S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Application is filed by the petitioners landlords against the judgment and decree of Assistant Judge, in Appeal No. 22 of 1976 dated 13th March, 1980, whereby he allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court directing defendant tenant to hand over peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises. The lower appellate Court, thus, dismissed the suit of the petitioners landlords for possession. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the legal submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners landlords, it would be relevant to set out few relevant facts hereunder : (A) The petitioners landlords instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 314 of 1974 in the Court of Civil Judge, (J. D.), Borsad at Nadiad to recover possession of the suit premises and arrears of rent on the ground that the defendant tenant was in arrears of rent for period of more than six months and that he was not ready and willing to pay the rent and secondly on the ground that the suit premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the petitioners landlords for their personal use and occupation. The suit premises bearing City Survey Tika No. 5 of 279 is situated near Kharakuva. (B) It appears that the father of the petitioners landlords, namely, Muljibhai prajapati, instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 223 of 1969 to recover possession of the suit premises from the respondent tenant, which suit came to be dismissed. Regular Civil Appeal No. 349 of 1970 preferred against the said judgment and decree resulted into compromise and thereafter respondent defendant has regularly remitted the amount of rent. (C) It is the case of the petitioners landlords that as per partition deed dated 1st of July, 1972, the suit property has fallen to the share of the present petitioners and that the same were required for their reasonable and bona fide personal occupation. (D) The case of the petitioners landlords for possession was resisted by the defendant tenant by filing written statement at Exhibit-13 firstly on the ground that the earlier suit filed by the father was already dismissed and that they have no knowledge of alleged partition of the properties. (D) The case of the petitioners landlords for possession was resisted by the defendant tenant by filing written statement at Exhibit-13 firstly on the ground that the earlier suit filed by the father was already dismissed and that they have no knowledge of alleged partition of the properties. It is denied that he had neglected to pay the arrears of rent or that he was not ready and willing to pay the arrears of rent. It was denied that the suit premises were reasonably and bona fide required for their personal use and occupation. (E) On the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed issues at Exhibit-19 and after recording evidence of the parties, the trial Court passed decree for possession of the suit premises. (f) Being aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree of the trial Court, regular Civil Appeal was preferred to the District Court being Civil appeal No. 22 of 1976 which was dismissed by the lower appellate court, against which the Civil Revision Application No. 14 of 1977 was preferred in this High Court and by judgment and order dated 15th september, 1978, N. H. Bhatt, J. allowed the Civil Revision Application and remanded the matter to the lower appellate Court with direction to frame following issue and call for the finding from the trial Court in that regard after extending an opportunity to both the sides to have their say in the matter. The proposed issue was as under :"whether the plaintiffs can be said to be the landlords in terms of explanation appended to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of the Bombay Rent act. "the High Court further directed that after the finding on the aforesaid issue is received from the trial Court, the appellate Judge shall proceed to decide the question of bona fide requirement. (G) It appears that thereupon the trial Court recorded additional evidence and sent its findings to the lower appellate Court and the lower appellate court has thereupon allowed the appeal of the tenant and has set aside the judgment and decree, requiring the tenant to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises. (G) It appears that thereupon the trial Court recorded additional evidence and sent its findings to the lower appellate Court and the lower appellate court has thereupon allowed the appeal of the tenant and has set aside the judgment and decree, requiring the tenant to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises. (H) The lower appellate Court has recorded the finding that the petitioners plaintiffs cannot be said to be landlords in terms of explanation appended to Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act and that, therefore, they were not entitled to institute the suit on the ground that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required for use and occupation by them. ( 3 ) MR. K. C. Shah, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners landlords has strenuously urged before this Court that the Courts below were not justified in holding that petitioners plaintiffs were not landlords within the meaning of the said term as defined by Explanation to Sec. 13 (1) (g ). In his submission, a person who has acquired his interest in the premises subsequent to 1st of January, 1964 or if the interest has devolved on him by