145 (1), Cr. P. C. , the question of title is not releva-it and only the question oi possession is to be considered. This reason ing cannot be faulted. The learned Spscial Judge has also referred to the certain entries in the house-tax register. These entries and the circumstances in which these were made have been considered by the learned Magistrate. The observation by the lower revisiooal court that the finding of the learned Magistrate on this point was against the law and evidence on record does not appear to be correct. 12. The learned Special Judge has also observed that the learned Magistrate has not considered the assertion that there was no apprehension of breach of peace. This observation does not appear to be correct as the learned Magistrate has considered this aspect of the matter in his judgment. 13. On a consideration of the entire material on record, I am of the view that there was no sufficient reason for the lower revisional court to re assess the evidence on record and to come to a different finding on a question of fact. The view taken by the learned Magistrate cannot, in any way, be said to be perverse nor it can be said that the learned Magistrate has over-looked some important and relevant evidence while giving finding as regards the actual possession over the property in dispute. In these circumstances, this revision should be allowed. The revision is allowed. The judgment dated 15-4-1993 by the Special Judge (D. A. A.), Banda is set aside and the order by the learned Magistrate is confirmed. Revision allowed. .