BHARUKA, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANT is aggrieved by the order dated 9/06/1994 passed in writ Petition No. 1737 of 1994, by which the learned single Judge has refused to entertain the writ petition on the ground that the appellant can have his say before the departmental authorities when the coercive action has been initiated against him in relation to the collection of the entertainment tax. ( 2 ) THE facts as set out by the appellant may be stated as follows : appellant is the owner of a cinema theatre at Kerur, Taluka Badami, Bijapur District. He has opted for composition of his entertainment tax liability under and in accordance with S. 4a of the Karnataka Entertainment Tax Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to for short as 'the Act' ). Accordingly he was granted a permit in Form No. IV-B by the Entertainment Tax Officer, 1st Circle, Bagalkot effective from 1-4-1991 after determining his liability by treating the population of Kerur as less than 15,000. Since as per the last census published on 1-2-1992 the population of Kerur was found to be 15198, a revised permit dated 3-1-1994 had been issued to the appellant, whereunder his liability has been enhanced from 15% xxxxx of his gross collection capacity to 20% xxxxx thereof with effect from 1/02/1992 in keeping with the rates of taxes prescribed in the table appended to S. 4a of the Act. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel appearing for the appellant has assailed the impugned revised permit on two grounds, namely - (i) it could not have been made effective retrospectively i. e. from 1-2-1992 since it deprives, the appellant from collecting the enhanced tax from the cinema goers; and (ii) the impugned determination has been made without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant, and as such it is ab initio void being violative of the principles of natural justice as also the statutory requirements. ( 4 ) ON the other hand, learned State Counsel has submitted that under S. 4a of the Act the Legislature itself has fixed the tax liability and no discretion has been left to the authorities to make any alteration therein. According to him, under the Table to S. 4a of the Act liability has to be necessarily computed at the rate of tax applicable to the population of the given locality wherein the cinema theatre is situated. According to him, under the Table to S. 4a of the Act liability has to be necessarily computed at the rate of tax applicable to the population of the given locality wherein the cinema theatre is situated. 'population' has been defined under S. 2 (ia) of the Act to mean it as the one ascertained at the last preceding census of which the relevant figures are published. Therefore, the submission is that every proprietor of a cinema theatre is presumed to know his liability which is based on the figures of the last preceding census, as published. According to him, since the figures of 1991-Census had been published on 1-2-1992, by operation of the statutory provisions, liability of the appellant was automatically fixed, and, by the impugned permit the same has only been communicated; and that being the position, appellant cannot complain on the ground of any prejudice. His further submission is that since the said determination of tax liability is inescapable, reinitiation of proceedings on the ground of non-affording of an opportunity of being heard to the appellant, will be merely an empty formality. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the rival contentions, we are of the opinion that irrespective of the merit of the submissions made on behalf of either party, the impugned revised; permit along with the communication dated 3-1-1994 (Annexure-B) has to be quashed for noncompliance of the statutory provisions contained under the Act. It cannot be disputed, that as a result of the issuance of revised' permit, there has been enhancement in the liability of the proprietor under the Act. Further, the revised permit can be justified either as a process of rectification of a mistake within the meaning of S. 6c of the Act or as a re-assessment on account of escapement of tax under S. 6b of the Act. In either event, it is the statutory requirement that either of the said two steps can be taken, but only after service of notice on the proprietor. Admittedly, in the present case, it has not been done so. Since issuance of notice is a condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction both under Ss. 6b and 6c, impugned communication and the revised permit have to be quashed being without jurisdiction. Admittedly, in the present case, it has not been done so. Since issuance of notice is a condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction both under Ss. 6b and 6c, impugned communication and the revised permit have to be quashed being without jurisdiction. Anyhow it will be open for the authorities to initiate such proceedings as may be found permissible in law against the appellant for determining his tax liability under the provisions of the Act. ( 6 ) WITH these above observations, appeal is allowed. The order under appeal is set aside. Writ Petition No. 1737 of 1994 is allowed. Impugned notice dated 3-1-1994 (Annexure-B to the writ petition) and the revised permit dated 3-1-1994 (Annexure-C to the writ petition) are quashed. However, we clarify that we have not entered into the merits of the rival claims either on facts or in law, and, it will be open to the authorities under the Act to determine the same keeping in view the objections of the appellant-proprietor. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .