ORDER M.F. Saldanha, J.—Heard counsel on both sides. These two petitions have been pending from the year 1988. The two petitioners who claim to have been employees of the respondent- Board allege that on March 30 1988, they had addressed a notice through their advocate pointing out that injustice was done to them insofar as even though they had been employed from about the year 1985-86 that they had been on daily wages, they were not being paid salary on holidays and that they had no security of tenure. It is their case that the notice was only a demand for justice which they had every right to address. They have produced the acknowledgment that the legal notice reached the Respondent-Board on April 2, 1988. According to them, the Board hit back by immediately refusing to allow them to work. They were not given any order of termination but they were not assigned any work from that date onwards. On June 6, 1988 the petitioners addressed one more notice through their lawyers calling upon the Board to assign work to the petitioners. I do not find on record any reply to these two notices. Thereafter on June 24, 1988 the present petitions were filed. 2. The respondent-Board has contended that the petitioners were temporary employees. That it was an ad-hoc appointment. That they had been appointed only for a limited period of time in order to complete some assignment and that consequently they had no right to demand either regularisation or any of the benefits that accrued to permanent employees. The Board submitted in connection with various assignments that it is required to undertake that it is quite normal and natural for them to require for a short period of time some additional hands whom they employ purely on an ad-hoc basis. It is further submitted that in such situations the employees concerned cannot claim the rights and benefits of duly recruited permanent employees. It is further submitted that the petitioners were discontinued on March 30, 1988 which is before the receipt of their notice and that it is false to allege that they were discontinued only because they had addressed the notice in question. 3. On behalf of the petitioners, their learned counsel has submitted that this is a case wherein the action of discontinuance of the petitioners is malafide. 3. On behalf of the petitioners, their learned counsel has submitted that this is a case wherein the action of discontinuance of the petitioners is malafide. He has stated that the respondent-Board which is a public authority was on the wrong side of the law in treating the two petitioners and other similarly situated persons as daily rated employees and that there is no justification in this. He states that the petitioners had only requested that their rights be safeguarded and respected through the legal notice and that the act of discontinuing them which took place immediately on the notice reaching the respondents is a very clear case of the Board taking vindictive action against the petitioners. He secondly submitted that this particular act should be quashed and set aside. 4. The subsequent developments in this case have some consequence. The petitioners counsel has filed on record a whole compilation of the subsequent correspondence and the Govt, Orders which are based on the decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court. He submits that the persons identically situated to the petitioners which includes persons appointed slightly before them and after them in identical situations have all been regularised by virtue of the Govt. direction. He therefore submits that the petitioners will have to be reinstated and they will also be entitled for all benefits as though the order dated April 2, 1988 has not been passed. 5. The respondents have basically relied on the position in law and their learned counsel has vehemently submitted that the flaw in the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners is that these persons had not entered employment through the regular channel prescribed for employment of permanent employees. He states that it has been the case of the Board that these appointments were temporary and ad-hoc appointments and that consequently the rights and privileges that are now claimed are not available to the petitioners. In support of this proposition, learned counsel has relied on two decisions repotted in Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. Vs. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070 and the second decision reported in State of Haryana and others etc. etc. Vs. Piara Singh and others etc. etc., AIR 1992 SC 2130 . In support of this proposition, learned counsel has relied on two decisions repotted in Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. Vs. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 2070 and the second decision reported in State of Haryana and others etc. etc. Vs. Piara Singh and others etc. etc., AIR 1992 SC 2130 . It is true that the Supreme Court has very clearly restated the law in the first of these two decisions wherein it is pointed out that persons who are purely temporary or whose employment is for an ad-hoc period of time cannot be put on par with regular or permanent employees nor can they claim as a matter of right regularization and consequential benefits. In the second of these decisions, the Supreme Court has reported guiding principles that Courts should follow before passing orders directing regulation in cases where it may not really be warranted and particularly where a large number of employees are involved because of the damaging effect that such orders involve. There is no quarrel with regard to the correctness of the proposition of the decisions laid down by the Supreme Court which do apply to all such cases. 6. As far as the cases of present petitioners are concerned, the fact that is distinguishable is that by virtue of the subsequent orders passed by the Govt. the persons who are appointed purely on ad-hoc or temporary basis have been invested with the status of permanent employees in so far as their employments have in fact been regularised and they have been given consequential benefits. This aspect of the matter namely the subsequent developments as far as the present employees of the respondent-Board are concerned distinguishes the petitioners cases. The question therefore arises as to what would have been the status of the petitioners but for the act of discontinuance of the petitioners on April 2, 1988. 7. Had the Board been able to justify the discontinuance on April 2, 1988, this Court would not under any circumstance had interfered in the matter. As the record stands, we do find that none of the other employees who are similarly situated has been discontinued on that date. Secondly it is not a mere coincidence that the two petitioners had been discontinued on April 2, 1988. As the record stands, we do find that none of the other employees who are similarly situated has been discontinued on that date. Secondly it is not a mere coincidence that the two petitioners had been discontinued on April 2, 1988. Counsel for the Board has disputed this position and drawn my attention to the subsequent submission in the reply on behalf of the Board wherein the contention is that the discontinuance was on March 30, 1988. Since the date was of crucial importance, I would have accepted it if the Board substantiated its contention in support thereof. There is also one more tell-tale circumstance namely the fact that the petitioners had addressed through their lawyers a notice on March 30, 1988 duly received by the Board on April 2, 1988 wherein they have specifically pointed out that the petitioners are being denied the benefits which the law entitled them to. Had the petitioners not been in the service of the Board when the notice reached the Board, this fact would immediately have been pointed out by the Board. In the reply when the subsequent notice was addressed in the month of June, the Board would have placed this fact on record. Not having done so, I have no hesitation in holding that the date of discontinuance was in fact on April 2, 1988 as has been recorded in the correspondence and not March 30, 1988 as indicated by the Board. There is also no satisfactory reason to indicate as to why out of the other similarly situated persons only the petitioners who happen to be the persons who addressed the notice were discontinued from employment. That the act was discretionary and that the act was retaliated is completely borne out. If the action is therefore tainted and malafide, there would be no option except to strike it down. It is true that there is no written order for the action of the respondents and the oral order of termination of the respondents is what has been referred to in prayer (A) to the petition. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, the relief asked for by the petitioners will have to be granted. 8. Petitioners learned counsel submits that if the petitioners are entitled to succeed in this petition, they will have to be relegated to the position as on April 2, 1988. In the circumstances of the case, therefore, the relief asked for by the petitioners will have to be granted. 8. Petitioners learned counsel submits that if the petitioners are entitled to succeed in this petition, they will have to be relegated to the position as on April 2, 1988. This has been seriously disputed by the respondents counsel who submits that even if the petitioners were to succeed, that at the highest, they would be entitled to be put back in the position of their colleagues with effect from the date of this order. I am unable to accept the latter submission in view of the earlier findings that have been recorded in this judgment. The inevitable consequence of the quashing of the order of termination would be that the petitioners would have to be reinstated to their original position with effect from April 2, 1988 with all consequential benefits, 9. The petitions accordingly succeed. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. 10. It is clarified that the direction in respect of consequential benefits shall mean that the petitioners stand relegated to the position us though they had not been discontinued as on April 2, 1988. By virtue of the subsequent orders and directions of the Govt. to the respondent-Board whatever regularisation and changes in service conditions of other similarly situated employees have received would accrue to the present petitioners. The respondent- Board shall reinstate the petitioners by virtue of the directions of this Court on or before October 1, 1994 and shall compute and pay to them the arrears due before December 31, 1994, The learned counsel on both sides shall convey the operative part of this order to the Board. 11. Sri Shashidhar Karmade, HCGP. is permitted to file his appearance within two weeks.