JAVERBEN v. JAHIDMIYA SAIYADMIYA SAIYAD — 1994 DIGILAW 276 (GUJ)

J. M. PANCHAL, J. ( 1 ) BOTH these appeals are directed against the common judgment and award dated 23/09/1983 delivered by the Motor Accident Claims tribunal, Sabarkantha at Himatnagar, in M. A. C. Petition Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of 1981. As common questions of law and facts are involved in the appeals, they are being disposed of by this common judgment with the consent of learned Advocates appearing for the parties. ( 2 ) THE vehicular accident occurred at about 3-30 p. m. on 21/07/1980 in the outskirts of city of Himatnagar on Himatnagar-Idar Road which claimed lives of two persons, namely, Dahyalal Gulabchand Prajapati and Nikhilkumar Ratilal Joshi. Both the deceased were close friends. Deceased Nikhilkumar had come to Radhiwad during the week end prior to the date of accident and was supposed to return to Mehsana where he was working as Sales Representative with Indian Potash Ltd. Deceased dahyalal who was serving in Dena Bank, Khedbrahma, took casual leave on 21/07/1980 with a view to accompanying deceased Nikhilkumar to mehsana for an outing. Deceased Dahyalal and deceased Nikhilkumar went from Radhiwad to Mehsana on 20/07/1980 on Rajdoot Motor-cycle No. GRF-4910. On 21/07/1980 they went from Mehsana to Vijapur on the said motor-cycle and again proceeded towards Mehsana for going to Himatuagar. At about 3-30 p. m, they reached the place of accident which is in the vicinity of Himatnagar town from where they had agreed to part. As they were supposed to part, they had stopped at the extreme eastern edge of State Highway at that place where accident took place. At that time, the motor-cycle was facing himatnagar town. Deceased Dahyalal was sitting on the drivers seat whereas deceased Nikhilkumar was sitting on the pillion seat. While they were chitchatting before parting, a Jeep-Car bearing No. GIG- 5042 came rushing at a great speed from Himatnagar town and violently dashed with the motorcycle. As a result of the accident, deceased Dahyalal died almost instantaneously at the place of accident whereas Nikhilkumar succumbed to his injuries within half an hour of his admission in the Civil Hospital, Himatnagar. Deceased dahyalal was working in Dena Bank as a confirmed Subordinate, whereas deceased Nikhilkumar was working as sales representatives in Indian Potash limited. As a result of the accident, deceased Dahyalal died almost instantaneously at the place of accident whereas Nikhilkumar succumbed to his injuries within half an hour of his admission in the Civil Hospital, Himatnagar. Deceased dahyalal was working in Dena Bank as a confirmed Subordinate, whereas deceased Nikhilkumar was working as sales representatives in Indian Potash limited. Under the circumstances, heirs of the deceased Dahyalal initiated Motor accident Claim Petition No. 2 of 1981 against (1) Jahidmiya Saiyadmiya Saiyad - driver of the Jeep, (2) Narendrasinh Radhakishan Tanwar - owner of the jeep, and (3) United India Insurance Company Ltd. with which the jeep was insured and claimed compensation of Rs. 1,60,000. 00; whereas parents of deceased nikhilkumar initiated M A. C. Petition No. 3 of 1981 and claimed compensation of Rs. 1,20,000. 00. ( 3 ) THE respondent No. 2 herein, i. e. , Narendrasinh Radhakishan Tanwar contested the claim petition by filing written statement contending inter alia, that he had sold the jeep to one Fazalmohmad Daudbhai Memon resident of Idar town on 1-5-1980 and, therefore, he was not liable to pay compensation to the claimants. The respondent No. 3, i. e. , The United India insurance Co. also contended inter alia in its written statement that the respondent No. 2, i. e,, Narendrasinh was not the owner of the Jeep No. GJG-5042 on the date of accident and, therefore, it was not liable to pay any compensation to the claimants. In view of the averments made in the written statement of the respondent No. 2, claimants in both the claim petitions submitted applications and sought permission of the Tribunal to implead Fazalmohmad Daudbhai Memon as a party to their respective claim petition. The said applications were allowed and Fazalmohmad Daudbhai memon was also impleaded as one of the parties to the claim petitions. On being impleaded as party to the claim petition, the respondent No. 4 submitted written statement at Exh. 46 and asserted that the real owner of the vehicle in question, on the date of accident was respondent No. 2 and claim petitions were liable to be dismissed against him. ( 4 ) THE Tribunal framed issues for determination at Exh. 47. 46 and asserted that the real owner of the vehicle in question, on the date of accident was respondent No. 2 and claim petitions were liable to be dismissed against him. ( 4 ) THE Tribunal framed issues for determination at Exh. 47. After appreciating the evidence led by the parties and hearing them, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the deceased Nikhilkumar to whom the motor-cycle belonged was guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of 25%, whereas respondent No. 1, i. e. , Jahidmiya Saiyadmiya Saiyad who was driving the Jeep-car, was negligent to the extent of 75% in causing the accident. The Tribunal also came to the conclusion that the respondent no. 2 Narendrasinh Radbakishan Tanwar had transferred the Jeep-car to the respondent No. 4, i. e; F. D. Memon on 1-5-1980 and, therefore, narendrasinh R. Tanwar and United India Insurance Company Ltd. were not liable to satisfy the claim made by the claimants. ( 5 ) ON consideration of evidence regarding income, the Tribunal assessed dependency benefit at Rs. 400. 00 in case of deceased Dahyalal and after applying multiplier of 18 years, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 86,000. 00 by way of future economic loss to the claimants. The Tribunal also awarded Rs. 5,000. 00 to the claimants under the head of shock and loss of expectation of life and Rs. 1,000. 00 as funeral expenses. In all, the Tribunal passed an award of Rs. 92,000. 00 in favour of the claimants and directed the respondents No. 1 and 4 to pay the said amount with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of application till realisation, to the claimants. ( 6 ) IN M. A. C. Petition No. 3 of 1981 instituted by the parents of deceased Nikhilkumar, the Tribunal assessed monthly income of the deceased at Rs. 750. 00 and after deducting Rs. 150. 00 which would have been spent by the deceased for himself, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that Rs. 600. 00 were available which would have been contributed by the deceased to his family. The deceased Nikhilkumar was unmarried and, therefore, dependency benefit for parents was assessed by the Tribunal at Rs. 200. 00 being 1/3rd of Rs. 600. 00. After applying the multiplier of 18 years, the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 40,200. 00by way of future economic loss to the parents and Rs. 5,000. The deceased Nikhilkumar was unmarried and, therefore, dependency benefit for parents was assessed by the Tribunal at Rs. 200. 00 being 1/3rd of Rs. 600. 00. After applying the multiplier of 18 years, the Tribunal has awarded Rs. 40,200. 00by way of future economic loss to the parents and Rs. 5,000. 00 towards shock and loss of expectation of life. The Tribunal has also awarded Rs. 800. 00 being funeral expenses. The Tribunal has held that in all the parents were entitled to get Rs. 49,000. 00 by way of compensation. As the Tribunal had come to the conclusion that deceased Nikhilkumar was guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of 25% the Tribunal ultimately awarded Rs. 36,750. 00 by way of compensation to the claimants in M. A. C. Petition No. 3 of 1981. Civil Appeal No. 1086 of 1984 is filed by the claimants and is directed against the judgment and award rendered in M. A. C. Petition no. 2 of 1981; whereas Civil Appeal No. 1158 of 1984 is also filed by the original claimants and is directed against the judgment and award rendered in M. A. C. Petition No. 3 of 1981. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants-original claimants contended that the Jeep-car was not transferred to the opponent No. 4 on 1-5-1980, but was transferred to opponent No. 4/07/1980 and, therefore, respondent No. 2 Narendrasinh Radbakishap Tanwar and respondent No. 3 United India Insurance Company should be saddled with the liability. It was contended that it was intended by the seller and purchaser that the property in the goods, viz. . Jeep-car would pass to the respondent no. 4 only on payment of full consideration and the Jeep-car being registered by the registering authority in the name of the respondent No. 4 and as the property in goods had not passed to respondent No. 4 before 23/07/1980, the respondent No. 2 as well as the Insurance Company were liable to satisfy the award of the Tribunal passed in favour of the claimants. ( 8 ) MR. J. D. Ajmera, learned Counsel for the United India Insurance co. Ltd. submitted that transfer of Jeep had taken place on 1/05/1980 and even in R. T. 0. record also the respondent No. 4 was shown to be the registered owner with effect from 21/06/1980 