C. M. Nayar ( 1 ) THESE three petitions, being C. M. (M) Nos. 413/92,398/ 92 nd 399/92 have been filed to impugn the order dated July 21, 1992, passed by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, Delhi, by which he disposed of the interlocutory petitions filed on August 31, 1990 in the Opposition Nos. DEL 6249, DEL 6254 and DEL 6247. Tin- interlocutory petitions were filed by M/s Bata India Limited arid the grounds taken therein are that M/s Adidas Sportsshuhfabriken Adi Dassler and Co. KG, West Germany were the proprietor of a number of trade marks in India including Registration Nos. (1)271864-B, (2)352655 in class 25 and (3) 271^63 in class IS. The consideration of these trade marks arises in the present Oppositions. The petitioner No. I assigned the trade marks by Deed of Assignment dated January 17, 1989, to M/s Bata India Lid. and it is contended on behalf of this Company that they are the assignees and necessary parties to the Opposition and they may be added as Opponents in the proceedings pending before the Deputy Registrar. The respondents in each case replied to the Interlocutory Petitions and took the plea that M/s Bata India Ltd. have no concern with the present Opposition proceedings; there is nothing on record to prove that the said Company are assignees of these trade marks. The present interlocutory petitions are not maintainable and are liable to be dismissed. 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioners contended before the Deputy Registrar, as has been contended before me, that M/s. Bata India Ltd. may be made a party to the present Opposition Proceedings inaccordance with the provisions of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as being a necessary party. He has further argued that the trade marks have been assigned by Deed of Assignment dated January 17, 1989, by M/s. Adidas KG (assignors) to M/s Bata (assignees ). The learned Deputy Registrar heard these interlocutory applications and disposed of the same by holding that petitioner No. I had assigned a mark in question vide Schedule I to the Deed of Assignment dated January 17, 1989, and they having 363 moved their Opposition in the Trade Marks Registry only on May 18, 1989, had no right to file the present Opposition Proceedings on the subsequent date since they were not the proprietors of the marks. 3. 3. The interlocutory applications of M/s. Bata were rejected on the ground that the petitions were moved on August 31, 1990, to become a party to the Opposition Proceedings at a belated stage i. e. aftermore than 1 years,which was in violation of Rule 51 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Rules, 1959 by which the party was entitled to become party to the Opposition Proceedings within a prescribed period, as definedin Rule 51 only by filing a notice of Opposition on the relevant form. The Deputy "registrar further concluded that there is no provision in the Trade Marks Law that a party could be added as a party at a belated stage and the provisions of Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code. have no application in the Trade Marks Law. It has further been highlighted that at the time when the Opposition was moved the necessary registration was not in operation and the same was allowed in favour of M/s. Bata India Ltd. and necessary entries were made in the register as subsequent proprietor on October 14, 1992. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has contended that the Deputy Registrar has gravely erred in not allowing the interlocutory applications by M/s Bata merely on the ground that the application was moved at a belated stage. He has further stated that M/s. Bata is now approved by the Registrar as subsequent proprietor and it will be in the interest of justice if the said company is permitted to participate in the proceedings. He has further referred me to Section 21 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) to highlight the proposition that any person may, within the specified period from the date of the advertisement of the application for registration etc. may apply in the prescribed manner and on payment of the prescribed fee with regard to opposition to the registration and there is no bar of any one joining the proceedings in accordance with this provision and it may not even be necessary fora party to have a direct interest in the matter. may apply in the prescribed manner and on payment of the prescribed fee with regard to opposition to the registration and there is no bar of any one joining the proceedings in accordance with this provision and it may not even be necessary fora party to have a direct interest in the matter. The relevant provision of Section 21 (1) reads as follows: ( 21 ) OPPOSITION to registration.- (1) Any person may, within three months from the date of the advertisement or re-advertisement of an application for registration or within such further period, not exceeding one month in the aggregate, as the Registrar, on application made to him in the prescribed manner and on payment of the prescribed fee, allows, give notice in writing in the prescribed manner to the Registrar, of opposition to the registration. " He has cited the judgment of the Chancery Division of the High Court in England as reported in the matter of an application by the HAVANA COM- MERCIAL COMPANY FOR REGISTRATION OF A TRADEMARK Reports of Patent Cases 1916 (Vol. 33) 399, to reiterate the proposition that the opponent is not necessarily a person who is aggrieved and, therefore, could not be a person who is interested in any existing mark. The relevant passage reads as under (page 404):- "it seems to me, in the circumstances, that the Opponents, as claimants to a mark, have no merits whatever, and if it depended solely upon their ownership of the mark, I should not have had any difficulty whatever in the case. 364 But there are two things to be considered. First of all, an opponent is not necessarily a person who is aggrieved, and therefore need not be a person who is interested in any existing mark. It may therefore be open to the Opponents to take the objection taken in the 4th of their grounds of Opposition that the registration will cause confusion in the trade and with the public; and the Registrar, when the facts are brought to his attention, is bound to