JUDGMENT Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J.— By this writ petition under Articles 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner seeks to challenge the orders of the first respondent (State of Himachal Pradesh) allotting quota of Ayurvedic medicines to the other firms ignoring the claim of the petitioner. According to the petitioner, these orders, denying similar treatment to him, are arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. The petitioner is a partner of Himachal Ayurvedic Pharmaceutical Works. His unit is dealing in the manufacture of Ayurvedic medicines since 1952 and is registered as a Small Scale Industry by the Industries Department of Himachal Pradesh in the year 1971 vide registration No. SS-I-06-07/010694/PMT/SSI. It is alleged in the petition that his unit is manufacturing more than 300 items and the work of manufacturing is being carried out with the help of modern machines. The Director of Health Services is alleged to have issued manufacturing licence to the petitioners firm on 24th June, 1970. The petitioner pleads that the drugs of his firm were approved by the Central Government Health Services Scheme and New Delhi Municipal Corporation, and since 1970 the drugs manufactured by the petitioner have been approved for reimbursement by the Himachal Pradesh Government for its employees and by Central Government as well since 1974. He also states that the petitioners firm is A category firm for purchases as per the policy of the Himachal Pradesh Government approved by the Cabinet Annexure-P-1). Out of the total number of 53 firms manufacturing ayurvedic drugs in the State of Himachal Pradesh, only 5-6 are A grade ; nearly 10 to 15 B grade and rest C and D grades. As per the policy of the State Government (Annexure P-3) this price preference is to be given to the local manufacturers in purchasing the medicines. Petitioners proposal for the purchase of ayurvedic medicines for the year 1992-93 was not considered by t he respondents whereas the proposal of the other firms were considered thereby ignoring the claim of the petitioner. 3. Notice of motion of this petition was issued to the respondents on 27th May, 1993. Petitioners proposal for the purchase of ayurvedic medicines for the year 1992-93 was not considered by t he respondents whereas the proposal of the other firms were considered thereby ignoring the claim of the petitioner. 3. Notice of motion of this petition was issued to the respondents on 27th May, 1993. In CMP No. 1388 of 1993 reply was ordered to be filed within four weeks and the second respondent (Director, Ayurveda, to the Government of Himachal Pradesh) was directed to consider the case of the petitioner through representation dated 7th May 1993 (Annexure-P-4) and before taking any decision with respect to any supply intended to be made by the petitioner, he would be heard in person The second respondent was ordered to intimate the date prayed for such hearing to the petitioner. 4. The Return was filed on behalf of the respondents on the affidavit of Shri N.C. Sood, Director of Ayurveda, Government of Himachal Pradesh. The only point raised in the preliminary submission is that the petitioner has already been issued supply orders by the department for procuring the glass bottles for Rs. 1,87,720 (Annexure-R-1). Another order for supplying plastic bottles amounting to Rs. 41,808 was also issued to the petitioner (Annexure-R-2). Thus, the department had given the supply orders for Rs. 2,29,528 during the financial year 1992-93 to the petitioner. It has been stated in paragraph 1 of the preliminary submission that so fai as the purchase of medicines of the petitioner are concerned, the replying respondents were aware of the lodging of F I R No 2/1989 against him for cheating the Government department for charging more than 14.2% rates than its original cost and therefore, it was found not appropriate to purchase the medicines from the petitioners firm whose integrity was doubtful. It is also alleged that it is not obligatory for the State Government to issue supply orders to all the licenced firms In paragraph 2 of the preliminary submission it is stated that the petitioners firm does not manufacture such medicines which do not have the perfect substitutes and are not available with the other manufacturers to whom the orders for supply were given. The orders, were placed in accordance with the requirement of the department and procured from the suitable local firms as well as from the national reputed firms The replying respondents did not approve the petitioners firm suitable for issuance of supply orders for purchase of the medicines due to the pendency of K I. R. It is also alleged in paragraph 4 of the preliminary submission that the rates of certain ayurvedic medicines purchased from the petitioners firm in the year 1985-86 to 1987-88 were found higher than the rates of other firms by the High Power Committee constituted by the Himachal Pradesh Government to inspect the quality and functioning of Ayurvedic pharmacies of the Ayurveda Department. On merits it is admitted that the petitioners firm was registered in the year 1976. 5. Rejoinder to the reply-affidavit was also filed in" which the averments made in the petition were reiterated. 6. At the time of the hearing of the petition, we called upon the State to produce the record of the Departmental Purchase Committee Shri M. S. Guleria, learned Deputy Advocate General, produced the record. We have examined the noting-sheets and minutes of the Committee. We find that the reasons stated in the reply-affidavit were not at all taken into consideration by the Committee at the time of consideration. The committee had absolutely ignored the claim of the petitioner from consideration. The petitioner had the right of consideration which was denied to him by the Committee. In our opinion, the reasons so mentioned in the reply-affidavit do not absolve the decision making authority from considering the claim of the petitioner. The. precise point is whether the decision of the committee in not considering the petitioners claim suffers from arbitrariness. We think, petitioner suffered an unfair treatment at the hands of the Committee which decided the matter violating fundamental principles of fair-play in action. 