inheritance or succession on or after 1st of january, 1964, shall not be regarded as a landlord for the purposes of Clause (g) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the Bombay Rent Act. He submitted that this explanation was introduced by Gujarat Act No. 57 of 1963 with specific intention so as to protect tenants from their eviction by dubious transfer of properties in urban areas. He submitted that even landlords, on whom the interest has devolved by inheritance or succession subsequent to 1st of January, 1964 were also precluded from instituting the suit on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement under Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. However, the explanation nowhere refers to recognition of subsisting or existing interest of co-parcener in a Joint hindu Family property by a subsequent deed of partition whereby properties are divided by metes and bounds and property falls to the share of the person, who reasonably and bona fide requires the premises for his personal occupation, submits Mr. K. C. Shah. Under Hindu Law, if the properties belong to a Joint hindu Family, all co-parceners of undivided Joint Hindu Family have interest in the property. K. C. Shah. Under Hindu Law, if the properties belong to a Joint hindu Family, all co-parceners of undivided Joint Hindu Family have interest in the property. Such interest is unascertained equal interest liable to fluctuate. Nonetheless, all members of undivided Hindu Joint family have interest in the joint family property. Such interest is unascertained and gets specified and ascertained only on properties being partitioned by metes and bounds. Therefore, when partition of the property takes place amongst the members of undivided Joint Hindu Family, it cannot be said that interest in the property is acquired by the person to whose share the property has fallen. Partition is only recognition of the existing or subsisting right of members of Joint Hindu Family, whose share in the undivided property gets clearly earmarked and specified. Such a person, to whose share, a particular property has fallen, is not one who has for the first time acquired interest in the property. His interest was existing or subsisting and to such a situation explanation to Sec. 13 (1) (g) is not attracted. Such a coparcener whose interest is earmarked or specified cannot be said to be a person who has for the first time acquired interest in the property either by inheritance or by succession. ( 4 ) ON the other hand, Ms. Naina Panchal, learned Counsel for the respondent tenant submitted that on findings of facts recorded by Courts below, it is not necessary for this Court to go into this wider question which is raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners. She submitted that the theory of partial partition of property in the year 1971 is not accepted by two Courts below. Two Courts below more particularly the lower appellate Court has recorded a positive finding that the suit property was the self-acquired property of father of the present petitioners muljibhai Prajapati. It is found that the property in question was purchased by a registered sale deed by Muljibhai Prajapati in his own name. It is also found that in the Village Record, the property stood in the name of Muljibhai Prajapati. It is also found that earlier suit was instituted by Muljibhai Prajapati describing himself as the sole and only owner of the property. It is also not shown by any positive evidence as to how the property is acquired by Muljibhai Prajapati. It is also found that in the Village Record, the property stood in the name of Muljibhai Prajapati. It is also found that earlier suit was instituted by Muljibhai Prajapati describing himself as the sole and only owner of the property. It is also not shown by any positive evidence as to how the property is acquired by Muljibhai Prajapati. The Courts have found that the property was acquired by Muljibhai Prajapati from his own income and, therefore, she submitted that when theory of partition of property is not accepted by two Courts, the present suit filed by the petitioners landlords for recovery of possession under Sec. 13 (1) (g) is rightly held to be not maintainable as they have acquired interest for first time after 1-1-1964. ( 5 ) IN order to appreciate the aforesaid rival submissions, in my opinion, it would be necessary to refer to the findings reached by the lower appellate Court. ( 6 ) THE lower appellate Court has found that property in question was purchased by Muljibhai Prajapati by Registered Sale Deed at Exhibit-91 dated 14th December, 1961. It is a Registered Sale deed whereby Muljibhai Prajapati has purchased the property for consideration of Rs. 1,000. 