and, therefore, Insurance company has been rightly absolved from the liability. ( 8 ) MR. J. D. Ajmera, learned Counsel for the United India Insurance co. Ltd. submitted that transfer of Jeep had taken place on 1/05/1980 and even in R. T. 0. record also the respondent No. 4 was shown to be the registered owner with effect from 21/06/1980 and, therefore, Insurance company has been rightly absolved from the liability. It was contended that the property in goods, viz. . Jeep-car passed to the respondent No. 4 on 1- 5-1980 and not 23/07/1980 as contended on behalf of the claimants and, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in not passing any award against the respondent No. 2 and the Insurance Company and the Appeal deserves to be dismissed. ( 9 ) THE question, therefore, which arises for consideration is whether the respondent No. 2 had transferred the vehicle to the respondent No. 4 before the date of accident or after the date of accident ? ( 10 ) FOR the purpose of proving the factum of transfer of the vehicle before the date of accident by the respondent No. 2 to the respondent No. 4, two witnesses have been examined on behalf of the respondent No; 2, i. e. , (1) Kailashbhai Radhakishan Exh. 95 who is brother of the respondent no. 2 and (2) Mrugesh Shantilal at Exh, 96. Witness Kailashbhai has stated in his evidence that his younger brother narendrasinh had sold jeep to Fajalmohmad on 1-5-1980 for consideration of Rs. 31,500. 00 and a writing was executed in his presence which was signed by Fajalmohmad and his brother Narendrasinh. He has further stated that on the day of execution of the writing, Fajalmohmad had paid Rs. 11,000/ - to his brother Narendrasinh and on 1-5-1980 delivery of the jeep-car was handed over to Fajalmohmad. He has also stated that the remaining amount of Rs. 20,500. 00 was paid by Fajalmohmad to his brother Narendrasinh on 18-6-1980. In cross-examination on behalf of Fajalmohmad, he has stated that the jeep-car was transferred in the name of Fajalmohmad on 21-6-1980. He has denied the suggestion that the jeep-car was not transferred in the name of Fajalmohmad. In cross-examination on behalf of the claimants, witness kailashbhai has denied the suggestion that he had signed T. T. 0. forms on behalf of his brother. He has also denied that Fajalmohmad had paid rs. 7. 000/-fo him on 23-7-1980. Witness Mrugesh Shantilal Exh. He has denied the suggestion that the jeep-car was not transferred in the name of Fajalmohmad. In cross-examination on behalf of the claimants, witness kailashbhai has denied the suggestion that he had signed T. T. 0. forms on behalf of his brother. He has also denied that Fajalmohmad had paid rs. 7. 000/-fo him on 23-7-1980. Witness Mrugesh Shantilal Exh. 96 has stated in his examinationin- chief that writing dated 1-5-1980 was attested by him near one Shop which was closed and which was adjacent to the Tower situated in the city. He has further stated that the writing dated 1-5-1980 was also attented by one Rahimbhai and after execution of said writing, Fajalmohmad had paid Rs. 11,000. 00 to Narendrasinh. In cross-examination on behalf of original claimants, he has asserted that at the time of execution of writing dated 1-5-1980, he himself, Rahimbhai, Narendrasinh and Fajalmohmad were present. Evidence of this witness clearly rules out presence of witness Kailashbhai at the time of execution of writing dated 1-5-1980. Ismailbhai Sajfajauddin who was serving as a clerk in Regional Transport office, Ahmedabad is examined at Exh. 134. In his examination -inchief, he has stated that a sum of Rs. 20. 00 was received by the Office being transfer fees in respect of vehicle bearing No. GJG-5042 and the said amount was credited on 23-7-1980. He has produced credit certificate issued by his superior officer Mr. Vaishnav at Exh. 135. The certificate at exh. 135 clearly indicates that the transfer fee for motor vehicle No. GJG- 5042 was credited vide receipt No. 87 of Book No. 888251 on 23-7-1980. He has further stated that entry in respect of the transfer of the vehicle in the name of Memon Fajalmohmad was recorded in the register on 23-7- 1980. In cross-examination on behalf of the respondent No. 2, i. e. , narendrasinh, he has stated that in certificate Exh. 138 it is stated that the jeep-car was transferred in the name of Fajalmohmad on 21-6-1980 because the date of sale mentioned in T. T. O. form was 21-6-1980. The respondent No. 4, i e. , Fajalmohmad Daudbhai has examined himself on oath at Exh. 143. In examination-in-chief he has stated that he had a dealing in respect of the jeep-car bearing No. GJG-5042, with Narendrasinh in the summer of the year 1980 and had purchased the jeep-car for Rs. 32,000. 