7. It is well settled law that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of statutory authority must contain reasons for rejection. It is appropriate to refer the decision of Supreme Court in support of our view. We think, petitioner suffered an unfair treatment at the hands of the Committee which decided the matter violating fundamental principles of fair-play in action. 7. It is well settled law that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of statutory authority must contain reasons for rejection. It is appropriate to refer the decision of Supreme Court in support of our view. In Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, AIR 1978 SC 851, Krishna Iyer, speaking for the Court in paragraph 8 has observed as under: "The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out." Therefore, the reasons stated in the affidavit are unreasonable and untenable. 8. The reasons stated by the respondents are unsustainable and unjustified on another ground as well. It has been admitted by the respondents that F. I. R. was lodged in the year 1989 against the petitioner. We find from the record that thereafter in the succeeding years of 1989-90, 1990-91 and 1991-92, supply orders were issued in favour of the petitioner and he made supply and received payments, In the year 1992-93 he was given supply orders for the supply of glass and plastic bottles costing about Rs. 2,29,528. If it is so, how it lies in the mouth of the-respondents to allege that since there was F. I. R. registered against the petitioner, his claim was not considered for the year 1992-93. The respondents are taking unusually conflicting pleas in their return. For this reason also the action of the respondents is unjust, arbitrary, irrational and cannot be allowed to stand and has to be quashed 9. It is now settled law that unfair treatment by the State in discharging its administrative functions certainly violate the fundamental principles of fair play even in administrative action (See Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1985 SC 1147. It is now settled law that unfair treatment by the State in discharging its administrative functions certainly violate the fundamental principles of fair play even in administrative action (See Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana and others, AIR 1985 SC 1147. The Supreme Court in the case of Food Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, AIR.1993 SC 1601, held that non-arbitrariness in state action is necessary in the decision making process. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of powers as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review. 10. As referred to above, the Supreme Court clearly lays down that if the exercise of discretionary powers suffer from arbitrariness, it at once becomes subject to judicial review and cannot be permitted to stand in as such as it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 11. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts in hand, it is undisputed that the claim of the petitioner was excluded from consideration without assigning reasons. The petitioner had. right of consideration which was denied to him. Non-assigning of reasons or the non-communication thereof were not based on public policy, but non-consideration of the petitioners claim without the existence of any cogent reason in furtherance of the object in which the power is given to the committee would amount to arbitrariness and therefore, against public policy. 12. The action of the Committee excluding the petitioners claim sought to be substantiated on the allegations made in the counter-affidavit without verification of their truth, would certainly amount to arbitrary action in the matter of distribution of State largesse which is impermissible. 13. We may now turn to the ground based on mala fide use of power. 12. The action of the Committee excluding the petitioners claim sought to be substantiated on the allegations made in the counter-affidavit without verification of their truth, would certainly amount to arbitrary action in the matter of distribution of State largesse which is impermissible. 13. We may now turn to the ground based on mala fide use of power. The petitioner has set out in the petition various incidents when he incurred displeasure of Shri Dhani Ram Acharya (respondent No. 4) who was admittedly one of the members of the committee and contended that the fourth respondent, therefore, nourished hostility and malius animus against him and it was for this reason that the petitioners claim was not considered Since we are quashing the action of the respondents on legal grounds, we are not going into the question of personal mala fides alleged against respondent No. 4 who has not refuted them by filing return for reasons best known to him. 14. The next question arises as to what relief can be granted to the petitioner at this stage. It is stated in the affidavit by the respondents that the orders for supply of medicines in accordance with the budget provisions in the year 1992-93 have already been given to the firms as approved by the Departmental Purchase Committee prior to the ending of financial year 1992-93 i. e. before 31st March, 1993. The budget available for the SOE material and supplies has already been spent. It is stated by the learned Deputy Advocate General at the bar that no fresh demand is made to the firms for the supply of extra medicines for the financial year 1992-93 and the entire payments were also made to the firms before filing, of the petition, on 26th May, 1993. In the facts and circumstances no effective relief can be granted in favour of the petitioner at this belated stage. 15. However, looking tj the constitution of Departmental Purchase Committee and taking into account the functional and important responsibility entrusted to the Committee we are of the opinion that henceforth the Departmental Purchase Committee should be headed by the Secretary/ Additional Secretary/Joint Secretary (Health) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, so that the cases of all the parties are considered by a high ranking Government Functionary giving no cause for discrimination and complaint to them besides avoiding litigation in such matters. Director of Ayurveda, Controller of Stores should be made members of the Committee. In addition, there should be four other professionally qualified members from Ayurveda specialities to be nominated by the State Government. 16. Accordingly, we dispose of this writ petition, in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -