(1) THESE appeals are preferred against the order of the government of India in a revision petition filed under Section 36 of the central Excise Act, as it obtained at the relevant time. (2) THE appellant imported certain industrial fittings for 400 KV Transmission Lines in the year 1977. He presented the Bill of Entry on 26/2/1977. He classified the said imported goods under the then obtaining tariff item 73.33/40 and paid the appropriate duty thereon. The duty payable under the said tariff item at that time was 100% duty and 20% additional duty. Having paid the duty, he cleared the goods. Subsequently, the appellant says, he entered into correspondence with the Customs Authorities regarding the appropriate tariff item under which the said goods ought to have been classified. He says that he received the letter dated 26/10/1978 from the authorities, which according to the appellant, supports his contention that the said goods must be subjected to duty not under tariff item 73.33/40 but under tariff item 85.18/27 which attracts a far lower rate of duty. (3) BE that as it may, the appellant filed an application for refund on 9/10/1978, even before receiving the letter dated 26/10/1978, which, of course, has not been produced before us. The application was filed admittedly beyond the period of six months prescribed by Section 27 of the Customs Act, 1962. The Assistant Collector rejected the same on the ground that the application was barred under Section 27. The appeal before the Collector met the same fate as also the revision before the government. (4) IN these appeals it is submitted by Shri A.K. Ganguli, learned counsel for the appellant that the period of six months prescribed under Section 27(1 applies only where the duty is paid in pursuance of an order of assessment. Learned counsel submitted that in this case, there was no order of assessment as such, and therefore, the period of limitation did never begin to run. The second submission urged by Mr Ganguli is that by virtue of Section 72 of the Contract the bar of limitation contained in Section 27 cannot be invoked by the authorities to reject the appellants application. We are unable to see substance in either of these contentions. The second submission urged by Mr Ganguli is that by virtue of Section 72 of the Contract the bar of limitation contained in Section 27 cannot be invoked by the authorities to reject the appellants application. We are unable to see substance in either of these contentions. (5) SECTION 45(1 of the Customs Act provides that "save as otherwise provided in any law for the time being in force, all imported goods unloaded in a customs area shall remain in the custody of such person as may be approved by the Collector of Customs until they are cleared for home consumption or are warehoused or are transhipped in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VIII". (6) SECTION 46 provides for filing of the bill of entry. It says that the importer of any goods other than goods intended for transit or transhipment, shall make entry thereof by presenting to the proper officer a bill of entry for home consumption or warehousing in the prescribed form. (7) SECTION 17(1 says that if an importer has filed a bill of entry under Section 46, the goods shall be examined and tested by the proper officer. Sub- section (2 of Section 17 says that after such examination and testing, the duty, if any, leviable on such goods shall save as otherwise provided in Section 85 be assessed. (8) SS. (1 of Section 47 says that where the proper officer is satisfied that any goods entered for home consumption are not prohibited goods and the importer has paid the duty and any charges payable under this Act in respect of the same, the proper officer may permit clearance of goods only after the duty assessed is paid along with other charges, if any, payable according to law. (9) READING S. 47 and 17 together, it is clear beyond any doubt, that as soon as the bill of entry is filed, the proper officer examines the goods, tests them, assesses the proper duty and permits clearance of goods only after the duty and other charges, if any, are paid. In the scheme of the Act, there is no room for contending that any goods will be allowed to be cleared without assessment of the duty, whether provisional or final, as the case may be. In the scheme of the Act, there is no room for contending that any goods will be allowed to be cleared without assessment of the duty, whether provisional or final, as the case may be. (10) NOW it may be noticed that the Act does not prescribe any particular form in which the order of assessment is to be made. In the very nature of things, no formal order of assessment can be expected when there is no dispute as to the classification or the rate of duty. No formal order can be expected in such a case, it is more like across-the-counter affair. In the present case it may be reiterated that the appellant himself classified the goods under tariff item No. 73.33/40 and paid the duty at the rate applicable thereunder. At that stage, he did not raise any dispute either as to classification or as to right of duty applicable. Hence, there was no occasion for passing a formal order since there was no lis at that stage. The bill of entry presented by the appellant was signed, signifying approval by the assessing officer. That itself is an order of assessment in such a situation. We are, therefore, not prepared to agree that there is no order of assessment in this case, and therefore, the limitation prescribed in Section 27 did not begin to run. Section 27 is emphatic in language. It says that an application for refund of duty shall be made before the expiry of six months from the date on which the duty was paid. In the face of this provision, the authorities under the Act, including the government of India, had no option but to dismiss the appellants application. This is also the view taken by this court in Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. v. Union of India. (11) NOW coming to the second submission of Mr A.K. Ganguli, it must be seen that the application made by the appellant was under Section 27. The authorities under the Act must necessarily operate within the four corners of the Act. They have no option but to reject an application filed beyond six months. Learned counsel, however, brought to our notice a decision of this court in Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India. The authorities under the Act must necessarily operate within the four corners of the Act. They have no option but to reject an application filed beyond six months. Learned counsel, however, brought to our notice a decision of this court in Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. v. Union of India. In the said decision, it has been observed that where duty has been paid under a mistake within the meaning of Section 17(1(c) of the Limitation Act, 1963, the excess amount paid becomes refundable by virtue of Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. Firstly, this decision was rendered under the central Excises and Salt Act and it pertains to the situation obtaining in 1976. Above all, the decision does not refer to any provision of the central Excise Act prescribing a period of limitation as is done by Section 27 of the Customs Act. We cannot understand the said decision as saying that even where there is a specific provision prescribing a period of limitation, it can be ignored by invoking Section 72 of the Contract Act. In fact, this appears to be the view briefly indicated in Miles India Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs. We may, in this connection, notice Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh v. Doaba Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. S. Mukherjee, J., as he then was, speaking for the bench made the following observation in para 6 which may be quoted iin full, in view of the fact that it puts forward another aspect of the controversy relating to refund : "IT appears that where the duty has been levied without the authority of law or without reference to any statutory authority or the specific provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder have no application, the decision will be guided by the general law and the date of limitation would be the starting point when the mistake or the error comes to light. But in making claims for refund before the departmental authority, an assessee is bound within four corners of the statute and the period of limitation prescribed in the central Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder must be adhered to. The authorities functioning under the Act are bound by the provisions of the Act. If the proceedings are taken under the Act by the department, the provisions of limitation prescribed in the Act will prevail. The authorities functioning under the Act are bound by the provisions of the Act. If the proceedings are taken under the Act by the department, the provisions of limitation prescribed in the Act will prevail. It may, however, be open to the department to initiate proceedings in the civil court for recovery of the amount due to the department in case when such a remedy is open on the ground that the money received by the assessee was not in the nature of refund. This was the view taken by the tribunal in a previous decision in the case of Miles India Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs, but it was assailed before this court. The appeal was withdrawn. This court observed that the Customs authorities, acting under the Act, were justified in disallowing the claim for refund as they were bound by the period of limitation provided therefor in the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. If really the payment of duty was made under a mistake of law, the party might seek recourse to such alternative remedy as it might be advised. See the observations of this court in Miles India Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Customs." ACCORDING to the principle of this decision as well, the appellants application must be held to have been rightly dismissed. (12) THE appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs. (13) MR A.K. Ganguli wanted us to make an observation that the appellant should be free to adopt such remedies as are open to him in law. It is obvious that this order does not preclude the appellant from adopting such remedies as are open to it in law.