00. The respondent No. 4, i e. , Fajalmohmad Daudbhai has examined himself on oath at Exh. 143. In examination-in-chief he has stated that he had a dealing in respect of the jeep-car bearing No. GJG-5042, with Narendrasinh in the summer of the year 1980 and had purchased the jeep-car for Rs. 32,000. 00. He has further stated that he had paid Rs. 12,000/~ in cash to narendrasinh and rest of the amount, i. e. , Rs. 20,000. 00were paid in instalments. He has asserted in his evidence that the last instalment of Rs. 7,000. 00 was paid by him on 23-7-1980. The most important thing stated by him in his evidence is that the ownership was required to be transferred when full consideration was paid by him to Narendrasinh. He has also stated that on coming to know about the accident, he had gone to Himatnagar police Station in company of brother and father of Narendrasinh and he was informed by the P. S. I. of the said Police Station that one who was the owner of the vehicle was entitled to have its custody from police. He has specifically stated that father of the respondent No. 2 told him that the amount paid would be forfeited if balance of the consideration was not paid by him and delivery of the jeep-car would be taken from the police authorities. He has asserted that under these circumstances he paid a sum of Rs. 7,000. 00to the father of the respondent No. 2 and after receipt of rs. 7,000/-father of the respondent No. 2 had obtained his signature in T. T. O. form. He has also stated that one Jagdishbhai C. Parmar of his town who was associated with the father of the respondent No. 2 had handed over to him registration book on 24-7-1980. In cross-examination he has denied the suggestion that he had engaged Jahidmiya, i. e. , the respondent No. 1 as his driver 8 days prior to the date of accident. He has also stated that he was not able to give specific dates on which he had paid instalments to narendrasinh. In further cross, he has denied his signature on writing dated 1-5-1980 Exh. 97 which is tendered in evidence by witness Mrugeshbhai. He has asserted that he had agreed to purchase the jeep-car for Rs. 32,000. 00 (Rupees thirty-two thousand) and not for Rs. 31,000. In further cross, he has denied his signature on writing dated 1-5-1980 Exh. 97 which is tendered in evidence by witness Mrugeshbhai. He has asserted that he had agreed to purchase the jeep-car for Rs. 32,000. 00 (Rupees thirty-two thousand) and not for Rs. 31,000. 00 (Rupees thirty-one thousand ). The vital thing to be noted in his evidence is that his assertion, namely, that he had paid last instalment of Rs. 7,000. 00 (Rupees seven thousand) to father of the respondent No. 2 on 23-7-1980 remains almost unchallenged. The circumstances, under which he had to make payment of Rs. 7,000. 00 (Rupees seven thousand) are also not challenged. His assertion that the ownership of the jeep-car was to be transferred on payment of full consideration by him to Narendrasinh is accepted by the respondent No. 2 and it is not challenged by the respondent No. 2 at all. ( 11 ) BEFORE deciding the point in issue, it would be relevant to refer to certain provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. Section 4 of the said Act reads as under :"4. Sale and agreement to sell:- (1) A contract of sale of goods is a contract whereby the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a price. There may be a contract of sale between one part-owner and another. (2) A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional. (3) Where under a contract of sale the property in the goods is transferred from the seller to the buyer, the contract is called a sale, but where the transfer of the property in the goods is to take place at a future time or subject to some condition thereafter to be fulfilled, the contract is called an agreement to sell. (4) An agreement to sell becomes a sale when the time elapses or the conditions are fulfilled subject to which the property in the goods is to be transferred. "whereas Sec. 19 of the said Act reads as under :"19. Property passes when intended to pass: (1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. "whereas Sec. 19 of the said Act reads as under :"19. Property passes when intended to pass: (1) Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. (2) For the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case. (3) Unless a different intention appears, the rules contained in Secs. 20 to 24 are rules