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1994 DIGILAW 274 (PAT)

Mahanth Madhusudan Das Ji v. Bihar State Board Of Religions Trust

1994-08-12

RADHA MOHAN PRASAD

body1994
Judgment Radha Mohan Prasad, J. 1. In the present writ application, the petitioner, who claims to be Mahanth of Chhoti Sangat Mathia Dumraon, has prayed for quashing of the notification issued by the Special Officer of the Bihar hindu Religious Trust Board in Exercise of the power under Sec.32 read with Sec.81 (b) of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) settling scheme for administration of the said Religious trust and appointing a Committee therefor, vide Annexure 3, as also the order 17-9-92 of the Circle Officer, Dumraon as contained in Annexure 2, whereby the petitioner has been asked to hand over the charge of moveable and immovable properties of the Trust to the members of the Committee by 19th September, 1992. failing which the same shall be delivered to the members of the Trust by the use of force. 2. Mr. Vijeshwar Narain Sinha, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised a short question that the impuged notification has been issued in complete violation of the provisions contained in Sec.32 (1) (a)of the Act, inasmuch as it has been contended that before exercising the power provided under Sec.32, no notice was given to the petitioner or to any of its disciples nor any enquiry was made. The learned Counsel also submitted that the impugned order (annexure 2) cannot be sustained in view of the provisions contained in Sec.57 which provides for the manner, in which such notification can be inforced. In support of this submission the learned Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U P. V/s. Maharaja Dharmendar Pd Singh etc. (AIR 1989 s. C 997 ). 3. Mr Sinha in support of his first submission has referred to the statement made in paragraph 6 of the writ application which is as follows : "that the petitioner has further come to learn that before settling the aforementioned scheme nominating the members of the Committee neither any notice was ever given to the petitioner or any of his disciples nor any enquiry was nude, as provided in Sec.32 (1) (a) of the Act and as such the notification contained in Annexure 3 is violative of the provisions contained in Sec.32 (1) (a) of the Act". 4. 4. It has been contended that the said facts have not been denied by the religious Trust Board as no counter affidavit has been filed on their behalf. Thus, according to the learned Counsel, the fact that no notice was given to the petitioner, who is interested in the Trust stands admitted by the Board. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 4 to 10, who are nominated as members of the Committee constituted vide notification (Annexure 3) In the said counter affidavit it is stated that the Chhoti Sangat mathia was created and established by public contribution in the shape of land and cash and the major portion of contribution was made by Maharaja of Dumraon. It is also stated that Baba Mangal Das Ji was a founder mahanth of the said Mathia, in paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit it is stated that when Mahanth Das Ji was managing Chhoti Sangat Mathia be created a Pancbayat to look after the management of its entire properties and since then, the entire management was being looked after and taken care of by the members of the Panchayat. In support of the fact that the said mathia was created by the public for religious and charitable purpose, a registered Deed of settlement dated 16-12-60 has been annexed as Annexed a Tn paragraph 9 it is stated that the said Mathia was registered with the bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) in terms of the aforesaid Deed of settlement and accordingly, the Trust committee took over charge and started managing its properties. In the said counter affidavit a copy of the petition filed by the petitioner before the D. C. L R. Buxar as well as a copy of the writ petition being C. W. J. C. No.803/77 filed by him has been annexed as annexures B and C respectively, it is contended that the petitioner has admitted the aforesaid facts in the said petition and the writ petition filed in this Court. The relevant statements made in Annexures B and C which have been referred by Mr. Nandan Mohan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents are quoted hereunder : "2 That the aforesaid Chhoti Sangat is a corporate body which holds lands in its own capacity.3. The relevant statements made in Annexures B and C which have been referred by Mr. Nandan Mohan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents are quoted hereunder : "2 That the aforesaid Chhoti Sangat is a corporate body which holds lands in its own capacity.3. That the lands belonging to the Chhoti Sangat are managed by the members of the Trust who have been appointed through registered deed of trust long age on 16-12-50 and since then the Board is functioning without any obstruction 7. That the petitioner Madhusudan has got no control over the lands aforesaid and is acting as Manager of the lands on behalf, of the trust. " (annexure B) "6 That subsequently aforesaid Chhoti Sangat Trust was registered by the Bihar Hindu Religious Trust Board in accordance with terms and conditions mentioned in aforesaid deed of settlement. The said Trust regularly filed returns and paid taxes to the religious Trust Board.7. That the said Chhoti Sangat Trust maintained its own separate account and was controlled and managad by a Committee or 5 members. The petitioner or his Guru and other disciples had no manrer of concern with the properties of the said Trust. It will not be out of place to mention that rent receipts were issued in its name and Chaukidari taxes were paid by the aforesaid trust.8. That the lands which belonged to the Chhoti Sa ngat Trust (a body corporate) are in possession of the Trust as mentioned in the Trust deed since the date of its creation. Rent receipts are granted in its name by the State of Bihar after mutation.9. That the petitioner has got no control over the lands mentioned in the aforesaid deed of settlement. " (Annexure C ). 6 The fact stated in paragraph 6 of the writ application in which it has been alleged that the petitioner was not given any notice before the issuance of the impuged notification has been answered by the said respondents in paragraph 31 : "that the statements in paras 5 to 10 are misleading, fabricated and false The actives of the Board in issuing notification and publication thereof in Bihar Gazette (Annexure-3) is strictly in accordance with law and procedure and is therefore, absolutely justified. " 7. Mr. " 7. Mr. Madan Mohan, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that as the petitioner cannot be said to be an interested person, the Board proceeded to taken action in terms of Sec.32 (a) of the Act in accordance with law and procedure adopted by the Board which is quite justified. 8. Mr. Thakur, learned Counsel for the Board has not disputed the fact that the petitioner was not given any notice before the impugned notification was issued. He however, submitted that in terms of Sec.32. the notice is only required to be given to the Trustee of such Trust and to such other persons as may appear to the Board to be interested therein. According to him, as it did not appear to the Board that the petitioner was an interested person, no notice was required to be given to him. 9. Mr. Sinha, on the other hand, submitted that appointment of the committee could only take place after the other requirements of Sec.32 including giving notice to the persons interested are complied with. In support of the contention, be placed reliance on a decision of this Court in the case of Rajasthani Dharmshala V/s. Bihar State Board of Religious Trust (1988 PLJR 333), the relevant passags of which is as follows : "it is not the stand of the Board that any scheme had been settled in accordance with Sec.32 of the Act before which a Committee had been appointed by the Special Officer to manage the dharmshala in question. We fail to understand as to how before complying with the other conditions mentioned in Sec.32 of the Act including framing and then settling a schme for any such religious trust a committee could have been appointed by the special Officer. " 10. Section 32 (1) (a) of the Act reads as follows : "32. Power of Board to settle schemes for proper administration of religious trusts- (1) The Board may, of its own motion or on application made to it in this behalf by two or more persons interested in any trust,- (a) settle a schems for such religious trust after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and giving notice to the trustee of such trust and to such other person as may appear to the Board to be interested therein;. . . . . . . " 11. . . . . . . " 11. There cannot be any dispute that before complying with the conditions mentioned in Sec.32 of the Act, the scheme cannot be settled nor a committee can be appointed. There cannot be any doubt that the trustee of a Trust in respect of which the scheme is being settled is entitled for notice. So far as the expression" as may appear to the Board to be interested, in my opinion, means whoever in the opinion of the Board is interested, only such person is required to be given notice and nobody has any right of a notice merely because he considers himself to be interested in the Trust. 12. In the instant case, the very fact shows that the petitioner also does not dispute that the Trust was registered by the Board in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Deed of settlement and the Trust regularly filed return and paid taxes to the Religious Trust Board. In paragraph 7 of the petition filed before the D. C. L. R. a copy of which has been annexed as annexure b shows that the petitioner himself stated that he has got no control over the lands aforesaid and it merely acting as a Manager of the land on behalf of the Trust. Mr. Sinha, learned Counsel for the petitioner despite repeated querries made has not been able to show that by virtue of his being Manager, he acquired any right under any of the provisions of the Act which would entitle for a notice in terms of Sec.32 (1) (a) of the Act. Further, I find that an enquiry was also conducted by the D C L R. , buxar, who submitted bis report, a photo copy of certified copy of which has been annexed as Annexure d. The D C L. R in his said report has found that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the Trust properties and that he has sold the properties of the Trust without even permission of the Board. 13. Thus, I find, before taking action under Sec.32 (1) (a)an enquiry was also held in terms of the said provisions and the Special Officer after being satisfied, took action in terms of Sec.32 (1) (a ). I therefore, do not find any infirmity in the impugned notification. 14. So far as (he submission of Mr. 13. Thus, I find, before taking action under Sec.32 (1) (a)an enquiry was also held in terms of the said provisions and the Special Officer after being satisfied, took action in terms of Sec.32 (1) (a ). I therefore, do not find any infirmity in the impugned notification. 14. So far as (he submission of Mr. Sinha in regard to the validity of order contained in Annexure 2 is concerned, Mr. Thakur has rightly pointed out that the said provision contained in Sec.57 of the Act does not deal with decision of the Board taken in terms of Sec.32 (1) (a ). Sec.57 only provides that every order of the Board passed under clause (b) of subsection (2) of Sec.28, sub-section (4) of Sec.29 or sub-section (1) of section 33 shall be enforceable by any Civil Court having local jurisdiction in the same manner as a decree of such court. The action taken by the board in the exercise of Sec.32 is not covered by the said provisions of section 57. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U P. V. Maharaja Dharamendra Prasad Singh etc. (A. I. R.1989 S. C.997) relied upon by Mr. Sinba on behalf of the petitioner will have no application to the facts of this case. ID the said ease the Supreme Court was considering whether a lessee after the expiry of its lease was sought to be forcibly dispossessed and the Supreme Court in that context held that the lessee cannot be dispossessed otherwise than any due course of law and, further, that the possession can be assumed by the Government only in the manner known to our recognised by law. In the instant case by Annexure 2, the petitioner has simply been asked to hand over charge of the properties in question to the Committee constituted in terms of Sec.32 (1) (a) of the Act and in case of failure on his part the Circle Officer, Dumraon has stated that the charge of the trust shall be handed over to the members of the Committee by use of force, which cannot be interpreted to me a force which is not permissible in law. 15. Further, as I have found that the petitioner had no statutory right to continue as a Manager, in my opinion, he has no right to continue in the charge of the properties. 15. Further, as I have found that the petitioner had no statutory right to continue as a Manager, in my opinion, he has no right to continue in the charge of the properties. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the petitioner has no right to invoke the discritionary writ jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in the writ application and the same is dismissed, but without costs. Application dismissed.