consider the Application from not only the point of view of the Applicants and the Opponents, but also from the point of view of the public; and it is the point of view of the public which I must consider in the present case. " 5. " 5. The learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, has contended that the Deputy Registrar is already proceeding to hear the opposition of M/s. Adidas AC, who are the original proprietors of the trade marks and the observation of the Deputy Registrar to the effect that the said company had no right to file the opposition proceedings subsequent to the date of the assignment in favour of M/s. Bata India Ltd. , is of no consequence as it is merely an observation and the Deputy Registrar is already hearing the opposition of M/s. Adidas AC. The controversy is, accordingly, narrowed down to the consideration as to whether the consignee M/s. Bata India Ltd. is a necessary party to the present proceedings and whether the delay in filing their interlocutory applications could be condoned or covered by the provisions of Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code. ( 6 ) THE Counsel for the petitioner states that the Deputy Registrar has not given any findings, which he was bound to do while not accepting the application which has been filed at a late stage. Support is sought from the provisions of Section 22 of the Act, which relates to correction and amendment and the powers vested with the Registrar to permit such correction of any error in, or an amendment of a notice of opposition or a counterstatement under Section 21 of the Act. It has been argued that M/s. Adidas AG had already moved an application for the opposition and the subsequent interlocutory petition filed by M/s. Bata to which the trade mark had been validly assigned was merely an act of seeking correction and amendment of an earlier notice of opposition, which was already pending with the Deputy Registrar. ( 7 ) THERE is force in the contention of the Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that M/s. Bata India Ltd. is a necessary party in view of the subsequent Deed of Assignment in its favour and it will be against the norms of justice if the said company is excluded from the proceedings when they have substantial interest in the matter. There is no doubt that the application was moved at a belated stage but the fact remains that M/s. Bata was only approved by the Registrar as a subsequent proprietor on a later date i. e. October 14, 1992. There is no doubt that the application was moved at a belated stage but the fact remains that M/s. Bata was only approved by the Registrar as a subsequent proprietor on a later date i. e. October 14, 1992. In this view of the matter it will be wrong to deprive the said Company to participate in the proceed ings merely on the ground of delay. ( 8 ) THE provisions, as contained in Sub-section (8) of Section 109 of the Act would indicate that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to the appeals before the High Court under this Act and it has been argued that the same benefit could accrue to the petitioner in proceedings before the Deputy Registrar. It will not be necessary for me to give any finding in this regard in view of the fact that M/s Adidas AG is already a party to the proceedings and the Deputy Registrar 365 is hearing them in respect of their opposition to the registration of the trade mark of the respondents. M/s Bata India Ltd. , who are now approved as a subsequent proprietor, in view of the Deed of Assignment dated January 17, 1989, do have vital interest in the matter and it will be necessary for them to be made a party to the proceedings and to dispose of the matter after hearing them. lnviewoftheabove,theimpugnedorderdatedjuly21, 1992, is set aside and the learned Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, New Delhi, shall proceed in the matter in the light of the abovejudgment, aftergiving due opportunities to all the parties in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. 54 (1994) DELHI LAW TIMES 365 (DB) DELHI HIGH COURT Present: Mr. Y. K. Sabharwal b Mr. S. C. fain, JJ. WAISLJDDIN -Appellant versus STATE AND OTHERS -Respondents Cri. Writ 911 of 1993-Decided on 22. 4. 1994 Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 32-A - Suspension, remission or commutation - Came into force with effect from 29th May, 1989 - After the commission of the offence - Whether the provisions would apply to a case where offence has been committed before the said date? - (No) - Section 32 - Prospective in operation. Held: In the present petition we are considering the question of withdrawal of benefit of remission by a subsequent legislation, namely. - (No) - Section 32 - Prospective in operation. Held: In the present petition we are considering the question of withdrawal of benefit of remission by a subsequent legislation, namely. Section 32-A, which was not on the Statute book at the time of commission of offence in the case of fixed term sentence. Ouranswer would depend upon whether we favourstrict interpre- tation or we favour a liberal interpretation. The strict interpretation would be that penalty being inflicted after enforcement of Section 32-A and before its enforce- ment remains the same as was inflictable under the law in force at the time of commission of the offence and thus there is no illegality. We do not think that there are any compelling reasons for favouring a strict interpretation as being suggested by the State. The hard fact and reality is that if Section 32-A is held to be applicable where offence is committed after its enforcement, it would result in offender being subjected to longer period of incarceration as compared to-the shorter period of incarceration had Section 32-A been not there on the statute book. lt. is possible that the petitioner may not have undergone full term of imprisonment of 10 years if after commission of offence Section 32-A had not been brought on the statute book. In absence of Section 32-A the petitioner may have been granted remission. The result of making Section 32-A applicable to the petitioner would be to deprive him of the benefit to which he would have been entitled under the law in force at the time of commission of offence. The effect of remission is reduction of actual period of