for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer," ( 12 ) ONE of the essentials to constitute sale is that there must be an agreement between the parties for purpose of transferring title to the goods. It must be supported by money consideration and that as a result of transaction property must actually pass in goods. If under agreement title to the goods has not passed then there is agreement to sell and not complete sale. Though Sec. 4 groups both sales and agreements to sell under single generic name of contract of sale it treats them as separate categories, vital point of distinction between them being that whereas in sale there is transfer of property in goods from seller to buyer, there is none in agreement to sell. Intention of parties is the decisive factor as to when property in goods passes. The governing principle, which should determine as to the passing of the property in the goods, must be to find out what is the intention of the parties. As provided in sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 19 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, regard should be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the parties. It is open to the parties to agree that the property shall pass immediately or that it shall pass at some time after the delivery is effected. It must be borne in mind that rules of construction embodied in Secs. It is open to the parties to agree that the property shall pass immediately or that it shall pass at some time after the delivery is effected. It must be borne in mind that rules of construction embodied in Secs. 19 to 22 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 are but prima facie rules of construction and in each case the intention of the parties must be ascertained and when ascertained, acted upon. A motor vehicle being moveable property, its sale is governed by the Sale of Goods act and there is no provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 to postpone the transfer of property in the vehicle from seller to the buyer till the vehicle is registered in the name of transferee. The reason is that the sale of motor vehicles is not under the Motor Vehicles Act but it is under the Sale of Goods act and failure to get the transfer of vehicle registered does not interdict the passing of the property in the vehicle to the transferee. However, that does not mean that the parties are prohibited from intending to pass the property in the vehicle to the transferee till the vehicle is registered in the name of the transferee and/or till payment of full consideration by buyer to seller. If the parties have intended that the property in the vehicle will pass to the transferee only on payment of full consideration by the buyer to the seller and/or registration of the vehicle in the name of transferee then the intention of the parties has got to be acted upon irrespective of provisions of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939 and failure to pay full consideration to the seller or to get the transfer of vehicle registered in the name of the transferee would interdict the passing of the property in the vehicle to the transferee. As would be indicated in the following paragraphs, from the facts of the present case, it is apparent that a different intention appears as to the time at which the property in jeepcar was to pass to buyer from the terms of contract, conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances and, therefore, it is not necessary for us to refer to rules of construction contained in Secs. 20 to 24 of the Sale of Goods act, 1930 for ascertaining intention of the parties. 20 to 24 of the Sale of Goods act, 1930 for ascertaining intention of the parties. ( 13 ) IN the facts of the present case, in order to ascertain as to whether the property in the vehicle was transferred to the respondent No. 4 after the accident or not, what is relevant is to ascertain the intention of the parties from the terms of the contract Exh. 97, their conduct and circumstances of the case. It may be noted that the respondent No. 2, i. e. , Narendrasinh has not stepped into witness box at all and therefore, the Court would be justified in drawing adverse inference against him in view of the provision of Sec. 114 (e) of the Evidence Act. Attesting witness Mrugeshbhai has clearly ruled out the presence of Kailashbhai who is brother of the respondent No. 2 at the time of execution of writing dated 1-5-1980. Even otherwise also neither the evidence of Kailashbhai nor the evidence of attesting witness mrugeshbhai throws any light on the question as to when the property in goods was intended to be passed to the respondent No. 4. In Exh. 97, which is executed on 1/05/1980 it is provided that on receipt of full amount of consideration, the jeep-car was to be registered in the name of the respondent no. 4 in R. T. 0. record. Thus, it becomes evident that sale was intended to be complete only on the full payment of consideration by the buyer to the seller and registration of the jeep-car in the name of the buyer thereafter. So far as payment of consideration of the jeep is concerned, the said document recites that Rs. 11,000. 