00 from Mohanlal Ambalal. From the sale deed, it becomes clear that it is purchased by Muljibhai Prajapati in his individual capacity. It is also clear that he has purchased the property from his separate income and that it was his self-acquired property. The second fact which is recorded by the lower appellate Court is that father of the present petitioners Muljibhai Prajapati instituted a Regular Civil Suit No. 223 of 1969 to recover possession of the suit premises from the tenant. In such suit, he has not joined his sons as parties. If property was joint family property, all co-parceners would have instituted the suit. In such suit also, Muljibhai Prajapati did not describe the property as his self-acquired property. The partition deed dated 1st of July, 1972 at Exhibit-93 is, therefore, the first document whereby share of the present petitioners is created. By such deed of partition, the suit house has fallen to the present two petitioners and the other house has fallen to the share of another brother Chandrakant and father Muljibhai prajapati. The partition deed dated 1st of July, 1972 at Exhibit-93 is, therefore, the first document whereby share of the present petitioners is created. By such deed of partition, the suit house has fallen to the present two petitioners and the other house has fallen to the share of another brother Chandrakant and father Muljibhai prajapati. It is found by the lower appellate Court that excepting the two houses, no other immovable or moveable properties are partitioned, though it must be stated that partial partition of the property is permissible under Hindu Law and therefore, much importance cannot be given to this fact. However, the lower appellate Court noticed that such partition deed was created solely with a view to making out a case of reasonable and bona fide requirement. The property was in fact the selfacquired property of Muljibhai Prajapati and the same was thrown in the common hotch-potch and thereafter theory of partition was made out. The lower appellate court, therefore, found that plaintiffs landlords have acquired interest in the property after 1st of January, 1964 only by virtue of the partition deed dated 1st of July, 1972 and therefore, they were not landlords within the meaning of term as defined by the Explanation to Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. ( 7 ) IN view of the aforesaid categorical findings of the Courts below, this Court is now required to examine as to whether the aforesaid legal contentions raised by mr. K. C. Shah, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners landlords can be accepted. Legally, there is no manner of doubt that Explanation to Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act does not refer to the acquisition of interest in the premises on partition of the property by metes and bounds when existing or subsisting share/ interest of the co-parceners is simply earmarked or demarcated. The co-parcener or sharer in the property does not for the first time get or acquire the interest in the property. His right over and interest in the property was acquired by birth and was pre-existing right. By partition deed, such right is clearly earmaked vis-a-vis the property. Therefore, in the legal submission made by Mr. The co-parcener or sharer in the property does not for the first time get or acquire the interest in the property. His right over and interest in the property was acquired by birth and was pre-existing right. By partition deed, such right is clearly earmaked vis-a-vis the property. Therefore, in the legal submission made by Mr. K. C. Shah, though he appears to be right, it is not necessary for this Court to decide such wider question on the facts and circumstances of this case because on facts it is found by the Courts below that partition deed dated 1st of July, 1972 at Exhibit-93 is sham and bogus and is created solely with a view to enabling the petitioners plaintiffs to institute suit on the ground of reasonable and bona fide requirement. Two Courts have also found that the property was in fact self-acquired property of Muljibhai Prajapati, father of the present petitioners. He has purchased the property in his own name by registered sale deed. There was no evidence to show that such property was purchased from the income of the Joint Family. There was no evidence to show that the Joint Family had any nucleus from which such property could be purchased. Even in the earlier suit which was filed by Muljibhai prajapati he has nowhere described the suit property to be the property of Joint hindu Family. Earlier suit was not instituted by him as Kartha of the family. In the earlier proceedings, he has described himself to be the sole owner of the property. He failed in the earlier proceeding to evict the tenant. Thereafter, the deed of partition is executed. At the most, therefore, a case of throwing the property in joint family common hotch-potch can be made out, but then it cannot be said that the petitioners have pre-existing or subsisting right in the suit property which was simply earmarked or partitioned by metes and bounds after 1-1-1964. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, in my opinion, the Courts below were justified in holding that petitioners plaintiffs would not be landlords within the meaning of said terms as defined by Explanation (a) to Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, in my opinion, the Courts below were justified in holding that petitioners plaintiffs would not be landlords within the meaning of said terms as defined by Explanation (a) to Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. Once it is found that they were not the landlords within the meaning of the said term, the Courts below were right in holding that the petitioners landlords were not entitled in law to recover possession of suit premises under Sec. 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rent Act. They were, therefore, justified in dismissing the suit of the petitioners plaintiffs. ( 8 ) IN view of the aforesaid, I do not find any substance in this Civil Revision application. The aforesaid was the only submission which was raised before this court by Mr. K. C. Shah. Since the same is not accepted, this Civil Revision application is liable to be dismissed and is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged. There shall be no order as to costs. .