00 were paid by the respondent No. 4 to respondent no. 2 on that very date, i. e,, on 1/05/1980. The respondent No. 4, i. e. , Fajalmohmad has stated that the ownership of the jeep-car was to be transferred on payment of full consideration by him to Narendrasinh. As noted earlier, this assertion of the respondent No. 4 has totally remained unchallenged. Thus, from the terms of contract Exh. 2 on that very date, i. e,, on 1/05/1980. The respondent No. 4, i. e. , Fajalmohmad has stated that the ownership of the jeep-car was to be transferred on payment of full consideration by him to Narendrasinh. As noted earlier, this assertion of the respondent No. 4 has totally remained unchallenged. Thus, from the terms of contract Exh. 97 and the evidence of the parties, it becomes evident that the property in goods was intended to be passed to the respondent No. 4 only on full payment of consideration by him to narendrasinh and subsequent transfer of the vehicle in the name of the respondent No. 4 in official records. Having ascertained and culled out the intention of the parties, it would be relevant to find out as to when the full consideration was paid by the respondent No. 4 to the respondent No. 2 and when actually the vehicle was transferred in name of the respondent No. 4 in the records of Regional Transport office, Ahmedabad. As noted earlier, the respondent No. 2 has not entered into witness box to tender evidence and he has remained content with by filing written statement only. His brother Kailashbhai Exh. 95 has stated that the remaining consideration of Rs. 20. 500. 00 was paid by the respondent No. 4 to his brother Narendrasinh on 20-6-1980. Except his bare words, there is nothing on the record of the case to indicate that respondent No. 4 had paid Rs. 20,500. 00 to Narendrasinh on 20-6-1980. His evidence indicates that he was running a shop of repairing automobile tyres whereas his brother Narendrasinh was plying the jeep-car on hire. Naturally Narendrasinh must be maintaining books of accounts in the course of his business. Witness Kailashbhai has not produced any books of accounts maintained by Narendrasinh or copy of receipt that might have been obtained by the respondent No. 4 to substantiate his say that Rs. 20,500. 00 were paid by the respondent No. 4 to the respondent No. 2 on 20-6-1980. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that his say that the respondent No. 4 had paid an amount of Rs. 20,500. 00 to the respondent No. 2 on 20- 6-1980 is highly doubtful and not believable. As against this, the respondent No. 4 has categorically stated that he had paid last instalment of Rs. 7,000. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that his say that the respondent No. 4 had paid an amount of Rs. 20,500. 00 to the respondent No. 2 on 20- 6-1980 is highly doubtful and not believable. As against this, the respondent No. 4 has categorically stated that he had paid last instalment of Rs. 7,000. 00 on 23-7-1980 to the father of the respondent No. 2. This assertion of the respondent No. 4 has almost remained unchallenged. The circumstances narrated by him under which he was compelled to make payment of Rs. 7,000. 00 to the father of the respondent no. 2, namely, threat to him by the father of the respondent No. 2 to forfeit amount paid and to take delivery of jeep-car from the police authorities are not seriously disputed in his cross-examination. The say of the respondent no. 4 gets full corroboration from the evidence of Ismailbhai Sajfajauddin who was serving as a clerk in the Regional Transport Office, Ahmedabad. Witness Ismailbhai has stated in terms that a sum of Rs. 20. 00 being the transfer fees in respect of vehicle bearing No. GJG-5042 was received by office on 23-7-1980 and necessary entry in respect of the transfer of the vehicle in the name of Fajalmohmad was recorded in the relevant register on 23-7-1980. It may be noted that the transfer of the vehicle in the name of the respondent No. 4 was to be effected only on payment of full consideration by the respondent No. 4 to the respondent No. 2. Thus, the evidence of witness Ismailbhai lends support to the evidence of the respondent no. 4 that he had paid last instalment of Rs. 7,000. 00 on 23-7-1980, i. e. , after the date of accident. Though certificate Exh, 138 produced by Ismailbhai indicates that the vehicle was transferred in the name of the respondent No. 4 on 21-6-1980, it is clarified by him that the said certificate was issued on the basis of statements made in T. T. O. forms. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the vehicle in question could not have been transferred in the name of the respondent No. 4 with retrospective effect more particularly when the necessary fee was received and credited on 23-7-1980 and therefore, the certificate at Exh. 138 has got to be ignored. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the vehicle in question could not have been transferred in the name of the respondent No. 4 with retrospective effect more particularly when the necessary fee was received and credited on 23-7-1980 and therefore, the certificate at Exh. 138 has got to be ignored. The fact that Rs. 7,000. 00 were paid by the respondent No. 4 to the respondent No. 2/07/1980 and the fact that after receipt of necessary fees, the vehicle was transferred in the name of the respondent No. 4 in the records of the Regional Transport Office, Ahmedabad on 23-7-1980 indicate that the transfer had become complete only on 23/07/1980 and not prior thereto. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the tribunal was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the respondent no. 2 was not the owner of the jeep on the date of the accident, i. e. , on 21/07/1980 and that the United India Insurance Co. Ltd. was not liable to satisfy the award made in favour of the claimants. We hold that on the date of accident, i. e. , on 21/07/1980 the respondent No. 2 was the owner of the jeep-car and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , was liable to satisfy the award passed in favour of the claimants as insurer. ( 14 ) SO far as quantum of compensation is concerned, no grievance is made regarding the same in Civil Appeal No. 1086 of 1984 which arises out of the judgment and award rendered in M. A. C. Petition no. 2 of 1981 and, therefore, it is not necessary for us to deal with the question of quantum in the said Appeal. In F. A. No. 1158 of 1984 finding that deceased Nikhilkumar was guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of 25% is not challenged. ( 15 ) AS far as quantum of compensation awarded to the claimants in M. A. C. Petition No. 3 of 1981 out of which Civil Appeal No. 1158 of 1984 arises, is concerned, it is to be noted that deceased Nikhilkumar was working as sales representative in Indian Potash Ltd. As a probationer he was getting rs. 629/- per month. Information provided by Indian Potash Limited regarding minimum and maximum of the scale of late Mr. 629/- per month. Information provided by Indian Potash Limited regarding minimum and maximum of the scale of late Mr. Nikhil R. Joshi indicates that after his confirmation on the post concerned he would have been placed in the pay-scale of Rs. 450-1065 and he would have been entitled to receive salary of Rs. 1345. 00. It may be noted that the deceased was aged 20 years and was B. Sc. Agriculture. He had bright future prospects. Thus, taking into consideration the bright future prospects of earning of more income by deceased, we are of the opinion that his income would have atleast risen to Rs. 2,000/ - per month and, therefore, monthly income of deceased should have been assessed at Rs. 2000. 00 per month. After deducting Rs. 500. 00 which would have been spent by the deceased for himself, Rs. 1,500. 00 would be available to the family members. The claimants are parents and, therefore, they would be entitled to claim 1/3rd of Rs. 1500. 00 by way of dependency benefit. The dependency benefit would come to Rs. 500. 00 per month in their case, i. e. , rs. 6,000/- per annum. It is true that the Tribunal was not justified in applying multiplier of 18 years in case of parents who were in their fifties at the time of the accident. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that multiplier of 10 years should have been adopted in case of claimants of M. A. C. Petition No. 3 of 1981. Applying the multiplier of 10 years, dependency benefit available to the claimants would come to Rs. 60,000. 00. The claimants would also be entitled to conventional amount of Rs. 20,000. 00 as and by way of loss of expectation of life and Rs. 1,000. 00 towards funeral expenses. In all, the claimants would be entitled to get Rs. 81,000/ however, as held by the Tribunal, deceased Nikhilkumar was guilty of contributory negligence to the extent of 25%. Therefore, deducting the amount of 25% from Rs. 81,000. 00, the claimants would be entitled to compensation of Rs. 59,950. 00. As the claimants have restricted their claim to Rs. 50,000/ -, we are of the opinion that the claimants would be entitled to get Rs. 50,000/ - by way of compensation for death of deceased Nikhilkumar instead of Rs. 36,750. 81,000. 00, the claimants would be entitled to compensation of Rs. 59,950. 00. As the claimants have restricted their claim to Rs. 50,000/ -, we are of the opinion that the claimants would be entitled to get Rs. 50,000/ - by way of compensation for death of deceased Nikhilkumar instead of Rs. 36,750. 00 awarded by the Tribunal. ( 16 ) AS far as interest is concerned in both the claim petitions, the tribunal has directed the respondents No. 1 and 4 to pay the amount of compensation awarded in respective claim petitions with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of application till realisation. The legislature has made a special provision for payment of interest in accident claims by enacting Sec. 110-CC (New Sec. 173 in the Motor vehicles Act, 1988) which provides for interest to be paid for the period between the making of the claim and the date of payment of compensation. It has a dual purpose, namely, (i) to compensate the claimant for delayed payment of compensation and (ii) to coerce the person/ persons who have to pay compensation so that they may not delay the payment. This is, therefore, a salutory provision. It is well settled that payment of interest on the amount of compensation does not result in double benefit to the claimant for the claimant can deposit the amount of compensation and earn interest on it only after it has been paid to him. Because of rise in bank rate of interest and inflation, interest at the rate of 6% should not have been paid to the claimants in both the claim petitions. In (Smt.) Chameli Watti and Am. v. Delhi Municipal corporation, AIR 1986 SC 1191 , the Supreme Court awarded interest at the rate of 12% from the date of petition. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the defences taken up by the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3, we are of the opinion that payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the compensation awarded to the claimants in both the claim partitions would be just, fair and proper. ( 17 ) IN the result, both the appeals are partly allowed. The awards passed by the Tribunal in both the claim petitions are hereby modified. ( 17 ) IN the result, both the appeals are partly allowed. The awards passed by the Tribunal in both the claim petitions are hereby modified. It is directed that the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1086 of 1984 who are original claimants in M. A. C. Petition No. 2 of 1981 would be entitled to recover a sum of rs. 92. 000/- from the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with proportionate costs and interest at the rate of 12% from the date of application. The respondents nos. 1, 2 and 3 are jointly and severally held liable to pay the aforesaid amount of compensation to the appellants. The claim petition against the respondent no 4 is ordered to be dismissed. The respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are directed to pay the amount awarded to the appellants latest by 30/11/1994, failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the amount awarded till realisation. Similarly, it is directed that the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 1086 of 1984, who are original claimants in M. A. C. Petition No. 3 of 1981 would be entitled to recover a sum of rs. 50,000/- from the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with proportionate costs and interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of application till realisation. The respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are jointly and severally held liable to pay the aforesaid amount of compensation. The claim petition against the respondent No. 4 is ordered to be dismissed. The respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are directed to pay the amount awarded to the appellants latest by 30/11/1994 failing which the respondents shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the amount awarded till realisation. There shall be no order as to costs. .